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Following state-building campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, the UK has 
increasingly eschewed large-scale intervention in favour of local proxy forces. 
Whilst this strategy might appeal to the war-weary and cash strapped 
interventionist, frequent use of military capacity building as a tool of foreign 
policy inevitably raises questions about the accountability of those local forces 
being trained. This thesis examines the exportation of Western concepts of civil-
military relations into the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), 
carried out by the British-led International Military Advisory and Training Team 
(IMATT) during intervention and post-conflict stabilisation in Sierra Leone. It 
argues that external interventionists can reshape local military culture, to 
promote both democratic civil-military norms and professional military 
effectiveness, but only through extensive institutional change. In Sierra Leone, 
IMATT attempted to change the organisational culture of the RSLAF by 
reforming its institutional mechanisms for socialisation, training, education and 
promotion. By inculcating a new normative ethos in a cohort of junior RSLAF 
officers, IMATT sought to promulgate cultural change throughout the military via 
a structured process of intra-service competition and generational replacement. 
This novel blend of internal and external processes of military change 
challenges existing scholarship on military innovation and adaptation, 
advancing our understanding of the relationship between military culture, 
military change, and external intervention. However, this process of institutional 
redevelopment and cultural change in the RSLAF proved to be both heavily 
contested and deeply political, ultimately leading to partial results. 
Consequently, IMATT’s experience of RSLAF reform holds important 
implications for the study of civil-military relations and security sector reform, 
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1. Introduction: Building Other People’s Armies 
 
‘In the management of native corps, ignorance of the language is attended with 
many and great disadvantages. The officer is in that case obliged to employ some 
native soldier as an interpreter; and those of this class who have, in menial stations, 
learned to speak a little English, are generally the most unworthy of confidence.’1 
Major Johnston, Third Ceylon Regiment, recalling operations in Ceylon in 1804. 
‘it was the nuance of training and our attempts to justify doing things “our way” 
which frequently got lost in translation…If you had a guy like Nawroz, whom we 
were allocated at the last minute for our first big op, who was too young, too 
impressionable and too nervous, you never knew if what you were saying was 
actually being translated…I later realised he would render my instructions into what 
he thought the ANA wanted to hear or, worse still, mistranslate ANA instructions he 
didn’t like the sound of.’2 
Captain Hennessey, Grenadier Guards, recalling operations in Afghanistan in 2007. 
 
The practical difficulties of training foreign military manpower are not new. 
However, at the end of the Cold War this activity took on a new meaning for 
Western interventionists. Historically, the West had raised or trained foreign 
military forces to maintain colonial empires, or else to create local proxies as a 
tool of power projection. But after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the West began to 
view military support to foreign states as a tool of liberal peacebuilding. Military 
training missions and defence reform projects were now expected to produce 
democratically acceptable local armies, not just militarily capable ones. The 
concept of Security Sector Reform (SSR) was born, envisaged as a means of 
underpinning liberal democratic peacebuilding in fragile (post-)conflict states. 
SSR programmes were subsequently conducted as a result of civil conflict, 
democratisation or international intervention in contexts as varied as Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, South Sudan, Rwanda, South Africa, post-unification Germany 
and Eastern Europe.3 
Yet by the second decade of the new millennium, this concept faced 
sustained scrutiny. The campaigns of America’s “Global War on Terror” saw 
                                                          
1 Major Johnston, Narrative of the Operations of a Detachment in an Expedition to Candy, in the 
Island of Ceylon, in the Year 1804 (Dublin, James McGlashan, 1854), pp. 100-1. 
2 Patrick Hennessey, Kandak: Fighting with Afghans (London, Allen Lane, 2012), p. 51. 
3 Roy Licklider (ed.), New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars 
(Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 2014); Lesley Anne Warner, ‘Armed-Group 
Amnesty and Military Integration in South Sudan’, RUSI Journal, 158:6 (2013), pp. 40-7; Marco 
Jowell, ‘Cohesion Through Socialization: Liberation, Tradition and Modernity in the Rwanda 
Defence Force (RDF)’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 8:2 (2014), pp. 278-93; John 
Duffield, World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions and Germany 
Security Policy after Unification (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1998); Peter Albrecht 




increasing use of SSR as a means of stabilising new democracies abroad, but 
with increasingly less success. During “de-Baathification” in Iraq, the US-led 
coalition disbanded the country’s existing armed forces in favour of a new 
military apparatus. Yet this fledgling Iraqi Army failed to live up to the ideals of 
SSR, being neither militarily effective nor particularly supportive of good 
democratic governance. The new Iraqi Government resisted US efforts to 
incorporate Sunni elements, and ultimately the Iraqi Army became a tool of Shia 
dominance rather than a symbol of a new, pan-sectarian nation. Faced with a 
reinvigorated Sunni insurgency, the Iraqi Army dramatically collapsed in 2014, 
abandoning northern Iraq in the process.4 In Afghanistan, the new Afghan 
National Army (ANA) formed the central pillar of the Western coalition’s 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) strategy for disengagement and 
withdrawal. Yet despite a decade of capacity building, the ANA remains 
militarily weak and politically suspect, necessitating continued Western military 
aid to prop-up the country’s ailing democracy.5 In Mali, US Africa Command 
was publically embarrassed after the Malian officers it had trained to fight the 
Islamist-backed Tuareg rebellion subsequently overthrew their own government 
in 2012.6 Having intervened in Libya to help depose Mummar Gadhafi, the 
British Government agreed to help build a new Libyan national army in 
Bassingbourn, Cambridgeshire, but the programme was abruptly wound down 
                                                          
4 Martin Chulov, ‘Sons of Iraq Turned the Tide for the US. Now They Pay the Price’, The 
Guardian, 13 May 2010, online at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/13/sons-of-iraq-
withdrawal-rebels, accessed on 27/01/2016; Martin Chulov, Fazel Hawramy & Spencer 
Ackerman, ‘Iraq Army Capitulates to Isis Militants in Four Cities’, The Guardian, 12 June 2014, 
online at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/11/mosul-isis-gunmen-middle-east-
states, accessed 27/07/16; Philip Dermer, ‘The “Sons of Iraq,” Abandoned by Their American 
Allies’, The Wall Street Journal, 1 July 2014, online at http://www.wsj.com/articles/philip-dermer-
the-sons-of-iraq-abandoned-by-their-american-allies-1404253303, accessed on 27/01/2016; 
Ranj Alaaldin, ‘Iraq: Growth of the Shia militia’, BBC News, 17 April 2015, online at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32349379, accessed 27/01/2016; Toby Dodge, 
Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism (Abingdon, Routledge, 2012); Ches Thurber, ‘Militias 
as Sociopolitical Movements: Lessons from Iraq’s Armed Shia Groups’, Small Wars & 
Insurgencies, 25:5-6 (2014), pp. 900-23. 
5 Antonio Giustozzi, ‘Auxiliary Force or National Army? Afghanistan’s “ANA” and the Counter-
Insurgency Effort, 2002-2006’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 18:1 (2007), pp. 45-67; Antonio 
Giustozzi, ‘The Afghan National Army: Unwarranted Hope?’, RUSI Journal, 154:6 (2009), pp. 
36-42; Obaid Younossi, Peter Dahl Thruelsen, Jonathan Vaccaro, Jerry M. Sollinger & Brian 
Grady, The Long March: Building an Afghan National Army (Santa Monica, CA, RAND, 2009); 
Adam Grissom, ‘Shoulder-to-Shoulder Fighting Different Wars: NATO Advisors and Military 
Adaptation in the Afghan National Army, 2001-2011’, in Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga & James A. 
Russell (eds.), Military Adaptation in Afghanistan (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 
2013), pp. 263-87. 
6 US AFRICOM, ‘AFRICOM Commander Addresses Concerns, Potential Solutions in Mali’, 





following accusations that Libyan soldiers were perpetrating rapes and sexual 
assaults in the local town.7 
The difficulty of building other people’s armies during recent interventions 
has proved immense. General Petraeus, commanding training efforts in Iraq in 
2004, likened the endeavour to ‘constructing an aircraft in flight – while being 
shot at.’8 Yet the poor record of SSR during these recent international 
interventions is particularly noteworthy, given the long histories of successfully 
producing local armed forces possessed by the intervening Western states. 
This is particularly true for Britain. During the Napoleonic Wars, the British Army 
successfully redeveloped the Portuguese military under the tutelage of the 
British Marshal Beresford.9 During the Raj, the British Indian Army became 
perhaps the most extensive and notable colonial military force in existence, and 
eventually developed a complex system of regimental and ethnic identity, 
recruitment and racial categorisation to underpin British control of Indian military 
manpower.10 More recently, the British Army supplied loan service and 
contracted officers to the Sultan of Oman’s (largely mercenary) army during the 
Cold War, defeating the communist-inspired Dhofar insurgency and tacitly 
supporting a palace coup to improve its fighting effectiveness.11 However, such 
cases are primarily examples of Military Capacity Building (MCB), and so differ 
                                                          
7 British Government, ‘Libyan Armed Forces to be Trained in UK’, 9 July 2013, online at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/libyan-armed-forces-to-be-trained-in-uk, accessed 
27/06/16; David Keller, ‘Bassingbourn Libyan Troops “Threw Village Upside Down”’, BBC News, 
15 May 2015, online at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-cambridgeshire-32687137, 
accessed 27/06/16; Nadia Khomami, ‘Libyan Soldiers who Assaulted Women at Army Base 
Seek Asylum in UK’, The Guardian, 30 September 2015, online at 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/sep/30/libyan-soldiers-assaulted-women-seek-
asylum-uk, accessed on 27/06/16; Mark Tran, ‘Two Libyan Soldiers Jailed for Raping Man in 
Cambridge’, The Guardian, 15 May 2015, online at https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2015/may/15/two-libyan-soldiers-jailed-for-raping-man-in-cambridge, accessed 27/06/16. 
8 Cited in David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 20. 
9 Harold Livermore, ‘Beresford and the Reform of the Portuguese Army’, in Paddy Griffith (ed.), 
A History of the Peninsular War, Volume IX: Modern Studies of the War in Spain and Portugal, 
1808-1814 (London, Greenhill, 1999), pp. 121-44; Malyn Newitt & Martin Robson, Lord 
Beresford and British Intervention in Portugal, 1807-1820 (Lisbon, ICS, 2003); Martin Robson, 
Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: Alliances and Diplomacy in 
Economic Maritime Conflict (London, I.B. Tauris, 2011). 
10 David Killingray & David Omissi (eds.), Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the 
Colonial Powers, c.1700-1964 (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1999); Kaushik Roy, 
‘The Construction of Regiments in the Indian Army: 1859-1913’, War in History, 8:2 (2001), pp. 
127-48; Tarak Barkawi, ‘Subaltern Soldiers: Eurocentricism and the Nation-State in the Combat 
Motivation Debates’, in Anthony King (ed.), Frontline: Combat and Cohesion in the Twenty-First 
Century (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 24-45. 
11 Ranulph Fiennes, Where Soldiers Fear to Tread (London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1975); Peter 
Thwaites, Muscat Command (London, Leo Cooper, 1995); John E. Peterson, Oman's 
Insurgencies: The Sultanate's Struggle for Supremacy (London, Saqi, 2007). 
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somewhat from SSR, in that they typically lacked the latter’s liberal normative 
political aspirations. 
Yet even as Western approaches in Iraq and Afghanistan floundered, the 
British military experienced some notable success in SSR elsewhere. In 2000, 
Britain intervened militarily in Sierra Leone’s civil war to stabilise its nascent 
democratic government. The British recognised that the Sierra Leonean military 
itself had significantly contributed to the country’s decade-long insurgency; both 
in its military impotence on the battlefield, and through its repeated political 
interjections. Indeed, in the years between colonial independence in 1961 and 
British intervention, the country was subjected to at least seven military coups 
or coup attempts. Subsequently, the British-led International Military Advisory 
and Training Team (IMATT) set about creating a new, militarily effective and 
democratically accountable armed force. By 2013, the rebuilt Republic of Sierra 
Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) appeared dramatically transformed. It had 
supported three democratic elections, providing substantial logistical and 
security support during two, including one which saw a transition of power 
between the incumbent government and the political opposition.12 It had also 
deployed internationally on peacekeeping operations in Darfur and Somalia, 
and would go on to spearhead the country’s emergency response to the West 
African Ebola Pandemic, displaying a degree of military effectiveness it had so 
evidently lacked during the country’s own civil war.13 Thus, IMATT’s experience 
of reforming the RSLAF is a notable outlier in recent examples of externally-led 
defence reform. 
This thesis will examine the process of military change in Sierra Leone. It 
seeks to understand how and why IMATT succeeded in producing normative 
cultural change in the RSLAF, when similar Western endeavours elsewhere so 
evidently foundered. It seeks to address persistent and fundamental questions 
                                                          
12 David H. Ucko, ‘Can Limited Intervention Work? Lessons from Britain’s Success Story in 
Sierra Leone’, Journal of Strategic studies (2015), pp. 1-31, online first at 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390.2015.1110695?needAccess=true, 
accessed on 05/09/16; Albrecht & Jackson, Security Sector Transformation in Sierra Leone, op. 
cit.; Ashlee Godwin & Cathy Haenlein, ‘Security-Sector Reform in Sierra Leone: The UK 
Assistance Mission in Transition’, RUSI Journal, 158:6 (2013), pp. 30-9; Peter Albrecht & Paul 
Jackson, Securing Sierra Leone 1997-2013: Defence, Diplomacy and Development in Action 
(London, Routledge, 2014). 
13 Peter Albrecht & Cathy Haenlein, ‘Sierra Leone's Post-Conflict Peacekeepers’, RUSI Journal, 
160:1 (2015), pp. 26-36; Ashlee Godwin & Cathy Haenlein, ‘Learning From Ebola in Sierra 
Leone’, RUSI Newsbrief, 26 January 2015, online at 
https://rusi.org/publication/newsbrief/learning-ebola-sierra-leone, accessed 27/06/16. 
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about the conduct of externally-led defence reform, which have significant 
implications for academic and policy understandings of SSR’s viability in 
peacebuilding, and its strategic utility to liberal interventionists. In particular, this 
thesis will address the following research questions: 
1. Can external interventionists create genuine cultural change in foreign 
armed forces?  
2. How does the interaction between external actors and internal military 
processes produce or inhibit military change?  
3. What is the relationship between military effectiveness and military 
accountability during such processes; that is, how do SSR and MCB 
interact? 
The process of military change pursued by IMATT in the RSLAF provides an 
opportunity to explore how externally-led military change can succeed, rather 
than why it can fail. As such, this study aims to shine light on the possibilities, 
as well as the limitations, for building other people’s armies. Moreover, by 
examining the case of the RSLAF, this thesis will offer a notable contribution to 
the study of military change more broadly, by providing new insights into its 
causes, conduct and consequences in Sierra Leone. 
A number of explanations for this incongruity of outcomes have already 
been advanced, but with little consensus. The British Army’s own guide to its 
lessons learnt in Sierra Leone concluded that IMATT’s success stemmed from 
the small size of the country and its armed forces, and thus the relative 
simplicity of the undertaking.14 Equally, in both Afghanistan and Sierra Leone, 
the West effectively intervened in an on-going civil war. In Sierra Leone, 
however, the British military had far more success in permanently altering the 
balance of power on the ground, enabling the integration of formerly warring 
combatants from both sides into the new national army.15 Yet even here, 
Albrecht and Jackson have concluded that the advances seen in the RSLAF 
may yet prove illusory, arguing that to a significant extent they have been reliant 
                                                          
14 British Army, ‘Sierra Leone Case Study: The British Army’s Contribution 1997 – 2015’, 
Warfare Branch (Warminster, February 2016), p. 44. 
15 Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs, ‘Bringing the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly into the Peace Fold: 
The Republic of Sierra Leone’s Armed Forces after the Lomé Peace Agreement’, in Licklider, 
op. cit., pp. 195-212. 
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on the continued presence of Western observers – just as in Afghanistan.16 
Ultimately, each case of international intervention is subject to its own unique 
circumstances, and outcomes are inevitably influenced by whether contextual 
conditions are conducive to success or failure. Yet IMATT’s relative success in 
changing the RSLAF – notwithstanding Albrecht and Jackson’s concerns – 
cannot be explained by context alone, not least because a number of earlier 
attempts at defence reform in Sierra Leone had already failed. A closer 
examination of the conduct of military change during international interventions 
is required, specifically, how the process of change led to the results it did in a 
successful example like Sierra Leone. 
Relatively little theoretical attention has been paid to the problem of 
externally-directed military change, although the use of military training missions 
as a tool of international relations has received some scholarly treatment. 
Focusing on MCB, Stoker argued that such missions have typically been 
conducted in support of the diplomatic, economic or security interests of the 
intervening (or donor) state.17 In nineteenth-century Chile, Prussia deployed 
military advisors to train and advise the Chilean armed forces with relative 
success, while at the same time encouraging sales of German armaments.18 
The interwar French mission to Poland privileged French naval exports to such 
a degree, that in Stoker’s view, France had actually undermined the security of 
her ally.19 Consequently, a number of recipients of military aid have attempted 
to ensure that Western military training was, as far as possible, provided on 
their own terms. In Mehmed Ali’s Egypt, for example, Western trainers 
appeared more like mercenaries hired to implement change than agents of 
Western intervention.20 Equally, the adoption of Western military practices in a 
number of non-Western states during the nineteenth century has been 
described as a process of strategic emulation, in which the drivers of change lay 
primarily in the ambitions of the recipient; something which helps explain the 
                                                          
16 Albrecht & Jackson, Securing Sierra Leone, op. cit. 
17 Donald Stoker, ‘The History and Evolution of Foreign Military Advising and Assistance, 1815–
2007’, in Donald Stoker (ed.), Military Advising and Assistance: From Mercenaries to 
Privatization, 1815-2007 (Abingdon, Routledge, 2008), pp. 1-10. 
18 William F. Sater, ‘The Impact of Foreign Advisors on Chile’s Armed Forces, 1810-2005’, in 
ibid., pp. 26-41. 
19 Donald Stoker, ‘Buying Influence, Selling Arms, Undermining a Friend: The French Naval 
Mission to Poland and the Development of the Polish Navy, 1923-1932’, in ibid., pp. 42-60. 
20 John P. Dunn, ‘Missions or Mercenaries? European Military Advisors in Mehmed Ali’s Egypt, 
1815-1848’, in ibid., pp. 11-25. 
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uneven military modernisation of Ottoman Turkey in comparison to Meiji 
Japan.21 While these cases offer some insight into the complexities of 
increasing local military effectiveness, they highlight how donors have 
historically lacked normative preferences about the political impact of local 
military change, providing it furthered their strategic agendas. 
In cases where military aid programmes did pursue donors’ overt political 
preferences about the form of local government, their success was typically 
limited. In nineteenth and early twentieth century Afghanistan, for instance, both 
the British and the Turks supported Afghan leaders attempting to create a 
centralised state by training a nascent Afghan army. As Cronin observed, these 
efforts fell foul of the strong conservative, regional and ethnic dynamics in 
Afghan society, exacerbating tensions between the centre and the periphery, 
modernity and tradition, and resulting in limited tangible military improvement.22 
Similar US attempts to export positivist military and governmental ideologies to 
their periphery in the Americas during the interwar years also ultimately failed.23 
A recent RAND study for the US Government concluded that building partner 
states’ military capacity works best when both parties share the same political 
objectives and vision.24 Yet even here, little attention has been paid to the 
conduct of externally-led military change, and even less consensus exists 
among the few scholarly forays into the field. For example, Nilsson and Kovacs’ 
comparative study of post-conflict military change in Sierra Leone and Liberia 
noted that the British approach in Sierra Leone was far more reformist than the 
US-led strategy in Liberia, which, much as in Iraq, radically disbanded existing 
institutions and started again from scratch. Yet the pair concluded that while 
each approach had its merits and risks, both might prove equally 
unsustainable.25 Conversely, one British military assessment of IMATT in Sierra 
                                                          
21 Emily O. Goldman, ‘The Spread of Western Models to Ottoman Turkey and Meiji Japan’, in 
Theo Farrell & Terry Terriff, The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology 
(Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 41-68. 
22 Stephanie Cronin, Armies and State-Building in the Modern Middle East: Politics, Nationalism 
and Military Reform (London, I.B. Tauris, 2014), pp. 83-132. 
23 Eric R. Rittinger, ‘Exporting Professionalism: US Efforts to Reform the Armed Forces in the 
Dominican Republic and Nicaragua, 1916-1933’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 26:1 (2015), pp. 
136-157. 
24 Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, Stephanie Young, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Joe 
Hogler & Christine Leah, What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What 
Circumstances? (Santa Monica, CA, RAND, 2013). 
25 Desirée Nilsson & Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs, ‘Different Paths of Reconstruction: Military 




Leone by an officer who served there, Lieutenant Colonel Simpson, asserted 
that change resulted from the process of British military mentoring, which he 
described as akin to ‘moral suasion’.26 Yet in his ethnographic examination of 
mentoring in the Afghan government during ISAF’s intervention, Rosén 
concluded that mentoring only really reflected the interventionists’ philosophy of 
‘neoliberal governmentality’, and remained decidedly agnostic as to its 
efficacy.27 
A substantial body of literature examining the causes and conduct of 
military change in Western armed forces does exist. Here, scholars like Posen 
initially assumed that armed forces are, by their nature, resistant to radical 
change, and so sought to understand how and why this phenomenon occurs. 
The relative importance of civilian intervention into the military organisation, the 
structure of civilian governmental institutions, and competition within and 
between services were all subsequently advanced in explanation.28 Studies 
have equally highlighted the importance of the ingrained codes of conduct, 
behaviour and attitude which permeate a military and can influence its proclivity 
to change – even over civilian preferences or battlefield pressures.29 More 
recently, attention has turned to processes of adaptation during warfare, which 
can lead to the adoption or refinement of new military practices and paradigms 
from the grass roots of the military hierarchy rather than the top.30 These 
various concepts provide a useful insight into the dynamics of change in military 
organisations, and underline the importance of process in understanding the 
nature and presence (or otherwise) of military change. In of themselves, 
                                                          
26 Lieutenant Colonel Harold Simpson MBE, ‘UK Sponsored Stabilisation and Reform in Sierra 
Leone 2002-2013: A Unique Case or a Template for Future Intervention(s)?’, Sandhurst 
Occasional Papers No. 19 (Camberley, 2014). 
27 Frederik Ferdinand Rosén, ‘No Words will Deliver Anything: Coaching and Mentoring as 
Neoliberal Governance Strategy in the Afghan State Administration’, Journal of Intervention and 
Statebuilding, 5:2 (2011), pp. 154-5. 
28 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the 
World Wars (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1984); Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the 
Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1991); 
Deborah D. Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars 
(Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1994). 
29 Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars 
(Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1997); Theo Farrell, ‘World culture and the Irish 
Army, 1922-1942’, in Farrell & Terriff, op. cit., pp. 69-90. 
30 Adam Grissom, ‘The Future of Military innovation Studies’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 29:5 
(2006), pp. 910-3; Theo Farrell, ‘Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in 
Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006–2009’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 33:4 (2010), pp. 567-
594; Robert T. Foley, Stuart Griffin & Helen McCartney, ‘“Transformation in contact”: Learning 
the Lessons of Modern War’, International Affairs, 87:2 (2011), pp. 253-70. 
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however, they shed little light on how external interventionists may encourage 
change in foreign armed forces. 
Nonetheless, the literature on national military change has significant 
potential to inform theoretical understandings of similar externally-led 
processes, as Grissom has recently highlighted. In a notable attempt to bridge 
the literatures on military change and MCB, Grissom examined Western 
attempts to develop the ANA during the Western intervention and counter-
insurgency (COIN) campaign in Afghanistan.31 Afghanistan witnessed several 
phases of internationally-sponsored army building following Western 
intervention in 2001. The first coalition attempt to produce a new central army 
for the Afghan Government saw the British Army raise a Western-style multi-
ethnic infantry battalion to secure Kabul. Called the Afghan National Guard, this 
effort ultimately proved abortive.32 The subsequent creation of an all-volunteer, 
multi-ethnic national army was driven by the West, somewhat over the top of 
Afghan political opposition.33 As the Taliban insurgency deepened across the 
country, the ANA was significantly expanded, and subsequently provided with 
increasingly complex Western weapons and equipment, including vehicles, 
armour, artillery and an air force. The rapid expansion of the ANA to around 
170,000 by 2011 was accompanied by significant coalition investment in ANA 
institutions; first those pertaining to recruitment and training, and subsequently 
logistical support.34 Indeed, the rapid growth of the ANA in the size, shape and 
structure of a modern Western army has been described variously as 
‘isomorphism’ and ‘coercive emulation’.35 This institutional development was 
accompanied by extensive use of ISAF training teams to mentor ANA units.36 
Yet the combat performance of the ANA remained abysmally low. By the end of 
2011, ISAF judged that two thirds of ANA units were still incapable of operating 
without coalition military support, despite having already watered down the 
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metrics of operational capability.37 Such was the tactical and institutional under-
development of the ANA, that Giustozzi argued that it remained little more than 
a client auxiliary force for ISAF in the imperialist tradition.38 
Informed by literature on military adaptation, Grissom concluded that the 
very presence of international forces mentoring the ANA precluded any 
profound indigenous military change. Instead, the presence of large numbers of 
ISAF troops, typically better prepared and more willing to fight than the ANA, 
effectively insulated the Afghan military from the adaptive pressures of combat 
which might otherwise have driven improvements in combat effectiveness. Such 
change as was carried out was the product of reforms imposed externally by 
ISAF and implemented from the top down. Grissom found that even these 
reforms proved ineffective, however. Competing political and warlordic factions 
in the ANA were able to subvert ISAF-directed reforms of the Afghan military, 
largely because the presence of ISAF combat troops insulated the ANA from 
existential levels of military threat. Thus, where externally-desired changes 
offered advantages to competing elites within the ANA, they were easily 
implemented, but the complex patron-client power structures of the ANA 
(mirroring wider Afghan society) served to undermine the utility of changes, as 
rival political networks worked covertly to appropriate and apportion the spoils of 
Western reform. This held true even when ISAF pursued military changes that 
were somewhat inappropriate to the situation in Afghanistan – such as the 
mechanisation of the ANA – but which still provided opportunities for 
enrichment. However, when ISAF attempted to implement changes that would 
threaten the existing power dynamics of the ANA – such as by increasing 
accountability and transparency, or by formalising certain institutional processes 
– reforms were actively resisted by military elites and ultimately failed, despite 
the improvements in military effectiveness such changes might bring.39 
Grissom concluded that externally-led top-down change in the ANA 
proved incapable of displacing the pernicious but ingrained power structures of 
the ANA, even as the force appeared to mimic Western military organisation 
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and structure. Simultaneously, the force was insulated from the adaptive 
pressures of combat – which might have impelled change from below in order to 
improve combat performance – by the presence of the very international troops 
demanding ANA transformation.40 Indeed, the pressures of combat acted 
unevenly on ISAF compared to the ANA, limiting ISAF’s ability to pursue 
change in the ANA. As one senior British officer serving in the US command 
responsible for training the ANA observed, ‘the imperative was the training and 
the education of the force [the ANA]. Unfortunately the operational imperative 
was to fight and win battles, and there’s always a tension between those two 
things’. Consequently, the ISAF focus was not on the profound institutional 
development of the ANA, but ‘to get people through the system and trained as 
quickly as possible’ for the fight.41 Grissom concluded that externally-directed 
defence reforms will inevitably be unsuccessful, unless the West’s desired 
military changes work with prevailing social and political systems rather than 
attempt to displace them – as the concept of SSR implicitly does.42 
This explanation of limited ANA development is important, because it 
suggests that the prospects for externally-led military change are a product of 
an interaction between existing theoretical understandings of national military 
change, and the political and social context in which interventionists act. 
Moreover, it suggests that when local military and political cultures are not 
receptive to change, this interaction is ultimately flawed. Yet this observation is 
itself problematic. Grissom described the complex networks of patron-client 
relationships prevalent in the ANA as a ‘limited access order’,43 a system 
elsewhere known as neo-patrimonialism.44 He found that the lack of adaptive 
pressure on the ANA meant that ISAF was unable to displace these practices, 
and so the ANA’s organisational culture precluded fundamental change. The 
Sierra Leonean military displayed equally neo-patrimonial tendencies,45 and 
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arguably, was equally insulated from adaptive pressure. Yet the RSLAF 
displayed a far greater degree of military change than the ANA. This 
discrepancy challenges Grissom’s understanding of externally-led military 
change. Such incongruity of outcomes in ostensibly similar conditions raises a 
number of important questions, with potentially dramatic implications for our 
understanding of how military change actually occurs in such circumstances. 
Namely, how did IMATT successfully produce military change in the RSLAF? 
How do processes of externally-directed military change successfully interact 
with – and in turn affect – local military and political cultures? And what is the 
relationship between top-down reforms and bottom-up adaptation during such 
processes? Can other theories of Western military change usefully explain 
externally-led military change in Sierra Leone? 
This thesis seeks to advance current understandings of externally-led 
military change by contributing new insights into the relationship between 
external intervention and local military culture, with potentially profound 
implications for the wider scholarship on military change and innovation. By 
examining the relatively successful process of externally-led military change in 
the RSLAF, this thesis will develop Grissom’s concept of ‘extrinsic’ military 
change. In so doing, it will compare the experience of IMATT’s interaction with 
the RSLAF against the extant literature on military change, adaptation and 
innovation, in order to explain this incongruity of outcomes. While Grissom’s 
study of ISAF reform in the ANA acts as a starting point for the development of 
theoretical concepts, and provides a useful comparator, IMATT’s reform of the 
RSLAF presents an opportunity to examine these concepts in a new context. 
The initial literature on military transformation largely examined peacetime 
military change, and recent studies of adaptation have focused on wartime 
military change. However, IMATT’s reform of the RSLAF largely occurred in a 
fragile post-conflict period of political transition which bridged these two 
environments. Indeed, the uniqueness of this transitional environment has led to 
calls for a new policy concept of ‘Security Sector Stabilisation’, to fill the 
doctrinal gap between active warfighting and later post-conflict SSR in a 
                                                                                                                                                                          




permissive environment.46 Thus, understanding the changes seen in the 
RSLAF’s organisational culture during the period of IMATT’s intervention will 
significantly advance that state of current theory on military change, by notably 
providing new insights into the role of local military culture and external 
intervention during such processes. 
Understanding how externally-led military change can successfully occur 
is all the more important, given the significant potential implications for Western 
policy on international intervention. The end of the Cold War appeared to 
represent the triumph of liberal democracy, and scholars like Fukuyama 
heralded the coming ‘liberal moment’ and ‘the end of history’.47 Yet, at the same 
time, this liberal vision appeared beset by new wave of disorder and state 
collapse prompted by disintegration of the Warsaw Pact. Kaplan’s influential 
essay ‘The Coming Anarchy’ predicted a future of intra-state conflict, organised 
crime, economic scarcity and societal collapse, and prominently cited Sierra 
Leone’s raging civil war as an example of times to come.48 Observing the rising 
tide of ethnic conflict in the Balkans, Kaldor concluded that a fundamentally new 
form of war had emerged, characterised by identity politics, organised crime 
and sub-state violence.49 Concern at this spike in insurgency, civil wars, and 
state failure led to a flurry of academic in interest in ethnic conflict and civil 
war.50 It also led to the development of the concept of ‘liberal peacebuilding’. 
Liberal peacebuilding sought to address sub-state instability overseas by 
exporting (or re-building) capable state institutions in the liberal Western model. 
It thus reflected both Western ideological confidence in the post-Cold War 
status quo, and Western concern at the impact of instability in the international 
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system. It was seen as a logical response to the perceived causes of instability 
overseas: the absence or ineffectiveness of state institutions. In line with 
Western perceptions of good governance, theorists concurred that liberal 
democracy was the form of political order best placed to ensure long-term 
stability in these newly reconditioned states, though academic opinion varied as 
to the precise order in which electoral systems and governance institutions 
should be constituted.51 
The concept of SSR developed as a corollary of liberal peacebuilding. 
There was a growing recognition in the international development community 
that development, both in terms of liberal peacebuilding and poverty alleviation, 
could only take place in a secure environment. Yet the ill-disciplined and 
predatory armed forces of many weak or illiberal states – once tolerated 
because of their strategic utility during the Cold War – were now recognised as 
one of the major threats to human security.52 As Rotberg argued, in the 
hierarchy of political goods, ‘None is as critical as the supply of security, 
especially human security.’53 Thus, rebuilding military institutions as a means of 
ensuring state security was insufficient; these new security institutions had to be 
accountable to their elected governments and civil societies, in line with the 
principles of good governance and democratic development. The resulting 
‘security-development nexus’ required a normative agenda in defence reform, in 
which Western ideals of the relationship between state, citizen and the military 
were exported along with the model of the democratic liberal Western nation-
state. The practical processes adopted in pursuit of this goal became known as 
SSR.54 As Barkawi and Jackson have observed, such processes are still 
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defined by asymmetric power relations between states, in which the 
development of local armed forces forms part of a wider metropolitan project of 
order-making primarily concerned with the establishment of formal state 
sovereignty in a fashion conducive to the maintenance of the status quo 
international system.55 But in contrast to imperial or Cold War programmes, 
which focused on producing effective clients or proxies, either by direct control 
or through a “train and equip” paradigm of military aid, SSR privileged normative 
change in the civil-military behaviour of armed forces alongside their 
effectiveness. SSR was thus envisaged as a holistic process, encompassing 
the military, other formal security institutions like the police and intelligence 
agencies, non-state or non-traditional security providers like militias, justice 
systems, and governance or oversight mechanisms.56 
Yet the legacy of Western intervention and state-building during the 
“wars of contested choice” which followed the 9/11 terrorist attacks has seen a 
reaction against liberal peacebuilding and SSR. The COIN doctrines developed 
by Western armed forces during these campaigns have been described as 
‘armed nation building’,57 while the idea of nation-building has itself been 
problematized.58 Scholars have argued that the neo-conservative approach to 
liberal peacebuilding adopted in Iraq and Afghanistan was fundamentally 
illiberal in character,59 and that SSR efforts during these campaigns represented 
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little more than cynical ‘exit strategies’.60 Clare Short, the former British cabinet 
minister for the Department for International Development who promoted the 
concept of SSR, later stated that the War on Terror represented the death of a 
liberal ‘humanitarian surge’.61 The 9/11 attacks are widely perceived to have 
heralded a general ‘securitisation’ of development.62 More profoundly, critical 
scholars have argued that the failures of SSR and state-building in Iraq and 
Afghanistan underline the inherent contradictions in liberal peacebuilding 
agendas. Park, for example, asserted that state-building is premised on a 
Western cultural obsession with the rule of law as the basis of political order, a 
myth she described as responsible for imposing culturally inappropriate 
governance and justice mechanisms during peacebuilding.63 Others have 
argued that the tenets of centralised Weberian governance have little 
resonance in societies where political authority is not defined by the same 
principles.64 In general, critical scholarship has rejected interventionist liberal 
peacebuilding in favour of grass-roots programmes that privilege ‘local 
ownership’ over the institutional preferences of Western donors.65 Even 
advocates of liberal peacebuilding have come to view the Western interventions 
in Iraq and Afghanistan as aberrations, urging that the proverbial baby should 
not be thrown out with the bathwater,66 or that a less technocratic and more 
‘problem-driven approach to SSR’ should be found.67 
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After Iraq and Afghanistan, Western states have increasingly eschewed 
large-scale interventionism. In 2011, the British Government released its 
‘Building Stability Overseas Strategy’ (BSOS), which envisaged a light-footprint 
approach to ‘upstream capacity building’. BSOS emphasised the promotion of 
stable, preferably democratic governance abroad, by providing limited support 
to allies before state failure and so precluding the need for expensive and 
difficult reconstruction efforts ‘downstream’.68 In principle, BSOS did not 
abandon the goals of liberal peacebuilding so much as revise the ways and 
means through which they might be achieved. Its military sub-component, 
however, the ‘International Defence Engagement Strategy’ (IDES), represented 
a fundamentally different approach to overseas defence reform.69 In practice, 
IDES and BSOS have heralded a return to the defence diplomacy and proxy 
capacity building seen during the Cold War. British MCB in Libya has been 
conducted by Special Forces, acting to strengthen one side or another in 
Libya’s civil war.70 In Iraqi Kurdistan and Syria, as in the Ukraine, British efforts 
have similarly followed a “train and equip” paradigm based around the 
deployment of Short Term Training Teams (STTTs) to teach basic tactical 
skills.71 Indeed, efforts to train the Kurdish Peshmerga seem at odds with the 
British policy of ensuring an intact Iraqi state, and have led to sustained concern 
about the risks of sponsoring proxy militias.72 Consequently, this recent 
reversion to tactical MCB over more profound political and institutional forms of 
engagement has been criticised by scholars as little more than a mechanism for 
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intervention on the cheap; an absence of true strategy rather than a strategy in 
itself.73 As Grissom argued, the West has ‘abandoned the comprehensive state-
building project in Afghanistan without replacing it with a coherent alternative.’74 
Given the continuing policy interest in the West in developing foreign military 
forces, and the lack of clarity in theory and in policy, the potential insights 
offered by the relatively successful reform of the RSLAF by IMATT require re-
examination. 
This thesis examines the process of externally-led military change in the 
RSLAF, and proceeds as following. The study’s research design and 
methodology is presented In Chapter 2. Chapter 3 then examines the existing 
scholarship on Western military change, alongside the concepts that underpin 
SSR, informing the thesis’ theoretical perspectives. In Chapter 4, Sierra 
Leonean civil-military relations prior to British intervention are examined, 
establishing the character of the Sierra Leonean neo-patrimonial state and its 
impact on state and military collapse in Sierra Leone. Chapter 5 then turns to 
the politics behind British intervention in Sierra Leone, and its impact on later 
British policy approaches to defence reform there. Together, these two chapters 
chart the local and international context in which military change in Sierra Leone 
occurred, and their influences on British interventions into the RSLAF. 
The next three chapters then explore the different phases of British-led 
military change in Sierra Leone, examining the impact of successive IMATT 
approaches on the RSLAF. Chapter 6 focuses on the relative impact of bottom-
up adaptation and top-down reform on the Sierra Leonean military during the 
British stabilisation campaign. Chapter 7 goes on to trace the process of RSLAF 
institutional development IMATT embarked upon after the war, under the 
auspices of “Plan 2010”. Here, IMATT attempted to harness bottom-up, 
generational change in the RSLAF, but was only able to pursue this agenda 
owing to high-level political support for top-down institutional transformation. In 
Chapter 8, the fate of this generational model is assessed, as IMATT withdrew 
and the RSLAF embarked upon its own peacekeeping deployments abroad. In 
Chapter 9, the thesis concludes that the RSLAF did witness some sustained 
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normative change, improving both its military effectiveness and democratic 
accountability. This was primarily achieved by manipulating the career 
incentives of junior and middle-ranking RSLAF officers, largely through IMATT’s 
control of the RSLAF’s internal processes of socialisation, promotion, and 
professional military education, and by exploiting inter-generational tensions in 
the RSLAF. Inevitably, this process proved both highly contested and deeply 
political. Far from impeding internal adaptation, external military intervention 
was essential to stimulate change in the RSLAF’s military culture – but 










This thesis aims to understand the process of externally-led military change in 
the RSLAF, and the implications of this process for the development of 
democratic civil-military relations during international interventions. This chapter 
outlines how this study has sought to address this question, explaining in detail 
the methodology used. It proceeds in four sections. First, the study’s research 
design is explained. Second, the chapter outlines the data collection processes 
undertaken. In the third section, the ethical implications of the research process 
are discussed. The last section details the data analysis methods used to draw 
conclusions from the data collected. 
Research Design 
In order to address the core questions posed in this thesis, the project has 
adopted a qualitative research methodology using a case study design. The 
central research questions – how and why externally-led military change occurs 
– necessitate an in-depth analysis of the interactions between host and donor 
nation, and the impact of this interaction in context. As such, a qualitative rather 
than quantitative approach to research has been adopted in an attempt to 
‘unravel the chronological flow and see which events led to which 
consequences and derive fruitful explanations’.1 While a body of theoretical 
literature on military change exists,2 and several empirical studies of SSR have 
been conducted,3 relatively little theoretical attention has been paid to normative 
defence reform components of either MCB or SSR. As such, the study’s 
approach is partially exploratory; aiming to better understand the process of 
externally-driven military change in relation to established theories of military 
change in a single national context. Some quantitative approaches to the study 
                                                          
1 Sebastiaan Rietjens, ‘Qualitative Data Analysis: Seeing Patterns in the Fog of Civil-Military 
Interactions’, in Joesph Soeters, Patricia M. Shields & Sebastiaan Rietjens (eds.), Routledge 
Handbook of Research Methods in Military Studies (Abingdon, Routledge, 2014), p. 130. 
2 See for example, Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and 
Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1984); Stephen Peter 
Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY, Cornell 
University Press, 1991); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine 
between the Wars (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1997); Theo Farrell, Frans 
Osinga & James A. Russell (eds.), Military Adaptation in Afghanistan (Stanford, CA, Stanford 
University Press, 2013). 
3 Peter Albrecht & Paul Jackson, Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997-2007 
(Birmingham, GFN-SSR, 2009); Peter Albrecht & Paul Jackson, Securing Sierra Leone 1997-
2013: Defence, Diplomacy and Development in Action (London, Routledge, 2014). 
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of military organisations do exist. Questionnaires have been used to collect 
participants’ self-reported perceptions of military cohesion, and scholars have 
made use of statistical data to examine correlations between macro-level 
variables when studying military integration and power-sharing.4 However, such 
models are best suited to testing already-developed concepts rather than 
exploring new themes. Quantitative approaches typically only provide a snap-
shot of the relationship between variables at a given point in time, or at best 
allow comparison between successive snap-shots over time, rather than 
permitting a detailed insight into how the process of change actually occurs. 
In recent years, this qualitative approach has challenged the previous 
methodological dominance of positivism, which privileged experimental 
methods as the sole claim to knowledge on causation. Maxwell has highlighted 
how this ontological position has shifted as a result of the development of 
methodologies like process tracing, which view causal processes as 
observable, and seeks to unpack the “black box” explanations of the 
experimental approach. Scholars adopting such approaches view causation as 
an inherently contextual process which is not amenable to being reduced into 
“extraneous variables”.5 As Miles and Huberman have argued, qualitative 
research ‘is far better than solely quantified approaches at developing 
explanations of what we call local causality – the actual events and processes 
that led to specific outcomes’.6 
In order to facilitate an in-depth analysis of the issues in question, this 
study has adopted a case study design, focusing on the reform of the RSLAF by 
IMATT. In-depth case study research is particularly well suited to exploring 
complex processes, in which the relationships between variables are unknown 
and opaque, or profoundly interconnected and difficult to unpick except in 
context. As Green has highlighted, case study research is typically ‘concerned 
with pinning down the specific mechanisms and pathways between causes and 
                                                          
4 Guy L. Siebold & Dennis R. Kelly, ‘Development of the Platoon Cohesion Index’, US Army 
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (October 1988); J. Griffith, 
‘Measurement of Group Cohesion in U.S Army Units’, Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 9:2 
(1988), pp. 158-161; Caroline Hartzell & Matthew Hoddie, ‘Institutionalizing Peace: Power 
Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management’, American Journal of Political Science, 47:2 
(2003), pp. 318–332; Katherine Glassmyer & Nicholas Sambanis, ‘Rebel-Military Integration 
and Civil War Termination’, Journal of Peace Research, 45:3 (2008), pp. 365-84. 
5 Joseph A. Maxwell, ‘Using Qualitative Methods for Causal Explanation’, Field Methods, 16:3 
(2004), pp. 246-9. 
6 Quoted in ibid., p. 245, emphasis in the original. 
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effects rather than revealing the average strength of a factor that causes an 
effect’.7 Initially, it was hoped to conduct research on two similar case studies 
exhibiting somewhat different outcomes: firstly, the reform of the RSLAF by 
IMATT, and secondly the reform of the ANA by ISAF. Process tracing was to be 
used for in-case analysis, before conducting cross-case comparisons. This 
comparative methodology is a particularly potent means of improving the 
generalisability of case study findings.8 
However, it became rapidly apparent during the early stages of research 
that the level of detail required to properly examine the processes in question 
rendered a comparative approach impractical due to the time and resource 
intensive nature of in-depth research, and so only the Sierra Leone case study 
was selected. Because this thesis primarily aims to understand the process of 
externally-led change and the implications of various factors in context, a single 
case study design was adopted in order to privilege depth of analysis over 
cross-case comparison. While findings based on IMATT’s experiences of 
RSLAF reform may not be generalisable to every instance of externally-led 
military change, they can still inform the development of theory, and in this way 
have wider implications via generalisable theory. As Yin argued, ‘case studies, 
like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to 
populations or universes’.9  In other words, the intent was to produce ‘analytic 
generalization… corroborating, modifying, rejecting, or otherwise advancing 
theoretical concepts’ outlined in the extant literature on military change and civil-
military relations;10 specifically, to advance understanding of the process of 
successful extraneous military change. 
To a significant extent, the utility of a single case study for analytic 
generalisation and theory development is dependent on the selection of the 
case study itself. Here, the selection of the reform of the RSLAF by IMATT was 
informed by a number of factors. Firstly, previous empirical studies of 
democratic civil-military relations in Sierra Leone have observed some change 
                                                          
7 Joachim K. Blatter, ‘Case Study’, in Lisa M. Given (ed.), The Sage Encyclopedia of Qualitative 
Research Methods, Volumes 1 & 2 (Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage, 2008), p. 69. 
8 See Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage, 
2014). 
9 Ibid., p. 21. 
10 Ibid., p. 41. 
30 
 
in the RSLAF’s behaviour since British military intervention.11 The case, 
therefore, provides an opportunity to examine the impact of external intervention 
on local military behaviour in an example where a degree of change has 
successfully occurred. Indeed, the relative success seen in Sierra Leone in 
comparison to Iraq and Afghanistan makes the case a notable outlier, 
increasing the potential to develop conceptual understanding through 
comparison with theories already developed in less successful cases, such as 
that presented in Grissom’s study of the ANA.12 Moreover, Sierra Leone may be 
as close to an “ideal type” for post-conflict SSR as is realistically possible, owing 
to its small population and relative willingness to reform.13 Thus, understanding 
how and why those changes that have been seen in Sierra Leone occurred is of 
vital importance not just to theory, but also to policy. This “most likely” test is 
effectively the reverse of what Green describes as ‘the “Sinatra inference”: If a 
theory can make it here, it can make it everywhere’.14 Hence, if externally-led 
civil-military change cannot make it in post-conflict Sierra Leone, it probably 
can’t make it any other similar post-conflict environments. 
Secondly, the fact that civil-military change in Sierra Leone – while 
significant – was still somewhat limited, makes the case of RSLAF reform 
particularly valuable for analytic generalisation. It provides the opportunity to 
examine not only factors that caused change, but factors which impeded it 
within the same case. Albrecht and Jackson have contended that change in the 
RSLAF was partial and potentially unsustainable because it was primarily reliant 
on IMATT’s presence.15 The fact that both the RSLAF’s behaviour and the 
nature of IMATT’s interaction with the RSLAF changed over time reinforces the 
need for a qualitative approach. It also permits comparison of differing 
relationships between external and host militaries within the same case, 
improving the analytic generalisability of conclusions through this comparison. 
Finally, IMATT’s interactions with the RSLAF are practically viable to study 
owing to a number of factors. Both IMATT and the RSLAF were relatively small-
                                                          
11 See Albrecht & Jackson, Security Sector Transformation, op. cit. 
12 Adam Grissom, ‘Shoulder-to-Shoulder Fighting Different Wars: NATO Advisors and Military 
Adaptation in the Afghan National Army, 2001-2011’, in Farrell, Osinga & Russell, op. cit., pp. 
263-87. 
13 See for example, the British Army’s lessons learnt analysis of British intervention. British 
Army, ‘Sierra Leone Case Study: The British Army’s Contribution 1997 – 2015’, Warfare Branch 
(Warminster, February 2016). 
14 Blatter, op. cit., p. 70. 
15 Albrecht & Jackson, Securing Sierra Leone, op. cit. 
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scale military organisations, making detailed understanding of processes more 
viable here than in larger cases, like intervention in Iraq or Afghanistan. The fact 
that SSR in Sierra Leone – and IMATT in specific – were dominated by the UK 
also simplifies the process of research and analysis, and precludes the need to 
unpick large numbers of different national perspectives and approaches, as 
would be required in a case of military change initiated by an intervening 
coalition. The fact that English is the official language of both the intervening 
military and the recipient armed forces also makes Sierra Leone practical as an 
in-depth case study. The primary focus of research was limited to the period of 
British military intervention and subsequent reform under IMATT, from 2000 to 
2013. However, the study has also made use of wider British experiences of 
change in Sierra Leone in the period preceding intervention (1998-2000), and 
following the establishment of ISAT, as well as Sierra Leone’s wider political 
and military history. It was decided to cap the study at 2015, as researching 
ongoing events in sufficient detail to draw any firm conclusions would have 
been impractical. 
Data Collection 
Data collection was informed by the need to ensure detailed coverage of the 
themes identified as potentially important by extant theory, and the 
chronological span of the period of reform. Practically, the methods used to 
collect data were designed to ensure the reliability of later analysis in so far as 
possible. These aims were supported by the collection of data from multiple 
different types of source. Here, research was divided across two broad 
categories of evidence: primary sources and secondary data. Secondary 
sources are those created either after events took place or by individuals not 
directly involved. Types of secondary sources used in this thesis include 
published academic analyses and policy-focused studies written after events 
took place,16 and NGO reports, which while frequently compiled at the time 
mediate first-hand accounts with their own assessments.17 Secondary sources 
utilised by the project also include participants’ own published accounts and 
                                                          
16 For example, David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone (Oxford, James Currey, 
2005). 
17 Such as the International Crisis Group’s periodic reports, for instance. See, for an example, 
International Crisis Group, ‘Sierra Leone: A New Era of Reform?’, Africa report No. 143 
(Dakar/Brussels, 31 July 2008). 
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memoirs; both those presented by the participants’ themselves,18 and those 
collected by intermediaries.19 Some official publications should also be 
considered as secondary sources depending on their application. The British 
Army’s own lessons learnt briefing note on its role in Sierra Leone is a 
secondary source for factual information, but a primary source for the British 
Army’s enduring view of its operations there.20 Primary sources are defined as 
material created at the time by those directly involved in the processes under 
study, or their later unpublished accounts. An equally expansive range of 
different types of primary data sources have been used. These include 
published official documents and unpublished internal papers,21 interviews, and 
archival material. The latter was mainly sourced from the Imperial War 
Museum’s archives, in the form of British Army Camera Crew reels and later 
oral history interviews conducted by the museum.22 
Methodological discussions on conducting research related to military 
subjects frequently note the difficulty of gaining access to material as a 
significant constraint.23 Access is typically restricted due to security 
considerations or institutional prohibitions concerned with reputational harm.24 
In this study, the bulk of both primary and secondary material used came from 
“open source” resources, accessed either through literature reviews or online 
searches. Both the British and Sierra Leonean governments provide access to 
core doctrinal and policy documents via their online web portals, although the 
range of Sierra Leonean government material available online is limited.25 Here, 
the Sierra Leonean online archiving website, Sierra Leone Web, proved 
                                                          
18 See for example, General David Richards, Taking Command (London, Headline, 2014). 
19 See Peter Albrecht & Paul Jackson (eds.), Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone 1997 - 
2007: Views from the Front Line (Berlin, Lit, 2010). 
20 British Army, ‘Sierra Leone Case Study’, op. cit. 
21 The former includes doctrine, such as British Ministry of Defence, ‘Joint Doctrine Publication 
3-40 Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution’, Development, Concepts and Doctrine 
Centre (Shrivenham, November 2009), and policy papers, like Government of Sierra Leone, 
‘Defence White Paper: Informing the People’ (Freetown, 2003). It also includes the periodic 
consultant-led audits and reviews commissioned by DFID. An example of the latter used 
prolifically in the thesis is Colonel Dent’s IMATT briefing document, Colonel Mike Dent, ‘Sierra 
Leone Background Brief 2002’, IMATT internal briefing document (Shrewsbury, 24 July 2002). 
22 Online at http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections, accessed on 26/08/16. 
23 Eyal Ben-Ari & Yagil Levy, ‘Getting Access to the Field: Insider/Outsider Perspectives’, in 
Soeters, Shields & Rietjens, op. cit., pp. 9-18. 
24 Ibid., pp. 12-13; Brenda L. Moore, ‘In-Depth Interviewing’, in Soeters, Shields & Rietjens, op. 
cit., pp. 126-7. 
25 See https://www.gov.uk/ and http://www.mod.gov.sl/, accessed on 26/08/16. 
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invaluable.26 The Imperial War Museum’s collections are open to researchers 
by appointment, and the material held by the museum’s archives has been 
cleared for release. However, much of the audio and visual material is yet to be 
digitised, and so was not available for research purposes owing to the fragility of 
the original media. Limited access to the British Ministry of Defence archives 
was obtained, but the current level of security classification on this material 
precluded its use in this project. Consequently, internal IMATT documents were 
largely inaccessible, save for personal notes and presentations provided by 
participants. 
In consequence, the major source of primary data used in this thesis 
came from interviews conducted with participants who had been directly 
involved in the processes under examination. When Sierra Leone was selected 
as the main case study, it was expected that significant interviewing in-country 
with Sierra Leonean representatives would be possible. However, the outbreak 
of Ebola Virus Disease in West Africa, which spread to Sierra Leone in May 
2014 and reached pandemic proportions, rendered this expectation void. 
Restrictions on travel to and within the country made research in Sierra Leone 
impractical, while the University of Exeter concluded that the risks to academic 
researchers in Sierra Leone precluded travel. Moreover, as the government and 
military of Sierra Leone were entirely absorbed in dealing with the crisis, which 
did not abate until after the study’s allotted period of field research had ended, 
interviewing in-country would likely have been impossible anyway. Interviews 
were nonetheless conducted in the UK with participants from two different 
constituent cohorts: serving or retired British military personnel who had served 
in Sierra Leone; and British Government civilians who had deployed to Sierra 
Leone. The bulk of interviews in these cohorts constituted “elite interviews”; 
interviews with participants occupying a position of privileged access or 
influence, or with specific claims to professional knowledge or experience. Such 
interviews offer a particularly powerful means of gaining insight into otherwise 
inaccessible communities or processes.27 
                                                          
26 See ‘Sierra Leone Web’, online at http://www.sierra-leone.org/, accessed on 26/08/16. 
27 Glenn Beamer, ‘Elite Interviews and State Politics Research’, State Politics & Policy Quarterly, 
2:1 (2002), pp. 86-96. 
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As the study aims to produce conclusions generalisable to theory, 
interviews directly conducted during the research process were intended to 
cover the military changes under examination, rather than to produce a 
statistically sound sample size in comparison to a potential population. Most 
participants were purposively selected on the basis of their known position or 
role, using secondary sources or their advertised career history on the 
professional networking website LinkedIn. Initially, it was intended to recruit 
further participants via snowballing; that is, by using existing participants to 
identify further potential participants whose relevance or accessibility may 
otherwise have been opaque. Interviewing was conducted until conceptual 
“saturation”, rather than against a fixed target number. Saturation was defined 
as the point at which interviews had covered the date range in question, and no 
new themes emerged from further interviews – i.e. the point at which further 
interviewing ceased to provide any pertinent new insights. In a snowballing 
technique, saturation can be additionally defined by ‘a convergence of 
recommendations’ for further inquiries – especially among smaller cohorts like 
senior army officers.28 Previous studies have shown that when conducting 
qualitative interviews, saturation tends to occur between 20 and 30 interview 
participants. Moreover, data analysis from substantially larger numbers of in-
depth interviews can become unwieldy.29 In the event, however, the 
overwhelming majority of interview participants were identified purposively, 
owing to the difficulty in locating participants through snowballing, the fact that a 
number of participants recommended through snowballing had already been 
purposively identified, and the fact that saturation was attained without the need 
for significant numbers of additional snowballed participants. 
A semi-structured interview methodology was adopted in all interviews 
conducted as part of this study. In a semi-structured interview, the participant is 
asked open-ended questions as a prompt for comment or discussion. In this 
study, these were drawn from a standardised list which acted as a handrail for 
discussion, and tailored to the participants’ background. However, participants 
                                                          
28 Beamer, op. cit., p. 91. 
29 Greg Guest, Arwen Bunce & Laura Johnson, ‘How Many Interviews Are Enough? An 
Experiment with Data Saturation and Variability’, Field Methods, 18:1 (2006), pp. 59-82; Mark 
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were otherwise free to shape discussion around their own experiences, with the 
interviewer asking contextual follow-up questions to explore details as required. 
This method differs from more structured interview techniques, which typically 
resemble a verbal questionnaire, and unstructured techniques used in oral 
history, in which the interview is characterised either by informal conversation or 
by the participant’s own narrative.30 Accordingly, a semi-structured interview 
format is well-suited to conducting in-depth interviews in which explanation or 
participants’ subjective assessments are sought.31 As Beamer highlighted, 
semi-structured interviews are a particularly potent ‘tool to tap into political 
constructs that may otherwise be difficult to examine…involving the beliefs of 
political actors’,32 but, in Fetterman’s words, are most useful when ‘the 
fieldworker comprehends the fundamentals of a community from the insider’s 
perspective’.33 Interviews varied in length from around 45 minutes to several 
hours, depending on the wishes of the participant. Most interviews lasted 
around an hour in duration. All but one participant interview was recoded using 
a digital audio recorder, and subsequently transcribed; an interview summary 
was prepared based on field notes taken during the unrecorded interview. 
Participants were recruited according to the following procedures. 
Potential participants were identified on the basis of their position or role held, 
either through use of secondary literature, snowballing, or via their advertised 
career history on the online networking site LinkedIn. Participants were 
approached electronically with a brief outline of the project, and where 
appropriate, an attached Call for Research Participants sheet. This document 
provided potential participants with a brief introduction to the study’s aims and 
the nature of participation. Interested potential participants were then supplied 
with the Participant Information Sheet, and an interview was subsequently 
arranged after potential participants had had the opportunity to reflect on this. 
Interviews were conducted in a variety of locations, including participant’s 
offices, social clubs, homes, and at the University of Exeter, according to the 
participant’s preference. Accordingly, participation was entirely voluntary, and 
so although potential participants were identified either directly or by 
                                                          
30 Lioness Ayres, ‘Semi-Structured Interview’, in Given, op. cit., pp. 810-11. 
31 Moore, op. cit., pp. 117-8, pp. 123-4. 
32 Beamer, op. cit., pp. 86-7. 
33 David M. Fetterman, ‘Ethnography’, in Given, op. cit., p. 290. 
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snowballing, interviewees effectively self-selected for participation by electing to 
respond to a request for interview. In this fashion, the recruitment process itself 
shaped the nature of the eventual interviewee cohort, but necessarily so, in 
order to conform to ethical best practice in academic interviewing. 
In total, 25 participants were formally interviewed as part of this study, 
alongside a number of informal “audit” interviews. 22 interviews were carried out 
with British military personnel from all three services (eight still serving in some 
capacity, 14 retired). The remaining three interviews were conducted with 
British civilian participants from various civil service backgrounds; a police 
adviser, a member of DFID, and a Stabilisation Unit civilian expert. The study 
had originally aimed to conduct around 40 participant interviews. It was 
expected that around 24 interviews (60 per cent) with British military personnel 
would be sufficient to reach saturation, with the remaining interviews to be split 
between RSLAF personnel, British and Sierra Leonean civilian civil servants, 
and representatives from NGOs or IOs; sufficient to establish official or 
consensus positions. However, the inaccessibility of Sierra Leone during 
research meant that other sources of primary data on Sierra Leonean 
experiences had to be found. 
Here, extensive use of second-hand interview data originally collected by 
the Innovations for Successful Societies (ISS) project has been made. The ISS 
project was established by Princeton University in 2008, and aims to chronicle 
experiences of governmental change in developing states, including Sierra 
Leone. The project makes the transcripts and audio files of interviews 
conducted by its researchers freely available online for wider scholarly use, 
classified thematically and by country of focus.34 ISS interviews provided a 
significant insight into otherwise inaccessible groups, and are particularly useful, 
as they were largely conducted shortly after the events they discuss. In total, 26 
interviews from the ISS project were used: six with deployed UK Government 
civilians; 14 with IO, NGO or Sierra Leonean National Electoral Commission 
representatives; and six with Sierra Leonean police or civil servants. These 
included two transcripts from the same participant on different subjects, and one 
ISS participant (Keith Biddle) was interviewed additionally as part of this study. 
                                                          
34 See the Innovations for Successful Societies website and digital archive, online at 
https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/, accessed on 26/08/16. 
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In total, therefore, 51 participant interview transcripts were analysed from 49 
different participants, with a further three taped interviews coming from the 
Imperial War Museum archives. The difficulty in accessing RSLAF participants 
was addressed through the use of published RSLAF views, the extensive 
quotations from RSLAF members published in Albrecht and Jackson’s various 
narratives, and the availability of RSLAF policy documents.35 In general, 
however, the focus on IMATT perspectives and activity reflects the core 
research question the thesis seeks to address; namely, how external 
interventionists build other people’s armies. 
Ethical Considerations 
The use of interviews as a means of data collection raises questions of ethical 
conduct in field research with human participants, first codified in the 
Nuremburg Code and later in the Declaration of Helsinki. The project’s field 
research was governed by two separate ethical oversight bodies. Interviews 
with serving British military personnel and MOD civil servants were conducted 
under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence Research Ethics Committee 
(MODREC), which in effect provides both ethical oversight and an approval 
process for institutional access to participants. Without MODREC clearance, 
both researchers and MOD/military personnel are banned from carrying out or 
participating in research.36 Retired military personnel and all other participants 
were interviewed under the purview of the University of Exeter School of Social 
Sciences and International Studies Research Ethics Committee (SSISREC). 
MODREC approval was sought under the protocol number 570/MODREC/14, 
and required prior approval from the Army Scientific Advisory Committee. This 
two stage process proved to be significantly time-consuming, and necessitated 
the support of an institutional sponsor for the project, in the initial form of SO1 
Concept Development in the Force Development cell of the Capability 
directorate at Army HQ.  
This dual process of ethical approval resulted in a significant delay to 
components of the field research. While approval to conduct non-MOD 
                                                          
35 Albrecht & Jackson, Security Sector Transformation, op. cit.; Albrecht & Jackson, Securing 
Sierra Leone, op. cit. 
36 See ‘Ministry of Defence Research Ethics Committees’, online at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/ministry-of-defence-research-ethics-committees, 
accessed on 26/08/16. 
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interviews was received in July 2014, approval from MODREC was not 
forthcoming until May 2015. Nonetheless, it was vital to ensure ethical best 
practice was adhered to throughout the research process, both to gain access 
to cohorts and to ensure the study would not cause any harm to participants. 
The main risks to participants posed by the study are professional and 
reputational. If participants’ unfavourable views of colleagues or official policy 
later became publically known as a result of this research, it might cause 
reputational, social or professional and career-related damage to participants. 
Additionally, it was acknowledged that a small number of interviews were 
related to experiences surrounding active military operations, the recollection of 
which might prove potentially distressing for participants. Procedures were put 
in place to terminate interviews and refer distressed participants to appropriate 
sources of assistance. In reality, this concern proved unfounded. The potential 
for reputational and professional harm was largely mitigated through provisions 
for confidentiality of participants during research, and their anonymity in written 
outputs and publication, as well as effective data handling and storage 
processes. 
Participant welfare and confidentiality were safeguarded in a number of 
ways. Interview participation was entirely voluntary, and only conducted after 
obtaining the participants informed consent. All participants retained the option 
to confidentially withdraw from the study at any stage, without having to give a 
cause. Participant recruitment and selection methods were specifically designed 
to ensure potential participants’ confidentiality, and to prevent any undue 
influence or coercion over participants that could impede their ability to freely 
decide whether to participate. Interview participants were approached 
individually via email or private message on LinkedIn. Participants who declined 
to participate or did not respond to the initial invitation were not pursued further. 
Potential participants’ recommended during snowballing were contacted directly 
by the interviewer, rather than by other participants, in order to maintain 
confidentiality and preclude any undue influence or coercion. Some participants 
did, however, elect to circulate the Call for Research Participants, which invited 
potential participants to contact the interviewer directly. Participants were 
supplied the Project Information Sheet in advance, and were invited to ask any 
questions they had about the project prior to arranging an interview, and again 
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in person before the interview commenced. All interviews were preceded by a 
general preamble discussion, during which the conditions of the interview were 
agreed. All participants were invited to sign a consent form prior to the 
commencement of the interview, thus providing their voluntary consent to 
participate in writing. Participants also had the option to decline to be audio 
recorded.  
Procedures relating to anonymity and post-interview processes differed 
between MODREC and SSISREC participants. Under the provisions of 
MODREC, all MOD and military participants were required to be anonymised in 
all outputs, regardless of the wishes of the individual participant. Interviews held 
under SSISREC were conducted under the presumption of participant 
anonymity, but some participants were afforded the option of waiving anonymity 
if they so wished. All “non-elite” participants (including military personnel up to 
and including the rank of major) were anonymous by default, and were not 
offered the option of speaking on-the-record. “Elite” interview participants 
interviewed under SSISREC provisions (military officers of the rank of lieutenant 
colonel and above) were offered anonymity, but had the option of speaking on 
the record if they wished to. This was justified on the basis that such individuals, 
by virtue of their position, had sufficient experience, training and awareness to 
speak publically without undue personal or reputational risk. Moreover, the 
titular nature of their positions would make them difficult to reasonably 
anonymise, and on-the-record interviews were only conducted at the 
participants’ own choosing. Anonymous participants have been referred to by a 
generalised form of role, rank or position within the text, and by a randomised 
participant number in citation. On-the-record participants were referred to by 
name, both in text and in citation.  
Under SSISREC guidelines, participants were offered the option of 
reviewing and commenting on their interview transcript and requesting 
amendments in discussion with the interviewer. In practice, most participants 
requested a copy of their transcript but very few amendments of any substance 
were made. However, a number of participants who had spoken on-the-record 
requested that sections of their transcript be treated anonymously. In these 
instances, quotation or citation from anonymised sections of the transcript were 
referred to according to generalised job descriptors and participant numbers. In 
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order to maintain anonymity, both the participants’ named interviews and their 
anonymised sobriquets have been included in the bibliography. This prevents 
their identification by omission, but also artificially inflates the total number of 
participants listed in the bibliography. MODREC participants were not permitted 
to review or comment on their interview transcripts. All transcription was 
conducted by the interviewer to prevent disclosure of data to third parties. 
During the process of transcription, anonymous participants’ interviews were 
transcribed without key identifying details (like names) in order to produce an 
anonymised transcript, and preclude inadvertent disclosure in later analysis and 
outputs. All data has been held in accordance with the Data Protection Act 
1998, and participants were informed that their data would be destroyed should 
they decide to withdraw. Otherwise, data will be retained for three years beyond 
the end of the project to enable publication. Participants’ transcripts will not be 
published as transcripts, in whole or part, except through quotation in this thesis 
or other published outputs. During the process of transcription, interview speech 
was largely retained it its original “colloquial” spoken form. This retained a 
degree of nuance in the transcripts which proved useful in later analysis. 
However, grammar and syntax have been “cleaned” into a more standardised 
written style when directly quoted in this thesis, at participants’ request. 
The project was funded by the University of Exeter and Babcock 
International Ltd, via a competitive academic scholarship. In this fashion, the 
University of Exeter funded academic costs, while Babcock International 
provided a maintenance stipend. However, both sources of funding were 
awarded by University of Exeter in a competitive academic selection process, 
and were not contingent on the specificities of the project. Thus, despite 
providing an academic scholarship to fund the project, Babcock had no 
influence over the direction or substance of the research, which was in no way 
contingent on industry approval. Babcock will, however, receive a copy of the 
project’s conclusions, in common with the Ministry of Defence, which maintains 
this as a condition of ethical approval. Moreover, the project must in due course 






Qualitative approaches to research are characterised by a greater divergence of 
analytical methods used to interpret evidence than seen in quantitative 
research. To a significant extent, this reflects a lack of consensus in the 
academy as to the position of the researcher in the collation and analysis of 
qualititative material. One school of thought takes the view that like quantitative 
data, qualitative material must be deliberately handled to ensure reliability in 
analysis; that is, to ensure that other researchers, using the same method and 
material in a similarly objective fashion would come to the same conclusions. 
The opposing school of thought contends that the researcher’s biases, 
assumptions and world-view cannot be fully separated from the collection of 
material, or its analysis. Thus, research is an inherently subjective process 
(even in quantitative studies using experimental methods, though to a lesser 
degree) and so can never be objectively replicated. However, this view argues 
that it is this very subjectivity in research which brings contextual meaning to 
analysis – something fundamental to qualitative research. Hence, researchers 
should simply approach their research in a “reflexive” fashion; openly 
acknowledging their subjective biases and attempting to understand their 
implications on analysis and conclusions.37 While acknowledging the inherently 
subjective nature of the human research process implicit to qualitative interview-
based research, this study has nonetheless strived to ensure rigour in analysis 
in an attempt to manage and mitigate confirmation bias and ensure the veracity 
of information. 
Process tracing was used as a methodological vehicle for analysis. At its 
core, this approach seeks to identify the process through which independent 
variables effect dependent outcomes by following a causal chain or mechanism 
from start to end. As Vennesson and Wiesner explained, using process tracing 
a ‘researcher can assess not merely the presence or absence of an antecedent 
but the logic of the association between antecedents and outcomes’.38 
However, this approach need not be purely inductive, leading to narrative 
tendencies, and this study has adopted a more deductive approach to 
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Rietjens, op. cit., p. 95. 
42 
 
identifying causal processes and relationships. Thus, process tracing becomes 
less concerned with identifying every single interaction within a causal process, 
but about understanding key elements in relation to the determining features of 
extant theories. Consequently, this thesis examines the reforms IMATT sought 
to implement in the RSLAF and the quality of the interaction between IMATT 
and the RSLAF over time, in comparison to the RSLAF’s demonstrable civil-
military behaviours, such as performance on active operations and conduct 
during successive electoral cycles. Used in this way, process tracing becomes 
‘a valuable analytical tool for researchers interested in analysing the specifics of 
one case (or a small number of cases), in finding generalizable patterns and 
making theoretical arguments.’39 Thus, the project has made extensive use of 
descriptive context, explanation building, and critical analysis of rival 
explanations to support what Yin calls internal validity; the extent to which 
causal relationships within the case study can be isolated.40 Here, process 
tracing is also of particular utility, as it ‘provides an opportunity to pay careful 
attention to “non-events” or “negative cases”, the process or outcome that did 
not materialize but could have’41 
Analysis was informed by the recognition that each type of source has 
unique strengths and weaknesses, derived from the manner and origin of their 
production. These affect the utility of a source’s evidence; both in the 
application to which a certain source may reliably be used, and the relative 
weighting or emphasis which can reasonably be put on certain source types in 
certain applications. For example, this thesis has made use of a number of 
political and military memoirs, such as General David Richards’ Taking 
Command and President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah’s Coming Back from the Brink 
in Sierra Leone.42 Military memoirs in particular pose certain pitfalls for analysis, 
just as they can provide some unique insights. As King highlighted in his use of 
military memoirs to analyse the organisation and tactics of the SAS, these 
sources can be particularly prone to hyperbole or misrepresentation to improve 
reputation. Nonetheless, King found that such self-aggrandisement is relatively 
easily identified in the text, particularly through the use of cross-referencing, 
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such that military memoirs ‘must be treated with care, but they should not be 
dismissed per se as evidence.’43 At the same time, the production of military 
memoirs is typically subject to layers of censorship. As Jenkings and Woodward 
chronicled, military memoirs are shaped by the self-censorship of their authors, 
who are often sensitive to the reputations and emotions of their former 
colleagues and their wider family members even when they are less concerned 
about their own reputation. Equally, their publication is mediated by the 
commercial interests of publishers and the demands of genre. Many are also 
actively censored by the author’s former employers in the form of the MOD, 
which can use security prerogatives to censor material for a variety of reasons; 
something which also shapes author’s self-censorship. Yet as Jenkings and 
Woodward conclude, these ‘books make a claim to truth, about the veracity of 
the lived experience of war’, and their authority in so doing remains potent 
providing scholars analyse their content in a nuanced fashion, sensitive to their 
method of production.44  
Similar critiques might be made of other published accounts and 
analyses that are intended to articulate a particular perspective or advocate a 
policy position, such as internal or open-source policy reviews, and NGO 
reports. Such documents provide a vital insight into potentially inaccessible 
sites, and provide a wealth of information, but must be treated with 
circumspection and contextual awareness. Equally, participant interview 
transcripts must be treated with similar caution, not least because of the 
dialectic nature of their production. Interviews in which there is a pronounced 
power imbalance between the interviewer and interviewee are particularly 
noteworthy here. This study conducted a number of “elite interviews” with senior 
military officers and civil servants. Not only do such participants hold significant 
claims to unique professional knowledge (hence why they are being 
interviewed) relative to the interviewer, they also occupy a relatively elevated 
position in British society. As Beamer has described, the power differential 
between interviewer and interviewee in such situations shapes the character of 
discussions, and can potentially render it difficult for the interviewer to challenge 
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or test participant narratives during the interview – even if only through a lack of 
detailed knowledge.45 These dynamics persist in non-elite interviews, though to 
a lesser extent. In general, interviewees may misremember details, seek to 
protect their own reputations by presenting selective accounts, or misrepresent 
in order to please the interviewer. Moreover, the recruitment methods used in 
this study were reliant on interviewees self-selecting to participate. This raises 
potential issues of selection bias, in that participants with certain views or 
experiences may have been more likely to volunteer (or decline to volunteer).46 
These concerns necessitated analytical processes to ensure the validity of 
factual information supplied by interview participants, while recognising 
underlying opinions and beliefs these interviews offer. It also reinforces the 
importance of basing analysis on multiple types of source material. 
In his discussion of qualitative analysis techniques, Reitjens advanced 
three broad stages of data analysis through which these dangers can be 
avoided and evidence marshalled into useful conclusions: data reduction, data 
display (or conceptualisation), and drawing and verifying conclusions.47 To 
ensure rigour during data reduction and conceptualisation, this study has 
adopted a standardised and evenly-applied coding process to analyse primary 
material. From this, the process of reform could be traced chronologically 
through the data, themes and patterns identified, and then compared to extant 
theory as a vehicle for analysis. Here, analysis was grounded in the critical 
assessment of sources to ensure the veracity of chronology, interactions, 
patterns and themes identified. Although Reitjens primarily considered cross-
referencing and triangulation as means of verifying findings, these techniques 
proved equally important in helping to identify patterns and form conclusions. In 
this fashion, a degree of objectivity and credibility could be established in the 
tracing of processes and their impact. Analysis was conducted with a reflexive 
acknowledgement of the research process’s subjective nature, and the role of 
the interviewer in shaping interview data. This thesis has also deliberately 
sought to identify incongruent data, and to test alternative hypotheses, in order 
verify its conclusions.  
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A coding framework was used to underpin cross-referencing and 
triangulation, as a further means of ensuring rigour during analysis. Coding was 
primarily adopted to facilitate the analysis of interview transcripts. During this 
process, sections of interview material were assigned thematic labels, known as 
“codes”, based on their content. This process was conducted using NVivo 10/11 
software, which enables coded material to be sorted and compared, facilitating 
the analysis of information both within and between participants. Initially, codes 
were developed based on the theoretical issues under scrutiny and the subject 
matter of the interviews. As further previously unforeseen themes emerged 
during the process of coding, additional codes were added to this master list. 
Already coded transcripts were then re-coded according to these additional 
codes, as required. Each code was assigned a definition to ensure consistency 
in application, and some codes contained ‘nested’ sub-codes to facilitate more 
granular examination of certain themes. In total, 41 codes and sub-codes were 
used, grouped under seven different headings. Other primary material, such as 
policy documents, contemporary NGO reports, and interviews conducted by the 
Innovations for Successful Societies project, were also coded according to the 
same themes. Once coded, material was compared and contrasted within and 
between these thematic codes. This helped to develop an understanding of the 
relationship between different thematic areas, but also permitted examination of 
the same thematic processes over time, allowing change to be identified. 
This coding method also facilitated comparison between sources and 
source types, known as cross-referencing and triangulation, which were used 
as the primary means of ensuring rigour during analysis. Cross-referencing 
refers to the use of comparison between multiple sources in order to test the 
veracity of information by identifying inconsistencies, alternate perceptions and 
potential biases within a given set of sources. Cross-referencing is a technique 
informed by modes of historical research, in which different perspectives are 
interrogated as if ‘witnesses in a trial’ in order to construct meaning.48 Cross-
referencing was supported by the use of source triangulation. Akin to the use of 
intersecting bearings from known reference points to deduce location during 
navigation, source triangulation uses cross-referencing between multiple 
different types of source material to improve the veracity of analysis, by 
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offsetting the potential weaknesses of any one source type with the intrinsic 
strengths of another.49 This was enabled by a focus on multiple different source 
types during data collection. Hence, participant interviews were cross-
referenced against other participant interviews (including from different 
participant cohorts) and triangulated against published policy documents, 
observing NGO’s reports, journalistic commentary, etc. – each of which was 
itself cross-referenced against other sources of the same type wherever 
possible. Throughout this process, evidence was handled critically in 
accordance with the type of source that it originated from. 
Summary 
This chapter has outlined the research methods used to produce this thesis. It 
has explained the project’s research design, in which a qualitative single-case 
study methodology was adopted. It then detailed the data collection methods 
used to garner primary and secondary material. These included first-hand 
interviewing and the use of existing interview transcripts, searches of published 
and unpublished official papers, collection of archival material, and a review of 
NGO reports, academic literature and policy-focused analyses. It then 
discussed the ethical considerations associated with conducting interviews, and 
the ways in which these shaped data collection and later analysis. Finally, the 
chapter outlined its approach to analysis, which is grounded in process tracing. 
Coding, cross-referencing, and triangulation were used alongside pattern 
matching and alternate hypothesis testing to underpin the validity of analysis 
and help produce conclusions generalizable to theory. The next chapter will 
now turn to the existing theoretical literature on military change and SSR, 
exploring in detail the academic concepts which underpin the methodological 
approach to analysis that has been adopted, and is explored in the proceeding 
chapters. 
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3. Concepts: Changing Armies, Changing Nations 
 
As a tool of liberal intervention, SSR is preoccupied with normative military 
change. This chapter compares scholarly explanations of military change with 
the concept of exporting “democratic civil-military relations”, defined in Western 
political philosophy by the principle of civilian control of the armed forces. 
Together, these two bodies of literature form a corpus of theoretical knowledge 
which underpins SSR as a tool of policy. Hence, this chapter aims to provide an 
introduction to the theoretical constructs which underpin later analysis of 
IMATT’s reform of the RSLAF. In so doing, it highlights the gaps and 
contradictions in current scholarship which this thesis seeks to address; notably, 
the confused relationship between military culture and military change present 
in the literature, and the limited understanding of how internal and external 
processes of military change interact. This chapter proceeds in four sections. 
First, it deconstructs the assumptions inherent in SSR policy, unpicking the 
character of military change that SSR aims to produce, and examining its’ 
historical development in Western civil-military thinking. The chapter then turns 
to the causes of military change in Western armed forces, exploring the state of 
current theory. In the third section, these theories of national military change are 
examined in relation to empirical scholarship on army building during 
international interventions. This raises some important questions for our 
understanding of how military change occurs, with potentially profound 
implications for the conduct of externally-led military reform programmes, which 
are discussed in final section. 
The Norms of Western Civil-Military Relations 
SSR is an inherently normative endeavour. While there is little agreement over 
the best approach to conducting SSR, or even the vocabulary to be used,1 SSR 
is ultimately defined by the normative liberal democratic agenda at its core. For 
example, the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
(OECD) defines security as ‘a core government responsibility, necessary for 
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economic and social development and vital for the protection of human rights’;2 
an understanding that privileges human security as much as state security. 
Accordingly, the OECD defines SSR as programmes that seek ‘to increase the 
ability of partner countries to meet the range of security needs within their 
societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of 
governance and the rule of law’.3 Conceptually, this policy position reflects the 
rise of the ‘security-development nexus’ at the turn of the millennium, in which 
security and development are understood to be interlinked phenomena.4 
However, SSR as a concept and as a process is under-theorised. Even leading 
advocates of SSR acknowledge that the extant literature is largely ‘prescriptive 
(and technical) in nature’.5 Critics, meanwhile, have dismissed these policy 
guides as dangerously positivist, possessed with a ‘belief that with enough 
knowledge of the structural and cultural contexts of operations, and the actors 
involved and their preferences, one can apply the correct actions and activities 
and thereby produce specific pre-defined outcomes.’6 Yet the normative 
aspirations of SSR are well grounded in the wider theoretical underpinnings of 
Western civil-military relations. It is these concepts which SSR ultimately seeks 
to export, and therefore on which the viability of SSR agendas are predicated. 
Western civil-military thought is traditionally defined by one fundamental 
tenet; that of civilian control of the military, otherwise referred to as military 
accountability. This principle has deep roots in Western political philosophy. In 
The Republic, for instance, Plato imagined an ideal state in which the military 
class served the interests of the people while remaining subordinate to the aims 
of the polity. He likened these ‘guardians’ to dogs of war; ‘gentle to friends and 
fierce to strangers’.7 In more recent times, scholars of Western civil-military 
                                                          
2 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, The OECD DAC Handbook 
on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice (2007), p. 13. 
3 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Security System Reform and 
Governance: A DAC Reference Document (2005), p. 11. 
4 Clare Short, ‘A Humanitarian Surge and its Demise, 1997 to 2003: A Personal Account’, 
Peacebuilding, 1:1 (2013), pp. 33-7. 
5 Nicole Ball & Dylan Hendrickson, ‘Trends in Security Sector Reform (SSR): Policy, Practice 
and Research’, Conflict, Security and Development Group Working Papers No. 20 (London, 
2009), online at: www.securityanddevelopment.org/pdf/CSDG%20Paper%2020.pdf, accessed 
25/03/15. 
6 Robert Egnell & Peter Haldén, ‘Laudable, Ahistorical and Overambitious: Security Sector 
Reform Meets State Formation Theory’, Conflict, Security & Development, 9:1 (2009), pp. 27-
54. 
7 Plato, The Republic, G.R.F. Ferrari (ed.) & Tom Griffith (trans.), (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2000). 
49 
 
relations have, like Plato, sought to find ideal typologies of civil control of the 
military. These have been concerned with the fundamental question of how 
military forces capable of defending the state can be rendered subservient to 
the people they exist to protect – of who guards the guardians? The classic 
explanation for military accountability to civilian authority is found in the idea of 
military professionalism, articulated by Huntington in The Solider and the State. 
Huntington compared Cold War civil-military relations in the United States and 
the Soviet Union to conclude that civilian ascendancy was best guaranteed 
through “objective control”. “Subjective control”, as displayed by the Soviet 
Union, saw political commissars ensure military loyalty through direct 
involvement in military affairs, concomitantly resulting in the politicisation of the 
military. In contrast, Huntington accounted for military subservience to civilian 
government in the US through the military’s status as a largely self-governing 
profession with sole claims to authority over defined areas of state business. 
Not only did this “objective control” permit the development of the distinct 
military values necessary for combat effectiveness, but it largely confined the 
armed forces to a discrete area of responsibility; warfighting.8 
Huntington’s argument proved immediately controversial, giving rise to 
perennial debate over the so-called ‘civil-military gap’.9 Moreover, 
contemporaries argued that contrary to Huntington’s claims, the US military was 
in fact becoming less insular and more reflective of the occupational and 
professional traits prevalent in wider American society.10 Indeed, Huntington’s 
conception of military professionalism runs dangerously close to a tautology in 
which objective control is synonymous with professionalism, such that 
‘professional officers never intervene [in politics], because if they do, they are 
not true professionals’.11 In reality, the principle of civilian control over the 
military has frequently proved illusory. Although effective civilian governments 
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can successfully maintain control over their armed forces, such supervision has 
traditionally been viewed as the exception rather than the norm, as Finer 
highlighted.12  Indeed, a primary justification for the development of SSR as a 
concept lies in the fact that without at least tacit military support for 
democratisation, armed forces have repeatedly presented an insurmountable 
obstacle to political change.13 
Recently, this dissatisfaction with Huntington’s model has led to 
increased interest in the importance of military effectiveness in civil-military 
relations. Matei has argued for a new conceptualisation comprised of a trinity of 
control, effectiveness and efficiency, on the basis that civilian control is 
‘irrelevant unless the instruments for achieving security can effectively fulfil their 
roles and missions.’14 This understanding is reflected in policy literature on 
SSR. For example, a 2004 evaluation of the British Government’s SSR Strategy 
commissioned by DFID noted that military professionalism was constituted by 
both technical and normative dynamics. Normative components described 
appropriate civil-military behaviour, while the technical elements were related to 
the armed forces’ ability to carry out their military function. It concluded that in 
reality, ‘there is considerable overlap between the two’.15 Thus, it is not so much 
the objective structure of government-military interactions which defines military 
professionalism, as Huntington argued, but the relationship between the 
military’s values, or “norms”, and its occupational function. 
The recognition that normative values largely underpin democratic civil-
military relations is derived from the growth of constructivism in international 
relations.16 Early work on the role of norms and values in international security 
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largely developed out of the concept of strategic culture. Observing that 
America’s opponents often understood nuclear war (and thus nuclear 
deterrence) in strikingly different ways to the US view, Gray postulated that 
strategic action was not inherently rational, but instead the product of peculiar 
national interpretations of history and politics.17 Later generations of scholars 
have sought to somewhat deconstruct this idea of culture, decrying the potential 
for cultural analysis to descend into an ‘everything but the kitchen sink’ 
approach.18 However, this has not reduced the relevance of constructivist 
analyses, with scholars such as Gray and Farrell subsequently demonstrating 
that cultural values both shape and constitute strategic behaviour, which is itself 
inevitably ‘effected by human beings who cannot help but be cultural agents’.19 
Typifying this school of thought, Katzenstein argued that the choices made by 
states in the international system can only be fully understood by reference to 
the social and cultural values through which states and sub-state organisations 
interpret each other’s behaviour, and accordingly their own possibilities for 
action. For Katzenstein, these “norms” ‘describe collective expectations for the 
proper behaviour of actors with a given identity’. Accordingly, norms may be 
either constitutive – rules that define identity – or regulative – standards that 
define proper behaviour.20 This sociological understanding thus divides norms 
into two constituent categories of attitudes and behaviours. The relationship 
between these two normative components is significant, because while attitudes 
are extremely difficult to empirically measure, behaviours are eminently 
observable.21 
The importance of military norms in ensuring democratic civil-military 
relations is implicit; civilian control over the military is potentially problematic 
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precisely because a military capable of effectively defending the state is 
presumably capable of overthrowing or usurping it. Civil control, notwithstanding 
any bureaucratic or institutional safeguards, must therefore be reliant at least in 
part on the military’s voluntary consent. The power of norms in governing 
military behaviour can be seen in the self-imposed and self-limiting practices 
maintained by armed forces even in the face of the enemy. Legro has 
highlighted the antipathy towards chemical weapons exhibited by both the 
British and Germans during the Second World War. Consequently, both sides 
declined to use chemical weapons despite opportunities to do so with effect, 
and suppressed escalatory calls to break the taboo from among their own 
ranks.22 Such is the influence of these norms on the conduct of war, that Farrell 
has described war itself as a culturally defined project.23 Accordingly, Bruneau 
aptly characterises civilian control of the military in the United States as a 
product of ‘the trinity of money, careers, and culture’.24 Thus, the central 
problem of SSR which externally-directed military change seeks to address, is 
how to change the military culture of foreign armed forces so as to produce 
normative civil-military behaviour. 
The Causes of Military Change 
A significant field of academic research has developed examining the causes 
and mechanisms of military change, also variously referred to as military 
innovation or transformation. Although primarily interested in the dynamics of 
military change in a single-national context, this body of scholarship developed 
largely as a sub-discipline of international relations. These concepts provide 
important insights into the mechanisms through which national military 
institutions are altered, offering a theoretical lens through which to examine the 
conduct of military change driven by external interventionists. Just as the 
constructivist turn in international relations highlighted the importance of military 
norms and organisational culture in underpinning democratic civil-military 
relations, so the influence of norms and military cultures have come to feature 
prominently in explanations of military change. In particular, these arguments 
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have highlighted the importance of military attitudes in shaping the military’s 
proclivities towards change – i.e. in defining the types of new behaviour which 
will be considered acceptable or otherwise – either by impelling change, or by 
precluding it. 
In Imagining War, Kier demonstrated the strength of military cultural 
norms in conditioning the adoption of military policies. In her comparison of the 
British and French armies in the inter-war years, Kier showed how the cultural 
preconceptions of the British and French militaries led them to adopt different 
policies in response to the same threat of German revanchism. The French 
political left, imbued with the republican principles of the levée en masse and 
the nation in arms, viewed the professional military as a tool of domestic 
oppression. Consequently, leftist political parties viewed a citizen army as a 
fundamental bulwark against the usurpation of civil liberties and advocated a 
conscript army based on the shortest period of service possible. In contrast, the 
political right viewed a long-service military as an essential defence against civil 
disorder. The French Army in the inter-war years thus found itself sandwiched 
between two competing ideological standpoints. However, these contrasting 
views only became significant for military strategy because of the cultural 
preconceptions of the French professional officer corps, which believed that 
short-service conscripts were incapable of performing complex offensive 
operations. Thus in 1928, when the left-leaning French government cut the term 
of conscript service to a year, French officers could conceive of no way of 
conducting offensive operations with such inexperienced troops and accordingly 
abandoned their previous offensive doctrine in favour of a defensive strategy. 
This proved disastrous in the campaign of 1940; but it was a decision the 
French military needn’t have taken. The First World War had repeatedly 
demonstrated short-service conscripts’ ability to conduct offensive operations, 
and the German invasion of France in 1914 had been conducted with significant 
numbers of reservists in the first line. However, the cultural preconceptions of 
professional French officers prevented the lesson from being learnt.25 
However, the explanatory power of military norms in producing change 
has recently come under attack. Echoing wider criticism of constructivist 
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approaches to international relations and security studies,26 Griffin has 
contended that while ‘cultural approaches obviously accord culture greater 
status in shaping innovation they do not challenge the primacy of conventionally 
conceived explanations of what drives innovation’. He notes, for example, how 
constructivist analyses stop short of rejecting structural or functional 
explanations of military change altogether; while they highlight the importance 
of military norms in shaping change, they in effect subordinate it to other 
imperatives for change at the same time.27 For example, Griffin quotes Murray’s 
study of wartime military change, which concluded that ‘the organizational 
culture of particular military organizations formed during peacetime will 
determine how effectively they will adapt to the actual conditions they will face 
in war’;28 military norms define the landscape of military change, constraining or 
focusing it, but in Griffin’s view, cannot independently account for it.  
Griffin concluded that normative explanations for military change have 
been curtailed by the field’s ‘own theoretical conservatism’, which largely stems 
from the fact that most academics operating in the field work closely with 
military practitioners and so privilege applied research over theoretical 
advancement. Consequently, he contends that there has been a tendency to 
view different models of military change as mutually compatible, despite the fact 
that they are grounded in mutually exclusive (or at the least antagonistic) 
underlying theories of international relations.29 Consequently, Griffin has 
identified a number of areas of knowledge which remain remarkably under-
examined by the literature on military change; chief among them, the 
‘relationship between internal and external drivers of change’.30 While Griffin’s 
critique is intended as a rallying cry to strengthen the theoretical rigour of 
academic scholarship on military change, it also refocuses inquiry into the 
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relative compatibility of cultural explanations for military change against 
functional and structural explanations; namely, schools of thought advancing 
the causal power of civil-military relations, inter- and intra-service rivalries, and 
adaptation in combat.31 
Much of the early scholarship focused on changes in military doctrine. As 
Kilcullen argued, however, in the broadest sense ‘Doctrine is not only an 
idealized description of how things are done but also an attempt to inculcate 
habits of mind and action that change organizational culture and behaviour. It is 
an institutional rudder that helps turn the enormous bureaucracies it informs.’32 
In his seminal work, The Sources of Military Doctrine, Posen kick-started the 
study of military change as an academic discipline and established a civil-
military explanation for doctrinal change.33 Posen argued that developments in 
military doctrine were primarily the product of civilian political intervention into 
the workings of military institutions. Posen held that externally-directed reform 
was necessary to stimulate innovation, primarily because armed forces were by 
nature inherently resistant to change. Although contested by later scholars, 
Posen viewed armies, like all bureaucratic institutions, as primarily concerned 
with survival, and as such, pre-occupied with managing risk. Unlike many 
bureaucratic institutions, however, armed forces spend far more of their time 
preparing to perform their primary function – warfare – than actually doing it. 
This poses a fundamental problem for armed forces, which must anticipate the 
requirements of the next war without foreknowledge of its dynamics or 
circumstances. Consequently, military changes which seek to deviate from 
established, tried and tested institutional processes are inherently uncertain and 
risky, as well as bureaucratically difficult, and so are actively suppressed by 
inherently conservative military establishments.34 
Examining the development of military doctrine in France, Germany and 
Britain between the First and Second World Wars, Posen concluded that 
military innovation was primarily a response to heightened international threat. 
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At such times, civilian policy makers – at other times generally content to ignore 
the military – sought to directly interfere in military affairs in order to stimulate 
innovations they viewed as necessary for continued national security. Through 
comparative analysis of the significant doctrinal approaches which emerged 
during the inter-war period – namely German Blitzkrieg, the British air defence 
network, and French defensive doctrine epitomised by the Maginot Line – 
Posen observed that the mechanism for civilian intervention was for politicians 
to patronise military ‘mavericks’ at the expense of their more conservative 
colleagues. Politicians sought out officers at the periphery of their profession 
whose radical new views of military doctrine accorded with civilian perceptions 
of the required change. Doctrinal innovation and accompanying changes in 
military organisations were, therefore, necessitated by changes in the 
international system, but accomplished by direct civilian intervention into military 
affairs. Posen thus presents a model of military change based around external 
direction, in which the stimulus for change originates from outside the armed 
forces and is largely imposed on the military from above, top-down, via the 
activities of a small number of client military commanders whose authority 
stems from without.35 
Posen’s conception of militaries as ossified institutions requiring reform 
from outside was prominently challenged by Avant, who nonetheless advanced 
Posen’s civil-military model of military change.36 Avant noted that many armed 
forces have successfully reformed themselves without direct civilian instruction. 
For example, the British Army responded to the challenges of limited war during 
both the Boer War and the Malayan emergency, despite an institutional focus 
on other types of conflict. Comparing British and American political institutions, 
Avant concluded that the structure and organisation of the civilian political, 
administrative and legislative bodies overseeing the armed forces radically 
shaped the incentives for military leaders to innovate. In the US, where the 
structures of government act competitively to check and balance each other, 
lack of consensus served to reduce incentives for military commanders. 
Instead, commanders could court different legislative bodies depending on 
which best supported the status quo; the political environment allowed 
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commanders to hedge, providing little stimulus for change. In contrast, relative 
harmony among British political institutions meant that elite civilian supervision 
of the military was far less divided. Here, incentives for military commanders to 
reform were clear, and the penalties for not doing so equally apparent. While 
military organisations can change without explicit civilian intervention, Avant 
concluded that effective civilian supervision meant that armies chose not to wait 
for direct civilian intervention before developing their doctrine; the past record of 
civilian preferences, interventions, and ongoing oversight provided a sufficient 
guide to civilian expectations to stimulate the necessary military policy changes. 
Nonetheless, civilian policy maker’s supervision of the military is central to 
Avant’s analysis of military change; its character either provides the space for 
military culture to impede change, or instead impels it. 
However, Rosen strongly rejected the importance of civilian pressures in 
stimulating military change. Rosen noted how doctrinal changes were often 
already underway in the military prior to civilian interest in the reforms. These 
changes were the product of internal competition between rival factions in the 
officer corps, led by well-respected conventional military professionals rather 
than mavericks on the fringes. Here, reform-minded officers pursued complex 
campaigns of bureaucratic politics in order to co-opt colleagues to their ‘new 
way of war’, thus gaining both influence and legitimacy among the wider officer 
corps. Civilian elites could certainly accelerate this process through intervention, 
but only had real effect after the concept had already gained significant traction 
among military officers themselves. Instead, the process of military change was 
a product of competition in the officer corps between alternate visions of the 
military. Importantly, this caused rivals to seek control of military training and 
promotional policies. Once in the ascendancy, reformers institutionalised their 
desired change by creating new career pathways within the service. Crucially, 
these new promotional structures ensured that ambitious junior officers joining 
the institution would be inculcated with the new way of thinking, and would 
eventually be able to reach senior command positions. Thus, the military’s own 
institutional training and socialisation processes, and its bureaucratic 
promotional processes, were used to propagate and perpetuate the norms of 
the new military ascendancy, securing the reforms and protecting them from 
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rival camps in the officer corps.37 But the impetus for change itself stemmed 
from competing military cultures. 
For Rosen, these processes of bureaucratic change were not exclusively 
carried out through military infighting and subsequent promotional reforms, but 
also through the tools of bureaucratic oversight. For example, Rosen 
emphasised the importance of feedback loops through which senior 
commanders monitor compliance at lower levels of the military hierarchy. 
Ultimately though, it is the institution, and the support of important figures within 
the institutional hierarchy, which determined success. Rosen’s model is 
consequently best described as one of top-down change; but one in which the 
prospects for success or failure, as well as the likely originator of reform, 
resides firmly within military. Similarly, other examples of military reform have 
been attributed to inter-service competition over funding, where rival services 
compete to secure funding by developing new ways of war which accord with 
civilian elites’ wider policy preferences.38 While civil-military dynamics might 
therefore play a role in inter-service mechanisms of change, as civilian 
politicians act as arbiters between service rivalries, the locus of specific 
changes nonetheless originates from within the armed services, as in Rosen’s 
description of intra-service rivalry. 
In recent years, these top-down conceptions of military change have 
largely been eclipsed by scholarship emphasising bottom-up military adaptation. 
Interest in military adaptation largely developed out of the Western military 
experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, though its origins can be seen in literature 
on wider defence reforms pre-dating those campaigns. In his critique of the 
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), for example, Cohen found that the RMA 
was not only culturally and politically situated but largely ‘brought about by 
spontaneous innovation in reaction to tactical problems’.39 The concept of 
military innovation through bottom-up adaptation, while in many respects the 
product of empirical observation of ongoing military change, has its theoretical 
roots in Clausewitzian understandings of war. For Clausewitz, war was a living 
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and evolving beast, like ‘the collision of two living forces’, akin to ‘a duel on a 
larger scale’. Thus, as each side reacts to the other, and seeks advantage in 
turn, potentially driving war towards extremes, so equally the conduct of warfare 
evolves in response to the actions of the other duellist.40 As such, the concept 
of military adaptation is typically linked to change during (and as a result of) 
actual combat, distinguishing it from theories of peacetime top-down military 
transformation. In addition to this military necessity impelling adaptation, Farrell 
has highlighted further conditions under which adaptation may become more 
likely. These include: poor organisational memory (particularly of past 
approaches or doctrinal solutions); decentralisation, which passes authority to 
act down to levels actually in contact; and regular personnel turnover, which 
provides clear breaks at which changes in approach may be effected.41 Other 
scholars have subsequently added to this list, arguing that supportive 
leadership helps enable a culture in which the risks of adaptation are accepted, 
and Rosen’s feedback loops help adapters monitor the success of their 
amendments and further adjust them.42 
In an early attempt to draw attention to the phenomenon, Grissom cited 
the changing applications of Flak 88 artillery pieces in the inter-war Wehrmacht 
as a prominent example of institutional change caused by tactical adaptation. 
The Flak 88 was originally designed as an anti-aircraft weapon, but became one 
of the most prolific German anti-tank guns of the Second World War. However, 
its potential in this role was only realised after local battlefield improvisation 
during the Spanish Civil War. Here, a Condor Legion anti-aircraft battery 
commander, finding himself unsupported and hard pressed by enemy armour, 
was forced to use his Flak 88 anti-aircraft guns in the direct-fire role in a last 
ditch-attempt to save his guns from the advancing tanks. It was only through 
this piece of improvisation by a junior commander that the German military 
discovered the utility to the weapon against armour, and restructured 
accordingly.43 However, it was the wartime experience of counter-insurgency in 
Iraq and Afghanistan which most prominently highlighted these grass-roots, 
                                                          
40 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard & Peter Paret (ed. & trans), (Princeton, NJ, 
Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 75-77. 
41 Theo Farrell, ‘Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, 
Afghanistan, 2006–2009’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 33:4 (2010), pp. 583-8. 
42 Kristen A. Harkness & Michael Hunzeker, ‘Military Maladaptation: Counterinsurgency and the 
Politics of Failure’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 38:6 (2015), pp. 781-5. 
43 Grissom, ‘The Future of Military innovation Studies’, op. cit., pp. 920-1. 
60 
 
bottom-up processes of “organic” change. In a highly influential article, Farrell 
expertly traced adjustments in the praxis of asymmetric warfare adopted by 
successive British brigades in Helmand between 2006 and 2009 in response to 
the challenges of counter-insurgency and the prospect of strategic failure.44 
Various scholars have subsequently sought to test and expand these concepts 
through reference to historical cases, as well as other combatants’ experiences 
of campaigning in Afghanistan, including adaptations undertaken by the Taliban 
in response to Western counter-insurgency.45 
Paradoxically, it appears that many of the factors which facilitate military 
adaptation – such as decentralisation and poor institutional memory – also 
impede the longevity, dissemination and sustainment of those adaptations in 
the wider military organisation. Indeed, Farrell suggested that one of the primary 
requirements for British military adaptation in Helmand was caused by the 
British Army’s failure to remember its previous experiences of counter-
insurgency, or indeed its own extant doctrine on the subject.46 Thus, grass-roots 
innovations must at some stage become institutionalised in order to persist. It is 
only through access to the resources, authority and legitimacy of the military as 
an institution that bottom-up changes can propagate and sustain themselves. 
Moreover, while many adaptive responses to warfare are exclusively tactical in 
nature – such as adjustments in tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) – it 
is only through wider institutional change that such adaptations conglomerate to 
form a coherent new way of war. Consequently, academic interest in military 
adaptation has focused on mechanisms through which adaptive changes are 
institutionalised and thus affect wider military norms, resulting in significant 
interest on “lessons learnt” processes. These institutional mechanisms capture 
adaptations, or “lessons learnt”, filter them for content and then disseminate 
significant adaptations among the wider military institution. Examination of 
lessons learnt mechanisms in the Israeli, British, US and Australian militaries 
have highlighted how these processes can, to a greater or lesser extent, be 
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used to cascade adaptation ‘up’ the military institution.47 Marcus, for example, 
concluded that ‘organizational change in the IDF [Israel Defence Force] results 
from a dynamic interplay between both top-down and bottom-up processes of 
military innovation’.48 Historians have similarly emphasised the historical 
precedents to this recent trend in counter-insurgency focused adaptation, 
pointing to lesson-learning and adaptation during the First World War. Foley has 
even identified historical examples of other mechanisms for disseminating 
wartime adaptation, such as ‘horizontal’ change in the Imperial German Army, 
whereby military units shared experiences of adaptation and military best 
practice among each other at the same tactical level.49 
Yet the difficulty of institutionalising wartime adaptation, and thus 
sustaining adaptive military change and transforming it into more profound 
doctrinal reform, has been discussed by a number of scholars. For example, 
Kollars highlighted how the various organisational models, employed by the US 
military in Vietnam and Afghanistan to enable equipment adaptation, failed to 
produce sustainable innovation. Kollars concluded that the resulting 
‘adhocracies’ were inherently limited to providing unsustainable wartime fixes, 
because their informal organisational approach and operating mechanisms 
were unable to mesh formally with the more ordered peacetime military 
bureaucracies.50 Similarly, Harkness and Hunzeker demonstrated how the 
political complexities of military operations can impede battlefield adaptation, in 
their recent examination of failed change during the British campaign in the 
Southern Cameroons in 1960-1. There, the British Army identified the changes 
required to address tactical and operational threats, but were prevented from 
implementing them owing to domestic political considerations; the British 
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government decided that the costs of tactical adaptation in the Southern 
Cameroons were not worth the limited strategic gains they would bring.51 
More significantly, Catignani has questioned the ability of lessons learnt 
processes to fundamentally alter the core institutional processes which shape 
military organisations. Examining the British Army’s adoption of counter-
insurgency doctrine, Catignani found that the dissemination of lessons learnt 
failed to overcome the British Army’s deeply ingrained cultural preference for a 
conventional approach to operations. Despite a good understanding of the 
concepts of population-centric counter-insurgency at the operational level, this 
was not widely shared by subordinates at the tactical level. Despite the British 
Army’s ongoing counter-insurgency campaign in Helmand, officers and soldiers 
continued to be trained and educated primarily for conventional war. In some 
cases, this resulted in the informal exchange of best practice in counter-
insurgency via officers’ social networks, in partial compensation for the 
deficiencies of formal training. Thus, while battlefield pressures did produce 
some tactical adaptations to counter-insurgency, their local utility did not 
overcome the British Army’s institutional preference for conventional 
warfighting, and consequently many soldiers’ views of military best practice. 
This perception was reinforced by the British Army’s promotional system, which 
privileged conventional warfighting skills.52 In a direct challenge to Farrell’s 
description of British military adaptation in Helmand, King concluded that 
changes in the practice of British counter-insurgency were in fact conditioned by 
the British military’s organisational culture. Although commanders recognised 
that consecutive decisions to decentralise troop deployments (instead of 
concentrating forces) were likely to be counter-productive, they were 
nonetheless impelled by the Army’s offensive culture and competing regimental 
rivalries.53 
Notwithstanding Griffin’s criticism of theoretical ambivalence, it appears 
that military norms and organisational culture significantly account for the form 
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of military change, by either preventing or impelling specific reforms or 
adaptations which arise out of strategic or tactical circumstance. However, it 
remains significantly unclear as to how change reciprocally affects military 
norms and organisational culture – that is, if military culture affects military 
change, how does military change effect military culture? In SSR, structural and 
organisational changes are specifically intended to remake military norms in line 
with the principles of democratic civil-military relations. Yet in current 
scholarship on the causes and processes of military change, military norms are 
typically viewed as an independent variable rather than a dependent one; 
permitting, impelling, or impeding outcomes. While constructivist approaches to 
military change do not view military culture as ossified, they typically consider 
military norms to be inherently difficult to change.54 
Farrell and Terriff’s edited work on military change provided three 
explanations for military cultural change: leaders can reshape culture; external 
shocks might necessitate cultural change; and emulation of foreign military 
models may produce an accompanying emulation of foreign military norms.55 
Hence, Saideman found that Canadian military change during operations in 
Afghanistan was not primarily the product of adaptation, but of generational 
change among Canada’s military leadership. Influenced by their experience of 
peacekeeping, senior Canadian commanders were highly risk averse during 
early deployments to Afghanistan, preventing their subordinate operational 
commanders from undertaking major operations let alone adaptations to 
combat. Only after officers with direct personal experience of asymmetric 
warfare rose to senior appointments, and ultimately the Chief of Defence Staff, 
did restrictions on theatre commanders relax, permitting adaptive change. Thus, 
normative change in Canada’s military was prompted by the military’s own 
process of generational replacement, facilitating tactical adaptation and 
organisational reform.56 Murray observed a similar dynamic in the US military 
following the Vietnam War.57 
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Examining the interwar Irish military, Farrell found that Irish military 
officers’ professional culture determined which innovations were adopted, 
regardless of their relative strategic utility. Between the world wars, Ireland 
found itself caught between Britain and Germany, whose rivalry and military 
superiority rendered both a strategic threat. In response, Ireland adopted a 
professional model of military service, which emphasised conventional 
manoeuvre and deterrence, rather than a mass citizen army which would utilise 
guerrilla tactics to defend Ireland from invasion. Although Ireland’s small 
professional military could never have been funded sufficiently to conventionally 
defend the country, its development was actively pursued by Irish officers. The 
concept of a citizen army was dismissed, despite its greater strategic utility and 
the significant recent Irish experience of guerrilla warfare. Ultimately, military 
elites preferred the greater legitimacy a conventional military structure was 
perceived to confer, and their political masters concurred, recognising that the 
image of the Irish state would vicariously benefit.58 Here, Farrell concluded that 
military cultural norms ‘shape and are shaped by military emulation’.59 
In similar fashion, Germany’s recent adoption of network centric-warfare 
has proved of limited benefit, as it was primarily adopted to imitate perceived 
professional best practice rather than because it was particularly appropriate to 
the needs of the German military.60 Both Farrell’s example of the interwar Irish 
military’s strategic decision-making and the German adoption of network-centric 
warfare might reasonably be described as examples of normative isomorphism, 
in which shared professional norms led to the adoption of a professionally 
normative approach because of its conferred legitimacy. However, the British 
adoption of network-centric warfare, which centred on its strategic utility and 
adjusted the concept to enhance its functionality in peculiar local circumstances, 
might be described as a process of strategic emulation or mimetic isomorphism, 
in which external practices are adopted because of their perceived utility.61 This 
dynamic has also been used to explain the relative success of some historical 
cases of externally-led military change. During the nineteenth and twentieth 
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centuries, countries as diverse as Mehmed Ali’s Egypt, Ottoman Turkey, 
Afghanistan, Meiji Japan, and post-colonial Chile all invited foreign military 
missions to train their armed forces, adopting the Western military practices of 
their foreign patrons in the process.62  
However, in these processes the desire to adopt a given change – and 
with it reshape organisational culture – originated from within the recipient state, 
with foreign expertise only subsequently sought to direct implementation. In the 
specific case of SSR, it is unclear why armed forces with little historical 
familiarity or normative inclination to submit to civil control – the armed forces 
Western interventionists perceive as most in need of SSR – should themselves 
decide to reform. The influence of civil-military oversight structures, which Avant  
considered crucial to change, seem an equally unlikely prospect as these 
institutions are typically weak, inchoate, or lacking in political consensus in 
fragile (post-)conflict environments. Equally, the role of leadership in reshaping 
military culture has been challenged even in a national military context. Kier 
noted that the course of military history is strewn with failed reforms and failed 
reformers, contending that ‘organizational culture is not the sum of the values 
and beliefs of a few individual members’, such that ‘Replacing a few leading 
officers is unlikely to give rise to a new organizational culture’.63  
Accordingly, the difficulty of effecting profound cultural change has also 
been used to explain the difficulty – or near impossibility – of conducting 
extraneous military change. In Grissom’s study of ISAF’s failure to 
fundamentally improve the military effectiveness of the ANA, externally-led 
Western changes were foiled by the neo-patrimonial behaviours of the Afghan 
military and political elite. Owing to the strong presence of international troops in 
the country, the ANA was insulated from the bottom-up adaptive pressures of 
combat, largely because ISAF’s military operations both precluded existential 
ANA failure (at least for a time) and actually supplanted the ANA’s own 
presence on many operations. Instead, ISAF’s organisational changes, which 
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appropriately or otherwise mimicked Western military practice, failed to dislodge 
Afghan social and political behavioural norms, compromising their utility.64 In 
short, the rapid expansion, re-equipment, and organisational redevelopment of 
the ANA which ISAF was able to enforce did not affect its underlying culture, 
which itself was not conducive to operational capability in a conventional 
Western sense, and consequently military effectiveness failed to improve. Here, 
the inability for external processes of change to effectively interact with 
equivalent internal processes resulted in failure. Externally-led Western military 
reforms were inappropriate because they could not change local culture, 
mirroring wider critiques of liberal peacebuilding advanced by critical scholars, 
who instead advocate more “locally-sensitive” projects like accommodation with 
warlordic militias.65 
Thus, understanding how military norms are produced is vital to 
understanding how externally-directed military change can occur. By 
understanding how military norms are generated – and therefore how they 
might be altered – we gain an insight into whether changes in military praxis are 
simply shaped by military culture, or whether external interventionists may use 
organisational change to reciprocally shape local culture as well. As military 
accountability in Western civil-military relations is significantly the product of 
military norms, understanding how those norms are produced and promulgated 
in Western militaries becomes vital to understanding the prospects for exporting 
them – to the very viability of SSR as a tool of policy. 
(Re)Making Military Culture 
In Western armed forces,66 military norms of behaviour are typically inculcated 
through socialisation. These socialisation processes inculcate new soldiers with 
a common sense of military identity and values during basic training. As Soeters 
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et al noted, ‘Culture is learned, not inherited.’67 In the IDF, for instance, ritualistic 
socialisation processes are used to inculcate a collective sense of Jewish 
identity and fighting spirit. From the early 1950s, the IDF armoured corps swore 
in new recruits in a special ceremony held at Masada. According to Israeli 
mythology, this mountain fortress was defended to the last by Jewish patriots 
besieged by the Romans, who in a last act of defiance decided to commit 
collective suicide rather than surrender. IDF soldiers were encouraged to live up 
to the values of this legend through a military initiation rite at Masada, after a 
gruelling hike to the summit. As per Gray’s understanding of strategic culture, 
the Masada legend appears to have little basis in historical fact, but this 
nonetheless proved irrelevant to its socialising value for the IDF. When 
swearing in ceremonies ended at Masada in 1991 they were continued at 
Latrun, the home of the IDF armoured corps and the site its first major 
engagement.68 Comparable socialisation rituals are common in Western armed 
forces. At the French military academy at Saint Cyr, for example, progression 
through training is marked by a number of night-time rituals during which 
initiates receive various symbolic items of officers’ uniform and accoutrements 
from senior officers. These ceremonies are accompanied by historical re-
enactments of famous Napoleonic victories carried out by the students in full 
period dress.69 As Holmes argued, military training not only inculcates skills, but 
also values. Training not only makes men act like soldiers, such that men in 
combat act in the way which they were trained, it also makes them feel like 
soldiers.70 
Military socialisation processes are able to have such a profound 
normative effect on soldiers because armed forces exercise comparatively high 
levels of control over their members. Western armed forces have consequently 
been described as ‘total institutions’,71 in which almost every aspect of daily life 
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and individual conduct is governed by military norms. These codes of conduct 
are both positively inculcated and, where necessary, rigorously enforced; 
though the greater the acceptance of these military norms in an armed force, 
the more discipline tends towards normative correction through ostracism and 
denial of status as an in-group member, rather than formal punitive correction.72 
Such is the power of these military socialisation processes, that soldiers 
typically contextualise their operational experiences as uniquely military, even 
when deployed on explicitly policing tasks.73 Indeed, military socialisation, and 
the behavioural norms it produces, is vital to the functioning of military forces. 
One study of the French Foreign Legion highlights how the rigid codes of 
conduct, status, hierarchy and discipline present in la Légion étrangère 
underpin legionnaire’s obedience to orders.74 Equally, the power of military 
training and socialisation processes has been considered responsible for the 
military’s ability to persuade otherwise law abiding citizens to kill on command,75 
but also for instances where soldiers have knowingly carried out illegal orders; 
specifically, in instances where, despite their obvious illegality and wider social 
unacceptability, these illegal orders nonetheless accorded with the norms of 
military behaviour.76 
Owing to the importance of these military norms in defining civil-military 
relations, many early attempts at SSR hoped to reshape military norms through 
the structural and social reorganisation of armed forces. In particular, this has 
been pursued through the creation of new “national armies”, in which the 
composition of the armed forces reflects the political and ethnic demographics 
of wider society. Military integration programmes have been frequently used to 
achieve this, during which formerly warring factions are integrated into a unified 
military structure following a peace agreement. In the 1990s and early 2000s, 
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external interventionists supported military integration following civil conflicts in 
Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique, Burundi, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone, the Philippines, Bosnia and Cambodia, among others.77 In part, military 
integration programmes were so frequently implemented because they 
represent a pragmatic response to the political mechanisms employed by 
peacebuilders to end civil wars. Chief among these is power-sharing, in which 
former belligerents agree to share political power, or at least the institutions of 
the state, according to a detailed agreement. Power-sharing agreements are 
typically negotiated when a conflict has been fought to the point of mutually-
hurting stalemate, or when a third party intervenes militarily to impose a 
settlement.78 Envisaged as a temporary precursor to more direct forms of 
democratic government, power-sharing’s perceived utility lies the ability to 
regulate Hobbesian security dilemmas that might otherwise push factions back 
into conflict.79 This is achieved by giving antagonistic groups security 
guarantees through equal buy-in to state instruments; in particular, the state 
security apparatus.80 In Northern Ireland, for example, the Patten Commission 
recognised that in order to maintain support for the Good Friday power-sharing 
agreement among both Republicans and Unionists, the reformed Police Service 
of Northern Ireland needed to recruit Protestant and Catholic officers in equal 
measure.81 
Advocates of military integration consequently argue that the creation of 
representative national armies can help to forge new national identities and 
propagate these among society. Not only does this help create a new nation, 
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but it binds the new army to the new nation it represents – along with its civilian 
democratic leadership. Accordingly, Licklider has articulated a number of 
processes through which military integration contributes to sustainable 
democratic peace. Because the creation of integrated armies is undoubtedly a 
costly commitment, military integration may provide a practical indicator that 
peace overtures are sincere. Unified national armies similarly help to absorb 
former warring militiamen, who, in the absence of other gainful employment, 
might prove destabilising. Equally Licklider argues that integrated armies 
actively provide security for the power-sharing parties, deterring or defeating 
potential “spoilers”. In so doing, military integration further serves as a symbol of 
national unity, helping to reshape the identity of former combatants and society 
at large; and with it, the military’s internal culture.82 In a similar fashion, policy 
studies of comparable civilian bureaucracies have found that social 
representation in state organs improves public perceptions of institutional 
legitimacy, encouraging greater support for activities like policing among wider 
society. Equally, representatives within an organisation may actively champion 
their kinsmen in wider society, preventing state repression.83 
Military integration programmes thus reflect a significant strand in 
Western civil-military relations, which views national armies as a tool of identity 
construction. Since Machiavelli, Western political thinkers have argued that 
soldiers drawn from among the state’s citizenry are more reliable than 
mercenary cadres isolated from civil life.84 Following the French Revolution of 
1798, at the rebirth of mass democracy, military service became explicitly linked 
to the rights and obligations of political citizenship through the levée en masse. 
To defend the new political order, the National Convention requisitioned all able 
bodied Frenchmen aged between 18 and 25 for military service, to create a 
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“nation-in-arms”; in the words of one member of the National Convention’s 
Committee of Public Safety, ‘all the French, both sexes, all ages are called by 
the nation to defend liberty’.85 This relationship is at the heart of the idea of the 
nation-state, and indeed, at the heart of Weber’s canonical definition of the state 
as an entity which claims a ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force 
within a given territory.’86 Subsequently, mass armies were widely imitated 
because of their military utility, creating an enduring legacy of military service as 
a “school of the nation”; a “melting pot” through which nation-states are born.87 
The design of military integration programmes therefore mirrors the ideal 
normative relationship between soldier, state and society that dominated 
nineteenth-century Europe following the levée en masse. 
The role of representative national armies as agents for exporting 
Western civil-military relations equally reflects dominant understandings of non-
Western civil-military relations. There remains a dearth of recent civil-military 
relations theory exploring sub-Saharan Africa, the field having emerged in the 
1970s and witnessed a modest re-emergence in the 1990s.88 Those studies 
which have been undertaken, together with the significant and growing body of 
scholarship examining civil-military relations in North Africa and the Middle East, 
have been significantly preoccupied with coup-proofing. For example, Enloe’s 
classic study Ethnic Soldiers noted how ethnically divided states in the region 
have tended to interpret the loyalty of their citizens through an ethnic lens, 
which she termed ‘ethnic security mapping’. As such, military recruitment 
policies in these states reflect the political status of groups in relation to the 
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dominant conception of national identity.89 Groups excluded from the national 
community are either excluded from military service altogether, or are treated as 
cannon fodder, in a process commonly referred to as “ethnic stacking”. Recent 
studies of ethnic stacking in the Syrian officer corps have suggested that the 
Syrian military’s policy of privileging Shia officers at the expense of Sunni 
officers, producing a military loyal to the government on sectarian lines, is the 
principle cause of widespread disaffection and desertion among Sunni 
servicemen.90 Such practices frequently undermine the military’s ability to 
defend the state in the most effective way. Key units are retained for internal 
security duties rather than national defence, security structures are often 
duplicated to balance against each other, and talent from ethnic out-groups 
goes unrealised.91 Moreover, while ethnic stacking is designed to insulate the 
regime from internal threats, it is also one of the primary causes of coup 
attempts and civil insurrection from out-groups, who have little recourse but to 
violence to achieve political recognition or social change.92 Consequently, Peled 
considered that building integrated national armies is central to the process of 
democratic peacebuilding; both by demonstrating the loyalty of social groups, 
and by preventing unrepresentative security forces from repressing minorities.93 
In practice, the value of military integration has proved to be more 
complex. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the absence of a widely-held and 
transcending national identity meant that the new national armies were only 
considered legitimate to the extent that sectarian leaders viewed representation 
in the national army as communally advantageous.94 In South Sudan, the 
military integration programme appears to have actually contributed to further 
instability, by incentivising recalcitrant former rebels to rebel again in the hope 
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of securing a better deal within the new system.95 Similarly, a prominent 
comparative study of military integration under power-sharing found that military 
integration itself had little impact on the durability of peace; instead it was the 
power-sharing agreements themselves which determined success.96 
Historically, the ability of national armies to actually reshape competing social 
and political identities among their soldiery is also debateable. For example, 
Watson’s study of Polish soldiers in the Imperial German Army during the First 
World War highlighted how the very military institutions regarded as “schools of 
the nation” have frequently found it difficult to overcome antagonistic social and 
political norms held by their soldiers. Prior to the Great War, troops raised from 
the Polish areas of Masuria, Silesia and West Prussia, and Posen were formed 
into distinct units with regional identities, under the same terms and conditions 
of service as German troops. However, Poles from these German territories 
exhibited differing levels of Polish identity, language and nationalism. The 
assimilated, ‘Polish-speaking Germans’ from Masuria held the most Germanic 
identity and politics, and accordingly Watson found that their war service was 
almost identical to other German soldiers. Silesians, who had a Polish cultural 
identity but lacked Polish nationalist sentiment, also fought well. In contrast, 
West Prussian and Posen units, recruited from areas where Polish nationalism 
was comparatively strong, had comparatively worse combat records and 
exhibited much higher desertion rates during the war. Concerned at the 
reliability of Polish-speaking units, German military authorities eventually began 
posting Polish soldiers individually to German regiments in order to prevent the 
formation of cohesive, distinctly Polish identities.97  
Both the importance of military socialisation to producing military 
behavioural norms, and the competing influence of wider social and political 
identities in those military norms, is echoed in the traditional literature on military 
cohesion. Military cohesion is generally defined as the ability of military units to 
resist disintegration under the pressures of combat. The phenomenon is 
therefore closely associated with military motivation, or a soldier’s will to 
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continue to fight.98 Cohesion is thus intrinsically related to combat effectiveness 
– itself a constituent element of good democratic civil-military relations, and the 
primary concern of much scholarship on military change and innovation.99 
Indeed, matters of cohesion are frequently described as central to success or 
failure in war, not just at the tactical level but also at the strategic. For example, 
the purpose of Napoleonic tactics was ‘not to annihilate the enemy, but to send 
his men reeling to the rear in a complete rout…by undermining the intangible 
bonds of morale and cohesion which kept men in the ranks’.100 At least one 
analyst has similarly described American defeat in Vietnam as a product of the 
US military’s failure to break the cohesion of the North Vietnamese Army.101 
Academic inquiry into military cohesion largely developed from wartime 
analysis of the Wehrmacht carried out by Allied sociologists. In 1948, Shils and 
Janowitz concluded that the tenacious fighting spirit of the German Army was a 
product of the intimate peer bonds of trust, understanding and common 
experience that exist between soldiers at the small-unit level, described as 
“primary group” dynamics. A soldier’s will to fight was, therefore, a ‘function of 
the capacity of his immediate primary group (his squad or section) to avoid 
social disintegration.’102 The US Army’s official historian similarly held that poor 
American combat performance during the Second World War was attributable 
to these same dynamics; principally the diminished sense of social 
responsibility experienced by isolated riflemen using dispersed infantry 
tactics.103 Subsequent research attributed combat performance to primary 
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group dynamics in cases as wide-ranging as the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 
French Revolutionary Armée du Nord.104 The apparent significance of primary 
group dynamics also led to attempts to quantify cohesion, most prominently in 
the Platoon Cohesion Index (PCI) developed for the US military, which 
concluded that shared social bonds – or “social cohesion” – best accounted for 
units’ military performance.105 
In of itself, however, social cohesion can also impede military 
performance by providing a basis for deviant solidarity against military 
authority.106 While military units were bound together by social cohesion, Shils 
and Janowitz argued that their utility was underpinned by the interplay between 
that social solidarity and the wider values and standards of proper military 
conduct articulated by the military institution and wider society. Thus, social 
cohesion was harnessed for military purposes by the shared institutional, social 
and cultural norms of its members, which the pair referred to as “secondary 
associations”. In the Wehrmacht, for example, martial identity was defined by 
elaborate codes of honour, discipline and reward, which provided a uniformly 
understood social expectation underpinning primary group interactions.107 
Similarly, historians have noted the relative importance of wider social 
expectations in defining the role and conduct of military service in some armies. 
For example, Hughes has highlighted the importance of ‘military masculinities’ 
in supporting effective combat performance among Napoleon’s armies. While 
soldiers were promised ‘the lure of easy sex’ if they fought well, in carrot-and-
stick fashion they also had ‘to prove their manhood by displaying its qualities 
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while on campaign and in combat’ or risked emasculation.108 The relationship 
between military masculinity and wider social values is clear from nineteenth 
century military texts. The Soldier’s Pocket-Book of 1871, for example, held that 
the ‘better you dress a soldier, the more highly he will be thought of by women, 
and consequently by himself’.109 
The extent to which political ideologies also help to define the military 
norms underpinning social cohesion has been hotly debated. Shils and 
Janowitz considered that Nazi ideology mattered relatively little when 
accounting for Wehrmacht performance on the Western Front, with a small core 
of politically-motivated officers sufficient to keep units loyal, akin to Huntington’s 
concept of subjective control.110 This assertion has proved contentious, 
however. Bartov, for example, argued that Shils and Janowitz’s data from 
prisoners of war on the western front was unrepresentative. Instead, he 
suggested that the extremely high attrition rates on the eastern front meant that 
primary groups could not form; instead, units were held together by shared Nazi 
ideals, accounting for the distinctly ideological character of war in the east.111 
Yet Bartov’s analysis of unit attrition rates and their impact has itself been 
challenged,112 and studies of other supposedly ideological armies, like those of 
the First French Republic, have similarly questioned the depth of political 
sentiment in military motivation.113 Nonetheless, states have consistently sought 
to propagate patriotic sentiments among their populations to increase their 
propensity to mass mobilisation in time of war. In nineteenth-century France 
and Prussia, governments deliberately propagated nationalist identity for this 
purpose via schools, public discourse and the media. In a similar fashion, Israeli 
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school children are presented with a vision of military service in the IDF as 
heroic in order to socialise them to the military’s role in society (and indeed, 
their own role as potential future conscripts).114 While its role on the battlefield 
remains contested, recent analysis of wartime conversations between German 
prisoners of war recorded covertly by Allied intelligence agencies indicate that 
Nazi ideology undoubtedly accounted for the relative ease many German 
soldiers felt about war crimes.115 As Murray concluded, it appears that military 
cultures have historically been partly the product of ‘the Weltanschauung of the 
external society’.116 
Accordingly, Krebs has rejected the entire concept of integrated national 
armies as “schools of the nation”. Examining the politics of military service in 
India, Israel and the United States, Krebs found that socially representative 
armed forces did not develop as a matter of course, but as a result of changes 
in the wider social and political conception of citizenship. As such, national 
armies – both by definition and by historical experience – reflect pre-existing 
social and political constructions of national identity. In short, national armies do 
not build nations; rather, nations build national armies. When military 
recruitment policies have changed, the army merely acts as a conduit for wider 
political discourse.117 As a corollary of this, Krebs consequently dismisses the 
value of national armies in peacebuilding, arguing that military integration and 
similar military organisational changes have relatively little impact on the cultural 
or behavioural norms of military institutions or their individual soldiers.118 He 
compares military integration programmes to ‘an endangered and expensive 
African parrot’ whose only use is to warn the miners working at the coal-face of 
reconstruction that peace is dead through its collapse. While this in itself may 
have utility, there are other cheaper ‘canaries’ in the peace-builders’ tool-kit. 
Accordingly, Krebs finds that attributing the problems of peace-building to 
failures in military integration ‘is a bit like saying the dead canary is at fault for 
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the coal mine’s having become uninhabitable’, when in fact, ‘it is the noxious 
fumes that are dangerous, to canaries and coal miners alike.’119 
If the military’s own socialisation and cohesion-generating processes are 
partially reliant on wider societal norms, this might account for their resilience to 
change, and the difficulty external interventionists have in reshaping them. 
Moreover, diverse attitudes towards army and state among wider society may 
threaten the production of cohesive military norms altogether, explaining the 
less than successful record of military integration in reshaping civil-military 
relations. However, this conclusion is not fully borne out in the experience of 
military socialisation in contemporary Western armies which recruit from diverse 
social groups. Examining the identity forming processes within the IDF 
Paratroop and Golani brigades, Kachtan concluded that the ‘people’s army’ 
nature of IDF conscription did serve to reinforce existing social hierarchies 
evident in the wider Israeli polity. Although both brigades are open to soldiers of 
all backgrounds, the elite nature of the Paratroops resulted in modes of dress, 
culture, music and attitude commensurate with socio-economically superior 
Ashkenazim (Westernised Jewish) practice. In contrast, Golani soldiers 
privileged Mizrahi (middle-eastern Jewish) traits associated with Israeli counter-
culture.120 It is evident that some socio-ethnic characteristics have had more 
political saliency than others. Despite operational effectiveness requiring a 
degree of lingua franca, language differences are typically less of a challenge to 
military orthodoxies than ethnicity, in part because they are not considered 
zero-sum or immutable. Nonetheless, it would appear from the case of Arabic-
speaking IDF soldiers, that where language becomes associated with ethnicity it 
acquires similar political saliency.121 
While Katchan found that the IDF’s socialisation processes in the 
Paratroop and Golani brigades harnessed external social constructs for military 
purposes, in both organisations all soldiers adopted the dominant norms 
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regardless of their prior socio-ethnic background.122 Similarly, the experience of 
Multinational Peace Support Operations has shown that military contingents 
composed of diverse officers can function effectively together.123 Such 
observations have begun to challenge the importance of social cohesion and 
with it wider societal and political identities, in shaping military norms. Recent 
developments in the study of military cohesion have highlighted how Western 
armies have become increasingly able to incorporate diverse social and ethnic 
groups without fragmentation or reduced effectiveness, as they have 
professionalised. During the Al-Aqsa Intifada, for example, the IDF’s tactical 
successes were reliant on the flexible re-grouping of units to form ad hoc 
composites around key weapon systems. Here, troops were thrown together 
with little prior familiarity, precluding social cohesion and primary group 
dynamics. Instead, their interactions were underpinned by ‘swift trust’, 
generated by common training, doctrine and goals – by a professional form of 
military socialisation.124 Likewise, despite indications in the PCI study that social 
cohesion defines performance, Siebold subsequently found that racial and 
ethnicity diversity had no impact on US infantrymen’s cohesion or 
performance.125 
These observations have given rise to the concept of “task cohesion” to 
explain the apparently new form of cohesion which has developed in 
professionalised armies, largely since the Second World War. Much of the early 
literature on task cohesion imported management and business concepts into 
defence in an explicit attempt to challenge the US military’s ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ 
policy.126 However, like with early primary group theory and interest in military 
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adaptation, the maturation of task cohesion was promoted by observable 
discrepancies in military performance. As King persuasively observed: 
‘the Argentine Army in the Falklands did not fail because there were no primary 
groups…The Argentines were defeated because they were incapable of conducting 
effective collective drills…either of maneuvering against or of generating sufficient 
collective firepower from their defensive positions to stop the British advance.’127 
Consequently, King found that small-unit effectiveness in modern combat units 
was a product of shared procedures of communication and activity, imparted 
through extensive and continuous collective training. In contemporary Western 
armies, these processes produce a common understanding of the group’s task 
among soldiers, but also impose specific responsibilities on individuals within 
the group, becoming the bedrock of both cohesion and effectiveness.128 In The 
Combat Soldier, King traced the historical relationship between cohesion and 
combat effectiveness through the development of modern infantry tactics. 
Through particular reference to the British military experience, King argued that 
the mass citizen armies in the First and Second World Wars retained a pre-
modern tactical reliance on mass, or weight of numbers, despite the conceptual 
development (and limited employment) of more complex tactics based on fire 
and manoeuvre. Citizen soldiers were unable to fully embrace a professional 
military identity, while armies were logistically unable to provide the requisite 
training and education at such a scale. King shows how the professionalization 
of military organisations allowed for a greater emphasis on professional identity 
and skills, largely achieved through extensive training, which acted as the 
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necessary precursor to tactical sophistication. Thus, the process of 
professionalization appears to have reduced the salience of social norms in 
military cohesion and replaced them with new, distinctly military culture.129 
While citizen armies relied on heroic leadership, punitive and sometimes 
corporal discipline, and wider social constructs like patriotism or masculinity to 
motivate their troops, the discipline, performance and loyalty of professional 
armed forces are underpinned by distinctly self-referential norms. In this vein, 
modern Western armed forces increasingly incorporate social diversity in ways 
impossible for their citizen soldier forbears.130 Perhaps counter-intuitively, it was 
the strength of this professional military culture in the British Army which King 
used to explain the inappropriate operational decisions it took in Helmand, just 
as it accounts for the modern British Army’s superior tactical prowess.131 
However, the significance of professional military culture is in its relationship to 
task cohesion, and thus the ability (in potentia at least) to reshape military 
norms through institutional change in socialising processes like training and 
education. Indeed, the importance of training in developing task-based 
professional norms is evidenced by the presence of both societally-motivated 
(i.e. unprofessional) and task-based (i.e. professional) military units in the same 
army at the same time. For example, Geyer has highlighted how the tactical 
combat training adopted by certain elements of the German Army during the 
First World War led to radically improved military performance. This new way of 
war emphasised manoeuvre and mutual support, and was reliant on new forms 
of tactical training developed through wartime adaptation. In practice, it created 
highly motivated soldiers who understood the importance of their own agency to 
the unit’s wider tactical success, and their collective survival. Geyer 
subsequently concluded that the shift to more manoeuvreist principles of war 
created uniquely lethal units, in which both tactical practice and military 
cohesion were underpinned by rigorous combat training.132 
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While professionalization may offer a better route to normative civil-
military change than military integration alone, historical processes of 
professionalization in Western armies were conducted over long periods of 
time. Professional Western armies only came to full maturation following the 
ending of the Cold War, as Western military establishments finally abandoned 
mass citizen armies. Moreover, though undoubtedly stimulated by external 
events, these processes were not solely driven by external actors; nor should 
they be seen as inevitable trends towards progress.133 However, the socialising 
elements of this process appear to account for those successes witnessed by 
military integration and military democratisation programmes. Following the 
1994 genocide in Rwanda, for instance, the Rwanda Defence Force was rebuilt 
by integrating various guerrilla and revolutionary organisations of both Tutsi and 
Hutu origins. Jowell described how the integration processes utilised concepts 
of liberation and tradition to create a new identity for the force, which was 
subsequently cemented by meritocratic modernisation drives, military re-
education programmes, and the visceral experience of subsequent 
peacekeeping operations. Central to propagating the force’s new integrated 
identity was a political re-education process called Ingando, which included 
classes on national identity and history alongside technical military education.134 
In a similar fashion, even those scholars of civil-military relations who 
overtly reject the tautology of Huntingtonian professionalism consider 
professional military education (PME) essential to remaking military norms. 
Bruneau, for instance, argued that the reform of US PME following the 1986 
Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act significantly accounts for the 
promotion of a new “joint” culture of multi-service co-operation in US military 
operations, which the US armed services had previously resisted.135 The impact 
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of PME in reshaping civil-military norms has also been noted as an important 
component of military democratisation programmes in cases as wide ranging as 
Romania, Slovenia, Spain and Chile.136 
IMATT and the RSLAF: Normative Military Change driven from Without? 
SSR is a fundamentally normative undertaking, aiming to export Western norms 
of democratic civil-military relations to underpin stability and transitional 
democracy overseas. Central to effective civilian control of the armed forces is 
the recognition that the military itself must accept this prospect. Exporting 
democratic civil-military relations is thus a problem of exporting a particular set 
of military norms – of changing local military culture. However, relatively little 
theoretical understanding exists about the process of externally-led military 
change. Historically, interventionists have typically engaged in such processes 
as much for their own benefit as that of the recipient.137 As often as not, 
successful extraneous military change appears historically to have been the 
product of processes of strategic emulation, in which foreign military models 
were imported using foreign advisors at the behest of the recipient.138 If 
recipient as well as donor actively perceived change as desirable and eagerly 
pursued it, then the extent to which such changes were genuinely imposed from 
without must be seriously questioned. Moreover, the fact that historical 
examples largely focused on improving local military capacity and capability 
means such cases only tangentially addressed local military and political 
cultures. 
Even in the scholarship on Western military innovation, there is little 
clarity as to the relationship between the military’s cultural norms and military 
change. On the one hand, military norms appear to shape the prospects for 
military change, either by impelling it – as in Farrell’s study of the interwar Irish 
army – or precluding certain changes in favour of others – as in Kier’s study of 
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the interwar British and French armed forces.139 Yet as Griffin has argued, the 
explanatory power of military culture in explaining military change remains 
unclear. Typically, it has been viewed as a medium which filters other 
imperatives for military reform; be they civil-military interactions, inter- or intra-
service rivalries, or the adaptive pressures of combat.140 Accordingly, in a rare 
study of externally-led military change Grissom concluded that, insulated from 
adaptive imperatives by ISAF, Afghan political and military cultural norms 
subverted extraneous military innovations, resulting in failed military change.141 
Although recent re-examination of military adaptation and its limitations 
have highlighted the susceptibility of even functional imperatives to pre-existing 
military norms, serving to re-emphasise the importance of organisational 
cultures in conditioning change, these have only obliquely hinted at the prospect 
of reshaping military norms – largely through an absence of institutional change 
rather than its operation.142 Observers of national army building and liberal 
intervention have remained sceptical as to the political impact the institutional 
reform of local armed forces by outsiders can have. Krebs, for example, 
dismissed military integration programmes as an attempt to put the cart before 
the horse – inherently flawed by the mistaken assumption that national armies 
can build nations by reshaping their soldiers’ identities, and with it, wider 
society, whereas, in fact, it is nations that build national armies.143 Certainly, 
empirical studies of military integration demonstrate its troubled record.144 In 
short, military and political cultures have been typically shown to shape military 
change rather than the other way round. 
Yet the processes of military socialisation, which propagate military 
norms and help construct organisational culture, are eminently changeable 
through institutional reform or adaptive adjustment. Indeed, the concept of 
doctrine is premised upon this very ability. Moreover, there are some examples 
in which military change does appear to have reshaped military behavioural 
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norms.145 In Canada, the replacement of senior commanders with a younger 
generation possessing a different military culture precipitated institutional reform 
and facilitated tactical adaptation.146 Equally, in Rwanda, a successful military 
integration programme was largely underpinned by the Ingando military re-
education scheme, supported by accompanying institutional reforms.147 Thus, 
adherents of civil-military relations have highlighted the role of PME in shaping 
military values.148 The growing body of literature of military task cohesion 
similarly demonstrates how processes of military professionalisation – 
inherently liked to institutional reform, training and socialisation – have radically 
reshaped the norms of Western military culture, improving tactical military 
effectiveness. At the same time, these processes have replaced the salience of 
societal and political values in motivating soldiers with new, professional and 
career based norms, reshaping military discipline and social dynamics 
alongside improved tactical praxis.149 
How external interventionists might successfully use military change to 
reshape local military cultures and behavioural norms, however, remains 
unclear. How do external interventionists stimulate local military institutional 
changes? Is this achieved through the exploitation of civil-military dynamics, or 
through intra-service rivalries? Does successful extraneous military change 
stem from pre-existing intra-service tensions, exploited by externals, or from 
externally-led adaptation? Can external interventionists use military change to 
force a normative shift in local armed forces, or does such local military change 
only result from emulative desires already harboured by the recipients of foreign 
training missions? In answering these questions, this thesis seeks to inform 
policy approaches to intervention, such as SSR and MCB, by improving the 
state of practical knowledge on externally-led military change. It will directly 
contribute to the corpus of scholarship on military change and innovation by 
advancing our theoretical understanding of military cultural change, which in the 
current literature remains somewhat disparate. Understanding whether external 
interventionists carrying out SSR can successfully reshape local military norms 
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has potentially profound implications for our understanding of the relative 
importance of military culture in military change. If military culture can be 
reshaped by external interventionists, then this helps us to understand whether 
change causes culture, or culture causes change, or indeed, both. 
Ostensibly at least, IMATT succeeded in changing the military norms of 
the RSLAF following British intervention in Sierra Leone. Prior to British 
intervention, the Sierra Leonean military was not under civilian control, having 
attempted a series of military coups, periodically overthrowing civilian regimes 
to establish (often short-lived) military juntas. Moreover, the military was not 
particularly effective either. During the country’s decade-long civil war, it proved 
unequal to the challenge of counter-insurgency, atrophying and gradually 
disintegrating as a result. A little over a decade after British intervention, the 
rebuilt RSLAF appeared to be firmly supportive of civilian democratic 
governance. Sierra Leone had witnessed three democratic elections, including 
one largely peaceful transition of power. Not only did the military not intervene 
politically during these electoral cycles, as it had done previously, it actively 
supported the conduct of democracy through the provision of logistical and 
security support. Equally, the RSLAF had begun to display an increased level of 
military capacity, first deploying a company and then a battalion on international 
peacekeeping operations.150 The case of IMATT’s relatively successful reform 
of the RSLAF thus provides a window onto the process of building other 
people’s armies – and with it, an insight into the dynamic interplay between 
external and internal drivers of military change, and more fundamentally, the 
complex relationship between the norms of military culture and military change.
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4. Patrimonial Politics and Civil-Military Relations in 
Sierra Leone: From Colony to Rebel War 
 
Classic Western civil-military thought has tended to view the armed forces as a 
distinct entity, separate from civil society and political life. While this attitude is 
in many respects an ideal-type, epitomised by Huntington’s much-criticised idea 
of objective civilian control, it nonetheless remains resonant.1 Indeed, many 
scholars have argued that the professionalization of Western armed forces 
since the fall of the Berlin Wall has increasingly separated Western military 
identities from civil society.2 Boëne, for example, held that so-called post-
modern armed forces enjoy a ‘status as “a tribe among tribes” [which] allows a 
much greater deal of divergence from increasingly uncertain cultural 
mainstreams’,3 although the political implications of such a “gap” remain 
contested.4 Yet, in much of the non-Western world, it is far from clear that any 
political space separating the military from political discourse exists at all, let 
alone the kind of social space articulated by post-modern military concepts. The 
armed forces of Fiji, Pakistan and Uganda, for instance, have all developed 
distinct military identities akin to a “military ethnicity” – or a tribe within the tribe, 
to use Boëne’s language – yet these identities appear to have frequently 
intersected with specific ethnic identities in wider society, undermining both 
nascent democracy and supra-ethnic national identities.5 Arguably, the 
perceived need to import Western civil-military concepts into Sierra Leone was 
a direct response to the erosion of distinct and separate military institutions in 
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the period following independence, and the concomitant impact this had on 
Sierra Leonean military culture. 
This chapter examines civil-military relations in Sierra Leone, from 
colonial independence in 1961 to British military intervention in 2000. The 
patterns of civil-military relations seen during this period had a dramatic impact 
on the institutional fabric of the Sierra Leonean armed forces, and consequently 
came to shape the internal culture of the Republic of Sierra Leone Military 
Forces (RSLMF). This culture defined later wartime military behaviour, 
ultimately leading to British military intervention. Thus, understanding the nature 
and impact of civil-military relations prior to intervention is vital to understanding 
later internationally-directed military change. Moreover, the relationship 
between pre-war civil-military relations and the development of military culture 
in Sierra Leone helps explain the centrality of military cultural change to later 
peacebuilding efforts. This chapter first examines the concepts of 
patrimonialism and neo-patrimonialism, their prevailing features in Sierra 
Leonean history, and their utility for understanding Sierra Leonean political 
economy. It then turns to the history of civil-military relations in Sierra Leone 
from independence to the outbreak of war, examining the extent to which neo-
patrimonial practices can account for its pertinent trends. Countervailing 
explanations of the causes of the Sierra Leonean civil war are briefly examined, 
before the chapter turns to the behaviour of Sierra Leone’s armed forces during 
the conflict. Here, two prominent periods of military rule are examined as 
windows onto the cultural attitudes of the wartime RSLMF, and their impact on 
civil-military relations and military-institutional collapse. The chapter concludes 
that both military culture and civil-military relations in Sierra Leone before 
intervention cannot be understood without reference to the neo-patrimonial 
character of Sierra Leonean political society. 
Establishing the nature civil-military relations in Sierra Leone is 
particularly important, as neo-patrimonialism forms a central feature of scholarly 
arguments about liberal peacebuilding and military change more broadly. The 
civil war in Sierra Leone, known locally and henceforth as the Rebel War, was 
punctuated by extraordinary acts of violence against the civilian population. The 
main rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), developed a particular 
reputation for barbarism and ruthlessness, to the extent that the Rebel War 
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became the centre-piece for arguments extolling the intrinsic barbarism and 
primitivism of African society prevalent in the 1990s. The Rebel War formed the 
central case study of Kaplan’s influential essay, ‘The Coming Anarchy’, which 
presented a vision of neo-Malthusian collapse defined by greed, environmental 
degradation, primitivism and irrational violence. Kaplan’s arguments proved 
extraordinarily persuasive – particularly in the United States, which faxed a copy 
to all its African embassies – and tapped into wider fears about post-Soviet 
small wars and a “crisis of civilisation”.6 Though Kaplan’s thesis was widely 
debunked by scholars at the time and since, the international community’s 
response to state collapse in Sierra Leone was largely one of institutional state-
building on a Western model.7 While Kaplan’s ‘new barbarism’ explanation did 
not ultimately prove persuasive, the underlying social and political trends which 
led to such a dramatic unravelling of the prevailing political order in Sierra 
Leone are nonetheless important, as they shaped later international responses. 
In place of the ‘new barbarism’ argument, scholars have instead 
highlighted the imperfect nature of state institutions on decolonisation, and the 
pervasive and pernicious impact of patrimonial social and political processes on 
formal state institutions.8 Not only do such practices undermine the capacity of 
formal government, exposing the contradictory social contracts on which it is 
built, but they also shape the nature of civil-military relations. Studies of defence 
reform in other patrimonial societies have repeatedly argued that neo-
patrimonial dynamics shape the behaviour and preferences of local actors, with 
potentially dramatic implications for military effectiveness, accountability to 
democratic order, and externally-led reform. In Afghanistan, Grissom argued 
that the limited success witnessed in Western-led capacity building in the ANA 
                                                          
6 Robert D. Kaplan, ‘The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism, and 
Disease are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of our Planet’, The Atlantic Monthly, (February 
1994); Mary Kaldor, New & Old Wars; Organised Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge, Polity 
Press, 1999); for further discussion see Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth 
and Resources in Sierra Leone (Oxford, James Currey, 2008), p. xv. 
7 For rejections of Kaplan’s ideas, see Patrick Chabal & Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: 
Disorder as a Political Instrument (Oxford, James Currey, 1999); Richards, Fighting for the Rain 
Forest, op. cit.; Krijn Peters, War and the Crisis of youth in Sierra Leone (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
8 Chabal & Daloz, op. cit.; David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone (Oxford, James 
Currey, 2005); Morten Bøås & Kevin Dunn (eds.), African Guerrillas: Raging against the 
Machine (Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 2007). 
90 
 
could be attributed to neo-patrimonial dynamics.9 Marten similarly found that the 
limited advances in Afghan civil-military relations were largely caused by 
warlordism and similar neo-patrimonial influences, but concluded that 
incremental progress might yet yield results.10 More broadly, Cleary found that 
the inherent differences between the assumptions implicit in Western civil-
military relations and the realities of how political power is exercised in non-
Western contexts like neo-patrimonialism, has limited the scope for exporting 
democratic civil-military norms.11 In Sierra Leone, clientelism and coup-proofing 
appear to have undermined the military as distinct institution, shaping military 
culture in line with fractious political identities, and concomitantly impoverishing 
military effectiveness during the Rebel War. Exacerbated by the pressures of 
war, this eventually resulted in the virtual collapse of the military as an 
organisation. Consequently, understanding the RSLMF’s pre-war military 
culture, and how it developed, is vital to any analysis of post-intervention 
military changes aimed at reshaping it. 
Patrimonialism in Sierra Leonean Society and Politics 
In common with neighbouring states in Mano River Basin area, the exercise of 
political power in Sierra Leone has been traditionally characterised by 
patrimonialism. In a patrimonial system, ‘the essence of politics is [the] 
distribution of scarce resources’.12 This distribution occurs between patrons and 
clients, or “big men” and “smaller men”, in a transactional fashion. Big men 
disburse resources in order to buy the support of individuals, whose loyalty can 
then be leveraged for personal projects – be they political, military or business 
related. In return, smaller men, who become “for” the bigger man, look to their 
patrons for support and protection against other big men.13 As such, politics in 
patrimonial systems is not driven by ideological or national desires, but to 
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ensure the welfare of one’s own group.14 Relative power is attained through 
control of the resources required to maintain a big man’s network of 
dependents, and by expanding that network, thus increasing the number of 
smaller men who may be leveraged in support of the big man’s projects or the 
network’s maintenance. These networks of big men and smaller men are in 
constant flux, and there is nothing innately fixed about the transactional 
relationships between members of the network. A big man may himself owe 
allegiance to one or more bigger men, and followers may simultaneously have 
several big men, or move between them, depending on circumstance. These 
interactions thus become complex and opaque, visible primarily by the exercise 
of power through the network.15 Grissom refers to this patrimonial system as a 
‘limited access order’, in which established patrimonial networks compete with 
each other for resources and power, while tacitly collaborating to prevent 
newcomers’ access to resources, networks and upward mobility. Where such 
networks effectively counter-balance each other, such systems can provide a 
degree of political stability, with inter-network competition conducted via 
criminality and petty lawlessness rather than open political dispute.16 
In a patrimonial system, the relationships between big men and smaller 
men render political power intrinsically personal. Political power is not abstract, 
tied to particular offices as in a legal-rational Weberian state, but is based on 
the personal power of a big man and his network. Thus, there becomes no clear 
differentiation between the public and private space in patrimonial systems.17 As 
Richards noted, ‘Patrimonialism is a systematic scaling up, at the national level, 
of local ideas about…the duty of the rich and successful to protect, support and 
promote their followers and friends’.18 Equally, political power becomes 
fundamentally economic, and the conduct of politics a business, because it is 
primarily the resources required to maintain a network which define political 
power. In reciprocal fashion, political capital thus provides access to economic 
resources. In this way, competition in patrimonial systems fundamentally seeks 
to control the state and its institutions, as these provide the best means of 
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controlling access to resources.19 However, in Sierra Leone as in many other 
post-colonial societies, the formal state retains a degree of bureaucratic 
structure and process separate from the patrimonial networks of big men. 
These societies have been described as “neo-patrimonial”, in which both 
bureaucratic and patrimonial logics of power coexist. Ultimately though, the 
intersection of these two systems results in the hollowing-out of state 
institutions, which are both maintained and ransacked to support the patrimonial 
“shadow state”.20 According to some estimates, up to 80 per cent of power 
structures in the Mano River Basin region are informal or patrimonial, ultimately 
controlling the granting of concessions or salaried positions in the formal state. 
Accordingly, a number of scholars have argued that the informal shadow state 
and its opaque, patrimonial networks of big men and their followers actually give 
form and substance to the visible, formal state, which exists largely to provide 
the pretence of legitimacy – particularly to western aid donors.21  
In Sierra Leone, familial – and therefore by extension ethnic – 
association forms the primary basis of patrimonial networks. According to Sierra 
Leone’s 2004 census, there are 16 major non-European ethnic groups resident 
in Sierra Leone, and over 19 languages spoken. However, the country is 
effectively divided into three ethno-linguistic blocs, commonly known as the 
Temne, Mende (or Mande) and Krio peoples. The Temne compose around 31 
per cent of the population and are concentrated in the north of the country, 
while the Mende form 32 per cent of the population, and are focused in the 
south and east. The capital Freetown, however, is predominantly populated by 
Creole, or ‘Krio’ speaking people, descended from various freed-slave groups 
which founded the original British colony of Sierra Leone. Historically, the 
Creole population have exercised a disproportionate influence in the country’s 
affairs in comparison to their modest 1.2 per cent share of population; largely 
due to their dominance of the capital and associated access to better 
education.22 Despite these defined blocs, the plethora of ethnic and linguistic 
identities (and the high levels of inter-marriage between them) have historically 
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meant that ethnic identity is somewhat fluid. Traditionally, individuals have 
sought to emphasise different elements of their nested social and ethnic identity 
at different times, depending on audience and convenience, facilitating the 
development of (and competition between) patrimonial networks.23 
Patrimonialism defined pre-colonial tribal power structures in Sierra 
Leone, but was co-opted by the expanding colonial state as a politically 
expedient means of maintaining imperial authority. Although British-style 
‘Freetown law’ was maintained in the capital, colonial authorities largely 
exercised control over the Sierra Leonean hinterland via native chiefs, who 
served as intermediaries between traditional patrimonial systems and the 
growing formal colonial state.24 As British imperial influence spread to the 
interior of the country, it served to entrench the patrimonial system of tribal 
power which had always existed, making networks and class divisions more 
rigid and less open.25 Under this system of indirect rule, the British colonial 
administration established the institution of Paramount Chieftaincy. Paramount 
Chiefs were permitted to govern the population according to customary law, and 
in turn Paramount Chiefs generated significant private revenue from 
emoluments, tribal labour, and from 1937 a salary from the colonial 
government. However, the British maintained tight control over the office of 
Paramount Chieftaincy, and both the boundaries of chiefly administrative 
divisions and rules of inheritance were defined by the colonial state. In so doing, 
the British established zero-sum rivalries between prominent families over 
control of chiefdoms, particularly among the Mende tribes in the south. While 
this system allowed the British to maintain control through a divide-and-rule 
strategy, it also generated and then perpetuated significant social tensions in 
the districts.26 Consequently, British Imperial rule was characterised by a social 
and political divide between Freetown and the interior of the country, and 
between urban and indigenous elites and the “lumpen” rural population. 
Freetown’s Creole population and the chiefly elite were relatively well educated, 
and increasingly involved in administration and colonial civil service.27 However, 
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the system of indirect rule practiced by the British meant that although the 
institutions of governance were present in Sierra Leone on independence, the 
culture and practices of democracy were not well established.28 
Not all aspects of Sierra Leonean public life are defined by neo-patrimonial 
affiliations, and there remains a degree of associational fluidity between 
networks and groups. For example, Sierra Leone has three main religious 
communities. There are substantial Muslim and Christian groups, of various 
denominations, which exist alongside traditional or shamanistic religious 
practices known as Juju.29 Sierra Leonean society is remarkably tolerant of 
religious difference, and historically there has been little antagonism between 
religious groups. Towards the end of the Rebel War, a British officer posted to 
Sierra Leone observed that both Muslim and Christian prayers were routinely 
said at the start of meetings in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), and the Sierra 
Leonean Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) frequently asked Christian officers to say 
Muslim observances or vice versa, ‘because they all knew it’.30 In part, this 
remarkable degree of religious tolerance may stem from a degree of religious 
fluidity amongst elements of the population. Another British officer advising the 
SLA during the war recalled ‘a fascinating church service on a Sunday up at the 
4 Battalion’: 
‘the Christian minister would turn up and give a service, and they’d do the crossing 
themselves and all the routine. The imam would turn up, and the same soldiers 
would go through the whole Islam routine – they knew a bit of that as well – and all 
of them would have little Juju bags hanging off their belts, which was their Voodoo 
magic. You could see them all reaching round behind and giving it a quick rub… 
and they had it all covered. Religion was important to them, but it wasn’t worth 
dying for.’31 
This is not to say that the various faiths have always held equal status in Sierra 
Leonean society. Perhaps as a legacy of British rule, Christian chaplains in the 
Sierra Leonean military held the rank of captain, as per British military practice, 
while Muslim imams held the more junior non-commissioned ranks of sergeant 
or corporal.32 Historically, however, religious differences in Sierra Leone have 
                                                          
28 Peters, op. cit., pp. 38. 
29 Thomas, op. cit., pp. 58. 
30 Interview with Colonel (retd.) Mike Dent CBE, SILSEP and IMATT Adviser to the Sierra Leone 
Ministry of Defence 1999-2002, conducted in Worcester on 20 November 2015. 
31 Interview with Participant A15, a British Army officer who served with IMATT in 2000-1, 
conducted in Salisbury on 1 October 2015. 




not translated into sectarian or political tensions. Indeed, the country’s first 
democratically elected president after the Rebel War, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, 
was educated at a Christian high school and went on to marry a Catholic 
despite being a Muslim with a Koranic upbringing; he later attributed his 
electoral success in part to his religiously diverse background.33 
While religious differences are not a source of communal tension in Sierra 
Leone in the way ethnic and geographic identities can be, neo-patrimonialism 
does interact with and operate through other forms of social affiliation, like 
secret societies and hunting organisations. These secret societies initiate 
members into their secret knowledge and rituals, and in the process act as 
facilitators through which big men interact. In this sense, it is less the access to 
secret knowledge which membership to these societies grants that is significant, 
than the concealed interactions between important power-brokers that they 
obligate or facilitate.34 In Sierra Leone various male and female secret societies 
exist, including the Poro and Wonde for men and the Sande and Bondo 
societies for women.35 One UN election adviser during Sierra Leone’s 2007 
presidential electoral process observed that, ‘They are very, very big the secret 
societies. My understanding is that they are associated with political parties, 
but…I could not get anyone to talk about the secret societies or what goes on 
there in the period of two years and a bit.’36 Regardless of direct political 
affiliation, however, it is clear that these organisations can act as significant 
sources of social mobilisation. For example, one British officer serving in 
Kenema in 2007-8 witnessed near-spontaneous mass protests by a female 
secret society, after an international NGO publically addressed issues around 
female genital mutilation, which constituted part of its initiation practices.37 Thus, 
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secret societies can also provide a basis for legitimate challenge to both chiefly 
and neo-patrimonial state power, as well as underpin it.38  
However, the specifically ethnic character of post-colonial neo-patrimonial 
politics in Sierra Leone was reinforced under British colonial rule by uneven 
geographic development, which mirrored major ethnic divisions. After Sierra 
Leone became a British Protectorate in 1896, a railway was built across the 
south of the country connecting Freetown on the western coast with Pedembu 
on the border with Liberia. A shorter branch line was subsequently built in 1916 
connecting to Makeni in the north. Although the growth of Freetown had 
precipitated a significant increase in trade with the interior prior to the railway, 
the new line opened up Sierra Leone’s interior to ‘Creolisation’.39 The economy 
subsequently shifted to exploit rich mineral deposits of rutile, bauxite, iron ore, 
and in the eastern Kono District, alluvial diamonds.40 However, the country 
possessed little industry other than extractives, and urban areas largely acted 
as centres of trade for the import and export of raw materials by foreign 
companies. Moreover, development outside of the capital was largely confined 
to the predominantly Mende areas along the main southern rail line. Keen 
consequently described the Sierra Leonean colonial economy as one of 
‘skewed development’.41 Taken together, the overlapping structures of ethnicity 
and tribe, region and network, thus shape neo-patrimonial politics in Sierra 
Leone. 
Patrimonialism and Civil-Military Relations from Independence to War 
If power in Sierra Leone is exercised according to a neo-patrimonial logic, how 
then have these overlapping power structures affected the historic conduct of 
civil-military relations in Sierra Leone? Studies of non-western civil-military 
relations in clientelist regimes elsewhere in Africa and the Middle East have 
presented various conceptions of civil-military relations, with varied implications 
for military cohesion and state stability. Enloe argued that regimes relying on 
limited powerbases typically employed ‘ethnic security mapping’ to coup-proof 
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their armed forces, while Peled concluded that such ethnic stacking practices 
lead to predatory and unaccountable armed forces.42 While such strategies are 
primarily aimed at reinforcing state security (often at the expense of national 
and human security), recent studies of ethnic stacking in the Syrian military 
have found that, in fact,  such practices can result in internally divided armed 
forces, which are themselves potentially destabilising.43 Following 
independence, civil-military relations in Sierra Leone became characterised by 
infighting in the officer corps, and by political interjections by the military. To 
what extent do neo-patrimonial processes account for this, as opposed to 
military mismanagement and hasty decolonisation? Equally, did the intersection 
between the formal and shadow state in the Sierra Leonean military support or 
undermine civil-military relations and the exercise of democratic governance? 
The Sierra Leonean armed forces trace their origins to the colonial 
regiments raised by the British for imperial policing. On the eve of 
independence, the Sierra Leonean military appeared relatively professional and 
cohesive.  As independence approached, significant effort was expended to 
prepare the forces of the colony for national self-government. As per British 
imperial practice, Sierra Leonean units were composed of locally-recruited 
soldiers commanded by white British officers. However, postings to Sierra 
Leone were considered both unhealthy and unfashionable in the United 
Kingdom, and consequently the quality and quantity of seconded officers was 
typically poor. In advance of decolonisation, the British began to increase 
numbers of locally-recruited officers and NCOs to replace seconded white 
British cadres. Military educational and fitness standards were also tightened to 
bolster its local reputation and ease Sierra Leonean perceptions of the military 
as an agent of imperial dominion staffed by ‘a bunch of illiterates’. Native Sierra 
Leonean officers enjoyed locally competitive salaries, and were trained and 
employed to similar standards as white British officers; a development intended 
to lay the foundations of a democratically-accountable institution of an 
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independent state. The altered entrance and training standards were also 
designed ‘to avoid a preponderance of one tribe and achieve some sort of 
ethnic balance’. However, many of the institutional foundations of an 
independent army remained incomplete on independence, and the new Royal 
Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) were still reliant on a degree of foreign 
support; from Britain and from local neighbours like Nigeria, which continued to 
provide technical training via their own military academies.44 Nonetheless, the 
force deployed a company on UN operations in the Congo immediately after 
independence, and in 1965 the first Sierra Leonean force commander was 
appointed, Brigadier David Lansana.45 
While the fabric of the RSLMF may have conformed to a legacy British 
military template, Sierra Leonean civil-military relations were almost 
immediately shaped by the neo-patrimonial structure of Sierra Leone’s post-
colonial politics. After independence from Britain in 1961, the Freetown-interior 
rivalries, which predominated under the colonial administration, were 
supplanted by a far more divisive rivalry between the evenly balanced, 
geographically distinct and demographically significant Temne and Mende 
groups. Sierra Leone’s first independent government was formed by the Mende-
dominated Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), led by Sir Milton Margai. 
Although the SLPP did attempt to win over Temne groups in the north up to 
1964, it largely ruled through chiefly support, and in return turned a blind eye to 
chiefly abuses. Consequently, Temne political support became entrenched with 
the opposition All People’s Congress (APC), particularly after Margai was 
replaced by his half-brother, Sir Albert Margai, in 1964. The patrimonial politics 
which began to characterise SLPP rule during this period were also manifested 
in its relations with the military. Under Albert Margai, for example, the proportion 
of Mende in the officer corps rose from 26 per cent to 52 per cent; far 
disproportionate to the Mende’s third of population, illustrating the gradual 
ingress of neo-patrimonial logic into the military institution.46  
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The consequences of this erosion of military institutional independence 
became clear during the first major electoral cycle following decolonisation. As 
the 1967 general election approached, eight officers were arrested for allegedly 
plotting a coup d’etat, including the Deputy Force Commander, a northerner 
called Colonel John Bangura. The charges were never proven, but the incident 
raised the political stakes and Margai subsequently requested a guarantee of 
military support from Guinea. The 1967 election was closely contested, and 
despite extensive vote-rigging and subversion, resulted in a marginal victory for 
the Temne-backed APC. Shortly after the APC leader Siaka Stevens was 
announced the winner, Brigadier Lansana led a clique of Mende military officers 
in a coup. Martial law was declared, the Governor-General and Stevens were 
arrested, and soldiers opened fire on protesting crowds killing about 30 
people.47 It appears the coup was initiated at the request of Lanana’s political 
patrons in the SLPP; primarily as a delaying tactic to allow Margai time to cajole 
Paramount Chiefs holding swing seats in parliament round to his cause, and 
thus provide a façade of legitimacy to his reinstatement as Prime Minister. 
However, Lansana failed to convene parliament, and two days later was himself 
overthrown by a group of army majors who had helped him instigate the initial 
coup. This “Officers’ Coup”, or “Majors’ Coup” as it became known, installed a 
joint military-police junta. Both coups were largely the result of the politicisation 
of the officer corps by the SLPP, and had benefitted from police and senior 
SLPP political support. The junta subsequently reflected the stance of non-
Margai elements of the SLPP who were disgruntled with his leadership in the 
run up to the unsuccessful 1967 election.48 
While the RSLMF was undoubtedly subject to ethnic stacking by the 
SLPP, this did not effectively coup proof the regime. Indeed, because Sierra 
Leone remained democratic, thus providing a legitimate mechanism for 
removing the incumbent governing party, the patrimonial stacking of the officer 
corps actually encouraged coups to prevent regime change. Equally though, the 
stacking of the officer corps does not appear to have ensured military 
subservience to the incumbent political leadership either. As the Officers’ Coup 
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highlights, the neo-patrimonial logic to SLPP ethnic stacking of the military 
meant that officers’ were beholden to a range of SLPP big men, drawing military 
officers into political infighting between different factions of the ruling party. 
While these dynamics are by no means unique to Sierra Leone, the civil-military 
interactions evident in the 1967 coups are more complex than the picture of 
ethnic stacking and coup proofing presented by Enloe and Peled.49 The 1967 
coups are better characterised by the rivalries between governing elites, 
described by Roessler as an ‘internal security dilemma’, rather than between in-
groups and out-groups.50 That said, while the Officers’ Coup may have reflected 
intra-group tensions among the southern Mende-dominated SLPP, it did little to 
ease resentment at being denied political power among the predominantly 
Temne and northern-backed APC. 
After a year-long interregnum, the Officers’ Junta was itself undone in a 
further putsch, this time by enlisted military personnel. This was the first act in a 
significant history of tensions between senior and junior elements of the 
RSLMF. Although the Officers’ Junta lacked public legitimacy, managing to 
alienate almost all sections of Sierra Leonean society through its social and 
economic policies, the Soldiers’ Coup was largely an internal military affair. It 
was headed by a group of senior non-commissioned officers, and described by 
Bebler as ‘an internal pay strike of the ranks for better conditions of service and 
for self-promotion’.51 All serving indigenous army and police officers were 
subsequently stripped of rank and uniform and jailed. Nonetheless, most of the 
participating soldiers were northern, and they reinstated the northern Colonel 
Bangura. Stevens was promptly restored as the elected Prime Minister, and 
initially headed a unity coalition government which put the leaders of the former 
junta on trial.52 Although it returned the country to (notionally) democratic civilian 
government, the counter-coup only served to further politicise the army and 
ethnicise politics.  
Stevens subsequently used patronage to consolidate his position, and in 
order to undercut potential Mende military opposition he appointed 
disproportionately high numbers of northern ethnic groups into the army. From 
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1968 onwards the army was purged of Mende officers, either through 
accusations of treason or by pensioning them off. All senior military 
appointments were held by northerners, who held their positions on the basis of 
personal loyalty to Stevens. As big men in their own right, these officers 
appropriated the state’s military resources for their own personal projects. 
Officers, and increasingly soldiers, were expected to be loyal to the APC rather 
than the nation, creating a view among Mende groups that the army had 
become a paramilitary wing of the APC. Many soldiers had to unofficially buy 
their enlistments, a prospect which was still economically attractive given the 
rice bounty received by recruits.53 Patrimonial recruitment became known as the 
‘card system’, under which appointments in the army would be handed out as 
favours by ministers to their supporters. An officer or potential recruit would 
approach an appropriate government big man who, for a fee, would provide his 
calling card and annotate the reverse with instructions for the hopeful’s 
appointment to a particular position in the armed forces or police.54 These 
policies exacerbated the country’s already present north-south divide and 
created a lasting disparity in the military, which remained almost exclusively 
northern well into the 1990s. Ultimately though, this helped create a self-fulfilling 
cycle of destabilising clientelism and resulting resentment and alienation in the 
RSLMF, akin to that observed by Nassif if the contemporary Syrian military.55 
As the APC gradually appropriated the armed forces, purging it of 
potentially disloyal members from other patrimonial networks, this decline in 
meritocracy and accountability was mirrored across government. The judiciary 
was politically neutered, and when contested, elections saw widespread use of 
violence and intimidation. Losing candidates were frequently the subject of 
highly public and extremely aggressive attacks. Keen has argued that this 
created a public understanding of politics as a zero-sum game, in which power 
became associated with physical strength and traditional mystic qualities, and 
losing was associated with personal peril and public shame.56 As Richards 
argued, this is an intrinsic feature of neo-patrimonialism, which ‘involves 
redistributing national resources as marks of personal favour to followers who 
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respond with loyalty to the leader rather than to the institution the leader 
represents.’57 Accordingly, first under the SLPP and then even more so under 
Stevens, neo-patrimonial relationships became the basis for both party political 
and personal power. For example, Stevens maintained a number of mobile 
generators at the President’s official residence, State House, which he could 
use to intervene in local affairs. If, for example, students protested at an 
interrupted power supply and local politicians lacked the funds to rectify the 
issue, Stevens could dispatch his generators and tell students, ‘see, if you had 
come to me first, without rioting, I could have fixed this for you earlier (as your 
“father”).’58 
Notwithstanding the divisive nature of patrimonial and ethnic politics, 
Sierra Leonean society itself remained largely intact. Inter-marriage between 
ethnic groups remained common, and Creole remained a lingua franca. The 
chiefly class was not destroyed, and elites of all groups continued to be 
educated side-by-side at the same English-speaking schools. For a time, the 
APC even managed to elicit significant support amongst some elements of the 
Mende population; notably among  disenfranchised southern ‘youngmen’ and 
deposed Mende chiefly houses seeking leverage in southern tribal politics.59 
However, Stevens’ patrimonial powerbase was maintained through patrimonial 
business dealings, which effectively hollowed-out the formal structures of the 
Sierra Leonean state. Accordingly, Stevens personally monopolised diamond 
mining and export, oil and rice importation and distribution, and control of the 
national airline, in conjunction with a small number of Lebanese businessmen.60 
The Lebanese community in Sierra Leone had grown to form a significant 
mercantile class, periodically expanding during bouts of conflict in Lebanon. 
One British officer later observed that as a group, the Lebanese appeared to 
particularly rely on patrimonial business dealings because, as a distinct 
immigrant community, they had little access to ethnic or tribal sources of social 
leverage.61 
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Despite Stevens’ attempts to subordinate the military through patronage 
and ethnic recruitment, the RSLMF remained both highly politicised and 
internally divided. This gave rise to a series of further attempted coups. In 1971, 
officers tried to assassinate Stevens and overthrow the government in order to 
prevent him from declaring the country a republic. A number of officers were 
later executed for their part in the plot, including the then force commander, 
Brigadier Bangura. In consequence, Freetown revoked the Freedom of the City 
which had been granted to the armed forces. That year, Sierra Leone became a 
republic with Stevens as the country’s first president. Following the formal 
declaration of the republic, the military was renamed the Republic of Sierra 
Leone Military Forces (still the RSLMF). At the same time, Stevens removed the 
right of appeal from court martials and began side-lining the army as a military 
force.62 In 1973, Stevens created a parallel paramilitary organisation called the 
Special Security Division (SSD), which acted as a shadow army to counter-
balance the regular military. This was initially called the Internal Security Unit, 
leading first to the satirical epithet ‘I shoot you’ for ISU, and later ‘Siaka Stevens’ 
Dogs’ after the unit was renamed. The SSD was trained by Cuba to relieve 
Stevens’ reliance on the Guinean military, and was heavily involved in internal 
repression. This paramilitary was more frequently armed than the regular army, 
and was used to keep political opponents and traditional rulers like the 
Paramount Chiefs in check.63 The paramilitary also acted as a praetorian guard, 
rivalling the regular army and lowering its relative prestige and influence. This 
generated lasting antagonisms in the Sierra Leonean military, which 
perpetuated the perceived need for counter-balancing political militias.  
However, the emergence of a rival political paramilitary did little to deter 
the heavily politicised and deeply divided military from further political activities. 
In 1974, elements of the military staged a further coup attempt, this time against 
the Vice-President while Stevens was out of the country. Its failure resulted in 
the execution of 15 conspirators by firing squad, the ex-Brigadier Lansana 
among them. In response, Stevens appointed both the military and police force 
commanders as members of parliament and later cabinet ministers, bringing the 
senior military leadership deeper into his personal network. In 1978, Sierra 
Leone formally became a one-party state; a path it had been informally 
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descending since Stevens took office. The powerful neo-patrimonial networks 
that spanned political party and military institution were similarly apparent in 
Stevens’ hand-picked successor, army commander Major General Joseph 
Momoh, who took over the Presidency in 1985. Although Momoh had come to 
power from the senior ranks of the army, this did not prevent further military 
attempts against his rule. In 1987 another alleged plot was uncovered, and the 
Vice-President and several soldiers were executed.64 Momoh did briefly attempt 
to improve the country’s human rights record and even mooted a return to multi-
party democracy – announcing multi-party elections in 1990 to be held in 1992 
– largely in the hope of garnering international aid.65 But the fundamentally neo-
patrimonial basis of APC rule remained consistent in the years before the Rebel 
War, and the concession came too late.  
The repeated coups which characterise Sierra Leonean civil-military 
relations between independence and civil war demonstrate a deeply politicised 
armed force. The growing politicisation of the armed forces during the period 
was, to a certain extent, the product of uniquely military factors. At somewhat 
under 100 including seconded British officers, the Sierra Leonean officer corps 
was very small.66 Indeed, in 1966 Sierra Leone’s total military strength 
numbered only 1,360 personnel, comprising one infantry battalion, an up 
country company, and a small naval detachment.67 This facilitated easy 
discourse amongst the officer corps and ensured that the threshold of support 
required for a military coup was relatively low, such that a small number of 
individuals (be they charismatic soldiers or civilian big men) could exercise a 
disproportionate influence over the wider armed forces. Moreover, the rapid 
indigenisation of the military during British decolonisation had led to some 
unusually rapid promotions, and consequent discrepancies of age and rank in 
the officer corps which generated professional grievances. The Sierra Leonean 
military also inherited a British colonial military structure, replete with significant 
disparities between officer and solider pay scales; a legacy which on the one 
hand provoked resentment among the soldiery, while on the other produced 
expectations about the status and lifestyle of officers that proved unsustainable 
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in the post-colonial state. Arguably, this dynamic was exacerbated by the fact 
that Sierra Leone’s legacy military establishment, while objectively very small, 
was nonetheless still somewhat bloated and unaffordable in relation to Sierra 
Leone’s post-colonial budget and level of external threat. With little external 
menace to focus on, the military was drawn towards internal intervention in a 
similar fashion to the role of British colonial units in imperial policing.68  
While the post-colonial military legacy may have facilitated politicisation, 
the active agent was the neo-patrimonial stacking of the military. Neo-
patrimonial subversion of institutional processes for promotion and recruitment 
saw the military begin to replicate the factional divisions present in wider Sierra 
Leonean civil society, especially in the officer corps. Indeed, the modest size of 
the military establishment only served to enable the relatively easy patrimonial 
subversion (and therefore politicisation) of a significant proportion of the officer 
corps. This matches the ethnic stacking and coup-proofing observed in other 
non-Western states;69 though in Sierra Leone, the patrimonial nature of politics 
meant these processes began even before the advent of an authoritarian one-
party state. This directly led to the coups of 1967, in which pro-SLPP officers 
intervened in the democratic process in support of their civilian patrons, and 
was mirrored in the neo-patrimonial character of military appointments under 
the APC, and in later attempts to unseat Stevens by southern officers, who had 
little recourse but to coups in order to further their careers. To a degree, this 
period in Sierra Leonean civil-military relations also supports Ronald Kreb’s 
assertion that wider political discourse about national and political identities 
directly shapes the nature of military inclusion.70 Yet the use of the SSD as a 
counterbalance to the military suggests that Stevens was not able to totally 
suborn the military institution, or to completely displace the influence of rival big 
men in the officer corps. In fact, the Sierra Leonean military did manage to 
retain the rump of some institutional capability during the pre-war years. In 
1989, for example, the Sierra Leone Army again deployed on Peace Support 
Operations overseas, contributing LEOBATT 1 to Liberia as part of the Cease-
fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) provided by the Economic Community for 
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West African States (ECOWAS), and continued to rotate a battalion through this 
deployment until 1998.71 Nonetheless, the decline in military accountability in 
Sierra Leone’s post-independence civil-military relations reflects the increasing 
neo-patrimonial hollowing out of the military institution, in parallel with the 
similar decline in the political conventions of Sierra Leonean democracy. 
Neo-Patrimonialism and the Rebel War 
In 1991, a group of rebels and mercenaries crossed the border from Liberia into 
Sierra Leone under the banner of the RUF, initiating Sierra Leone’s decade long 
Rebel War.72 While neo-patrimonial politics may have undermined the integrity 
of Sierra Leone’s armed forces, the proximate cause of the Rebel War was the 
escalating violence in neighbouring Liberia. The ease with which insecurity in 
Liberia spilled over into Sierra Leone reflects the shared ethnic, linguistic and 
cultural groups that straddled the common border, such that Hoffman views the 
two conflicts essentially as one unified ‘Mano River War’.73 The RUF movement 
was initially supported by Charles Taylor, the RUF leader Foday Sankoh having 
met Taylor in a training camp in Libya. In turn, many of the sentiments evident 
in early RUF ideology owe much to Gadhafi’s Green Book.74 But important as 
these regional dynamics are, they do not in of themselves explain how a 
relatively small rebel incursion ignited a protracted and brutal insurgency in 
Sierra Leone. Nor can they explain the Sierra Leonean state’s consistent 
inability defeat the rebels. 
As the war progressed, fighting increasingly centred on control of Kono’s 
diamond mines. Consequently, Paul Williams described the civil war in Sierra 
Leone as ‘linked inextricably to the pursuit of profit by those individuals and 
groups able to command the necessary force’.75 Williams nonetheless refuted 
Kaplan’s Malthusian thesis, arguing that: 
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‘the violence is not random, nor does it result from the senseless activities of 
psychopaths. Rather it follows a clear logic: the pursuit of commercial gain within 
the context of the country’s complex patrimonial system.’76 
Although individual greed undoubtedly played a role in the calculations of both 
individual fighters and their leaders, the Rebel War is best understood as a 
product of the collapse of Sierra Leone’s neo-patrimonial state. The attendant 
social unravelling this collapse unleashed provided the tinder for the RUF’s 
incursion to light. Under APC rule, Sierra Leone’s economy had declined 
rapidly. Food production fell and the country began to import significant 
amounts of rice, which became the key currency of patronage.77 At the same 
time, declining state revenues were stretched to maintain the façade of the 
formal state. In 1980, for example, Sierra Leone hosted the Organisation for 
African Unity summit, which cost the country a sum equivalent to its entire 
foreign exchange reserves.78 Official extractives production fell as some areas 
became mined out, and raw products were increasingly smuggled out of the 
country in return for foreign currency, itself in flight, in order to grease the 
wheels of the shadow state.79 In order to access foreign credit, President 
Momoh agreed to an International Monetary Fund structural adjustment 
programme with accompanying austerity measures. In 1978 the currency, the 
Leone, ceased to be pegged to sterling. In 1981, one Leone was worth 1.16 US 
dollars; by 1991, one US dollar bought 295 Leones.80 Government expenditure 
on health, public transport, and education fell dramatically, reducing the 
patrimonial benefits the formal state offered. Momoh attempted to maintain pay 
and rice for the armed forces, and deployed the military to crack down on 
diamond smuggling. While this removed the military from the capital, it did little 
for the state of discipline in the military. Rather than restoring customs revenue, 
the army became actively involved in the smuggling business, and by 1991 
units were refusing orders to quit the diamond districts.81 
The motivations presented by RUF members support this conception of 
the war as rooted in the failure of the formal and patrimonial state. To a certain 
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extent, the views of RUF fighters must be treated with caution. The motives of 
foot soldiers do not always accord with those of their leadership, and 
anthropologists have noted how the self-perceptions of RUF fighters rapidly 
changed in the altered post-war political climate. Nonetheless, these individual 
perceptions are compelling.82 RUF propaganda claimed that: 
‘There was no fairness and transparency in the system in Sierra Leone. Despite 
mineral riches, there was no development of roads, schools and health centres in 
rural areas. No one in government was listening.’83 
Peters’ work on the RUF makes clear that this propaganda rang true for many 
RUF recruits, both conscripts and volunteers alike. One woman who 
volunteered for the RUF in her early twenties recalled that, ‘We were suffering 
too much…The main reason was the lack of job facilities and lack of 
encouragement for the youth.’ Even those who were forcibly conscripted 
sometimes came to share this understanding of the war. A man in his late 
thirties who was indirectly coerced into joining later told Peters that, ‘we were 
fighting for awareness and also to have justice in the country.’84 The detrimental 
effects of neo-patrimonial collapse on education proved particularly significant. 
Education had traditionally been held in high esteem in Sierra Leonean society, 
and was viewed as a route to status and opportunity. Declining access to 
education resulting from state bankruptcy provoked widespread disaffection, 
and initial RUF cadres came from amongst the ranks of disaffected student 
radicals.85 The RUF movement tapped into currents of ethnic and regional 
tensions underlined by the patrimonial system. The majority of RUF fighters 
were politically-excluded Mende speakers from the southern districts along 
Sierra Leone’s eastern border, and accounts by victims of the RUF specifically 
described rebel fighters as Mende and noted their destruction of Temne lands.86 
Accordingly, society in RUF bush camps rejected pre-war social norms. 
The social hierarchy was inverted, with youth rather than age, wickedness 
rather than education, defining social status. RUF bush life became the 
conscious “other” of traditional society, and social taboos and norms were 
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deliberately, often ruthlessly, transgressed.87 Keen has argued that the RUF 
attempted to create a social environment without shame, in which 
transgressions served to bind the rebel movement together, a conclusion 
supported by Coulter’s research on women’s wartime experiences.88 Thus, the 
social dynamics of wartime combatants suggests that the greed-grievance 
dynamic is not a binary “either-or” motivation, but a dialectic in which greed and 
grievance interact like two sides of the same coin.89 In this sense, the Rebel 
War was not so much an ideological struggle as a reflection of the collapse of 
Sierra Leonean formal and shadow states. Accordingly, there is some truth in 
Peters’ description of the war as a ‘crisis of youth’, an understanding shared by 
Bøås and Dunn, who concluded that the war represented a crisis of modernity 
in which rebels ‘rage against the machine’ – specifically, the machinery of 
dysfunctional state institutions.90  
Politics and the Army at War 
The SLA was undoubtedly among these dysfunctional state institutions. A 
number of senior RUF commanders claimed military backgrounds, and Sankoh 
himself was a former corporal who had been imprisoned for his part in one of 
the many pre-war coups against Stevens.91 During the Rebel War, Sierra Leone 
was subjected to two extended periods of military rule, both partially the product 
of the RSLMF’s pre-war neo-patrimonial decline. The Rebel War accelerated 
the decline of the RSLMF as an institution, further subverting military identities 
and behavioural norms. But at the same time, the manifest incapability of the 
RSLMF as a fighting force also gave rise to new trends in Sierra Leonean civil-
military relations. Just as Bruneau and Matei have called into question the 
emphasis on civilian control as the defining paradigm of civil-military thought, 
instead highlighting the importance of military effectiveness and efficiency,92 so 
the RSLMF’s battlefield impotence shaped both governmental and military 
attitudes to politics and the use of force. 
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The NPRC Coup 
At the outbreak of the conflict, the RSLMF struggled to deal with the escalating 
violence and the RUF quickly gained ground. Supported by various Liberian 
anti-Taylor militia groups operating in Sierra Leone, the military counter-
attacked in late 1991, and began to push the RUF back towards the border. Yet 
this temporary success only served to drive the RUF into an insurgent 
campaign of hit-and-run guerrilla warfare, which rapidly extended their influence 
across the south of the country. In April 1992, a group of army officers from the 
front mutinied, and proceeded to oust President Momoh. Captain Valentine 
Strasser was installed as the head of a military junta called the National 
Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). Kandeh characterised the NPRC coup as 
the product of a “militariat”; a proletariat of junior officers and enlisted soldiers in 
the military, responsible for doing the fighting but largely insulated from the 
clientelist and patrimonial benefits of military politicisation enjoyed by senior 
commanders. Kandeh argued that the militariat in African armed forces were 
uniquely disposed to political instability, being both politically disenfranchised 
and in active possession of the instrument of coercive force. Yet, without any 
unifying political agenda, Kandeh concluded that militariat coups – the NPRC 
included – benefited only those soldiers actively involved in the putsch, while 
further undermining governmental institutions and military discipline.93 
Matching the militariat concept, the NPRC coup was carried out by a 
coterie of front-line junior officers, largely from a single battalion, motivated by 
disgruntlement at the regime’s inability to sufficiently resource the war effort. 
Strasser and the NPRC were familiar with the RUF’s appeal to the country’s 
disaffected youth, and initially won a degree of popular support for the NPRC 
through anti-corruption rhetoric, street clean-ups, and the promise to return the 
country to democracy. Nonetheless, the NPRC simultaneously continued with 
previous coup-proofing trends in Sierra Leonean civil-military relations, 
executing a number of pro-APC army and police officers and posting others to 
the front. After a brief hiatus, the NPRC began to prosecute the campaign 
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against the RUF with added vigour.94 While the NPRC plotters may well 
epitomise Kandeh’s conception of a militariat, the NPRC coup equally reflects 
the enduring weakness of the institutions of the RSLMF. At the start of the war, 
the SLA had been a small and largely ceremonial force, militarily neutered by 
the political infighting of the APC years. In order to meet the rising RUF threat, 
the military had been expanded rapidly from among Freetown’s disaffected and 
unemployed youth. As the war escalated, political infighting within the officer 
corps also continued, and prior to the NPRC coup at least one prominent army 
commander was murdered by a rival army faction.95 
Although the NPRC was initially able to make inroads against the RUF, 
the military institution continued to decay under the junta. The NPRC continued 
Momoh’s pattern of recruitment, bringing large numbers of Freetown’s 
disaffected youth into the army, typically with as little as 19 to 21 days training.96 
Drug use became common, and marijuana and cocaine were actually issued to 
troops in an attempt to prop up their flagging combat prowess. The consumption 
of gunpowder acquired from ammunition as a stimulant also became common 
practice.97 Far from strengthening the military, the institutional fabric of the 
RSLMF began to further disintegrate under the NPRC. The SLA developed a 
reputation for “sobel”, or soldier-rebel, behaviour. Rogue soldiers became pre-
occupied with the spoils of illegal mining, and joined the RUF’s “sell-game” of 
looting, violence and appropriation in an apparent distortion of the pre-war 
shadow state’s practices. Some of this activity was actively supported by the 
NPRC as a means of generating the income needed to maintain its rule. In 
1992, for example, Kono was overrun by the RUF largely because troops 
commanded by Strasser were busy mining diamonds.98 By 1994, discipline in 
the RSLMF had declined to such a degree that it was becoming increasingly 
unclear which incidents were carried out by the RUF and which by renegade 
soldiers. In February that year, 400 soldiers from Teko Barracks in Makeni 
deserted east so as not to be left out of the plunder. As the RUF sphere of 
operations extended further west and north, rebels were frequently seen 
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wearing elements of RSLMF uniform.99 In late 1994, the NPRC publically 
admitted that it considered at least one fifth of its armed forces actively 
disloyal.100 In January 1995, when rumours circulated that the RUF were 
planning to attack the SIEROMCO bauxite mine in the Mokanji Hills, local 
soldiers removed the company’s heavy machinery along with their protection, 
and left the site to the mercy of RUF looting. Officers subsequently sold off the 
company’s stolen equipment for private profit in Freetown and Bo.101 As Keen 
and Hoffman noted, collusion between rebels and sobels created a situation in 
which, to many soldiers, continuing the war appeared far more profitable than 
ending it.102 
As a consequence of the SLA’s growing inability (or unwillingness) to 
provide either state security or human security, the Rebel War gave rise to a 
host of alternate security providers. In addition to sponsoring Liberian militias, 
Sierra Leone signed a mutual defence agreement with Nigeria, and the Nigerian 
military subsequently become heavily involved in the command and control of 
the SLA, and in prosecuting the war directly via ECOWAS.103 The period also 
saw the rise of various civil defence militias. These militias had initially grown 
out of the hunting society traditions of Mende villages as a spontaneous 
response to rural insecurity. Typically referred to as the Kamajor or Kamajoisia 
after the most powerful southern Mende groups, they also included ethnic 
northern organisations like the Tamaboros. While the Kamajor militias 
appropriated traditional hunting customs and rites, including the extensive use 
of Juju amulets or cross-dressing as magical protection from bullets,104 most of 
their members were recruited from the same class of disaffected youth which 
populated the RUF (and increasingly the SLA). As such, the Kamajor were in 
many respects a new militia movement.105 Though initially supported by the 
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SLA as an auxiliary counter-insurgency force, as sobels began to pose a similar 
threat to human security as the RUF, these militias became equally antagonistic 
to the RSLMF. Despite their belief in witchcraft, these local defence 
organisations could prove surprisingly effective. In December 1994, for 
example, a spontaneous uprising of civilian militiamen in Bo kept both the army 
and the RUF at bay for a week.106 
Strasser also contracted the South African mercenary firm Executive 
Outcomes (EO) to prosecute the war on behalf of his regime. This recourse to 
EO was a direct reflection of the RSLMF’s military weakness and its impact on 
civil-military relationships.107 Initially, the NPRC government had hired a private 
security company staffed by ex-British army Gurkhas, but the firm withdrew 
after its American head was killed in an RUF attack.108 Instead, EO supplied the 
NPRC with former professional soldiers from the South African military to train 
the SLA and Kamajor militias, and to provide technical support and command 
and control expertise. Under EO direction, the SLA and the Kamajor were able 
to retake the Kono diamond mining district from the RUF, and subsequently 
destroy the RUF stronghold in the Kangari hills. Much of the actual combat 
power during this campaign was manned by EO directly; most notably, a 
number of ex-Soviet helicopter gunships.109 The NPRC paid EO US$15 million 
along with diamond mining concessions in newly-recaptured Kono, reputedly 
totalling over US$30 million. Accordingly, Executive Outcomes’ British sister 
firm, Branch Energy, became a significant shareholder in various Sierra 
Leonean diamond mines.110 
While operationally effective against the RUF, this period of EO-led 
capacity building was both symptomatic of, and further deleterious to, the poor 
state of civil-military relations, emboldening a faction in the NPRC. With EO’s 
military successes turning the tide of the war against the RUF, pressure was 
increasing in Freetown to hold elections no later than early 1996 and return the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
members of the RUF to explain their combat experience. See  Peters, op. cit., pp. 22-31; Keen, 
op. cit., pp. 102-5. 
106 Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forest, op. cit., p. 15. 
107 Keen, op. cit., p. 151. 
108 Peters, op. cit., p. 69. 
109 David Shearer, ‘Private Armies and Military Intervention’, Adelphi Paper 316 (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1998); Hoffman, War Machines, op. cit., pp. 44. 39-43; Keen, op. cit., pp. 151-
2. 
110 Shearer, op. cit.; Keen, op. cit., pp. 151-2; Peters, op. cit., p. 69. 
114 
 
country to democracy. Yet, those in the NPRC who had benefitted from the 
RSLMF’s sobel activities viewed the prospect of both peace and democracy as 
a direct threat to their political power and sources of illicit wealth.111 On 15 
January 1996, Strasser was overthrown in a palace coup by his deputy, Julius 
Maada Bio, who replaced him as chairman of the NPRC. A lieutenant at the 
time of the NPRC coup, Bio subsequently appointed himself a brigadier and 
acted as the main liaison between the NPRC and EO, who may also have 
colluded in his coup.112 
Bio held talks with the rebels in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, on the basis that 
peace should be pursued instead of the promised elections. The RUF’s 
willingness to negotiate was undoubtedly a product of EO’s military strength, 
and it seems that Bio’s reconciliation with the RUF was also facilitated by the 
fact that his elder sister had risen to a senior position in the RUF. Equally 
though, both the NPRC under Bio and the RUF found common cause in stalling 
elections, realising that democracy would mutually threaten their position and 
business interests.113 Bio nonetheless publically assented to hold elections, but 
colluded with the RUF to undermine the process behind the scenes. In February 
1996, for example, the homes of the Electoral Commission head and the 
leading opposition SLPP presidential candidate, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, were 
attacked with gunfire and grenades before a conference scheduled to decide on 
election dates. Soldiers were suspected of carrying out the attacks, and NPRC 
troops later engaged in the widespread intimidation of voters.114 Up-country, 
sobels colluded with the RUF in a brutal campaign of amputations, chopping off 
voters’ hands and thumbs in a symbolic attempt to prevent the electorate 
casting their votes. Victims were reputedly asked whether they wanted “short or 
long sleeves” – amputation at the wrist or at the elbow.115 
Despite attempts to derail the democratic process, presidential elections 
were held, and on 29 March 1996, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was sworn in as 
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president. He inherited a disaffected and disloyal military, an economy in ruins, 
and the civil war in a state of suspended animation. In November 1996, Kabbah 
signed the Abidjan Accords with RUF leader Sankoh in the face of mounting 
international pressure. In return for RUF demobilisation and amnesty, EO were 
required to leave the county. Instead, international peacekeepers would be 
deployed, and the British and Americans agreed to supply military trainers to 
rebuild a national army. Unfortunately, these efforts proved lukewarm. 
According to Kabbah, the joint UK-US training team consisted of just five 
soldiers who were promptly withdrawn after a mutiny at the SLA’s Benguema 
training centre.116 During 1996, elements of the military staged two further coup 
attempts against Kabbah’s government, the first in September and again in 
December.117 Kabbah was increasingly forced to rely on the Nigerian military, 
and on the Kamajor militia. Predominantly drawn from the SLPP’s traditional 
southern Mende heartlands, the Kamajor had been brought under central 
government control under the title of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF). The 
Kamajor’s right to bear arms was legalised, and the CDF umbrella organisation 
was headed by Chief Hinga Norman, who became the SLPP Deputy Defence 
Minister.118 The reliance Kabbah’s new SLPP government placed on the 
Kamajor over the SLA was to have a further destabilising effect on civil-military 
relations. As EO left the country following the Abidjan Accord, the RUF promptly 
reneged on the agreement, throwing Sierra Leone into crisis once again.119 
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The AFRC Coup 
On 25 May 1997, Freetown was subjected to yet another military coup, forcing 
President Kabbah to set up a government-in exile in Guinea. This latest coup 
was carried out by junior SLA soldiers acting against both Kabbah’s government 
and the senior military hierarchy; the latest act in a long trend of internal 
divisions in the RSLMF. Shortly after the coup took place, Riley contended that 
the putsch was again the product of a militariat of junior elements in the armed 
forces. As such, Riley concluded that the coup was ‘wholly self-serving’, and 
largely the result of particularly military grievances.120 The Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) junta that the coup established was certainly 
dominated by junior soldiers, with 17 of the 22 positions in the AFRC 
government occupied by NCOs. The AFRC installed Johnny Paul Koroma as its 
leader, an SLA major then in prison for his part in a previous putsch attempt. 
According to Koroma, the AFRC plotters stormed the prison and forced him to 
be their leader on pain of death, and subsequently had to be restrained from 
killing the SLA’s senior officers.121 Following the coup, Brigadier Khobe, a 
Nigerian officer serving Sierra Leone, observed that AFRC ‘soldiers daily 
humiliated the entire Officer Corps. The situation was so bad that Corporals and 
other NCOs who initiated the mutiny demanded that officers should pay them 
compliments’ such that the ‘effort to overthrow the democratic order was only a 
by-product’ of the internal tensions between officers and soldiers in the army.122 
The proximate causes of the AFRC coup also tend to support Riley’s 
“militariat” conclusion. Much of the tensions between junior and senior ranks in 
the SLA were the direct result of patrimonial (and indeed, outright corrupt) 
practices among the RSLMF’s senior officers, which had caused significant 
discontent among their subordinates. Peter Penfold, the British High 
Commissioner in Sierra Leone at the time, later ascribed the coup to 
‘disaffection in the army, especially within the lower ranks, and the corruption in 
the army, especially within the senior ranks’. The spark which ignited the coup 
was an attempt by Kabbah to reign in senior RSLMF officers’ patrimonial 
dealings. Although the military was drawing rice for its full establishment of 
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15,000, it transpired that it only actually contained around half that number of 
active soldiers, with senior officers privately profiting from the unofficial surplus. 
According to Penfold, when Kabbah informed officers that he would be reducing 
the army’s rice allocation in line with its actual strength, senior officers decided 
to reduce soldier’s allocations rather than forego their lucrative trade in issued 
rice, sparking a mutiny on 17 May. The AFRC coup then followed.123 The neo-
patrimonial behaviour of SLA officers had evidently eroded the bonds of trust, 
authority and responsibility which obligated soldiers to their officers, resulting in 
a brittle institution. Ironically, it was precisely this sort of behaviour which 
Kabbah appears to have been attempting to reign in.  
The AFRC coup similarly reflected a simmering tension between the SLPP 
government and the military over the role of the Kamajors. Under pressure from 
the IMF, Kabbah had sought to downsize the army from an establishment of 
15,000 to around 4,000, prompting much resentment among the SLA. At the 
same time, the Kamajors were unofficially permitted to increase in strength to 
the region of 15-20,000 fighters, in order to provide the government with some 
sort of reliable military force.124 The subsequent relationship between the SLA 
and Hinga Norman is illustrative. Penfold commented that, ‘The army did not 
respect him and he did not trust the army’.125 The AFRC claimed that their coup 
was the direct result of ‘a pattern of marginalizing and disregarding the army’ in 
favour of the Kamajor.126 Johnny Paul Koroma himself cited the ‘degrading step 
of imposing a 6 o’clock curfew on all soldiers in Southern and Eastern provincial 
towns and cities’ – enforced by the Kamajor – as particularly inflammatory.127 In 
March 1997, just a few months before the AFRC coup, this tension between the 
SLA and the Kamajor boiled over to such a degree that the army’s Chief of Staff 
purportedly issued orders to the SLA to ‘shoot-to-kill’ Kamajor militiamen in 
areas of core interest to the SLA.128 For their part, the Kamajor undeniably 
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posed a direct threat to the military. On 3 May 1997, for instance, the Kamajor 
launched an all-out assault on an SLA brigade headquarters in Kenema.129  
Once in control, however, the AFRC invited the RUF to share power, 
prompting the sack of Freetown in a week-long orgy of looting, violence and 
rape carried out by sobels and rebels alike.130 Keen argued that in reality, the 
ostensibly unlikely alliance between the AFRC and the RUF equated to little 
more than a transfer of ‘covert collusion “up-country”…to the capital’, driven 
largely by AFRC soldiers’ desires to maintain profitable sobel activities.131 In 
consequence, Gberie rejected Riley’s militariat argument. Like Riley, Gberie 
found the root causes in the AFRC coup in the identity of the junior ranks of the 
SLA, but considered that it was the AFRC-RUF union after the coup which was 
defining. Gberie concluded that the junior ranks of the military were largely ‘from 
a social category which, irrespective of their colours, remain criminally disposed 
and undisciplined. They are the so-called “lumpens” of Sierra Leone society.’132 
According to this view, military grievances were little more than a post hoc cover 
for the coupists, who found common cause with the RUF because they shared 
the same disenfranchised, anarchistic street-culture, rendering the coup 
essentially criminal rather than political in nature. Following the coup, the joint 
AFRC-RUF force referred to itself as the ‘People’s Army’, and informally dubbed 
the looting of Freetown as ‘Operation Pay Yourself’. The institutions of Sierra 
Leonean statehood were prominently targeted in the widespread lawlessness 
which followed the coup.133 Similarly, Gberie noted that AFRC soldiers went 
about in civilian clothes rather than military fatigues, and tore the badges of rank 
from those still in uniform, such that the AFRC’s conduct went beyond 
‘institutional instability: there was no longer any institution to speak of’.134 
Yet, at the same time, Gberie noted that many of the politicians and a 
number of officers who found common cause with the AFRC junta (and may 
have helped to instigate it) were in fact associated with the previous ousted 
NPRC and APC regimes. These included the NPRC’s former defence minister, 
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Colonel Tom Nyuma, and the elder brother of Brigadier Bio.135 Likewise, the 
RUF and AFRC elements of the ‘People’s Army’ appeared less than cohesive, 
and in the first few weeks after the coup a number of firefights erupted at the 
junta’s headquarters between the two factions.136 Indeed, the AFRC was not 
itself politically united, first seeing off a counter-coup from senior officers a 
month into its rule, and again in November following internal conflict over 
diamond mining revenues.137 Significantly, the AFRC coup was carried out to a 
background of discontent among elements of the military and their former 
political patrons at the prospect of increasing democratic accountability, 
parliament having revoked the promised immunity for former members of the 
NPRC in December 1996.138 Gberie himself conceded that the AFRC was ‘only 
a cruder replay of the NPRC rule’ – though admittedly one in which sobel 
desires were exploited to the full.139 
In October 1997, UN Security Council Resolution 1132 established an 
embargo on Sierra Leone and empowered ECOWAS to enforce it.140 Nigeria 
increased its forces in Sierra Leone, and ECOWAS-led negotiations produced 
the Conakry Plan, under which the AFRC agreed to demobilise and allow 
President Kabbah to return to office.  Yet again RUF and AFRC elements 
reneged on the agreement, and the CDF continued to fight on behalf of the 
SLPP administration in exile. Hostilities culminated in the recapture of Freetown 
by ECOMOG in March 1998.141 President Kabbah was reinstated in Freetown, 
but ECOMOG proved unable to extend its influence outside the capital. By July 
1998 the UN had established an Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) 
under Security Council Resolution 1181.142 This had little immediate effect, and 
over Christmas 1998 the US evacuated international residents, and the British 
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Army also began to assess the crisis from a military perspective.143 In January, 
AFRC-RUF elements again entered the suburbs of Freetown, skirmishing with 
Nigerian troops and loyalist SLA elements and committing widespread atrocities 
during the so-called ‘Operation No Living Thing’.144 The British government 
subsequently pledged £20 million to prop-up Kabbah’s military position, but also 
pushed for the reopening of negotiations with the RUF. Yet again, the political 
situation in Sierra Leone was beholden to the military weakness and political 
unreliability of the RSLMF. 
The Lomé Peace Accord, signed in July 1999, constituted a power-
sharing agreement between Kabbah and the RUF, in which Sankoh was 
awarded the status of vice-president and retained control over diamond mining. 
Lomé thus reflected the continued weakness of the SLA and its inability to 
militarily defeat the RUF. Despite the favourable terms of the Lomé settlement, 
the RUF still proved loathe to end their campaign, and Sankoh was unperturbed 
by the arrival of the UN peacekeeping Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), 
which was authorised to enforce Lomé’s implementation under UN Security 
Council Resolution 1270.145 Kabbah’s restoration to Freetown also saw a further 
splintering of AFRC factions, with elements loyal to Johnny Paul Koroma taking 
to the bush as the West Side Boys.146 It is not clear if Sankoh still retained 
control over the RUF movement, but by early May 2000 the RUF was on the 
offensive again despite his arrest in Nigeria. Several hundred UN peacekeepers 
were either taken prisoner by the RUF or besieged in their compounds. The 
rebels once again threatened Freetown, precipitating widespread panic among 
the population. As the former colonial power, Britain then decided to intervene 
militarily; first to extract British citizens, and subsequently to stabilise Kabbah’s 
democracy, militarily destroy the RUF, and rebuild Kabbah’s army as the 
Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF). 
                                                          
143 Brigadier David Richards, ‘Operation Palliser’, Journal of the Royal Artillery, 127:2 (2000), p. 
10; General David Richards, Taking Command (London, Headline, 2014), p. 116.  
144 Caroline Hawley, ‘A Country Torn by Conflict’, BBC News, 12 January 1999, online at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special_report/1999/01/99/sierra_leone/251377.stm, accessed 
25/03/15; Keen, op. cit., pp. 227-47. 
145 United Nations, ‘UN Security Council resolution 1270 on the Situation in Sierra Leone’, 22 
October 1999, online at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/315/02/PDF/N9931502.pdf?OpenElement, accessed on 
25/03/15. 
146 Mats Utas & Magnus Jörgel, ‘The West Side Boys: Military Navigation in the Sierra Leone 




Neo-patrimonial systems are defined by the relationships between patrons and 
clients, or big men and their networks, through which power flows. Because the 
basis for generating political support in a neo-patrimonial system is 
fundamentally transactional, as Bøås has argued, ‘the essence of politics is 
distribution of scarce resources’.147 While these relationships are transactional 
and therefore fluid, in Sierra Leone these inter-dependent relationships of 
mutual loyalty and obligation have tended to overlap with dominant ethnic, 
geographic and class-based demographics, as patrimonial relationships grew 
out of familial, social and business networks. Patrimonial dynamics significantly 
pre-dated the founding of the colonial state, and largely survived its growth. 
Indeed, in some respects, the shift from patrimonialism to neo-patrimonialism, 
the latter defined by accommodation with the more formal institutions of the 
British imperial state, actually entrenched patrimonial tendencies.148 While 
Grissom has rightly highlighted that such neo-patrimonial systems, which he 
calls ‘limited-access orders’ can be essentially stable (though frequently less 
than ordered),149 the tensions between the demands of formal state institutions 
and the neo-patrimonial ‘shadow state’ in Sierra Leone ultimately proved 
destabilising, with significant implications for Sierra Leonean civil-military 
relations.150 
In the years after independence, the nascent institutions of the RSLMF 
proved unable to resist high levels of patrimonial recruitment, particularly in the 
officer corps, which came to disproportionately reflect the social and ethnic 
groups that made up the ruling SLPP government. Moreover, the nature of neo-
patrimonial recruitment meant that these officers not only held common cause 
with the incumbent regime, but owed personal allegiance to its big men, as their 
positions were reliant on their continued status as reliable political appointees. 
This led directly to the first military coup in Sierra Leone following the SLPP’s 
poor electoral performance in 1967, undermining the democratic process.151 
The use of political appointees and ethnic stacking to bind the RSLMF to its 
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political big men is symptomatic of wider coup-proofing trends in civil-military 
relations.152 Just as Nassif observed that ethnic stacking and coup-proofing has 
produced significant discontent and reduced military effectiveness in the Syrian 
military,153 so it fostered divisions in the RSLMF officer corps. These served to 
further politicise the armed forces, and may have contributed to the counter-
coup which eventually installed Siaka Stevens and the APC in power.154 Yet, 
unlike other instances of coup-proofing, where ethnic stacking typically reflects 
a regime’s pre-existing sectarian or authoritarian nature, in Sierra Leone it 
served to undermine military accountability, because the big men whose 
positions it supported were themselves still subject to democratically-initiated 
regime change.155 
The political nature of military recruitment during the early post-colonial 
years effectively served to exclude certain groups from the political community, 
in a fashion reminiscent of Enloe and Krebs’ theories.156 The partisan direction 
of military recruitment was reversed during Stevens’ rule, rendering the SLPP’s 
army subservient to the APC regime; but the neo-patrimonial mechanisms 
through which this was achieved only intensified.157 However, the absorption of 
senior officers into the APC, notably in the person of Stevens’ successor 
General Momoh, did not render the RMSLF subservient to (one-party APC) 
civilian authority. Indeed, the creation of the SSD highlights the regime’s 
discomfort at the reliability of its own armed forces, further precipitating their 
institutional stagnation. Instead, the politicisation of the armed forces under 
Stevens appears to have produced further divisions in the military, between 
patrimonial in-groups and out-groups, and between networked officers and 
alienated soldiers. On the one hand, the repeated coup attempts during the pre-
war years reinforces Barany’s assertion that military acquiescence to political 
change is vital to success; yet at the same time, it demonstrates that where 
military factions align with wider civilian interest groups, the military may still 
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pose a threat to political leaders while becoming simultaneously impotent as an 
armed force.158 
The same neo-patrimonial dynamics that undermined the quality of civil-
military relations also significantly account for the root causes and brutal course 
of the Rebel War. Although the proximate cause lay in the neighbouring 
Liberian civil war, Keen and Richards have demonstrated how the slow decay of 
both the formal and ‘shadow state’ in Sierra Leone reduced the state’s capacity 
to respond to the RUF incursion and, at least initially, helped foster armed 
opposition.159 This assessment is well supported by sociological studies of 
wartime combatants, their motives and understandings of the conflict.160 Indeed, 
the depth of insurgency the RUF incursion provoked must in part be attributed 
to the weak capacity of the RSLMF to effectively conduct security operations – 
itself a product of the politicised nature of the force. The sobel “sell-game” which 
developed during the war, leading to elements of the military effectively 
becoming yet another rebel faction, also reflects the nature of pre-war neo-
patrimonial politics. As political power was based on economic relationships, in 
which political loyalty was fundamentally transactional, when the formal state 
collapsed, all that remained was a belief that politics was essentially a personal 
business.161 The fact that soldiers’ behaviour ultimately mirrored that of the RUF 
only serves to highlight the normative collapse of the RSLMF. Neo-patrimonial 
recruitment and promotion hollowed out the institutional influence of RSLMF 
training, discipline, and career progression, such that by 1998, the military had 
ceased to be a coherent body. 
With regard to the relationship between RSLMF institutional decay and 
its political proclivities, the two wartime coups are particularly instructive. While 
the NPRC coup was initially a military affair, largely provoked by the poor state 
of the wartime effort and the alienation of front-line officers, it was nonetheless 
facilitated by the political divisions in the officer corps. Kandeh characterised 
this coup as the product of a militariat of junior soldiers, isolated from the 
benefits of the neo-patrimonial system. While the initial military grievances of 
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the NPRC coup tend to support this assertion, when viewed in context the 
NPRC coup was simply the latest in a long line of politically-inspired military 
coups. The subsequent behaviour of the NPRC was certainly equally neo-
patrimonial, despite their greater focus on effective military operations.162 
Although Riley has argued that the later AFRC coup followed the same militariat 
dynamic,163 the character of the AFRC appears decidedly different. The AFRC 
received political backing from former NPRC and APC big men, who saw an 
opportunity to arrest their political obsolescence under Kabbah’s democratically 
elected administration. However, the AFRC’s key plotters, their common cause 
with the RUF and the sobel identities and behaviour they exhibited, lend 
credence to Gberie’s more sociological reading.164 That said, it is too easy to 
dismiss the violence of the AFRC-RUF ‘People’s Army’ as merely the product of 
criminally disposed lumpen thugs. While sobels and rebels undoubtedly shared 
similar social backgrounds, wartime experiences and pre-war grievances, the 
AFRC did still articulate particular military identities (albeit while wearing jeans 
and t-shirts). This was especially true of their relationship with the Kamajor. 
The military weakness of the RSLMF saw the consistent use of 
paramilitary, mercenary, and non-traditional security providers during the war. 
To a certain extent, this was simply an extension of pre-war trends in Sierra 
Leonean civil-military relations, which had already seen the creation of the SSD 
as a counter-balancing political paramilitary. Yet, the institutional collapse of the 
RSLMF during the war saw this practice expanded on an unpreceded scale, 
including by the military-dominated NPRC, who were equally unable to curb 
sobel indiscipline. To a degree, the use of private security contractors to 
prosecute the war reflected a wider Western trend in military outsourcing which 
developed in the late 1990s – and one which did not go without caution from 
scholars of democratic civil-military relations.165 While EO proved highly 
effective in combatting the RUF, their economic stake in Sierra Leonean 
diamond concessions rendered them a destabilising force in Sierra Leonean 
civil-military relations. They had little objection to Julius Maada Bio’s coup 
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despite his obstruction of the democratic process. The relative stability achieved 
by EO operations proved short-lived, and rendered Kabbah’s government 
beholden to external security providers – an error which enabled the AFRC 
coup.166 In retrospect, the NPRC’s recourse to EO serves to underline the 
institutional collapse of the RSLMF, while calling to mind Machiavelli’s warning 
against the dubious loyalties of mercenary troops.167 
In many respects, the rise of the Kamajor appears to have had far more 
pernicious consequences for Sierra Leonean civil-military relations. The strong 
links between the SLPP’s political powerbase and Kamajor recruitment created 
a perception that the militia were effectively the SLPP’s private army. This not 
only perpetuated the neo-patrimonial relationship between political power and 
private military force, but further aggravated relations between the remnants of 
the RSLMF and Kabbah’s government.168 Though Kabbah arguably had little 
choice but to rely on the CDF after the AFRC coup, the legacy of the CDF was 
to have a lasting impact on SLPP-RSLMF relations, calling into question claims 
by Ahram that warlordic militias can provide the basis for more fundamental 
national development.169 
At the point of British intervention, the culture of the RSLMF was defined 
by neo-patrimonialism. Pre-war civil-military relations were shaped by neo-
patrimonialism, and had remade the internal practices of the pre-war military in 
the same image, subverting institutional identities for political ones, and shaping 
Sierra Leonean soldiers’ wartime behaviour accordingly. By 2000, the RSLMF 
was a divided and ineffective shell. Its officers and soldiers were split along 
political lines between supporters of Kabbah’s government, those affiliated to 
the NPRC or AFRC, and those former soldiers who had effectively become 
independent bands of sobels. Not only had democratic civil-military relations 
ceased to be in any conventional sense, so had the military as a unified 
institution. Moreover, political rivalries between elements of the RSLMF and the 
Kamajor effectively rendered President Kabbah’s position untenable without 
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international aid. This situation was substantially the product of the neo-
patrimonial decay of the RSLMF under successive pre-war governments, and it 
was this neo-patrimonial culture which later British-led change attempted to 
address in the Sierra Leonean military. The process of externally-led change, 
and the successes and limitations experienced in addressing this neo-
patrimonial culture in the Sierra Leonean military, are examined in Chapters 6, 7 
and 8 of this thesis. The next chapter, however, will first turn to the politics 
behind British intervention in the Rebel War. This, together with the neo-
patrimonial military culture this chapter has examined, defined the landscape of 
post-intervention military change in Sierra Leone. 
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5. The Politics of British Intervention in Sierra Leone 
 
This chapter will examine the politics behind British intervention in the Rebel 
War and its impact on post-conflict military change in Sierra Leone. The 
exportation of Western civil-military norms by interventionists is inevitably 
subject to the intersection of international and local political agendas. Grissom’s 
study of capacity building in the ANA argued that it was the misalignment 
between Western values and local political agendas that ultimately prevented 
genuine change.1 Analogously, even in cases of national military innovation, 
this interaction between ground-level change and strategic or metropolitan 
priorities has been crucial to success. Harkness and Hunzeker observed that 
the British military’s ability to adapt during counter-insurgency operations in the 
Cameroons in the early 1960s was primarily limited by the British Government, 
which concluded that the benefits of local change were outweighed by the 
political and opportunity costs of continuing to invest in a strategically marginal 
periphery.2 Specifically examining externally-led defence reform, Cleary likewise 
observed that the strategic reality perceived by interventionists and hosts were 
frequently divergent, creating a fundamental tension. In British praxis, for 
example, Cleary found that the imperatives which shaped local national civil-
military interactions were often significantly different from the strategic concerns 
which preoccupied British intervention.3 Marten has similarly argued that while 
patrimonial armed groups can be incorporated into state security apparatus for 
counter-insurgency, the mutual exclusivity of warlordic political mores and the 
centralising vision of the legal-rational Weberian state may nonetheless hinder 
long-term state transformation.4 Indeed, these dynamics form a central criticism 
of liberal state-building more widely, namely, that liberal interventions privilege 
Western agendas over local agency, resulting in inherently limited outcomes.5 
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Undoubtedly, the British military deployment to Sierra Leone in 2000 
altered the trajectory of the Rebel War, drawing the UK into a prolonged state-
building endeavour in which the reform of the RSLMF featured prominently. Yet, 
the strategic rationale behind British intervention in Sierra Leone is less than 
clear. Writing shortly after the intervention began, Williams concluded that 
‘Britain’s geostrategic interests and investments in Sierra Leone are negligible’, 
and indeed, the initial mandate of British forces was simply to evacuate British 
citizens.6 Instead, the British military commander on the ground, Brigadier David 
Richards, has been charged with unilaterally leading British foreign policy “from 
the ground up” – a perception which, in retirement, Richards has himself been 
happy to perpetuate.7 Certainly, when the British CDS arrived in Sierra Leone to 
assess the situation during the initial intervention, known as Operation Palliser, 
he replied to press questions about British intentions simply: ‘if we had a plan, 
we wouldn’t tell you.’8 Consequently, subsequent British military officers serving 
in Sierra Leone have described Operation Palliser as ‘essentially altruistic and 
conducted for humanitarian motives’.9 Humanitarian agendas should not be 
dismissed, but in contrast, scholars have tended to view the intervention as a 
product of converging international and domestic pressures acting on the British 
Government.10 Yet, it is not clear that this convergence remained consistent 
throughout the British effort in Sierra Leone. Varisco, for instance, contended 
that while British intervention was initially reactive and driven by events on the 
ground – perhaps because of an absence of defining strategic interests – this 
period helped give form to nascent SSR policy, which itself later provided a 
strategic guide for subsequent reforms.11 
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If the UK did not possess particular strategic interests in Sierra Leone, 
what motives did impel its intervention in the Rebel War? How did these interact 
with local political agendas to shape the nature of wartime and post-war 
defence reform? If the escalation of British commitment to Sierra Leone resulted 
from a divergence between British officers on the ground and their political 
masters in Whitehall, to what extent were the later policies of the British-led 
IMATT affected by factionalism among British government actors? And how did 
these intra-UK dynamics interact with the complex neo-patrimonial factions in 
Sierra Leonean politics, or indeed other international actors in Sierra Leone? As 
Woodward observed of civil war, the causes that lead to conflict are often 
transformed during the fighting, such that the motives that govern belligerents at 
war’s end can look very different to those which initially impelled them to take 
up arms.12 This concept might equally be applied to intervention, such that 
changes in British strategic imperatives during the decade of post-conflict 
defence reform must also be considered. This chapter will examine the 
expansion of British involvement in Sierra Leone, its motives and changing 
rationales, from the run-up to Operation Palliser to the eventual draw-down of 
IMATT. It seeks to understand how British political, strategic and bureaucratic 
pressures affected the course of IMATT’s interactions with the RSLAF, and in 
so doing, shaped cultural change in the Sierra Leonean military. 
Lomé and British intervention before Operation Palliser 
Operation Palliser was not the British military’s first foray into Sierra Leone 
during the Rebel War. Yet the record of previous British interventions in the 
country does not suggest a pattern of British political and military commitment to 
its former colony. Instead, it was characterised by a desire not to become 
substantively involved on the ground. Although the British Government had 
been involved in the Abuja Accords, subsequently providing a small number of 
British military trainers,13 it was the AFRC coup which largely acted as a catalyst 
to wider British involvement in the country. In response to the AFRC-RUF junta, 
the UN established an arms embargo on Sierra Leone via Security Council 
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Resolution 1132 in October 1997, to be enforced by ECOWAS.14 Nigeria 
increased its forces in Sierra Leone, and ECOWAS-led negotiations produced 
the Conakry Plan, under which the AFRC agreed to demobilise and allow 
President Kabbah to return to office.  Again, RUF and AFRC elements reneged 
on the agreement, and hostilities culminated in the recapture of Freetown by 
ECOMOG in March 1998.15 However, subsequent events on the ground forced 
the British Government into an ever greater commitment in Sierra Leone. 
During Kabbah’s time in exile, the British High Commissioner to Sierra 
Leone, Peter Penfold, continued to support Kabbah. This culminated in the so-
called “arms-to-Africa” scandal, which saw Penfold replaced and the British 
Government embarrassed, but also had the unintended consequence of 
drawing the UK further into the Rebel War. After the AFRC coup, the SLPP 
government-in-exile kept pressure on the AFRC-RUF ‘People’s Army’ through 
the CDF militias, which fought against sobel activity in the south. At the same 
time, the British private security firm Sandline International was hired to provide 
military support to the CDF in an attempt to oust the AFRC. Sandline was run 
by a former British Army officer, Tim Spicer, and was responsible for providing a 
helicopter and Bulgarian-made small arms to Kamajor forces in a parallel to the 
NPRC’s use of Executive Outcomes; an arrangement which Penfold was aware 
of. In the event, Sandline’s arms shipment arrived after President Kabbah was 
reinstated in Freetown by ECOMOG, although the Nigerian-led force proved 
unable to project power outside the capital.16 However, the role of Sandline and 
the relationship between the mercenary company and the British Government 
via Penfold nonetheless unravelled into a public scandal, after the arms 
shipment was seized in Nigeria. The supply of arms to Kabbah’s exiled regime 
appeared to contravene the UN arms embargo under Resolution 1132, which 
the UK had helped to draft. Moreover, it was alleged that the operation was 
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funded by bankers with mining interests in Sierra Leone, something reminiscent 
of EO’s previous involvement.17 
The “arms-to-Africa” scandal was particularly damaging for New Labour, 
which had made a high-profile domestic commitment to an “ethical foreign 
policy”, because it emerged that the Foreign Office may have tacitly supported 
the use of British mercenaries in a pro-Kabbah counter-coup despite the UN 
arms embargo.  Foreign Secretary Robin Cook subsequently maintained that 
ministers were never briefed and the Foreign Office had not officially acceded to 
the enterprise; a position upheld by an independent British Government 
investigation.18 However, emails were produced between Penfold and the FCO, 
and between in-country British officers and the MOD, and Penfold maintained 
that the Whitehall establishment had tacitly supported the plan, scapegoating 
him when it unexpectedly became public.19 Either way, the “arms-to-africa” 
affair was symptomatic of the lack of British interest in intervening in the Rebel 
War. Connaughton concluded that ‘the [British] government had been hoist by 
its own petard’; it had little appetite for intervention, but equally could not be 
publically seen to support “unethical” mercenary responses that might have 
avoided the need for a larger UK commitment later on.20  
Despite Kabbah’s return to Freetown, a conclusion to the Rebel War 
remained elusive. In fact, Kabbah’s restoration to Freetown only served to 
splinter the AFRC further, with elements formerly loyal to Johnny Paul Koroma 
taking to the bush as the West Side Boys.21 In a continued sign of the troubled 
relationship between the SLPP and the military, Kabbah’s government promptly 
arrested senior RSLMF officers who had remained in Sierra Leone during the 
AFRC interregnum, and publically executed 24 after a brief trial which 
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international observers considered less than just.22 In July 1998, the UN 
established an Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) under Security 
Council Resolution 1181 in recognition of the poor security situation, but this 
had little effect.23 Over Christmas 1998, the US evacuated international 
residents and the British Army also began to conduct contingency planning.24 In 
January 1999, the self-styled ‘People’s Army’ re-entered Freetown, skirmishing 
with ECOMOG and loyalist troops and committing widespread atrocities in their 
so-called ‘Operation No Living Thing’.25 Although the British government 
provided £20 million in support of Kabbah’s government, it also pushed for new 
negotiations with the RUF. Sierra Leone was again beholden to the military 
incapacity of the RSLMF, but this time exacerbated by a lack of international 
commitment to the country’s strife. 
Signed in July 1999, The Lomé Peace Accord consisted of a power-
sharing agreement between President Kabbah and the RUF, in which Sankoh 
gained equivalent status to the vice-president and control over diamond mining. 
The international community hoped that by bringing the RUF into the 
government, further violence would be avoided. However, the Accord was 
criticised even at the time for rewarding the brutality of war criminals like 
Sankoh.26 In reality, Kabbah had little choice but to sue for a peace, as the 
Nigerian will to sustain his position was eroding rapidly and no other country 
was willing to deploy significant numbers of troops in his defence. In part, Lomé 
thus reflected the continued weakness of the SLA and its inability to provide any 
real security, but also the Western transience that had characterised the “arms-
to-Africa” scandal. Britain led the International Contact Group that produced the 
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Lomé agreement, and arguably, by seeking to bring the RUF into the diplomatic 
fold rather than intervene militarily, the Lomé agreement better reflected the 
British government’s desire not to intervene rather than any genuine 
rapprochement in the country.  
The Lomé Agreement required the disarmament of the RSLMF in toto 
alongside the CDF and RUF, and envisioned a military integration programme 
to build a new national army from former combatants of all factions. In support 
of this, the British government deployed a small joint team of civil and military 
advisers to advise the Sierra Leonean government on the reform of its MOD, 
under the title of the Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme 
(SILSEP).27 Yet the British Government’s limited commitment to Sierra Leone 
was reflected in the resources it allocated to the SILSEP programme. The team 
initially consisted of three people, and was directed by DFID to conduct a study 
into how the Sierra Leonean MOD might be reformed to incorporate civilian and 
military elements.28 The task was vast. The team’s military adviser, Colonel 
Mike Dent, arrived in Freetown to find the MOD lacked window panes and 
electricity, and its staff consisted of only a few employees. Constitutionally, the 
President served as the Minister of Defence, leaving the ministry managed day-
to-day by the Deputy Minister, Chief (and retired captain) Sam Hinga Norman, 
who also ran the CDF. The civilian component consisted of two civil servants 
whose main duties were to sign cheques for the CDS, alongside a typist and a 
cleaner. The armed forces were de facto run by military officers in the separate 
defence headquarters,29 such that one Sierra Leonean civil servant described 
the MOD as simply ‘a “clearing-house” for all military financial matters’.30  
Initially, Kabbah appears to have been equally guarded in his support for 
British-led defence reform in Sierra Leone, perhaps in recognition of the 
uncertain British commitment. SILSEP’s planning process initially involved 
visiting all the major Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) ministries, but despite 
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being tasked to make recommendations on MOD redevelopment, Colonel Dent 
recalled that the team could not visit the RSLMF Headquarters. At the time, 
Nigerian forces were providing significant military support to the RSLMF, 
including providing a number of its staff officers and its Chief of Staff, Nigerian 
Brigadier Maxwell Khobe. In Dent’s view: 
‘The President didn’t want to upset Maxwell Khobe. He thought it was too delicate, 
and he really didn’t want the Nigerians to know what was going on. I think there was 
political pressure put on him by the UK Government to ensure we were not 
interfered with by anybody…but he didn’t want to upset the Nigerians by allowing, 
or letting them be involved in our study’.31 
While this position displayed a degree of reticence on Kabbah’s part, it also a 
reflected lack of trust in the Nigerian military. Certainly the Nigerian-dominated 
ECOMOG had gained a reputation for corruption and pillage, earning it the 
epithet “Every Car Or Moving Object Gone” in neighbouring Liberia.32 Similarly, 
in October 1999, UN Security Council Resolution 1270 created the UN 
peacekeeping Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to enforce Lomé’s 
implementation,33 but the Nigerian component was precipitously withdrawn after 
a spat with the Indian force commander, during which it emerged that Nigerian 
troops had been trading weapons with the RUF for personal profit.34 
This balancing act between the Nigerians, the British and GOSL 
complicated SILSEP’s work. Dent recalled one incident in which the SILSEP 
team managed to persuade Khobe to let them accompany him to a meeting 
with AFRC elements seeking to be reincorporated into the RSLMF under the 
Lomé Agreement, only to find themselves abandoned in hostile territory after 
negotiations broke down.35 Nonetheless, SILSEP did manage to draft 
recommendations for defence reform. In an indication of how the British 
commitment to Sierra Leone was increasingly led by advisers on the ground, 
these extended well beyond SILSEP’s original mandate. SILSEP had first 
produced an expansive root-and-branch review of the Sierra Leonean defence 
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sector based on advisers’ prior experience of the UK defence review process, 
which included drafting new defence missions and tasks for the RSLMF. 
Kabbah’s government were apparently content to let the British remake the 
armed forces as they saw fit; not least because they had more pressing 
domestic priorities. DFID were less convinced once it became apparent that 
SILSEP’s proposals effectively amounted to reforming the entire RSLMF, not 
just the MOD. Nonetheless, the plans were grudgingly approved by London.36  
Implementation, however, was overtaken by events on the ground. 
Despite the favourable terms of the Lomé settlement, the RUF still proved 
unwilling to abandon violence. Sankoh was unperturbed by the expansion of the 
UNAMSIL force and mission to 11,000 troops, jibing in local papers that, ‘The 
UN is free to send 20,000 troops to Sierra Leone, but who would scare a 
pregnant woman with a dead penis?’37 Whether Sankoh still retained control 
over the RUF is unclear, especially after his arrest in Nigeria. Nonetheless, by 
early May 2000 the RUF was on the offensive again, over-running significant 
elements of the UN force. The RUF were again poised to sack Freetown. Britain 
then decided to intervene, ostensibly to extract British citizens, but subsequently 
to defend Kabbah’s democracy and stabilise the country, rebuilding the RSLMF 
as the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) in the process. 
Both the “arms-for-Africa” scandal and the Lomé Accord, which in many 
respects was just a re-run of the previous (failed) Abuja Agreement, reflected 
the UK’s lack of strategic interest in intervention Sierra Leone. However, by 
declining to use hired proxies and instead publically committing to a diplomatic 
solution, the British Government found itself drawn into the Rebel War, as 
manifested by the deployment of the SILSEP team, and by the provision of 
limited financial aid to prop-up Kabbah’s military position. As the SILSEP team’s 
initial planning highlights, the implementation of British political commitments on 
the ground were shaped by the competing agendas of other local actors, both 
Sierra Leonean and regional. Once in country, the SILSEP team inexorably 
drew the UK into a more expansive institutional rebuilding project in the 
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absence of other viable options – a dynamic later paralleled during Operation 
Palliser. 
Operation Palliser 
British support for the Lomé Agreement betrays the UK’s desire not to become 
embroiled in Sierra Leone’s Rebel War. Given the apparent lack of British 
national interests at stake, Williams has argued that Operation Palliser was 
largely the product of New Labour’s moral and ideological policy commitments. 
Prima facie, intervention was precipitated by the likelihood that the RUF would 
overrun Freetown and thus pose a direct threat to British citizens. Williams 
argues that this eventuality also provoked a wider humanitarian impulse to ‘do 
something’ about the growing crisis; particularly given that prior interventions by 
both EO and (to a lesser degree) ECOMOG had demonstrated the utility of 
force in such a situation. The renewed RUF threat also accentuated New 
Labour’s desire to support Kabbah’s fledgling democracy in principle, and in so 
doing live up to pledges of an “ethical” foreign policy. Finally, the urgent need to 
prop-up the ailing UN force, and with it the credibility of UN peacekeeping in 
general, provided a more practical concern. For Williams, the convergence 
between the British Government’s political attitudes and the declining situation 
on the ground in Sierra Leone accounts for the initiation of Operation Palliser, 
and likewise explains the rapid transition from a Non-Combatant Evacuation 
Operation (NEO) to a stabilisation campaign with longer-term state-building 
implications.38 
Williams’ interpretation clearly holds some water. Humanitarian motives 
can translate into strategic imperatives for democratic governments when they 
catch the public imagination. As Connaughton argued, by ‘responding to 
demands to “do something”, conscience then translates into an interest as a 
government elects to appease electors.’39 Moreover, Tony Blair appears to have 
had a particular moral affinity for Sierra Leone. His father had lectured in 
Freetown in the 1960s, and perhaps more profoundly, Kampfner has suggested 
that the plight of the country chimed with Blair’s evangelical Christian morals.40 
Yet, British Government rhetoric during the early phases of Operation Palliser 
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deliberately accentuated the protection of British citizens rather than the 
righteousness of Britain’s moral cause. Moreover, according to Williams, the 
mood of the nation was decidedly uninterested in the fate of Sierra Leone. One 
Guardian commentary suggested that ‘Sierra Leone is more likely to be 
mistaken for a car model off a Ford assembly line, and as to the competing 
virtues of rebel leader Foday Sankoh, or President Kabbah, fewer than one in 
100,000 could even pretend to have an opinion.’41 Intervention was not foisted 
upon the government by the weight of public outrage; rather, public opinion in 
the UK appeared to view New Labour as caught off-guard by the declining 
situation. Newspaper editorials published as British troops deployed instead 
described the government’s simultaneous preoccupations with the situation in 
Northern Ireland, Kosovo, and in the personal case of the Prime Minister, the 
imminent birth of his youngest son.42 
New Labour undoubtedly did aspire to a moral foreign policy, as reflected 
in Blair’s Chicago speech the year before. Nonetheless, as Dorman has rightly 
observed, Blair rose to power on the back of domestic agendas, and the 1997 
New Labour manifesto contained little hint of overseas ‘adventurism’. At best, 
therefore, any ideological commitment to intervention in Sierra Leone should be 
seen as a corollary of the British campaigns in Bosnia and Kosovo, in that these 
earlier interventions gave the government confidence in the use of force 
abroad.43 Indeed, the British Government’s preferred course of action was to try 
to expedite the deployment of an additional six UN battalions rather than deploy 
troops itself.44 Thus, while intervention may have chimed with New Labour’s 
political rhetoric, it can hardly be seen as the preferred strategic option. Instead, 
Connaughton has taken a more realist perspective, viewing intervention as 
forced on the British government by a convergence of diplomatic and domestic 
factors. As the former colonial power, the UK was considered to hold some 
degree of obligation for Sierra Leone in the eyes of the international community. 
Consequently, British policy options appear to have been limited by the UN 
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Security Council’s view, conveyed to the British Ambassador and followed up by 
messages from the UN Secretary-General and the US and French 
Ambassadors, that the situation in Sierra Leone was a British responsibility.45  
In many respects, the British government had backed itself into a corner. 
Internationally, the UK had been instrumental in negotiating the Lomé Accords 
with all the legitimacy these had conferred on the RUF, and these were now in 
tatters. Domestically, New Labour had traded on its ethical stance on foreign 
affairs and the democratic credentials of President Kabbah. In fact, only 25 per 
cent of the Sierra Leonean population had been able to vote in the presidential 
elections – the remainder living in rebel-held territory – and even then Kabbah 
had only received 60 per cent of the vote in a second-round run-off.46 
Nevertheless, after criticism at the slow government response to floods in 
Mozambique in February 2000 and the “arms-to-Africa” scandal, it seems the 
British Government felt compelled to make good on its rhetoric. The British 
strategic rationale for Operation Palliser can, therefore, be seen as a reluctant 
response to previous policy failures, necessitated by the limited remaining 
options which conformed to the New Labour government’s policy stances.  
Given this, Operation Palliser is as much a reflection of the failure of 
Lomé, and in particular the UN and ECOMOG’s inability to enforce it, as 
anything else. The initial UN monitoring force had been dismissed by ECOMOG 
officers as ‘here on picnic and holiday. I wish we could open the beaches for 
them to sun-tan and enjoy their dollars.’47 Though perhaps better paid than 
ECOMOG, the subsequent UNAMSIL force was a rather motley collection of 
under-prepared contingents. In Bo, for example, the garrison consisted of 
soldiers from 26 different nationalities. Although UNAMSIL did enjoy the 
mandate and rules of engagement that should have allowed them to conduct 
offensive operations against the RUF, it is evident that most contributing 
countries did not envisage their contingents aggressively warfighting under a 
blue helmet. Even the UN commander, Indian Major General Vijay Jetley, 
conceded that many contingents ‘did not come up to the mark and were an 
embarrassment both to the countries and to the UNAMSIL’.48 Jetley himself 
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later faced public criticism, with Brigadier David Richards subsequently 
describing him as a ‘well-meaning’ but ‘extremely cautious UN commander who 
was fixated about not losing a single Indian soldier on this operation.’ Both 
Jetley and Richards’ remarks thus reflect the internally divided state of 
UNAMSIL, in which national priorities frequently trumped its UN mandate. In his 
memoirs, Richards later described the mentality at the UNAMSIL HQ during 
Operation Palliser as having ‘an air of Saigon 1975 about the place – panic and 
mental paralysis all at once.’49 Kabbah’s main regional backer, Nigeria, was no 
more reliable. With the death of Nigerian leader General Sani Abacha and the 
election of Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999, Nigeria began to withdraw its 
ECOMOG contingent. The public would not accept the costs of intervention – 
$1 million a day and significant numbers of casualties – as the generals had.50 
The shortcomings of the UN mission, while potentially providing a strategic 
rationale for British intervention, were to have a more profound impact on British 
thinking at the operational level. The dominant British narrative of Operation 
Palliser emphasises Brigadier Richards’ personal agency in the transition from 
NEO to a limited stabilisation campaign, and shortly afterwards Brigadier 
Richards felt the need to stave off criticism that the campaign on the ground had 
been effectively ‘driving the British Government’s policy’.51 David Richards later 
rose to Chief of the Defence Staff and retired as a Member of the House of 
Lords; a position which has allowed him to subsequently state that during 
Palliser he actively decided ‘to ignore my orders from London and intervene 
militarily in the civil war’.52  
British military activity during the initial stages of Operation Palliser was 
certainly reactive to events on the ground. A reconnaissance team led by 
Brigadier Richards arrived in Sierra Leone on 6 May 2000, subsequently 
becoming the core of the Joint Task Force HQ (JTFHQ) during Palliser. 
Richards found the situation in Freetown fragile, and shortly after requested the 
deployment of a battalion of the Parachute Regiment. During the night of 8 May, 
a large demonstration took place in Freetown during which Sankoh’s house was 
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sacked and his bodyguards shot dead 21 protestors. It was this incident that 
precipitated the initiation of the NEO, eventually seeing 442 entitled persons 
evacuated to Dakar, 299 within the first 48 hours.53 It was not until the following 
day that Brigadier Richards received the first set of formal orders from London 
confirming the evacuation. Richards recalled that these orders were ‘exclusively 
concerned with the conduct of an emergency evacuation. They had nothing in 
them about helping the UN and nothing about creating a military alliance to help 
Kabbah’.54 Instead, the British military focused on shoring up the GOSL defence 
of Freetown using a collection of loosely pro-Government armed groups 
coordinated by British officers, nick-named the ‘Unholy Alliance’.55 Shortly after 
Palliser, Richards wrote in a technical military journal that his decision to initiate 
a stabilisation operation was the product of an absence of clear direction from 
London, which necessitated ‘Identifying early on…HMG’s intent’.56 He later 
contended that, ‘Translating strategic intent is…[a] key operational level role’ 
and that in order to maintain the necessary tempo a commander ‘must feel that 
he has the freedom to work within strategic intent and not be required to wait for 
Whitehall machinery to function over issues of minor strategic significance’.57  
Dismissing formal orders as ‘barely relevant to what we were doing’,58 as 
Richards does in his memoirs, is not the same as translating strategic intent into 
timely action. Nor can becoming embroiled in a foreign civil war be seen as a 
matter of minor strategic significance. Nevertheless, Richards’ reading of 
“strategic intent” – in contradiction of specific orders – was supported by a 
number of factors. The decision to deploy the Amphibious Ready Group from 
the outset permitted significant tactical flexibility and indicated that the British 
Government was willing to commit itself to more than a NEO. Moreover, the 
Prime Minister, the Defence Secretary and the Foreign Secretary had all 
delegated decision-making powers to Brigadier Richards and the British High 
Commissioner on the morning of 7 May. Thus, to the extent that Richards drove 
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strategic priorities, he was authorised to do so within certain limits by his 
government.59 Richards had briefed Robin Cook on the developing situation in 
Sierra Leone at Sydney Airport in September 1999, and consequently felt he 
had a good understanding of the FCO perspective.60 When it became apparent 
that this meant direct involvement in the civil war, instead of recalling Richards, 
the British CDS personally visited Sierra Leone over the weekend 13-14 May. 
Sir Charles Guthrie could have sacked Richards – and some expected him to 
do so – but instead he confirmed Richards’ course of action.61 
Paralysis in Whitehall provided both the need and the opportunity for 
Richards to interpret government intent as he saw fit. Indeed, the Prime 
Minister’s personal involvement in Operation Palliser decision making appears 
to have been limited. Blair seems to have been initially persuaded into the 
deployment by the Defence Secretary, Geoff Hoon, and Robin Cook, with 
additional pressure coming from the head of the DFID, Clare Short, on the basis 
that once deployed, premature British withdrawal would undermine the UN 
position. Despite pressure from the Conservative opposition, Blair appears to 
have been content to let his cabinet colleagues run with Palliser, and his 
Principal Private Secretary apparently briefed ministerial meetings that the 
Prime Minister was content for them to ‘go for the radical option’. While the 
Prime Minister’s personal involvement may have been limited, his cabinet 
ministers were heavily invested in Sierra Leone. Cook had been personally 
involved in both Lomé and the “arms-to-Africa” affair. Short too had a stake in 
the outcome, having previously approved the use of DFID funds to supply 
ammunition to Kabbah’s armed forces.62 Equally, she had a deep personal 
commitment to development, and was receptive to the idea that poverty relief 
and humanitarian goals were dependent on improvements in security.63 
Discussion in Whitehall largely centred around differences in opinion 
between the MOD and the FCO. Both departments supported the concept of 
military deployment. However, the Foreign Secretary felt that the British interest 
lay primarily in shoring up the Lomé agreement and the UN mission – in effect 
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rescuing the Kabbah government – followed by the evacuation of British 
citizens. In contrast, the Defence Secretary was more concerned with the 
evacuation of British citizens and the extrication of British officers who had been 
taken hostage by the RUF while serving as part of the UNAMSIL force.64 
Consequently, Dorman characterises the situation in London during the initial 
deployment as one of ‘differences of view and government indecision’.65 In so 
much as Richards drove the government policy from the ground up, therefore, it 
was by pursuing one set of governmental priorities over another. 
Although intervention may not have been the preferred political option for 
the British Government, Britain could still in theory have declined to intervene at 
all. Still, once permission was given to deploy British troops, the operation took 
on a logic of its own. Operation Palliser, for example, provided an opportunity 
for elements of the British armed forces to further their various institutional 
interests. Although studies the previous year concluded that British forces were 
too overstretched to take on the RUF alongside commitments in Kosovo and 
East Timor, by 2000 this caution had been replaced by a desire amongst certain 
units to prove their worth and stave off potential defence cuts.66 Colonel 
Thomas, who served as Brigadier Richards’ Chief of Staff during the initial 
phase of Palliser, recalled a degree of British military “freebooting” during the 
operation, and attempted to limit the number of units seeking to deploy for 
institutional reasons unrelated to the requirements in theatre.67 Operation 
Palliser certainly provided the military with an opportunity to run-out the still 
largely untested Joint Rapid Reaction Force concept; the benefits of which were 
much touted by Brigadier Richards in defence articles following Palliser.68 
Kampfner has suggested that this dynamic also held currency at the political 
level, in as much as the Clinton administration’s praise for Operation Palliser 
apparently became a source of personal pride for Blair.69 
While the pace and nature of British military intervention was 
undoubtedly driven by events on the ground and the initiative of Brigadier 
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Richards, it would be wrong to say that Palliser lacked strategic direction. The 
British Government did have clear strategic imperatives for intervention in Sierra 
Leone beyond the protection of British citizens. However, prolonged debate in 
Whitehall about which imperatives to prioritise undoubtedly gave Richards the 
scope to interpret government intent according to the realities of the situation he 
found on the ground. Richards’ initiative was accepted not because it drove 
strategic imperatives, so much as because it aptly reflected them. That said, 
strategic imperatives are not the same as persistent and enduring national 
interests. The fact that intervention was undoubtedly the least preferred option 
for the British Government highlights the absence of genuine British national 
interests in Sierra Leone. Yet, because Palliser was largely driven from the 
ground up, the impact of this absence of profound British interests on British-
Sierra Leonean relations during the intervention only really became apparent 
during IMATT’s post-war defence reforms. 
Operation Palliser’s Legacy on British-Sierra Leonean Relations 
With Freetown saved, Operation Palliser subsequently handed over to 
Operation Basilica. This embedded loan service officers in the RLSMF and 
deployed a series of Short-Term Training Teams (STTTs) to re-train the SLA, 
with the aim of destroying the RUF.70 In September 2000, a patrol of British 
soldiers from the Royal Irish Regiment was abducted by a former ‘Unholy 
Alliance’ militia group called the West Side Boys. The incident prompted a 
British military hostage rescue called Operation Barras, and highlighted the 
volatile political situation persisting across the country.71 Ucko has argued that 
the precipitous withdrawal of British forces after Operation Palliser, which 
exposed the remaining training teams to significant risk, was driven by political 
imperatives in London rather than the military situation on the ground. Thus, it 
was symptomatic of the initially limited British commitment to intervention in 
Sierra Leone. Indeed, to a certain extent, the incident surrounding Operation 
Barras reflected this precipitous early withdrawal, and serves to refocus 
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attention away from the operational gains made during Palliser and onto the 
translation of those gains into strategic success during subsequent operations.72  
After Barras, Brigadier Richards and the JTFHQ were briefly redeployed 
to convince the rebels of the ‘inevitability of their defeat’. In November 2000, the 
Royal Navy redeployed warships to Sierra Leone in a show of strength, and HQ 
3 Mechanised Brigade assumed the title of HQ British Forces Sierra Leone.73 
Efforts to stabilise Sierra Leone continued under the banner of Operation 
Silkman, which subsumed both the STTT courses conducted under Operation 
Basilica, and the mentoring of the RSLMF by loan service officers deployed as 
part of the newly formed IMATT. A reinvigorated UNAMSIL also began 
deploying troops into the provinces, beginning with a Pakistan Army brigade in 
the RUF-controlled southern diamond areas.74 Despite some continued fighting, 
two cease-fire agreements were reached with the RUF in late 2000 and early 
2001, known as Abuja 1 and 2. These enabled the UN Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme to restart, and with it a 
Military Reintegration Programme (MRP) to incorporate former RUF and militia 
combatants into the renamed Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces 
(RSLAF).75 
The initial success of British intervention in Sierra Leone undoubtedly 
granted British advisers a high level of political access and acceptance. To a 
certain extent, the level of public esteem and professional regard in which the 
British were held was present even before Operation Palliser. On arrival in 
Sierra Leone under the SILSEP programme, Colonel Dent recalled the Deputy 
Defence Minister Hinga Norman expressing a somewhat nostalgic view that 
only British recolonization would resolve the country’s woes.76 While Kabbah 
may not have approved of such sentiments, the affinity for British leadership 
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appears to have intensified following Operation Palliser, and formed a common 
narrative of many British officers’ experiences in the country. Colonel Thomas 
recalled ‘the number of times people said to me in the six weeks that I was 
there…“have you come to take over again?”…I can remember saying at one 
point to a chap in the street, “you don’t really want us to take over again”, and 
he said “oh, it would be so much better…”’.77 To a significant extent, such 
sentiments reflected less a genuine desire for the realities of past imperial 
dominion than the recognition that Sierra Leone required external assistance to 
become functional. One IMATT officer, for example, felt that the British enjoyed 
an unusually high degree of co-operation from RSLMF colleagues, because 
‘they genuinely wanted this to work. And they saw that under quite frankly 
British hands, with some international members as well, it was going to work… 
and they were happy to be with us on that.’78 
The demonstration of British military might during Operation Palliser 
undoubtedly created a perception of British military capability which IMATT later 
traded off, and this was arguably bolstered as a result of Operation Barras. The 
kidnapping of British soldiers by the West Side Boys was publically 
embarrassing for the UK. However, during Operation Barras the West Side 
Boys were effectively wiped out as a coherent military entity, somewhat 
bolstering the UK’s reputation.79 Ucko has argued that Barras itself had a 
relatively minor operational impact on the course of the war, dismissing any 
impact on the RUF’s will to fight.80 However, later IMATT staff repeatedly 
emphasised its reputational benefits for the British during reform of the RSLMF. 
One British officer felt the psychological effect of Barras on potentially 
recalcitrant or obstructive elements of the RSLMF was ‘palpable…[it] scared the 
bejabus out of them’.81 Colonel Stack similarly described the legacy of Barras 
as ‘security capital. It was really, “don’t mess with the Brits”.’82 One IMATT 
officer, who arrived in Sierra Leone the day after Operation Barras, similarly 
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recalled being mobbed by local people clamouring for the return of British rule.83 
IMATT appears to have enjoyed this legacy consistently during its period of 
existence. For example, Colonel Jamie Martin, Commander IMATT from 2011, 
recalled what he termed ‘the IMATT effect, of British military driving around in 
white Landrovers with the windows down, engaging with the people, and pretty 
much wherever we went we were welcomed…because it was a reassuring 
presence’. In Martin’s view, this dynamic not only benefitted IMATT’s position in 
Sierra Leone, but also by association, the RSLAF’s own public image.84 
In January 2002, President Kabbah declared the Rebel War over. The 
RSLAF was subsequently redeployed up-country to reassert GOSL sovereignty 
in advance of elections planned for May 2002. However, the UK recognised a 
need to provide a substantial commitment to post-conflict reconstruction beyond 
the military support provided during the Rebel War. In 2002, the UK signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding with GOSL, committing the UK to support 
Sierra Leone for a further ten years.85 In part, this commitment reflected the 
“liberal moment” which prompted New Labour to pursue a normative rather than 
realist foreign policy. Equally though, it reflects a degree of entanglement in 
Sierra Leonean domestic affairs obligated by the UK’s prominent role in ending 
the Rebel War. Though spearheaded by DFID, the memorandum confirmed 
Sierra Leone’s political commitment to widespread governmental and 
democratic reform, including reform of the RSLAF.86 Command of British forces 
in Sierra Leone was handed over to IMATT, which the British Government 
agreed would remain in Sierra Leone beyond the three years originally 
envisaged in earlier SILSEP planning.87 IMATT’s mission was to ‘assist with the 
transformation of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) into a 
self-sustaining, democratically accountable and affordable force in order that it 
can meet Sierra Leone’s defence missions and tasks and to facilitate the 
phased disengagement and withdrawal of IMATT’.88  
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Almost immediately, however, the UK commitment to Sierra Leone 
produced tensions between the RSLAF and IMATT based around divergent 
expectations of reform. During the initial stages of IMATT’s existence, officers 
found their ability to pursue the British Government’s normative agenda in 
Sierra Leone was tempered by high RSLAF expectations of British aid. A 
number of British officers recalled how the RSLAF consistently lobbied for 
western military hardware like artillery and armour, which it had neither the 
funds and expertise, nor the external threats to justify.89 Colonel Dent 
complained that ‘you always want to deliver what people want, if you can, and 
they always wanted so much that it was impossible to deliver’.90 These tensions 
were only exacerbated after IMATT produced a ten year plan for the RSLAF’s 
regeneration in 2004, called Plan 2010, which will be examined in detail in 
Chapter 7. As Brigadier Le Grys later argued, Plan 2010 and the vision of 
RSLAF reform it expounded really only perpetuated the expectations which had 
originated in Operation Palliser. In Le Grys’ words, there was: 
‘a lot of friction between their expectation and what we were prepared to deliver. A 
lot of friction. So this was probably embedded in their thoughts when we arrived first 
off in Freetown. But we didn’t help it along the way.’91 
This was particularly so, given that British officers felt the need to maintain the 
vision of an RSLAF with a functional air force and naval component, despite its 
manifestly aspirational nature, in order to try and achieve a degree of RSLAF 
“buy-in” to more institutional and normative elements of their reforms.92 
Indeed, IMATT’s relationship with the RSLAF was criticised from relatively 
early in its existence due to a perceived lack of Sierra Leonean ownership of 
defence reforms. In March 2004, for instance, DFID’s evaluation of the Africa 
Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) fund through which SSR in Sierra Leone was 
funded, noted that ‘Local “ownership” of some of the reform programmes being 
implemented under the ACPP has not been as prominent as might be 
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expected.’93 In general, the report observed a tension between British advisers, 
who felt Sierra Leonean officials lacked capability and motivation, and Sierra 
Leonean staff, who charged that UK advisers did not understand the local 
context or trust GOSL to implement projects.94 IMATT in particular was singled 
out for criticism by DFID, whose report noted that ‘IMATT’s role has been 
described as advisory but in reality has involved taking the lead in many reforms 
and operational matters.’95 In part, these criticisms reflect the generational 
approach to normative reform which IMATT adopted in Plan 2010, which will be 
examined in Chapter 7. However, given that IMATT had officially transitioned 
the majority of its personnel out of executive functions and into advisory roles by 
2004, this assessment is noteworthy.96 Interestingly, Mark White, the DFID 
SILSEP programme manager, felt that British efforts in Sierra Leone generally 
represented a good example of local ownership, precisely because there was a 
willingness to accept British advice among Sierra Leonean officials following 
Operation Palliser. White did concede, however, that ‘the UK’s initial ambitions 
for the MOD were far higher than the Sierra Leone Government was capable 
and confident with’, such that programmes had to be revised in order to gain 
GOSL buy-in.97  
To an extent, persuading the RSLAF to take IMATT’s normative agenda 
seriously was also complicated by internal dynamics in IMATT, which did not 
always set the best of examples. In the immediate post-war period the IMATT 
Chief of Staff, Colonel Stadward, attempted to consolidate all IMATT personnel 
from its various national contingents into a newly-built IMATT compound called 
Leicester Square. This was largely an attempt to exercise greater control over 
off-duty IMATT personnel, particularly in relation to soldiers’ frequenting of 
Freetown prostitutes known colloquially as “nightfighters”. At least at Leicester 
Square, IMATT personnel were banned from bringing back nightfighters, which 
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Stadward considered ‘just a bad example’.98 The impact of such behaviour is 
evident from Brigadier Freer’s speech as Commander IMATT to the RSLAF 
officer corps in April 2003, in which he stressed the importance of RSLAF 
officers’ agency in changing the culture of the force: 
‘I do not pretend all IMATT personnel are beyond reproach; indeed some have 
succumbed to the immoral temptations of Sierra Leone, money changing, cheap 
sex and more. During my time as Commander IMATT anyone who falls short of the 
personal standards I have set will be sent back to their country.’99 
Thus, before IMATT was able to exercise compelling leverage over the 
RSLAF’s norms, it had to reign in some of its own soldiers’ more excessive 
behaviour. Equally, informal networks of international advisers occasionally 
impeded the formal development of RSLAF ownership. For example, British 
officers serving in UNAMSIL found it more efficient to work through IMATT than 
the RSLAF. By 2004, however, IMATT officers judged that the bypassing of 
official RSLAF liaison processes, although convenient, was no longer 
appropriate; it actively hampered the development of confidence and capability 
in RSLAF staff. They consequently connived to force the issue, demanding that 
senior British officers in the UN deal directly with the RSLAF.100 Yet, criticism 
over the degree of local agency in IMATT’s relationship with the RSLAF also 
reflected deep-seated tensions between British Government agencies 
altogether removed from the Sierra Leonean context, which had a profound 
effect on the development of British activity in country. 
Inter-departmental Rivalries and the Development of British Policy in 
Sierra Leone 
Following the end of the Rebel War, the British Government was represented in 
Sierra Leone by three main departments: the FCO, via the British High 
Commission; the MOD, which staffed IMATT; and DFID, which co-ordinated 
much of the wider state reconstruction activity and provided the funding. 
Formally, the in-country heads of these three departments formed a triumvirate 
implementing UK policy in Sierra Leone, with the High Commissioner – the UK’s 
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official diplomatic representative in Sierra Leone – as ‘primes inter pares’.101 As 
Brigadier Santa-Olalla, Commander IMATT in 2005, observed, ‘without DFID 
funding I couldn’t have done what I thought I needed to do, and without the 
political, diplomatic support, I couldn’t have done what I did, so it was a real 
three-legged stool that needed to be held together’.102 The formal façade of 
mutual dependence belied serious divisions between the three departments, 
manifested in frequent personality clashes in-country, which had a profound 
effect on the co-ordination and development of British policy in Sierra Leone. 
Tensions between the British military and DFID reflect the differing 
organisational cultures held by their members. Under Clare Short, DFID had 
embraced SSR as a necessary means of furthering its humanitarian and 
developmental agenda, notably expressed in the Millennium Development 
Goals. Yet it is not clear that all of DFID’s in-country staff were fully convinced 
of the department’s new approach. Despite many years of engagement in 
Sierra Leone, Colonel Jamie Martin, Commander IMATT from 2011, still 
observed a ‘considerable resentment on the part of DFID against the military. 
Part of that I think was just the inherent DFID dislike of anybody in a uniform.’103 
This antipathy, however, was undoubtedly mutual. Colonel Stadward, for 
instance, was disparaging of DFID staff in country immediately after the Rebel 
War: ‘They very rarely went out of Freetown. Any tree they could see they’d 
hug. They weren’t really very effective, weren’t very effective at all.’104 Albrecht 
later noted that this tension ‘reflected a conflict of values, cultures and 
objectives’ between the military and DFID;105 one which was apparent from the 
very start of British involvement with the Sierra Leonean defence sector. 
Colonel Dent, for example, recalled perennial disagreement over the nature of 
Sierra Leonean agency in reforms, with DFID contending that British officers 
paid insufficient attention to Sierra Leonean concerns, while British officers 
maintained that there were too many Sierra Leonean vested interests in the 
status quo to gain universal support for the normative changes required. 
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Fundamentally, this disagreement also reflected military resentment of DFID’s 
involvement in their planning processes, which Dent argued ran counter to the 
principles of “mission command” on which the British Army operates.106 
Similarly, calls by DFID consultants to establish clear management plans for the 
MOD were actively resisted by IMATT officers, who viewed them as 
unnecessary and overly convoluted. Instead, IMATT cited the simplicity of 
Ghanaian defence planning, at the time considered by IMATT to be a model for 
the RSLAF, in comparison to the complexity of DFID’s envisaged management 
plan.107 However, divergent views sometimes emerged even between the 
military and civilian staff deployed by the UK MOD. In 2003, for example, a 
professional rift developed between Commander IMATT and the UK civilian 
adviser to the MOD over whether the RSLAF should produce a Defence White 
Paper or a Defence Review.108 
Initially poor relationships between DFID and IMATT were mirrored by 
equally troubled relations between DFID and the British High Commission. 
DFID had originally been formed as an independent department from the FCO’s 
Overseas Development Administration in 1997, and the loss of control over 
development expenditure undoubtedly rankled with the FCO. In Sierra Leone, 
this was exacerbated by the disparities between the two departments’ in-
country profile. While formally the UK political lead in Sierra Leone, the High 
Commission found itself relatively low down the FCO’s list of global priorities, 
whereas Sierra Leone was a high priority for DFID. In-country, this meant that 
DFID’s largess (and therefore local influence) far outstripped the High 
Commission’s, undermining the High Commissioner’s position with GOSL which 
was well aware that DFID represented “the money”. This led to conflict between 
the two departments’ in-country staff over who “owned” relationships with 
GOSL; a rift which Sierra Leonean interlocutors undoubtedly exploited. In Mark 
White’s view, this was exacerbated by the fact that in Whitehall, the two 
departments’ priorities in Sierra Leone pulled in opposite directions; the FCO 
was seeking to normalise UK-Sierra Leone relationships as early as possible, 
while DFID continued to administer one of its largest and most significant aid 
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programmes there.109 IMATT was certainly not unaware of this dynamic 
either.110 
The poor relationship between the triumvirate of UK in-country 
departments significantly accounts for the uncoordinated nature of early British 
SSR in Sierra Leone. DFID’s evaluation of its programme in Sierra Leone noted 
that an in-country working group comprising representatives of the triumvirate 
was only formed in 2004.111 Yet in 2006, a House of Commons International 
Development Committee report still noted a lack of communication between the 
MOD and DFID in Sierra Leone.112 Colonel Martin later judged that initially, 
‘IMATT was a big beast with a brigadier, and a lot of money, and I think they 
probably did their own thing…I think in 2000, 2005-6, the MOD did what it 
wanted and it probably told the FCO and DFID afterwards’.113 At the same time 
though, the MOD’s large in-country presence via IMATT was mirrored by 
DFID’s relatively small footprint. Until late 2004, DFID’s in-country office in 
Sierra Leone was effectively a secretariat, with all decision-making run from 
Whitehall. Only subsequently did DFID’s decision-making functions devolve to 
Sierra Leone with the arrival of an in-country DFID director. After this, 
relationships between the three departments in Sierra Leone somewhat 
improved, though Mark White stated that there was, nonetheless, ‘an element of 
[DFID] initially playing catch-up’.114 In truth, disparate activities in Sierra Leone 
were partially the product of dysfunction in Whitehall, and a disconnect between 
perceptions in London and Sierra Leone. Desk officers in Whitehall in all three 
departments also held other responsibilities, limiting their focus on Sierra 
Leone.115 Similarly, a DFID report into the development of UK SSR strategy felt 
that senior officials in the MOD, military and FCO were less than committed to 
the concept.116 Practically, at least Brigadier Le Grys felt that his relations with 
Whitehall were characterised by a degree impatience and misunderstanding: 
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‘as always, there were people back here [in London] saying, “Well why isn’t it 
moving faster?” and people out in theatre saying, “Well you want to come out 
here and have a look at it and you’d understand why”.’117 
Nevertheless, successive IMATT commanders were keenly aware of the 
rift between DFID and the FCO, and variously sought to exploit or heal it. 
Brigadiers Freer, Porter and Santa-Olalla proved adept at persuading DFID to 
fund various IMATT programmes for RSLAF reforms, particularly for housing 
and redundancies, though these were sometimes hard-won.118 Brigadier Santa-
Olalla also noted how tripartite relationships were improved by the increase in 
DFID in-country staff. There was also a personality-based dynamic to this shift, 
likely the product of increased mutual understanding as a result experiences 
during the now-ongoing campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, which started to 
trickle down into Sierra Leone via staff-turnover.119 That said, the relationship 
between IMATT and DFID was not helped by the 2005 Output to Purpose 
Review (OPR) of British activity in Sierra Leone, which constituted the only 
external review mechanism for IMATT activity, and was highly critical of aspects 
of IMATT’s approach. Although officially a cross-government exercise, in reality 
the review was driven by DFID.120 The report undermined relationships both in 
Sierra Leone and in Whitehall, and appears to have left a legacy of suspicion in 
IMATT regarding consultant-led reviews. Brigadier Le Grys, for instance, 
complained that: 
‘There’d be the odd occasion when the consultants would be hired and they’d come 
out to Sierra Leone, interview you, basically write what you’ve told them. Put it into 
their report as their thoughts not yours, and of course, it’ll all come out from the 
RSLAF: “Oh well we wanted a four star CDS but the Brits wouldn’t allow us, and 
we’ve only got a two star. It’s not fair, we wanted this. Brits won’t allow us to send a 
whole brigade to Somalia yet”, you know. And then you start to explain to the 
consultant why not, but by then the word’s sort of out.’121 
A Saferworld study by Albrecht into the OPR process argued that while this 
tension was in part the result of different organisational cultures and 
approaches to external scrutiny between the MOD and DFID, the implications of 
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this criticism on inter-departmental relationships in Sierra Leone may have 
outweighed their constructive potential.122 As Varisco observed, though, the 
occasionally disparate and “ground-up” development of British policies in Sierra 
Leone nevertheless helped shape UK SSR policy more widely, in part through 
such consultant-led research and review exercises.123 
Shortly after DFID’s in-country expansion, DFID policy in Sierra Leone 
shifted away from the more traditional security-focused elements of SSR 
towards the wider security sector, and in particular the justice system. Sierra 
Leone Police (SLP) reform under the Commonwealth Community Safety and 
Security Project (CCSSP) was terminated in 2005, with some elements of 
policing support transferred to SILSEP, which was itself terminated in 2008. In 
its place, DFID launched the Justice Sector Development Programme, under 
which the SLP had to compete for resources alongside the wider judicial and 
legal system.124 This shift presented some problems for advisers working with 
the SLP. As Keith Biddle, the outgoing British Inspector-General of Police in the 
SLP argued, the increased focus on the wider judicial system was in of itself 
positive, but DFID’s approach effectively withdrew much-needed support from 
the SLP.125 In Mark White’s view, there was a subsequent difficulty in ensuring 
there was ‘no blue water’ between Official Development Assistance and 
International Development Act compliant DFID aid and the needs of the Sierra 
Leonean security sector, and support to the public order and armed elements of 
the SLP was at the crux of this.126 Although the MOD and FCO were given 
advanced warning, these departments nonetheless viewed closure of the 
SILSEP programme as abrupt.127  
In-country, DFID’s shift away from direct involvement in the hard security 
elements of SSR appears to have done little to improve relationships between 
IMATT and DFID. IMATT’s own approach to improving democratic civil-military 
relations in the RSLAF was in part reliant on SILSEP, but more significantly on 
the doctrine of ‘police primacy’, under which the RSLAF relinquished control of 
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domestic security to the SLP and instead focused on external threats. Police 
primacy was substantially reliant on the SLP maintaining sufficient capabilities 
such that the RSLAF did not perceive a need to interfere in domestic security; a 
prospect complicated by the withdrawal of direct DFID support for the SLP 
under the CCSSP.128 This concern was only exacerbated by perceptions among 
some senior IMATT officers that instead of funding security reforms, DFID was 
‘pouring money into hospitals that weren’t functioning and were never going to 
function, frankly, scandalously wasting taxpayers’ money’.129 Pressure on the 
SLP was certainly not helped by the simultaneous withdrawal of UNAMSIL in 
2005, which, although steadily drawing down since the end of the Rebel War, 
had nonetheless shouldered a significant burden of internal security duties in 
the immediate post-war period.130 More broadly, this shift in DFID policy also 
impacted on Sierra Leonean public perceptions of British commitment to Sierra 
Leone beyond the security sector, as DFID investment began to focus on the 
private sector, rendering UK expenditure (other than on IMATT) less obvious.131 
Despite unease in IMATT at the direction of DFID policy, by 2004-5 
IMATT was itself starting to come under pressure. Whereas DFID had 
increased its in-country presence, the MOD began to seek clarity over how 
IMATT would disengage and withdraw from Sierra Leone in the coming years. 
IMATT was never intended to be a permanent mission, and IMATT’s 2004 plan 
for RSLAF reform, Plan 2010, was itself a recognition that IMATT needed to set 
credible conditions for its own withdrawal. As one senior officer serving with 
IMATT in 2004 commented, Plan 2010 was an attempt to ‘set an end date as 
well as end state, and try and bring the two things together for the UK…and set 
us on a glide path – on both organisations, glide path – to allow a happy 
separation.’132 Here, the size and shape of IMATT was significantly dictated by 
changing priorities in Whitehall; namely, a refocusing of British Government 
attention in sub-Saharan Africa away from West Africa towards East Africa and 
the Horn, alongside the MOD’s growing preoccupations with two simultaneously 
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challenging campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.133 Although these pressures 
were not acute in Sierra Leone in 2004, budgetary pressures on the ACPP 
allocation to Sierra Leone – of which IMATT salaries were a substantial 
component – were growing.134 For example, planning for IMATT’s successor 
began as early as 2006,135 but was somewhat complicated by the fact that 
GOSL, in the words of one 2006 DFID review, viewed the UK as the ‘donor of 
both “first” and “last” resort for the security sector’. Consequently, GOSL had 
little incentive to find alternative sources of support for the RSLAF, while GOSL 
reliance on UK support limited the prospects for British withdrawal.136 
On the one hand, the relative lack of national interests in British 
intervention under Operation Palliser had led to a somewhat humanitarian and 
normative undercurrent to the British relationship with Sierra Leone, which 
prized normative liberal reform over immediate national objectives. On the other 
hand, the relative lack of British national interests in Sierra Leone (beyond the 
reputational) helps account for increasing Whitehall focus on withdrawal 
relatively early on in the SSR programme; especially after more concrete and 
pressing objectives were identified in Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia. While in 
2004, Colonel Stack was not convinced that the RSLAF fully appreciated 
IMATT’s relative insignificance in UK policy,137 by 2007 both GOSL and the 
RSLAF displayed a shrewd awareness of the strategic imperatives behind 
British policy in Sierra Leone. Successful presidential elections in 2007 were 
viewed by the British as a key benchmark of reform, which in reputational terms 
would confirm their efforts to date and enable further British disengagement. As 
Brigadier Cholerton, Commander IMATT during the 2007 elections, recalled: 
‘In 2007…Whitehall, was so, so keen to prevent failure in Sierra Leone, the Sierra 
Leoneans got that, and they almost blackmailed us to a situation where “You better 
give us more support or [it] might go pear-shaped”…But it was almost like we cared 
more than they did...there was a political imperative for success.’138 
The largely peaceful transition of power from the incumbent government to their 
political opposition in the 2007 elections was widely seen as an indicator of the 
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democratic progress Sierra Leone had made since the Rebel War. However, 
the British imperative to ensure success, and thus facilitate withdrawal, was 
keenly exploited by GOSL. The interplay between British strategic motives and 
conditions on the ground meant that GOSL exercised leverage over IMATT, to 
the point where it impeded some of IMATT’s longer-term objectives for the 
RSLAF, like independent budgetary sustainability. As Cholerton concluded, ‘the 
Sierra Leoneans knew that we desperately wanted success, and so they 
perhaps knew they could call on us for resources, perhaps more than we 
wanted to give, to ensure success.’139 
The success of 2007 elections did, however, provide a catalyst for a 
further reduction in IMATT numbers. In 2008, it was decided that IMATT would 
begin to drawdown, with the end-point roughly timed to coincide with the next 
electoral cycle in 2012. By the end of 2008, IMATT had reduced to 
approximately 70 all ranks,140 and by the end of 2009 IMATT’s strength dropped 
to around 50 personnel. At the same time, Commander IMATT was re-
designated as a full colonel rather than a brigadier appointment, and IMATT 
refocused its activity on supporting RSLAF deployments on Peace Support 
Operations (PSOs).141 Yet, this draw-down only exacerbated some of the long-
standing tensions between the RSLAF and the UK over conditionality and the 
continued provision of military support. Colonel Martin, Commander IMATT at 
the time, found that his relationship with the RSLAF was still characterised by ‘a 
lot of brinkmanship in terms of work and resources’.142 Nonetheless, the draw-
down continued following the 2012 presidential elections, resulting in IMATT’s 
replacement with the International Security Advisory Team (ISAT). 
ISAT was created following a Stabilisation Unit review of IMATT in 
February 2012, and was effectively a hybrid of the previous SILSEP programme 
and IMATT. It was led by a civil servant rather than a military officer, and its 
primary role was to provide holistic support to the security sector as a whole 
rather than simply the RSLAF.143 In Colonel Martin’s view, the Stabilisation Unit 
study ‘was a financially driven review’ prompted by the need to free up ACPP 
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funds at a time when ‘UK national interest and policy in Africa was switching 
focus from west to east, principally Somalia and increasingly Kenya’. In order to 
free up funds the size of IMATT had to be reduced, but by 2012 IMATT had 
dwindled to such a size that its “teeth to tail” ratio was already dubious. ISAT 
addressed this by transitioning IMATT’s Leicester Square compound to the 
FCO, removing the military’s logistical presence in Sierra Leone.144 Equally, 
ISAT reflected a growing shift in UK thinking towards stabilisation in favour of a 
“light-footprint” approach, which was later codified in the 2013 ‘Building Stability 
Overseas Strategy’.145 
On one level, the creation of ISAT demonstrated the extent to which 
tripartite departmental tensions had been overcome. This was partly enabled by 
changing relationships within the British military contingent in Sierra Leone. The 
reduction in IMATT allowed the Defence Attaché in the High Commission to 
assume a more prominent role, and this was exploited during the planning for 
ISAT. This was itself partly facilitated by the appointment of a naval officer to 
the role, Commander Sam Seward, who had previously served in IMATT. With 
a smaller IMATT focused on supporting RSLAF Peace Support Operations 
(PSOs), Seward was the formal UK military representative during much of the in 
country planning for ISAT, and was able to take a more holistic perspective than 
previous incumbents who had remained in the shadow of IMATT. Equally 
though, reduced inter-departmental tensions reflected the reduced importance 
of Sierra Leone in Whitehall. Seward, for example, was not only the Defence 
Attaché to Sierra Leone, but simultaneously to Guinea and Liberia, and the UK 
maritime adviser for maritime security in West Africa.146 
ISAT’s broad focus effectively recognised that other Sierra Leonean state 
institutions had fared less well than the RSLAF, which itself remained a source 
of inter-departmental contention. In Colonel Martin’s view,  
‘there was also tacit acknowledgement that DFID had got it wrong when it withdrew 
funding from the mainstream police at the end of 2005, and had moved to focusing 
                                                          
144 Interview with Colonel Jamie Martin, op. cit. 
145 British Government, ‘Building Stability Overseas Strategy’ (London, 2011), online at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67475/Building-
stability-overseas-strategy.pdf accessed 10/03/14; see also Robert Johnson, ‘Upstream 
Engagement and Downstream Entanglements: The Assumptions, Opportunities, and Threats of 
Partnering’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 25:3 (2014), pp. 647-668. 
146 Interview with Commander (retd.) Sam Seward, IMATT Maritime Adviser 2000-2002 and UK 
Defence Attaché to Sierra Leone 2010-13, conducted in Devon on 30 October 2015. 
159 
 
on sort of, community policing, access to justice. And I think as a result the 
performance of the SLP had dropped, and I think, I never actually got anyone to 
admit it, DFID knew they had got that wrong and they were quite defensive about it, 
whereas they could see the RSLAF had just continued to go up and up, and the 
police had gone down and down, and I think they felt that didn’t reflect’.147 
Although Albrecht and Jackson have questioned the fairness of this 
assessment,148 Seward’s support for the ISAT model largely stemmed from a 
belief that the RSLAF could no longer be the priority, owing to its relative 
success.149 The extent to which ISAT truly represented a more co-operative 
attitude between the MOD and DFID is further debatable, given that Martin at 
least felt ISAT should have been initially led by a military officer or retired 
officer.150 Nonetheless, during the UK surge to counter Ebola in Sierra Leone 
known as Operation Gritrock, MOD-DFID working relationships in theatre were 
noticeably improved.151  
Perhaps more importantly, as IMATT downsized inter-departmental 
rivalries were somewhat supplanted by concerns that British influence in Sierra 
Leone was being eroded by other donors. The UK had never been the only 
external country intervening in Sierra Leone, and in comparison to the UN and 
ECOMOG, came rather late to the party. Yet, the legacy of IMATT is widely 
considered to have provided the UK with significant enduring influence in Sierra 
Leone.152 Nonetheless, Sierra Leone received aid from a number of European 
countries and the US, while the US, Canada, Nigeria, and various other African 
states all contributed personnel to IMATT.153 In 2005, for instance, the 
Netherlands offered €2m for vehicle purchases, Switzerland donated 206 
trucks, and the US three coastal patrol vessels, with a further one donated by 
China.154 These contributions were generally well received by IMATT, who 
appreciated both the RSLAF and DFID’s resourcing limitations,155 and felt that 
the international nature of IMATT improved its legitimacy. DFID consultants did 
raise concerns that the provision of such off-budget aid was potentially 
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pernicious to the development of proper financial accountability and planning in 
the RSLAF.156 Still, as IMATT downsized, officers became increasingly sensitive 
to the political influence of the last donor on that list: China. 
 China had provided limited aid to the Sierra Leonean armed forces since 
before the Rebel War, and continued to do so throughout the conflict.157 China 
holds strategic interests in Sierra Leone related to fishing and mineral 
resources, which Chinese aid helps to secure; something which has not gone 
without comment in the local press.158 One British adviser during the war 
recalled distributing a substantial shipment of Chinese equipment and arms, 
including AK56 rifles and combat clothing (much of which ultimately did not fit 
RSLMF soldiers). But as this officer observed, 
‘you never saw anyone, never saw a Chinese guy ever in the whole place, but their 
influence was everywhere. Very clever. The Sierra Leone Government, probably 
sensibly, was taking whatever it could get from wherever it could get.’159 
Similarly, Keith Biddle was able to obtain new sewing machines for the SLP via 
Chinese donation, much to the chagrin of the UK.160 But occasionally, IMATT’s 
efforts at defence reform led it into conflict with Chinese interests. For instance, 
while serving as IMATT adviser to the Sierra Leonean navy during and after 
Operation Palliser, a significant proportion of Seward’s time was spent 
attempting to enforce fishing licences on the large Chinese fishing fleets off the 
coast of Sierra Leone. Seward’s attempts at establishing GOSL maritime 
sovereignty, however, were frustrated by the unwillingness of other GOSL 
departments to enforce their own laws, having established their own less than 
transparent business relationships with Chinese fishermen.161 The subsequent 
donation of a Chinese patrol boat to the RSLAF, ostensibly to help Sierra Leone 
enforce its maritime sovereignty, further demonstrated the limits of British 
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influence over GOSL, as IMATT was side-lined from the associated 
negotiations.162  
As IMATT began to withdraw, it became apparent that the RSLAF could 
use donations from other states – and particularly China – not only to replace 
British support, and so to an extent alleviate the need to make the more painful 
transformations that the British advocated, but also as a lever in its relationship 
with IMATT. For example, IMATT officers were generally sceptical as the long-
term viability of Sierra Leone’s maritime wing – contrary to RSLAF ambitions. 
They also repeatedly raised concerns about the sustainability of Chinese 
maritime donations, which came without maintenance or logistical support 
packages and for which local parts were not available.163 Instead of revising 
their ambitions, Sierra Leone approached China to repair the donated craft, and 
again excluded the British from negotiations.164 To a certain extent, China’s 
policy of non-intervention may have made Chinese aid more appealing than 
Western aid, which largely came with liberal normative caveats or expectations. 
Yet, Chinese influence was not automatically detrimental to democratic 
normative development. For example, during the 2007 election cycle, President 
Kabbah sought international support for declaring a state of emergency which 
may have derailed the election process and maintained him in office, but was 
reputedly rebuffed by China which maintained pressure on Kabbah in line with 
the rest of the diplomatic community.165 It is clear though, that Chinese aid 
somewhat supplanted British influence as the UK withdrew. China always 
offered places on its staff courses to Sierra Leonean officers, but following 
IMATT withdrawal, China is the only country which continues to fund overseas 
courses.166 Similarly, China provided military medics to Sierra Leone during the 
Ebola crisis.167 
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In retrospect, IMATT officers were generally extremely proud of the 
distance the RSLAF had travelled under their guidance since the Rebel War. 
Yet, a number of former IMATT commanders expressed doubts over the 
strategic utility of the British effort in Sierra Leone. Brigadier Cholerton, for 
example, remarked that ‘they always hold up IMATT and Sierra Leone as a 
classic example of a success story. But it’s a success story that I would say has 
come at a disproportionate cost, in terms of effort.’168 Similarly, the last 
Commander IMATT, Colonel Jamie Martin, recalled his scepticism at IMATT’s 
role while in theatre, but also how his opinion has changed subsequently: 
‘in terms of UK Government policy and priorities, I was quite hard pushed to justify 
why this little team was sitting in Sierra Leone, you know, what was the strategic 
significance of Sierra Leone…I personally think that the Ebola outbreak, and from 
what I can understand the response and the activities of the RSLAF, I think have 
vindicated to a large extent the expenditure and the effort that IMATT put in in the 
12, 13 years of its existence.’169 
Such concerns were inevitably more prominent as IMATT began to draw down 
and the RSLAF became less reliant on international advisers for its day-to-day 
functioning. Yet equally, the relative difficulty in justifying British expenditure on 
IMATT expressed by a number of senior British officers in IMATT may also help 
to explain the British irritation at increasing Chinese influence, given that 
informal British influence in GOSL was perceived to be one of the more tangible 
and enduring benefits of IMATT’s legacy. 
Conclusions 
British military intervention in Sierra Leone resulted from a convergence of 
international and domestic strategic pressures. A number of these were 
effectively reputational, stemming from the UK’s prominent involvement in the 
discredited Lomé Accords and the “arms-to Africa” scandal. As Connaughton 
argued, reputational factors can become effective substitutes for national 
interests when pertinent to domestic electorates.170 As Kampfner has 
highlighted, there was also an ideological dimension to British intervention, at 
least in so far as the British Government felt it had a historical obligation to 
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Sierra Leone stemming from its colonial past; something mirrored by Tony 
Blair’s personal affinity with the country.171 Moreover, the ten-year 
Memorandum of Understanding signed by the UK matched New Labour’s 
“ethical foreign policy” stance. British commitment to SSR in Sierra Leone 
certainly reflected DFID’s developing commitment to a security-development 
nexus, notwithstanding Dorman’s observation that New Labour policy was 
otherwise primarily domestically-orientated.172 Nonetheless, international 
dynamics also played a role; not least the international community’s view that 
after Lomé, Sierra Leone was primarily a British problem (especially in France 
and the United States).173 Similarly, as Williams observed, the need to prop-up 
the ailing reputation of UN peacekeeping represented both a national priority 
and a normative international commitment.174 
However, the expansion of British commitments in Sierra Leone was 
driven from the ground up. Brigadier Richards acted largely unilaterally by 
initiating a stabilisation campaign alongside the authorised NEO, driving British 
policy at a pace Whitehall was not immediately comfortable with. In part, 
Richards’ decision simply reflected an astute understanding of the political 
pressures acting on the New Labour cabinet. While a broad and amorphous 
British commitment to defending the reputation of UN peacekeeping may have 
justified British military action, it was primarily Brigadier Richards’ initiative on 
the ground which confirmed this course of action.175 To a certain extent, 
however, Richards’ initiative was only accepted in Whitehall because it was 
successful, and it solved an immediate problem which Whitehall had not itself 
yet reconciled. The idea that British intervention was not driven by strategic or 
national interests, but instead by a convergence of circumstance can be seen in 
British policy prior to Palliser. Both the Abuja and Lomé power-sharing 
agreements demonstrated a British desire not to directly intervene. Similarly, 
the “arms-to-Africa” scandal, with its use of hired mercenaries and local (rather 
than metropolitan) planning, equally reflected a lack of official British interest in 
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developing a wider UK commitment in Sierra Leone.176 This limited initial 
commitment to Sierra Leone is mirrored in the British military operation which 
followed Palliser, Operation Basilica, which constituted a standard British 
military training team despite the fact that the Rebel War remained in a state of 
suspended animation. This rapid withdrawal of British military presence led in 
part to the kidnapping of the Royal Irish and Operation Barras, necessitating an 
increased British military presence in Sierra Leone.177 Once again, British 
involvement was driven by events on the ground, drawing the UK into a more 
costly commitment. 
 Operation Palliser and the subsequent British effort during the Rebel 
War, together with the ten-year memorandum on inter-governmental support, 
created local expectations which outstripped British will. This was manifested in 
the level of resourcing the UK was willing to commit to Sierra Leone, 
complicating normative change in the RSLAF and eventual IMATT withdrawal. 
While the British desire to foster liberal democratic civil-military norms in the 
RSLAF was partly underpinned by an absence of core national interests in 
Sierra Leone, it was also seen as the main mechanism through which the Sierra 
Leonean security sector would become sustainable, thus enabling British 
withdrawal.178 Yet, RSLAF reliance on IMATT reduced the UK’s ability to use its 
support conditionally to compel normative change, concomitantly impeding 
British withdrawal.179 Thus, at least in principle, the dynamics of British policy in 
Sierra Leone appear comparable to Grissom’s characterisation of the 
mismatched strategic interaction between Afghan and ISAF priorities in the 
ANA, which resulted in dysfunctional defence reforms in Afghanistan.180 
The pressure on IMATT to downsize became more acute following the 
increased British commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, and more widely in 
West Africa as part of the post-9/11 war on terror. These other commitments 
reduced the UK’s relative strategic interest in its commitments in Sierra Leone, 
while simultaneously creating pressure for UK resources there to be freed up for 
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other theatres.181 Despite this, IMATT remains one of the longest examples of 
bi-lateral SSR, and regardless of other priorities, the UK was largely committed 
until 2012 by its initial memorandum.182 Here, events on the ground again drove 
priorities, as the UK strove to ensure its normative and reputational aspirations 
in Sierra Leone survived the 2007 and 2012 electoral cycles, in a dynamic that 
might be reasonably described as akin to “sunk costs” theory.183  
To a significant extent, however, British policy in Sierra Leone was also 
mediated by the ebb and flow of inter-departmental conflict, which acted both in 
Whitehall and more profoundly in-country. Poor relationships between the 
MOD/IMATT and DFID led to a lack of commitment to the concept of SSR 
among senior officers in Whitehall, and IMATT’s programmes being conducted 
largely in isolation from DFID in theatre. The gulf between the two organisations 
can be seen in the negative military reactions to DFID oversight reviews, and in 
IMATT’s attitude to changing DFID approaches to SSR – particularly regarding 
the SLP.184 The sometimes strained nature of this relationship was periodically 
matched by conflict between the High Commission and DFID, which reflected a 
long-standing inter-departmental rivalry and differing departmental perceptions 
of Sierra Leone as a strategic priority. Conflict between DFID and the FCO in-
country largely revolved around which department should lead, with the FCO 
being de jure in charge, while DFID’s funding made it de facto more influential – 
a schism GOSL attempted to exploit.185 The importance of these in-country 
relationships in driving British policy on the ground is demonstrated in DFID’s 
decision to increase its staff in Sierra Leone in late 2004, and devolve policy 
decision making to its Freetown office. 
Nonetheless, it is easy to overstate the significance of these tensions. 
Relationships in-country undoubtedly improved over time, and British 
representatives still attempted to present a united front to GOSL despite their 
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internal differences. Equally, as Varisco has highlighted, these (frequently 
reactive) in-country dynamics did much to influence the development of wider 
UK Government thinking on SSR best practice, later codified by Whitehall.186 
Equally, as the ten-year memorandum drew to an end, future British policy in 
Sierra Leone was determined both by in-country discussions and by 
metropolitan imperatives. In this sense, ISAT can be seen as an early 
manifestation of the UK’s shift towards BSOS principles. ISAT itself also reflects 
the reduction in inter-departmental tensions, being jointly composed of 
development, military, civil service and police professionals. Yet equally, ISAT 
also reflected the increasing irrelevance of Sierra Leone in UK foreign policy, 
which must also have been accompanied by a reduction in inter-departmental 
tensions there. 
The British surge back into Sierra Leone to tackle the West African Ebola 
pandemic under Operation Gritrock offers an interesting window onto recent 
British policy towards the country. On the one hand, Gritrock is in continuity with 
previous British intervention, driven by events on the ground and a sense of UK 
obligation to Sierra Leone as much as by any metropolitan national interests. 
Yet at the same time, the need for Gritrock (as well as the performance of the 
RSLAF during this operation, which will be examined in detail in Chapter 8) has 
been used as a post-hoc justification for British expenditure under IMATT, 
compensating for a lack of other tangible UK interests in Sierra Leone.187 Here, 
views towards intervention have perhaps come full circle, prioritising 
humanitarian narratives once again. Yet the presence of Chinese medical 
teams in Sierra Leone during Gritrock, in line with a wider increase in Chinese 
influence, exposes tensions between British departmental approaches to 
intervention that are mirrored in liberal normative defence reform more widely. 
The UK’s stated aim of producing an independent, self-sustaining, and 
democratically-accountable RSLAF was complicated by unilateral Chinese 
military aid, which lacked overt normative conditionality.  In the context of a 
general British military suspicion of China, this arguably reintroduced a higher 
degree of national interest into British agendas in Sierra Leone. In the abstract, 
it is expected that as the recipients of SSR programmes develop, they will 
become less reliant on their donors. Yet simultaneously, donors will also 
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exercise less influence over recipient’s policy. Where these policies then run 
counter to either the norms espoused by SSR, or contrary to what the donor 
perceives as its own strategic agendas, this creates a conflict of interest in (or 
between elements of) the donor state, between pursuing development and 
retaining influence. In Sierra Leone, the potential for this dynamic is particularly 
ironic, given that the UK did not perceive any significant British interests in 
Sierra Leone during much of its engagement there. 
This chapter has explored the changing strategic imperatives behind 
British intervention in Sierra Leone, and the inter-departmental and 
metropolitan-periphery dynamics which shaped the implementation of British 
policy. The previous chapter examined Sierra Leonean civil-military relations 
prior to British military intervention, which shaped the neo-patrimonial culture of 
the Sierra Leonean military and led to institutional collapse. Taken together, 
these two chapters chart the social and political motives which shaped military 
change in Sierra Leone – both the local and the international – and which 
together formed the landscape that later defence reforms would have to 
traverse. The next three chapters will now turn to the detail of actually 
implementing cultural change in the Sierra Leonean military, examining the 
process through which these local and international agendas intersected, and 
the ways in which IMATT sought to manage that process to ensure its agendas 
succeeded. Chapter 6 looks at wartime military adaptation and immediate post-
war attempts at consolidation, while Chapter 7 examines IMATT’s more 
programmatic peacetime reforms. Chapter 8 then examines the impact of 







6. Improvise, Adapt and Fail to Overcome? Stabilisation and 
Military Capacity Building in Sierra Leone, 2000-3 
 
This chapter will examine the relative impact of wartime adaptation and 
institutional reform on the Sierra Leonean military, both in terms of its combat 
effectiveness, and its political character. In Chapter 4, the history of Sierra 
Leonean civil-military relations prior to British intervention was examined, 
outlining the prevailing neo-patrimonial culture of the RSLMF. The previous 
chapter highlighted the lack of hard strategic interests behind British 
intervention in Sierra Leone, finding that the initial British focus on stabilisation 
developed into a wider normative agenda from the ground up. This chapter will 
explore how these two dynamics – the RSLMF’s neo-patrimonial collapse, and 
the British focus first on stabilisation and then on normative civil-military reform 
– intersected during British military intervention in the Rebel War. Ultimately, the 
Sierra Leonean armed forces did change as a result of British supervision 
during the war, but while adaptive in nature, these changes were externally-
driven. Yet, the depth of the RSLMF’s neo-patrimonial culture precluded more 
profound institutional reform during the war, and limited the normative impact of 
British advisers. Consequently, the relatively modest changes seen in the Sierra 
Leonean military, such as they were, are best described as somewhat ad hoc 
externally-led adaptations. 
Interventionists have typically sought to improve the military capacity of 
local partners through the deployment of advisory missions to educate, train 
and equip their hosts. As Stoker’s edited work highlighted, such missions are 
frequently deployed in pursuit of the diplomatic, economic or security interests 
of the intervening state.1 German military advisers in nineteenth century Chile 
advocated both Prussian military thought and Krupp munitions, while Stoker 
found that in their dealings with Poland, interwar French naval advisers 
privileged the sale of French weapons to the point that they actually undermined 
the security of their ally.2 Mehmed Ali’s Egypt attempted to bypass these 
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dynamics through its preference for more mercenary sources of external 
advice.3 Yet the Sultan of Oman’s use of contracted British officers to bolster his 
military during the Dhofar insurgency did not preclude wider British interference 
in the Omani state.4 As a contemporary RAND study for the US Department of 
Defence concluded, the success of these training missions is typically 
determined by the extent to which external priorities align with local interests, as 
well as by the scale of the external commitment to local change.5 
Nonetheless, a number of processes have been identified through which 
these missions can achieve change. In line with the constructivist turn in 
international relations, scholars have highlighted the importance of normative 
exchange. Kier’s examination of the interwar French and British armies found 
that cultural assumptions affect armies’ propensity to adopt certain reforms; an 
argument Farrell expanded in his study of the inter-war Irish army, whose 
professional proclivities impelled imitation along British lines.6 A desire to 
modernise armed forces in line with established international norms can provide 
the stimulus for national governments to host foreign military missions. This 
seems particularly likely when foreign military practices have demonstrable 
utility for a country’s own defence policies, as with Japan’s use of foreign 
advisers to import Western military norms during the Meiji period.7 Military 
training missions have also been used to export norms at the insistence of 
interventionists, rather than at the invite of their hosts. Arguably, early US 
involvement with the armed forces of the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua 
mainly reflected positivist trends in US domestic policy,8 while Jowell has 
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demonstrated how externally-led processes of military integration and normative 
socialisation can reshape local armed forces following civil war.9 Lieutenant 
Colonel Simpson, a British officer who served with IMATT following the Rebel 
War, described this process in Sierra Leone as ‘moral suasion’, through which 
the Sierra Leonean military was educated, persuaded, and cajoled into pursuing 
the UK’s normative agenda.10 Rosén has argued that this advisory process 
during international intervention in Afghanistan represented a new paradigm of 
international relations, in which the mentor became a conduit for neo-liberal 
state-building practices aimed at exporting Western organisational cultures.11 
However, recent scholarship has increasingly distanced peacetime 
reform from wartime change. Older literature on peacetime preparation for war 
tended to focus on top-down institutional mechanisms of change,12 or else on 
features of the external environment that shape military actions, such as the 
structure of civil-military relations or deliberate interventions by political elites.13 
Recent studies have differentiated these processes from wartime change, which 
is described as adaptation rather than reform. Farrell found that ground-up 
adaptation intended to overcome enemy strengths on the battlefield accounted 
for the development of British counter-insurgency in Helmand.14 Foley similarly 
identified adaptive traits in the Imperial German military’s tactical evolution 
during the First World War.15 Consequently, the promulgation of adaptive 
advantages throughout the military institution through horizontal and vertical 
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systems of “lesson learning” has become a source of considerable scholarly 
interest.16 
Yet, a number of studies have highlighted the difficulties of 
institutionalising wartime adaptation – of ensuring adaptation re-orientates 
institutional culture. Catignani found that despite the development of extensive 
lessons learnt processes in the British Army, British soldiers’ preferences 
towards the conduct of war changed little.17 Similarly, Kollars found that many of 
the improvised structures the US military developed to facilitate wartime 
adaptation – described as “adhocracies” – proved impossible to accommodate 
in the military’s more rigid peacetime bureaucracy.18 Harkness and Hunzeker 
also found that political elites may actively inhibit military innovation for strategic 
reasons.19 The difficulties of conducting wartime adaptation have led Grissom to 
conclude that the very presence of external interventionists may actively serve 
to impede ground-up adaptation. In his study of ISAF’s reform of the ANA, 
Grissom suggested that the large number of ISAF combat troops in country 
effectively insulated the ANA from critical levels of enemy threat, reducing 
imperatives to adapt. While the ANA certainly did change, this was largely in 
response to top-down external pressure from ISAF, which proved unable to 
displace the ANA’s neo-patrimonial political culture, resulting in ineffective and 
unenduring results.20 In short, Grissom concluded that the top-down model of 
externally-led military reform, typified by peacetime “train and equip” missions, 
was ill-suited to effecting the wartime innovation needed for battlefield 
effectiveness. 
This chapter will assess the impact of externally-led reform and wartime 
adaptation on the Sierra Leonean armed forces following Operation Palliser. In 
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2000, the British military intervened in the Rebel War, providing significant 
support to the RSLMF during the course of the conflict. Just as in the later 
Afghanistan campaign, the British deployed military trainers and advisers 
alongside combat forces. In Sierra Leone, however, international intervention 
proved sufficient to defeat the RUF and stabilise the country. Nonetheless, the 
extent to which the British managed to implement genuine change in the Sierra 
Leonean military is questionable. First, the extent of Sierra Leonean military 
change during the war is examined. This chapter then explores the ways in 
which the British sought to develop Sierra Leonean military capacity, in the 
second section, and normative civil-military behaviour, in the third section, 
looking in detail at the political interactions which defined outcomes. In the 
fourth section, immediate post-war attempts to consolidate IMATT’s wartime 
activities are examined, establishing the state of the RSLAF at war’s end. 
Finally, some conclusions are offered on the implications of external 
intervention on wartime military adaptation and change. 
Train and Equip: Intervention and Change in the Wartime SLAF 
British military support to the RSLMF, which was retitled the Sierra Leone 
Armed Forces (SLAF) during the war, was aimed at improving GOSL’s military 
capacity sufficiently to stabilise the country. The British provided simultaneous 
support to the SLAF at both the tactical and operational levels. During 
Operation Palliser, the British created a loose association of nominally pro-
government armed groups to fight the RUF, known as the ‘Unholy Alliance’. The 
SLA formed the coalition’s core, despite being heavily divided between pro-
Kabbah and pro-AFRC factions. AFRC splinter groups like the West Side Boys 
were also included, as was the CDF and the SLP;21 the Operational Support 
Division (the successor to Stevens’ SSD) having served as infantry throughout 
the Rebel War.22 At the operational level, the British attempted to co-ordinate 
militia and military activity, while British mentors provided direct support to SLAF 
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units at the tactical level. This was initially conducted by British Special Forces, 
but was later continued by IMATT officers on loan service.23 
Despite the RUF’s eventual military defeat, the extent to which this 
support enabled adaptation and development in the SLAF is debateable. In fact, 
the success of operations against the RUF was substantially the product of 
international troops, air power and psychological operations. For example, the 
Sierra Leonean Air Force’s Mi-24 “Hind” helicopter gunships, which provided 
close air support, were operated by foreign mercenaries.24 At least publically, 
Brigadier Richards considered that the real turning point during Palliser came 
following a small engagement between British Pathfinders and the RUF at Lungi 
Lol. Despite being only a minor unit action, Richards felt the ‘victory sent a 
powerful message to the RUF…from then on they did not want to fight us’.25 
Even where SLAF units were directly involved in the fighting, their performance 
was often unreliable. One typical operation carried out over the night of 13/14 
June 2000 is illustrative. Here, the RUF attempted to destroy an SLA battalion 
stationed in Lunsar, by using a vehicle mounted with an anti-aircraft gun to force 
the SLA into a pre-prepared ambush infiltrated into their rear. The RUF vehicle 
was located and destroyed by GOSL’s mercenary-operated Mi-24. However, 
the sound of the attack only served to demoralise the SLA battalion, which 
attempted to retreat, but was trapped by the RUF. The rebel advance was only 
halted after an SLA radio operator, acting on British instructions, imitated the 
destroyed RUF vehicle and was able to identify the RUF commander’s location. 
The British promptly revealed their ruse by threatening the rebel commander 
with an air strike, after which the RUF attack faltered.26 
This appears to have been typical of SLA performance. During Palliser, 
Colonel Dent arrived in the MOD one morning to find ‘one of the COs standing 
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Thomas received 05 April 2016. 
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with his armed escort party with his tin hat on’ outside the CDS’s office, having 
left his battalion at the front on the basis that conditions were too dangerous.27 
Similarly, Colonel Thomas, who was seconded to run the SLAF headquarters, 
was forced to recall one SLA battalion commander to Freetown in an attempt to 
personally cajole him into carrying out orders to attack an RUF position.28 British 
officers also held reservations about the political loyalties of some of their Sierra 
Leonean colleagues, and sometimes did not inform SLAF personnel of 
operational planning details, ‘because we knew the message would get out and 
it would become inefficient’.29 One British adviser who served with an SLA 
battalion shortly after Palliser similarly commented that in the SLA, as an officer 
‘you just roughly did your bit and everyone was quite chuffed if you turned up 
and did some soldiering every now and again. That was it, because it’s a 
survivalist culture.’30 Colonel Thomas concluded that the prevailing mentality in 
the SLA ‘was not martial in any way, it was hunker down and hope nothing bad 
happens to you.’31 
In fact, British troops assumed effective control of Sierra Leonean 
command functions from the outset.32 Although loan service officers 
theoretically sat under the Sierra Leonean chain of command, and some even 
wore SLAF uniform, in reality they took their orders exclusively from a parallel 
British hierarchy. In the words of one officer serving in a “forward liaison team” 
mentoring SLA infantry battalions, ‘we were basically running the show making 
sure it [the war] happened’.33 During Operation Palliser, forward support to 
SLAF units was initially limited by Whitehall restrictions, which prevented British 
soldiers from accompanying the SLA on operations any distance from 
Freetown.34 As the war continued, however, loan service officers regularly 
accompanied SLA battalions into the front line.35 British mentors were also 
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embedded with the Sierra Leone Navy. The government’s flotilla consisted of an 
ageing Chinese patrol boat, the Alimamy Rassin, and three wooden-hulled 
“whalers” of local construction. Sea-worthy vessels were revamped using 
cannibalised parts from scrapped army trucks, and subsequently supported 
SLA operations along major waterways and established cordons at the mouth of 
rivers to interdict arms smugglers.36 Yet British advisers serving with SLA 
battalions during Operations Basilica and Silkman, which followed the initial 
Palliser intervention, continued to view the SLAF’s tactical capabilities as 
rudimentary. A typical battalion attack would be spearheaded by a Bedford truck 
onto which a 14.5mm anti-aircraft machine-gun had been mounted using a 
wooden frame. This would be used to fire directly at RUF ground positions over 
the top of the drivers cab. The SLA battalion would line up in file behind the 
vehicle and advance along a track until it made contact with the RUF, where-
upon the anti-aircraft gun would open fire and the troops behind would make an 
attempt to fan out and provide supporting small arms fire.37 British observers 
noted that soldiers were typically fortified with “Dutch Courage” before 
operations, and were prone to rout during unexpected shocks, as in one 
meeting engagement with the RUF near Masiaka.38  
Recently, Ucko has challenged the significance of Operation Palliser in 
the eventual success of the Rebel War. He has argued that the events which 
led to Operation Barras, and the subsequent British military surge back into 
theatre, demonstrate the relative importance of stabilisation under Basilica and 
Silkman to eventual military victory.39 Certainly, the re-training of the SLAF 
formed and important element of the stabilisation campaign. Shortly after the 
initial intervention, the UK agreed a financial commitment of £21.27 million to 
train and equip the SLA, and conducted a personnel verification process to 
define the SLA’s working establishment as a precursor to a more formalised 
process of re-training. Under Operation Basilica, training was conducted by a 
series of Short-Term Training Teams (STTTs), each training a battalion of 1,000 
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soldiers over six weeks.40 These were largely recruited from RSLMF ‘service 
continued’ personnel who volunteered to re-join the SLA from the abortive Lomé 
DDR programme. STTT1, provided by 2nd Battalion, the Royal Anglian 
Regiment, arrived in Sierra Leone just before Operation Palliser finished.41 
Training was carried out in a large tented camp outside Waterloo called 
Benguema, and was subsequently subsumed under the title of Operation 
Silkman, which was tasked with stabilising Sierra Leone after Operation Barras. 
By December 2000, 3,000 Sierra Leonean soldiers had been retrained, and the 
UK further agreed to procure uniforms and equipment for the SLA.42 In early 
2001, re-trained SLA battalions were being used to relieve units fighting up-
county, enabling those units to be re-constituted and trained in turn. By the time 
the final STTT departed in early October 2001, a total of 9,300 SLA soldiers and 
315 other former combatants had passed out of the now renamed Armed 
Forces Training Centre (AFTC) Benguema, under the tutelage of nine 
successive STTTs.43 By early 2001, however, the limited tactical capacity 
displayed by retrained units led international observers to describe the UK’s 
approach as ‘high-risk’, despite the efforts made to train and equip the SLA. 
Instead, one report demanded that ‘British officers must be [formally] placed in 
the chain of command, probably as deep as the rank of major’.44 
Although the British were primarily concerned with improving the SLAF’s 
fighting abilities during the Rebel War, much of the British activity also hoped to 
improve the civil-military behaviours of the military. The SLAF, in common with 
all armed groups during the war, had developed a reputation for indiscipline, 
brutality and human rights abuses, contributing to its widespread de-
legitimisation among Sierra Leone’s civilian population.45 During the AFRC 
                                                          
40 Almost immediately, local journalists and international NGOs raised concerns that the courses 
were too short to effect fundamental changes. See Imperial War Museum Film Archives BFA 
1417 ‘Operation Basilica, Sierra Leone, July 2000 (Tape 8)’, Visit to the frigate HMS Argyll 
(second press conference); International Crisis Group, ‘Sierra Leone: Time for a New Military 
and Political Strategy’, Africa Report No. 28 (Freetown/London/Brussels, 11 April 2001), 
Appendix A. 
41 Dent, ‘Sierra Leone Background Brief’, op. cit., p. 23. 
42 International Crisis Group, ‘Sierra Leone: Time for a New Military and Political Strategy’, op. 
cit.; Dent, ‘Sierra Leone Background Brief’, op. cit., p. 25.  
43 Dent, ‘Sierra Leone Background Brief’, op. cit., p. 31. 
44 International Crisis Group, ‘Sierra Leone: Time for a New Military and Political Strategy’, op. 
cit., p. 23. 
45 For example, Colonel Stack described how the military was ‘feared, resented, had lost public 
respect. It was a damaged institution, because it was seen to have been the institution that had 
brought the country to the edge of ruin’, reflecting the depth of public antipathy he observed for 
178 
 
interregnum, for example, sobels had committed widespread atrocity against 
both the civilian population and the SLPP government’s tribal militias, the CDF. 
A witness before the Special Court for Sierra Leone later recalled one 
illustrative instance in which AFRC soldiers repeatedly drove over the mangled 
body of a CDF member with an army ambulance, while a sergeant looked on 
and fired into the air in celebration.46 British officers serving alongside the SLAF 
following Operation Palliser found that these attitudes persisted in the force. For 
example, one British mentor later recalled how difficult it was to prevent SLA 
soldiers murdering captured RUF prisoners.47 Colonel Thomas concluded 
simply that ‘there isn’t a tradition of prisoners of war in Africa’.48 
British attempts to address this behaviour extended beyond the 
constraining normative presence of British officers embedded in SLA battalions. 
The second Abuja cease-fire with the RUF enabled the UN to re-start its Military 
Reintegration Programme (MRP) in May 2001, with significant British support.49 
The revamped MRP was seen as important for rehabilitating British credibility, 
but equally represented a profound attempt to reshape the political and civil-
military character of the military. Candidates from the RUF and CDF 
volunteered to join the MRP via the UN-run DDR programme, and were initially 
processed at a temporary holding centre at Kabata Juction. Here, candidates 
were screened for suitability to join the SLAF, and successful candidates 
progressed to further selection and holding camps at Lungi and Mape. These 
facilities became operational in early June 2001,50 and around 3,000 former 
combatants had registered for the programme by May 2002. Ultimately, 2,349 
soldiers entered the SLAF via the MRP; 65 per cent of them former RUF 
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fighters. Although the number of former combatants who entered the MRP was 
relatively modest in comparison to the 72,000 former combatants who 
registered as part of the DDR process, it nonetheless represented a significant 
demographic change for the SLAF, which was at the time only around 12,500 
strong. Former militia and rebel fighters came to constitute somewhat over 15 
per cent of the new establishment.51  
The MRP itself was planned and run by IMATT officers. Although 
UNAMSIL sent a panel of officers to formally accept combatants into the MRP, 
Major Stadward, the IMATT selection officer in the MRP selection camp at 
Kabata Junction, stated bluntly that, ‘I would be very, very, very surprised if they 
went against my recommendations’.52 In no small part, British involvement 
appears to have been necessary in order to convince President Kabbah that a 
military re-integration programme was feasible.53 During the MRP process, 
entrants received classes on literacy, Sierra Leonean history, and training in 
human rights and the laws of war.54 At nine weeks, the military training received 
by entrants on the MRP was 50 per cent longer than STTT courses run for SLA 
soldiers; a fact which likely reflects both an increased concern for political 
reliability of those undergoing the training, and their reduced level of military skill 
at the outset. The first training course for successful soldier entrants began in 
October 2001, and saw 889 former combatants trained by a mixture of British 
and SLAF instructors AFTC Benguema. Subsequent MRP2 and 3 courses 
trained 535 and 610 former combatants respectively. Ultimately, 56 new officers 
were commissioned from MRP entrants, and some 290 former combatants 
were also appointed as non-commissioned officers.55 
In January 2002, President Kabbah inaugurated a new MOD building in 
Freetown’s former Paramount Hotel, marking the effective end of hostilities. At 
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the reopening ceremony, Kabbah officially renamed the military the Republic of 
Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF). Although SLAF institutional 
redevelopment had taken a back seat to operational necessities during the 
Rebel War, British military support also rejuvenated various elements of the 
military’s institutional fabric. In addition to rebuilding the MOD, the British helped 
redraft SLAF policy during the latter stages of the Rebel War. In early 2000, for 
example, the British oversaw an increase in the military’s pay scales to bring it 
in line with other public servants, and subsequently restructured officers’ pay 
bands to ensure they fairly reflected rank responsibilities.56 An honours system 
was also reintroduced, which the British hoped would provide a way of 
recognising deserving soldiers without the award of unsuitable promotions, as 
had been previous practice.57 Yet, many of the benefits of these reforms were 
partially subverted by the existing neo-patrimonial preferences of SLAF officers. 
According to one British mentor, one of the first citations for an award was 
submitted by a SLAF officer seeking to have himself decorated. A significant 
cash award made to one SLA battalion by President Kabbah in recognition of a 
valorous action was appropriated by the unit’s officers on a sliding scale 
according to rank, while the soldiers were instead given a small amount of 
alcohol and some cigarettes.58 Nonetheless, in a statement of GOSL 
commitment to democratic civil-military relations, it was announced that the new 
MOD would be staffed jointly by both military and civilian personnel.59 
In early 2002, GOSL reasserted national sovereignty ahead of upcoming 
general elections by moving SLAF units up-country. With continued fighting in 
Liberia raising the threat of incursions, and significant numbers of displaced 
Sierra Leonean refugees across the border, establishing a military presence 
along the Liberian frontier was judged necessary to prevent instability seeping 
back into Sierra Leone during the election cycle. These tensions were matched 
by a long-standing border dispute with Guinea over the Yenga area.60 The 2002 
redeployment represented a significant change in the RSLAF’s centre of gravity. 
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By this stage the RSLAF consisting of three deployable infantry brigades, and 
was ultimately dispersed into platoon and company sized border checkpoints.61 
RSLAF units advanced across the country to take up stations along the frontier, 
ostensibly as a guarantee of Sierra Leonean territorial integrity. The naval wing 
also made efforts to re-assert a government writ throughout the country, 
establishing forward operating bases along the coast as far south as Sulima on 
the Liberian border.62 
Yet, the wholesale retraining of SLA battalions by British STTTs appears 
to have had only a marginal impact on SLAF capabilities. The 2002 
redeployment highlighted the RSLAF’s continued shortcomings. As one IMATT 
officer stated, ‘The operations of war that we were able to conduct were fairly 
basic. They didn’t need to be elaborate. We were essentially conducting un-
opposed advances to contact out towards the border’.63 Practically, this was 
enabled by arrangements made with the UN and CDF. Under the supervision of 
the UN, the CDF vacated territory as the RSLAF passed through, establishing 
movement corridors through which RSLAF could advance unhindered.64 
Consequently, the redeployment was more a series of coordinated moves than 
tactical operations. RSLAF units were technically led by RSLAF officers, who 
IMATT considered competent enough to command battalions providing IMATT 
mentors were on-hand to assist, but IMATT clearly remained the driving force.65 
Brigadier Le Grys, then serving with UNAMSIL, remarked that the RSLAF was 
‘completely incoherent’ above battalion level.66 Another IMATT officer described 
RSLAF overall capabilities to be ‘rudimentary’, and their general level of military 
skill as ‘very low’ or ‘largely untrained’ despite the STTT programme. The 
RSLAF Joint Force Commander, under whose orders the deployment was 
conducted, remained a British officer with executive powers, and the position 
was only transitioned to a Sierra Leonean officer after the elections.67 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, neither the presence of British advisers nor the 
MRP appear to have had any immediate impact on the political behaviour of the 
force. The redeployment of the newly renamed RSLAF to border security duties 
in 2002 was not simply a presentational attempt to reassert GOSL sovereignty; 
it was also a practical reflection of the continued concerns over the military’s 
political proclivities ahead of presidential elections. One senior IMATT officer 
stated that ‘between January and May 2002, there was a short window….[to] 
fundamentally get the army away from Freetown and out into the countryside, 
and away from centres of population…so they couldn’t be a threat to the 
population and couldn’t influence the outcome of the election.’68 IMATT ensured 
that military posts were separated from both the CDF, with which antagonisms 
persisted, and the civilian population. The same IMATT officer remarked that 
new dispositions were deliberately chosen so that, for example, the RSLAF 
brigade commander headquartered in Kenema did not ‘start to view Kenema as 
part of his responsibility’.69 For their part, large swathes of civil society evidently 
continued to view the military as a dangerous political actor. In April 2002, for 
instance, five soldiers were attacked by SLPP supporters in Freetown in 
separate incidents, primarily because they considered the army to be an agent 
of the APC.70 
Although the military did not intervene politically in the 2002 elections, the 
elections only served to highlight the dangerous political attitudes which 
remained in the RSLAF. Just a month before the elections, British officers 
discovered a coup plot involving Johnny Paul Koroma, the ex-army officer who 
had headed the AFRC coup which overthrew Kabbah.71 The election itself 
passed largely peacefully, and was subsequently declared free and fair by 
international observers. However, in a break from traditional electoral practice, 
the security forces voted the day before the general population. It is not clear 
why this procedure occurred. It may have been intended to improve the 
military’s ability to respond to disorder on the election day itself, though it is 
equally plausible that it was the result of political machinations within the 
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SLPP.72 The result, however, was that the political inclinations of the armed 
forces were clearly identifiable from those of the wider population. While 
President Kabbah’s SLPP won the election, the armed forces – in common with 
the wider security sector – overwhelmingly voted for Kabbah’s political 
opponents in the APC and the Peace and Liberation Party (PLP).73 The appeal 
of the PLP among the military was particularly concerning, given that it was 
headed by Johnny Paul Koroma. Although the PLP only polled around 3 per 
cent of the vote nationally, winning two parliamentary seats, an estimated 80 
per cent of PLP votes came from the security forces.74 The voting record of the 
armed forces was subsequently made public, in a move further detrimental to 
relations between the SLPP and the military. It was speculated that Kabbah 
himself may have approved this in order to justify continued official support for 
the CDF. However, Kabbah was also dealing with an internal rift in the SLPP, 
and so the leak may have come from Kamajor leaders hoping to shore up their 
own position inside the SLPP vis-à-vis Kabbah.75 
After the election, Kabbah conducted a tour of the RSLAF to reassure 
soldiers that his re-election would not prompt purges or reprisals against the 
military.76 While this may have diffused fears of a further coup attempt, it had 
little appreciable impact on wider RSLAF behaviour. In May 2002, for example, 
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the RSLAF introduced a new code of conduct. This aimed to curb the worst 
excesses of indiscipline and politicisation that had facilitated past coups, and 
consisted of a series of nine ‘dos’ and 16 ‘don’ts’ for RSLAF personnel.77 
Despite the extensive guidelines, the code of conduct was still being 
implemented in 2003.78 Indeed, on 13 January 2003, a group of former soldiers 
and civilians attacked the RSLAF armoury in Wellington on the outskirts of 
Freetown with the intention of overthrowing the government and reinstating 
Johnny Paul Koroma. A subsequent police investigation found evidence of links 
between the would-be coupists and serving soldiers. The RSLAF remained so 
deeply politicised that one international NGO even reported RSLAF concerns 
that placing newly trained soldiers under the command of existing officers was 
as good as never having trained them at all.79 
British Stabilisation and Externally-led Adaptation in the SLAF 
Given the significant British military investment in SLAF capabilities during the 
Rebel War, how can this modest improvement in military capacity be explained? 
The limited improvement in RSLAF capabilities was partially due to the scant 
GOSL resources available. In October 2001, for example, one of the two Mi-24s 
crashed and the remaining airframe was deemed unsafe and grounded owing 
to a lack of spare parts. Mi-8 “Hip” transport helicopters were still flown in 
support of RSLAF logistics, but the majority of the 2002 redeployment had to be 
conducted on foot.80 Similarly, the RSLAF only had the strength to man 32 of 
the 150 border crossings in the south east.81 Yet at the same time, the SLAF’s 
capabilities appear to have differed little from any other rebel or militia group 
involved in the Rebel War, despite enjoying British support. Like the SLAF, the 
RUF also made use of “technicals” – vehicles with support weapons 
rudimentarily mounted on them – while the West Side Boys were able to carry 
                                                          
77 Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces, ‘Establishment and Development of the Republic of 
Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), online at 
http://www.mod.gov.sl/docs/TheHistoryOfRepublicOfSierraLeoneArmedForces-RSLAF.pdf, 
accessed on 25/05/16, pp. 13-15. 
78 GOSL, Defence White Paper, op. cit., para 1017. 
79 International Crisis Group, ‘Sierra Leone: The State of Security and Governance’, op. cit., pp. 
6-7. 
80 Julie Hemmings, ‘Coroner's Safety Questions for Army’, The Yorkshire Post, 18 August 2005, 
online at http://www.yorkshirepost.co.uk/news/coroner-s-safety-questions-for-army-1-2478829, 
accessed on 22/04/16; Dent, ‘Sierra Leone Background Brief’, op. cit., p. 26; Interview with 
Participant A14, op. cit. 
81 International Crisis Group, ‘Sierra Leone After Elections’, op. cit., p. 10. 
185 
 
out basic fire-and-manoeuvre tactics, establish vehicle check-points, and run a 
signals section.82 Grissom contended that in Afghanistan, the presence of 
international forces effectively served to inhibit the adaptive pressures of war on 
the ANA, instead mediating change through exclusively top-down processes, 
which themselves became subject to political and neo-patrimonial subversion.83 
Does this account for the limited military adaptation seen in the SLAF during the 
later phases of the Rebel War? 
The SLAF certainly did not lack bottom-up experience of war, and 
remained under significant pressure throughout the Rebel War. The period of 
conflict prior to British intervention did indeed see some adaptation; the 
expansion of the CDF, initially sponsored by the RSLMF, being the most 
prominent. But arguably, the RSLMF degraded as much as it innovated, to the 
point where it differed little from its rebel enemy. It might be argued that 
adaptation does not always have to be positive – not all changes are successful 
or desirable – and that the increasing “sobelisation” of the RSLMF during the 
Rebel War represented a form of deviant adaptation to the character of conflict 
presented by the RUF and the force’s own limited resource base.84 Instead of 
enacting more profound change, the RSLMF fell back on pre-war habits of 
political intervention as a response to battlefield pressure. 
Following intervention, the British drove both operations and operational 
change. During Palliser, Colonel Thomas was seconded to the SLAF and 
established the Defence Operational Planning Group to co-ordinate Unholy 
Alliance operations. The extent to which British officers were able to exercise 
control over the CDF, AFRC and West Side Boys is debateable. Thomas 
himself conceded that the British had no means of verifying up-country CDF 
activity, and that the CDF liaison, ‘as well as being a mystic was also a 
bullshitter’. Consequently, Thomas felt that CDF operations consisted of ‘a lot of 
“blah”, and you know a lot of heat and light and not much activity’.85 Another 
British officer concurred, stating that while the CDF were useful for intelligence 
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gathering, ‘a lot of display went on’.86 Similarly, the West Side Boys were 
viewed by Thomas as ‘a bunch of scum’ who ‘would only fight when it suited 
them’.87 Nonetheless, the British were still able to exercise a degree of control 
over them during Palliser. After one incident in which the West Side Boys 
confronted and disarmed some CDF militiamen, Thomas threatened to destroy 
their bush camp with an air strike if they did not reign in their activity.88 
Notwithstanding the group’s evident unreliability and dubious loyalties, as 
demonstrated in the later Barras incident, the West Side Boys were able to hold 
their own territory between Masaika and Mile 38 from the RUF, itself a useful 
tactical contribution.89 The British presence appears to have had more impact in 
the SLAF. Seward, then embedded in the SLAF naval component, later recalled 
how his advice was ‘accepted readily. You’re always going to get one or two 
dissenters, because you’re taking over, but I think we all tried to be fairly careful 
and not completely take everything from them’.90 Similarly, when Thomas 
arrived SLAF officers clearly still identified themselves as members of either the 
AFRC or loyalist faction. Six weeks later, AFRC and SLA officers were 
reminiscing together in Freetown’s bars. Yet, Thomas conceded that even this 
was somewhat superficial; while senior officers would be ‘outwardly be 
friendly…I think underneath…it was probably too visceral between them at that 
level’.91 
The limited impact of British mentoring on core SLAF behaviours was 
more pronounced at the tactical level. Initially, British “forward liaison teams” 
attempted to improve the SLA’s tactical abilities by introducing the rudiments of 
British Army tactics, planning and command procedures. One British major 
mentoring 4 Battalion SLA recalled attempts to teach SLA officers the British 
Army’s seven-step combat planning process. However, British attempts to 
introduce Western tactics were repeatedly frustrated by ingrained Sierra 
Leonean preferences: ‘We tried to teach them the manoeuvreist approach, 
which they politely listened to, and then come the day they would just line up 
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and do what they did.’92 Where British mentors were able to influence tactical 
change, it was typically only as a concession. The same officer recalled 
reviewing a defensive position occupied by 5 Battalion SLA around Port Loko, 
and remonstrating with the unit’s officers over a gap in their defences. The SLA 
officers maintained that the unguarded ground was an area of bad Juju, known 
to both them and the RUF, and consequently did not need to be covered – 
much to the mentor’s chagrin. After some discussion, some general purpose 
machine guns (GPMGs) were re-sited to cover the gap. When members of the 
RUF were later debriefed in a DDR camp, they confirmed that they would not 
have attacked across the undefended ground because it was an area of bad 
Juju. With hindsight, the mentor concluded that the 5 Battalion officers must 
have only re-sited their guns ‘to keep us happy…our brilliant Western military 
minds of course, were telling us that’s a brilliant place to attack…but in the end 
we wasted two valuable GPMG positions that weren’t needed; we just assumed 
we knew better.’93 
In consequence, the British appear to have adopted a pragmatic 
approach to improving SLAF effectiveness. As the major recalled, ‘In the end 
you realised, OK, this is the way they’re going to do it, so how can we reinforce 
and make better what they’re going to do anyway?’94 Consequently, IMATT’s 
wartime focus sought to improve many of the SLAF’s administrative and 
logistical processes, in an attempt to make their basic tactical praxis more 
effective: 
‘from what we could see, the way to win the battle was to be the person with the 
most ammunition and keep firing, so you could win a battle with logistics, by simply 
making sure…they were making more noise than the enemy who’d fired off all their 
ammunition. The enemy would go away, you could move forward’.95 
Here, improvements in SLA fire discipline were achieved as much through new 
weapons as new training. The British began to replace the motley collection of 
automatic Kalashnikov variants then in use in the SLAF with semi-automatic 
Self Loading Rifles and ammunition from surplus British stocks.96 This helped 
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reduce SLA ammunition expenditure, and also made SLA weapons more easily 
accountable. Still, Lieutenant Colonel Stadward observed that SLA soldiers 
disliked the weapon: ‘it was heavy, you couldn’t look a gangster with it’; 
perceptions not helped by IMATT officers’ preferences for other small arms. 
Nonetheless, the weapon gradually gained favour with the SLA – not least 
because its ammunition would pass through jungle vegetation better than 
Kalashnikov rounds.97 Thus the UK’s re-equipment programme facilitated 
improvements in SLA’s operational performance which tactical mentoring alone 
struggled to achieve. 
This is not to say that British capacity building had no impact on the 
SLAF. The STTT courses did contribute to a rudimentary improvement in the 
SLA’s tactical capabilities. The STTT packages included instruction in basic 
soldiering skills like fieldcraft, navigation, weapons handling, marksmanship, 
and drill. They also included some tactical training, including patrolling 
techniques and coaching on basic operations like reconnaissance patrols and 
platoon attacks,98 as well as instruction in the laws of war carried out by the 
ICRC.99 IMATT mentors working with retrained SLA battalions in the field did 
notice a perceptible improvement in the capabilities of units which had passed 
through the STTTs. Unlike pre-trained battalions, these units were deemed 
capable of operating collectively to a certain degree, and their discipline and 
motivation was also noticeably improved: 
‘A pre-trained battalion, you’d say, “Right, go left now. You five – up – move – now”. 
And they were like, “Uh. Get up, really? OK. Guys, apparently we’ve got to get up. 
Shall we get up? We could do, I suppose, go on then get up”…And you realise what 
drill is for; drill is just making people act on the word of command: “We’re going to 
go left, standby – three – two – one – go!” Executive word of command, they had 
learnt drill, they had learnt that the go word, or the executive word, meant do 
something and do it now, ‘cos if you didn’t do it now you’d get shouted at and it 
made you look bad in front of your mates. So what you did see was the ability for 
them to react quickly...which had been absent before, and then suddenly you could 
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manoeuvre groups of people, and keep a structure. You know, “Charlie section – 
forward – down”. Down is an executive word of command, they would do “down”, 
instead of wandering around a bit. Some of them would still obviously do their own 
thing, ‘cos they were high on drugs.’100 
Still, British officers nonetheless remained central to SLA operational 
effectiveness. The extent to which this retraining persisted in SLA formations is 
debatable. Although SLA soldiers were keen to learn, and were far more 
familiar with Sierra Leone’s bush environment than their British instructors, 
members of the STTTs found that SLA soldiers’ ability to absorb training was 
limited. One training warrant officer during STTT3, for example, commented 
that, ‘The main thing is retention. They’re not very good at retaining the 
information we give them. Anything written, or speaking too long, and they get 
distracted and bored. Practical skills is what they know best.’101 Consequently, a 
number of SLA elements which had already passed through Benguema had to 
be later retrained owing to the high level of ‘skills fade’.102 Brigadier Le Grys, 
then a staff officer with UNAMSIL, observed that the SLA remained ‘very much 
under UK command…and literally there was a UK mentor on every corner’, 
such that during the 2002 redeployment, ‘you’d have a British officer leading the 
patrol and the move’.103 
Institutional changes in the SLAF also appear to have had a limited 
impact on SLAF behaviour during the war. Here, SLAF logistical and pay 
reforms are particularly illustrative. By September 2000, much of the SLA had 
not been paid for three months. Alongside their pay, soldiers were issued a 
monthly rice ration, which formed part of the SLA’s basic remuneration 
package, and was a lifeline for soldiers’ families. Yet the supply of rice was 
unreliable, directly impacting on operations. Battalions would refuse to move 
positions in advance of the ration delivery, fearing it might otherwise fail to 
reach them. Once issued, the strength of the battalion would drop considerably 
as soldiers left for Freetown to deliver a cut of the rations to their families. The 
ration system effectively meant that battalions were only properly manned and 
available for offensive operations for a two week window every month, with the 
battalion either waiting for rations or absent delivering them to dependents in 
the rear for the remaining fortnight. Consequently, the SLA planning cycle 
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became one of ‘Where’s the two week window?’, and increasing SLA 
operational tempo became dependent on ensuring a reliable supply of 
rations.104  
However, the unreliable supply of rice was not simply a product of limited 
SLAF resources, but also of its institutional culture. Wartime attempts to alter 
such institutional practices brought British mentors into direct confrontation with 
the Sierra Leonean hierarchy, limiting reforms. The SLAF command tacitly 
accepted the practice of maintaining “ghost” soldiers on nominal rolls. 
Quartermasters would draw rations for a full-strength battalion of 700 men, 
when British advisors estimated their units contained 400 active soldiers at 
most. The difference in pay and rations would then be distributed among the 
battalion’s officers, serving as an incentive for officers to maintain their units 
below establishment as well as diverting scant resources.105 This practice was 
deeply ingrained in the neo-patrimonial culture of the Sierra Leonean military, 
and indeed a previous attempt to check the practice precipitated the AFRC 
coup.106 This culture equally pervaded the SLAF’s non-commissioned soldiers. 
In November 2000, for example, British mentors distributed British Army ration 
packs among SLA soldiers with the aim of boosting soldiers’ morale prior to a 
major planned operation. The following morning British officers found the 
majority of the unit absent, away selling their British-gifted rations in the 
Freetown market – a fact which neither surprised nor concerned the battalion’s 
commander.107 
IMATT was able to take some steps to curb these practices. During the 
unit verification scheme, the British issued ID cards to identify legitimate 
soldiers from hangers-on who had not been officially registered as part of the 
SLAF. By the end of the process, 2000 ghost serials were removed from the 
SLA’s establishment.108 The exercise was resisted by SLAF officers, because 
although the ID cards were a bonus to soldiers, they were a threat to officers’ 
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neo-patrimonial practices.109 Consequently, the British were conscious that 
reforms were implicitly limited by the need to ensure that they were not 
‘dishonouring and discrediting the instruments of state. If you make all the 
officers look like the crooks that they are, that’s not good’.110 Despite the 
extensive organisational restructuring and tactical retraining of the SLAF carried 
out by the British during the Rebel War, IMATT was not able to dislodge neo-
patrimonial and fundamentally short-termist behaviours. For example, the 
British major serving in a Forward Liaison Team previously cited recalled 
issuing a number of new helmets to an SLA battalion, only to spark a brawl 
because the initial delivery had been insufficient to equip every soldier. 
Referring to the difference in organisational culture between IMATT and the 
SLAF which had underpinned the incident, the officer remarked that ‘we just got 
it fundamentally wrong. You couldn’t discipline them; that’s our mistake’.111 
Similarly, he recalled his horror at finding that an SLA soldier in the forward 
trench of a defensive position had only been issued six rounds of ammunition. 
When asked, the unit’s Quartermaster stated that the battalion always received 
word of an RUF advance in good time, whereupon ammunition would be 
issued. In the meantime, all stocks were held centrally to prevent individual 
soldiers selling off the battalion’s ammunition for personal profit.112 
Reforming Civil-Military Relations: Military Integration and the Norms of a 
National Army 
The utility of military integration and national army building in effecting 
normative political change has been deeply contested in academic scholarship. 
Licklider has argued that military integration provides an overt commitment 
towards peace on the part of former belligerents, and helps to assuage the 
security dilemmas warring parties experience at the end of hostilities. Licklider 
also argued that the process of integration can act as a symbol of national unity, 
helping to reshape the identities of former combatants and wider society 
alike.113 This analysis is consistent with critiques of authoritarian states’ security 
                                                          




113 Roy Licklider (ed.), New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil 
Wars (Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 2014), pp 7-9. See also, Florence Gaub, 
192 
 
policies, which often exclude minority groups from equal service in the armed 
forces along political lines.114 Practices such as coup-proofing and ethnic 
stacking have been shown to have a negative impact on military 
effectiveness,115 but may not improve regime security.116 Peled has also argued 
that such policies facilitate internal repression and predatory behaviour by 
armed forces,117 somewhat reinforcing the archetypical link between national 
militaries and democratic civil-military relations seen in historical discussion of 
Western mass armies.118 Yet the practical record of military integration is mixed. 
Rwanda appears to have been a success story, while South Sudan remains 
problematic,119 and academic opinion differs as to whether mixed results should 
be interpreted as a sign of progress or of failure.120 Krebs forcefully argued that 
the correlation between national armies and political identity is symptomatic 
rather than causal. He concluded that dominant political identities shape military 
demographics, but that this relationship is one way; changes in military 
demographics have little impact on wider social attitudes or on soldiers’ own 
identities.121 A number of studies have highlighted the numerous difficulties 
experienced by socially-diverse armies in reshaping the identity of their 
soldiers.122 But there has been little conclusive attention paid to the role of 
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external interventionists in MRPs, and there remains little understanding of how 
these dynamics interact with the processes of externally-led change observed 
by Grissom. 
This contested state of academic understanding is reflected in the Sierra 
Leonean experience. The British-led MRP was not the first attempt at military 
integration during the Rebel War. Following ECOMOG’s recapture of Freetown 
in 1998, for instance, many junior AFRC soldiers were re-incorporated into the 
RSLMF.123 The subsequent Lomé Agreement also required the disarmament of 
the RSLMF, CDF and RUF, to be replaced by a new national army formed from 
demobilised combatants of all factions. Between October 1999 and April 2000 
nine UN-run DDR centres were opened across the country, and received 
12,500 weapons before the Lomé peace collapsed.124 Many of these weapons 
were sub-standard, however, creating an impression of less than genuine 
commitment to the scheme on the part of the RUF and CDF.125 The process 
consequently became a focal point for political tensions, and the eventual 
collapse of the Lomé Agreement was triggered by RUF attempts to reclaim 
former combatants from the DDR scheme, whom they considered deserters.126 
Much like Licklider’s arguments, the British-run MRP deliberately sought 
to offset security dilemmas by attempting to make the programme as inclusive 
as possible. Both the RUF and CDF provided liaison officers to monitor the 
selection process and guarantee equal treatment. During the selection process 
itself, candidates spent a week at Kabata Junction, where they completed a 
mile and a half run, a written test, and were interviewed on their leadership and 
military skills by a British officer. Candidates were then ranked using a points 
system.127 Pass rates at selection varied from 50 to 90 per cent, with around 80 
per cent of applicants successful overall. 98 per cent of those accepted passed 
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out from initial training.128 IMATT deliberately interpreted entry requirements 
liberally in order to recruit as many former combatants as possible. Stadward, 
for instance, was less interested in whether candidates were genuinely literate 
than whether they were willing to co-operate in order to make a pretence at the 
minimum standard. This attitude was typical of the British approach throughout 
the MRP. At Kabata Junction, former combatants from the RUF and CDF were 
intermixed, accommodated together, and treated identically. Stadward made it 
known that the more candidates from a (mixed) syndicate that passed, the more 
favourably the whole syndicate would be judged. This was manifestly untrue; 
each candidate was scored on their own individual merit, but the rumour 
encouraged co-operation rather than competition. In Stadward’s words, the 
British approach was one of ‘you’re now in the army. We were trying this 
cohesion from the very beginning. Forget who you are, forget who you were, 
forget what you’ve done; you’re in the army now.’129 This facilitated a significant 
degree of integration between formerly antagonistic combatants; at least while 
under British supervision. IMATT officers repeatedly expressed their surprise at 
combatants’ capacity to integrate, in stark contrast to British officers’ 
experiences in Northern Ireland, Kosovo and Angola.130 One IMATT officer who 
visited an MRP camp recalled how candidates ‘all looked at each other evilly 
when you got them in there; 24 hours later they were playing football together 
and getting on with it, which I just found astonishing’.131  
Despite these early successes, the MRP’s long-term legacy on the 
RSLAF was limited. Here too, British intentions were somewhat frustrated by 
the deeply ingrained culture and politics of the Sierra Leonean military. As early 
as July 2002, a split had emerged in the RSLAF between the wartime SLA and 
the MRP entrants.132 Stadward recalled that there ‘was a certain degree of 
funniness’ among “loyalist” SLA officers, who did not like the idea of former 
rebels becoming NCOs or officers.133 Wartime tensions between “loyalists” and 
“rebels” were aggravated by the additional British training received by the latter, 
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which was perceived to improve relative career progression.134 These 
antagonisms persisted, and were still observable to IMATT officers serving in 
2004.135 As late as 2012, IMATT officers noted a perception among former RUF 
soldiers that their wartime affiliation continued to disadvantage their subsequent 
military careers.136 Indeed, the RSLAF’s institutional commitment to 
reintegration seems dubious, given that MRP entrants were only offered one-
year initial contracts and their RSLAF ranks were considered temporary, subject 
to review six months after entry.137 In parallel fashion, ex-combatants who 
elected to demobilise rather than join the MRP also struggled to re-integrate into 
post-war society. Respondents to perception studies conducted in 2005-6 
described both the CDF and “Ghetto Boys” – urban gangs formed from wartime 
militias – as continuing security threats. Other ex-combatants took up work as 
motorbike taxis and subsequently formed biker gangs; reservoirs of civil 
disorder which later concerned both GOSL and IMATT.138 
Many of the institutional mechanisms intended to support military 
integration were not fully implemented. Some of IMATT’s initial selection 
practices during the MRP were at odds with later attempts to professionalise the 
RSLAF. For instance, Stadward perpetuated the belief among MRP candidates 
at Kabata Junction that he was a witch-doctor, whose lazy eye could see into 
their souls and tell if they were lying, in order to solicit honesty in the selection 
tests.139 Similarly, some ex-combatants experienced significant difficulties in 
adjusting to military institutional life, resulting in higher rates of discharge and a 
perception of persecution. As one IMATT officer explained:  
‘more of the RUF and the Kamajor…were given the push, frankly, because the 
behaviours they exhibited were probably the worst and therefore the most 
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problematic…they had a lot of problems with some of the more disturbed former 
child soldiers in the RUF and the CDF who…were not amenable to discipline’.140 
While IMATT stressed the importance of distributing former rebels throughout 
the force, and more generally of posting soldiers away from their tribal 
homelands, in reality this proved difficult.141 As Brigadier Le Grys explained, 
attempts were made to cross-post officers, but ‘you can’t expect soldiers to start 
moving across the country at vast expense when they haven’t got any 
money’.142 Consequently, one southern battalion gained a reputation as ‘the 
RUF battalion’ due to the origins of its soldiers.143 This only served to retrench 
antagonisms, and it seems this battalion expressed persistent fears that it was 
particularly vulnerable to downsizings for political reasons.144 
This last concern does not appear to have been totally unfounded. Major 
General Alfred Nelson-Williams, writing as the RSLAF CDS some years after 
the MRP, noted that ex-combatants were ‘the first casualties of the downsizing 
phase for officers’ in 2004 and 2005.145 Ostensibly, Nelson-Williams attributed 
this to poor performance on staff courses, but he also made it clear that he 
viewed the commissioning of ex-combatants as an overtly political attempt to 
marginalise APC-supporting SLA officers.146 This was true – at least insofar as 
the MRP was seen as a way of rebalancing the social demographics of the 
force to prevent military praetorianism. Later British policies intended to 
professionalise the military – themselves designed to improve civil-military 
relations and normative behaviour in the RSLAF – inadvertently compounded 
this political antagonism. The British revamped military educational standards, 
and established the Armed Forces Education Centre to provide literacy and 
numeracy training in the RSLAF. But at the same time, these educational 
requirements appear to have disproportionately disadvantaged former CDF and 
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RUF members.147 Moreover, the military remained dominated by ex-RSLMF 
officers (either “loyalists” or ex-AFRC) with historic grievances against both the 
RUF and CDF. 
To a significant extent, the limitations of the MRP reflect IMATT’s wider 
inability to redress deeply ingrained neo-patrimonial and political cultures. 
Senior promotions, such as the appointment of a Sierra Leonean officer to the 
role of Commander Joint Forces in 2002, required the direct involvement of the 
President; a reality readily accepted by IMATT. As one senior IMATT officer 
commented, ‘trying to make the place coup-proof was part of the deal’.148 The 
RSLAF chain of command also remained subject to both political and 
patrimonial subversion. The same officer described how RSLAF commanders 
were ‘forever short circuiting the chain of command’ through tribal and 
patrimonial links: ‘Whenever I was talking to CDS in the Ministry of Defence or 
anywhere else, there’d always be a queue of people bringing gifts and things, 
and some really inappropriately junior officers would come and see CDS and 
ask for favours, or bring gifts’.149 IMATT attempted to reinforce the formal chain 
of command, largely through constant explanation and monitoring. Here, IMATT 
hoped to replicate the dynamics of professional emulation described by Farrell 
in the interwar Irish Army,150 promoting change through normative exchange – 
as if by an osmosis of values. Prima facie, this dynamic appears to have had 
some limited success in historical examples of military training missions.151 In 
Sierra Leone though, favouritism and patrimonialism were so deeply ingrained 
that the SLA were continually ‘flicking back to it, and you’d have to remind them 
again’, though they ‘were always delightfully charming about it’.152 
IMATT officers tended to downplay the legacy of MRP tensions in the 
later development of the RSLAF. A senior IMATT officer serving in 2004 later 
commented that, ‘You occasionally heard a comment from somebody, about 
somebody else, about where they came from. But that was it…we saw no real 
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evidence of that being a barrier to development of the armed forces.’153 
Brigadier Santa-Olalla, Commander IMATT in 2005, likewise argued that ‘one 
heard from different people that so-and-so had been reintegrated into the 
RSLAF, but as far as I was aware they were such small numbers I don’t think it 
was any longer of relevance.’154 An IMATT major in Sierra Leone in 2007-8 
similarly concluded that ‘they’d just moved on’.155 Equally, many officers did not 
ask too many questions about the social and political demographics of the 
military. A senior IMATT officer serving with the RSLAF in 2002 stated bluntly 
that: 
‘There was tension, yes…but generally it was handled by the Sierra Leonean 
commanders themselves, and it seemed to work for the most part…it wasn’t my 
role to judge people on the basis of their role during the civil war. It was my role to 
use the army to do a job.’156  
Brigadier Cholerton, Commander IMATT in 2007, similarly conceded that, 
‘There was unit there, and we just tried to work with that unit, we didn’t 
investigate who came from where too closely.’157 To a significant degree, the 
MRP was viewed by British officers as a mechanism for immediate political 
stabilisation at the war’s end, of little relevance to the longer-term development 
of the force. Despite initial success under British supervision, as a top-down 
externally-directed reform mechanism, the MRP failed to displace neo-
patrimonial power structures in the RSLAF, and IMATT did not pursue the point. 
The Post-War Politics of Institutional Change 
Despite notable British investment in the wartime SLAF, its fundamental 
behavioural norms remained largely unchanged, limiting both combat 
effectiveness and civil-military accountability. While the RSLMF experienced 
significant combat pressure prior to British intervention, it had shown itself 
consistently unable to sufficiently adapt to the RUF threat. Subsequent change 
was led from without, driven primarily by British commanders according to 
priorities as they perceived them. While this clearly did produce some change, 
the attitudes and behaviours required to sustain this remained absent, leading 
to a reliance on British support. To an extent, more profound normative change 
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was precluded by the British military’s own focus on immediate stabilisation. 
However, the formal end of hostilities facilitated a more fundamental 
restructuring of the RSLAF. In 2003, GOSL produced a Defence White Paper to 
publicly outline its strategic priorities for defence; largely focused on the 
democratisation and professionalisation of the RSLAF.158 At around the same 
time, IMATT embarked upon its first and only major infrastructure project; a 
barracks rebuilding programme called Operation Pebu, or “shelter” in Mende.159 
Yet these post-war attempts to institutionalise change were frustrated by neo-
patrimonial resistance from the RSLAF officer corps.  
The 2003 White Paper was a clear statement of normative intent. The 
document hoped ‘to instil in the hearts and minds of our Service men and 
women a set of values that would make them become loyal and accountable to 
the government of the day, regardless of its political composition, while retaining 
their professional effectiveness.’160 The White Paper mandated the MOD to 
oversee RSLAF transformation in conjunction with IMATT.161 GOSL’s primary 
intention behind the White Paper was to explain ongoing defence reforms to 
both the public and the RSLAF.162 This was deemed necessary because, in the 
words of the Sierra Leonean civil servant Al-Hassan Kondeh, the military had 
been previously ‘run as a more or less secret cult with little or no 
accountability’.163 Although the White Paper resulted in a clear statement of 
normative intent, the process of drafting the White Paper proved to be deeply 
contested. The Sierra Leonean drafting committee included Kondeh, who later 
complained that IMATT had attempted to undermine their independent agency.  
Kondeh stated that Commander IMATT refused to discuss unilateral funding 
preferences, on the basis that UK money and decisions were not accountable to 
the Sierra Leonean MOD. Similarly, IMATT had insinuated ‘that civilian ministry 
employees lacked the competence to make informed contributions’ and one 
IMATT commander bluntly refuted the White Paper Committee’s findings from 
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its unit visits.164 Speaking of IMATT’s attempts to control the reform process in 
the MOD, the Sierra Leonean civil servant Emmanuel Coker remarked that, ‘We 
had to bulldoze our way in’.165 Such incidents reflect a conflict between IMATT 
and Sierra Leonean officials over the direction and control of defence reform. 
While IMATT and GOSL differed in their approach to normative change, 
RSLAF officers resented the civilian presence IMATT had introduced to the 
MOD altogether. They viewed it as a de facto indictment of the military’s 
competence, as well as a constraint on their independence. Following the White 
Paper, DFID conducted a review of the MOD with the intention of further 
institutionalising the civilian presence in the ministry.166 Although wartime 
IMATT reforms had expanded the civilian presence in the MOD, this had been 
necessarily ad hoc, creating significant discrepancies between the civil and 
military components. For example, the civilian Director General was paid at 
Grade 13 and his deputy at Grade 9, while the CDS sat at Grade 14 and his 
assistant chiefs at Grade 13. Some military officers in the MOD were being paid 
400 per cent more than civil servants working at the same level.167 The re-
grading of Sierra Leonean civil servants faced concerted resistance from 
RSLAF officers. Alfred Nelson-Williams, then an RSLAF staff officer in the 
MOD, complained that civil servants in the MOD ‘were not properly trained or 
qualified for their appointments’.168 RSLAF officers declined to engage with the 
White Paper drafting committee, and subsequently boycotted MOD 
procurement meetings, claiming they were rigged by the civil service.169 While 
IMATT officers shared their RSLAF colleagues’ low opinion of MOD civil 
servants, largely owing to a high rate of perceived corruption,170 IMATT 
nonetheless supported the principle of civilian control. The UK imposed the re-
grading on the RSLAF, and Kondeh conceded that much of IMATT’s 
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obstreperousness during the White Paper process resulted from British 
attempts to marginalise senior RSLAF officers whose agendas it viewed as 
reactionary.171 
However, the British ability to impose change on the RSLAF had clear 
limits. IMATT had assumed a significant degree of executive control over the 
RSLAF in order to pursue the war, but it was apparent by 2003 that this was 
inhibiting sustainable RSLAF ownership of reforms. The MOD’s civilian Director 
General, for instance, described IMATT’s restructuring of the MOD as ‘far too 
complex for Sierra Leoneans to grasp’.172 One IMATT officer posted to the MOD 
in March 2003 found that the MOD was driven by IMATT officers. IMATT had 
‘developed a battle rhythm of committees for the MOD that would run, which 
was running at a pace which we could run at, but they couldn’t.’173 The 
institution itself was composed of three distinct groups – IMATT officers, RSLAF 
officers and Sierra Leonean civil servants – ‘which interact with little obvious 
team work or cohesion’. Consequently, Sierra Leonean staff were ‘content to let 
the IMATT team drive…but resent the style and pace’.174 Moreover, the RSLAF 
proved unable to staff the new organisational structures IMATT had introduced. 
In 2002, the air and naval components had lost their independent status, 
becoming the Air Wing and Naval Wing of the RSLAF, and the force was also 
reorganised under two parallel headquarters. The Joint Force Command 
became responsible for the force’s combat troops, while the Joint Support 
Command was established to oversee logistics.175 The new structure envisaged 
three infantry brigades and a garrison in Freetown, with each brigade consisting 
of three infantry battalions, plus assorted support units under direct command of 
one of the twin headquarters.176 But by late 2003, the MOD was 50 per cent 
undermanned (41 per cent with IMATT officers included), while the Joint Force 
Command HQ was 41 per cent undermanned (24 per cent with IMATT), and the 
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Joint Support Command HQ was similarly 28 per cent undermanned (reduced 
to nine per cent by IMATT staff).177 
IMATT consequently established a committee of Sierra Leonean officers 
to review the RSLAF’s senior command and control structures. This disbanded 
the Joint Support Command and subsumed its functions into the MOD and the 
Joint Force Command.178 IMATT supported the change on the basis that the 
previous IMATT-imposed design had proved dysfunctional. Colonel Stack, for 
example, remarked that the previous structure ‘didn’t work; it was a failure, it 
never worked’.179 While the closure of the Joint Support Command brought the 
official organisation into line with the functional reality of how the RSLAF wished 
to operate, it also removed a central tenet of IMATT’s initial normative 
restructuring of the RSLAF. Indeed, the division between Joint Force and Joint 
Support Commands had been deliberately established in 2002 as an attempt to 
make the military more politically accountable, by ensuring no single 
commander had unilateral access to both the troops and the logistics required 
to overthrow the government.180 The disbandment of the Joint Support 
Command barely two years after it was established highlights the limitations of 
IMATT’s initial wartime and post-war reforms on RSLAF norms. 
The starkest example of RSLAF resistance to IMATT-led change can be 
seen in the failure of Operation Pebu. Pebu planned to renovate or build from 
scratch three brigade HQs and eight battalion barracks, enabling a formation 
training cycle to begin by May 2004.181 It also facilitated a rationalisation of 
RSLAF dispositions by consolidating the force from over 50 sites into a few 
centralised locations.182 Much of the RSLAF’s barrack accommodation had 
been destroyed during the war, and many soldiers lived in tented 
accommodation or local villages, exacerbating the difficulties of command and 
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control.183 IMATT considered that the poor standard of RSLAF accommodation 
meant that ‘in terms of the moral component of fighting power, and providing for 
your armed forces, it just didn’t work’.184 Although Pebu was intended to 
facilitate military training, it therefore also contained an overtly normative 
element. As Colonel Stack later remarked, there was a feeling that ‘contented 
soldiers, being paid, being given their rice, with a home, were unlikely to topple 
the government’.185 Indeed, one of the public concerns raised in consultations 
during the preparation of the Defence White Paper was the state of RSLAF 
accommodation.186 
The project was to be jointly funded by DFID and GOSL, and saw the 
refurbishment of existing barracks and the new-build brigade HQs by specialist 
contractors, while the remaining battalion sites were to be built using mud bricks 
by the infantry battalions themselves.187 The project was significantly 
redesigned in June 2003 to provide more salubrious family accommodation.188 
As the design expanded, Hydraform machines were purchased from South 
Africa to speed up progress. These used a mix of local mud and concrete to 
manufacture bricks.189 By February 2004, however, little progress had been 
made. Estimates suggested that only 12 per cent of soldiers’ accommodation 
could be completed by the original summer 2004 deadline, with the programme 
now expected to take six years to complete. Additional brick-making machines 
were purchased, but DFID refused an IMATT request for additional funding and 
instead commissioned an independent review of the project. The subsequent 
report warned that Pebu ‘could result in the creation of new slums’. By the end 
of 2005, all efforts were subsequently focused on finishing just two battalion 
sites (those closest to the border) pooling both DFID and GOSL funds.190 The 
project was finally wound down in 2007.191  
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In part, the failure of Operation Pebu reflects a degree of over-ambition 
on the part of IMATT. Aldo Gaeta, the UK civilian adviser to the Sierra Leone 
MOD between 2003 and 2006, concluded that ‘the initial planning timeframe 
was entirely unrealistic’,192 and even went so far as to state that Pebu ‘failed on 
so many counts that it is best described as conceptually flawed’.193 Significant 
difficulties were experienced in the management of the project, and one IMATT 
officer tasked to review the Pebu command structure concluded that it initially 
had no ‘single project manager, no clear reporting structure, [and] no overall co-
ordination’.194 Similar problems were experienced in the project’s 
implementation. Gaeta asserted that the hydraform machines were procured 
‘based on an advertisement in the back of a local magazine’ without trials or 
visits to the manufacturers, an allegation some IMATT officers partially 
denied.195 Regardless, the hydraform technology proved entirely unsuitable to 
Sierra Leone, requiring a different soil type, constant maintenance, and 
significant water; failings recognised by IMATT.196 Wells were dug during the 
rainy season which then went dry as the water table dropped for the remainder 
of the year.197 Both DFID and GOSL procurement processes were subsequently 
criticised, and Pebu suffered from a considerable degree of corruption.198 As 
one IMATT officer concluded, the shortcomings of Pebu were as much ‘about 
the weaknesses of some of the skills we have as soldiers…we hadn’t the skills 
on our side to recognise how you implement a complex infrastructure project.’199  
Equally though, Operation Pebu failed because IMATT proved unable to 
convince the RSLAF of its utility. There was a significant gap between IMATT’s 
intent and the RSLAF’s expectations. Pebu originally envisioned single room 
mud-brick houses with corrugated iron roofs and communal ablutions. However, 
the RSLAF aspired to bungalows similar to 1950s colonial military 
accommodation in Sierra Leone, with multiple rooms, running water, glass 
windows, electric lighting and indoor plumbing; a standard beyond the RSLAF’s 
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budget and out of keeping with the rest of Sierra Leonean society.200 
Consequently, IMATT officers blamed implementation issues on a lack of 
RSLAF motivation. One IMATT commander stated bluntly that, in his opinion, 
Pebu didn’t work because the RSLAF were ‘basically lazy…they’re lazy and 
corrupt’.201 Another officer recalled a widely-held IMATT view that ultimately the 
RSLAF ‘weren’t that interested. You know, “the Romans used to build a sodding 
camp every night. Why can’t the RSLAF just put their backs into this?”’202 For 
their part, the RSLAF wasted no opportunity to remind IMATT that Pebu was 
offering ‘crap accommodation’;203 a dynamic encouraged by the fact that DFID 
was simultaneously funding the construction of police barracks to a much higher 
standard through contractors.204 This RSLAF view was exacerbated by the fact 
that at their compound at Leicester Square, IMATT officers in Freetown lived in 
the kind of accommodation to which the RSLAF aspired, but which the UK 
refused to provide.205  
Progress on Pebu sites proved uneven, further highlighting the politically 
contested nature of the project. IMATT officers who visited the more successful 
sites attributed much of progress – and by the same token, many of the 
problems elsewhere – to the attitude and commitment of individual commanding 
officers.206 A number of IMATT officers later conceded that the idea of untrained 
RSLAF infantrymen becoming capable and enthusiastic builders was overly 
ambitious.207 If the RSLAF lacked commitment to the project, the Sierra 
Leonean MOD had similar reservations and effectively declined to participate in 
project oversight altogether.208 This evidently exorcised IMATT, one officer 
flippantly remarking that ‘the MOD couldn’t have given a fuck’.209 The 
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discrepancies between British and Sierra Leonean expectations of Pebu 
became highly charged because, as one IMATT officer observed, ‘a lot of 
IMATT credibility was bound up in it’.210 Pebu simultaneously exposed tensions 
between DFID and IMATT. Just as the RSLAF resented the Pebu plan IMATT 
had proposed, frustrating IMATT, so DFID became agitated with IMATT at the 
spiralling costs, levels of corruption, and lack of tangible progress.211 Even 
before the project was eventually abandoned, it had become ‘a stick [for the 
RSLAF] to beat IMATT and the British Government with’.212  
RSLAF resistance to the institutional components of civil-military reform 
was reflected in GOSL’s continued political distrust of the military. In line with 
the Defence White Paper’s focus on soldiers’ welfare, in 2003 the RSLAF 
began making preparations to pay emoluments to the next of kin of soldiers 
killed in action during the Rebel War. A verification exercise was undertaken, 
and further plans drawn up to provide support to soldiers wounded in action. 
However, the settlement scheme was unfunded in the 2004 defence allocation, 
which was approximately US$5.5 million short of the requested budget. 
Eventually, IMATT used DFID money to pay 3,029 bereaved relatives in 2004 
and 290 wounded servicemen in 2005, but 345 certified medically disabled 
personnel were still awaiting payment in 2010.213 This reticence in paying 
benefits for killed or wounded servicemen partly stemmed from GOSL’s 
financial hardships, but it was equally evident to IMATT officers that the plan 
had stalled at the political level,214 highlighting the legacy of bitterness still felt 
by the SLPP towards the RSLAF. Public confidence in the armed forces 
remained equally sour. One senior IMATT officer recalled a brief public panic in 
2004 after RSLAF uniforms, sent to a local laundry to be laundered prior to re-
issue, sparked rumours that rebels were returning to Freetown.215 Despite 
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GOSL unwillingness to pay emoluments, IMATT officers still considered that 
‘the civilian element [in the MOD] were a bit fearful of a military coup’.216 
As difficulties with these programmes unfolded during 2003, it became 
increasingly evident that IMATT’s activity lacked strategic direction. IMATT had 
yet to develop a long-term plan, either for the RSLAF’s development or its own 
withdrawal, and consequently objectives had become heavily liked to the one-
year tenure of individual IMATT commanders; a point IMATT itself began to 
recognise.217 Brigadier Adrian Freer, Commander IMATT in 2003, became 
convinced of the need to develop clear training goals for the RSLAF around 
which IMATT could structure its activity. But at the same time, Freer conceded 
that longer term IMATT objectives were somewhat vague: ‘what were we 
seeking to train them to do? You know, what was the objective here? And I 
don’t think that that was very clear.’218 This recognition led to the development 
of a ten-year plan for IMATT-RSLAF defence reform, called Plan 2010, which 
was launched in 2004, and will be examined in the next chapter. 
Conclusions 
British intervention did produce some change in the SLAF. British mentoring at 
battalion level provided SLAF units with direction and normative guidance as 
well as technical expertise. Advisers also acted as an additional link between 
the tactical and operational levels, bolstering command and control. STTT 
courses reconstituted and retrained entire SLAF battalions, increasing individual 
soldiers’ basic infantry skills and reasserting military discipline, and in so doing 
provided a foundation for tactics based on fire and manoeuvre. The British 
developed the organisational structure of the SLAF, including its headquarters 
and logistics systems, as well facilities like AFTC Benguema. The British also 
built on pre-Palliser planning conducted by SILSEP to rejuvenate the MOD. 
Given the limited strategic impact of Palliser and Barras alone, Ucko has 
consequently argued that this capacity-building activity, alongside diplomatic 
efforts, proved ‘critical to its [intervention’s] overall outcome’.219 However, the 
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operational and strategic benefits of wartime capacity building should not be 
confused with fundamental change in the nature of SLAF military capacity, or its 
political quality. 
While the SLAF clearly became more coherent under British tutelage, it 
does not appear to have become dramatically more effective. Although the RUF 
were defeated, even retrained SLAF battalions were still considered incapable 
of reliably operating independently of British support. In consequence, the most 
decisive elements of combat power applied against the RUF came from British, 
UN or mercenary forces. Here, the redeployment of the military in 2002 is 
particularly illustrative. Although SLA battalions were able to conduct basic 
tactical moves, they remained under close British supervision despite the fact 
that the environment was increasingly benign. Moreover, the need to redeploy 
the military was in no small part the product of the force’s continued political 
unreliability. Both IMATT and GOSL felt that the army had to be removed from 
population centres prior to the elections, and British officers deliberately 
engineered the operation to ensure the two main branches of GOSL’s military 
capacity – the SLAF and the CDF – did not meet, owing to their continued 
political animosity. 
The lack of fundamental change in the SLAF during the Rebel War does 
not appear to have been the product of any deep-seated resentment at British 
interference, or unwillingness to acknowledge IMATT’s advice, at least at the 
tactical level. As the previous chapter noted, the British military intervention 
produced extensive good will among both the Sierra Leonean population and 
military. British officers sought to shape SLAF behaviour through a mixture of 
advice, example and coercion, working alongside the SLAF chain of command 
and embedded within it. While this gave the British the ability to issue orders 
and carry out both de facto and de jure organisational changes, the British 
hoped that their presence would equally influence SLAF soldiers’ culture and 
behaviour through continuous processes of learning and exchange. Lieutenant 
Colonel Simpson, who served in IMATT after the Rebel War, described this 
approach as one of ‘moral suasion’, in which ‘advisors exercised a combination 
of moral, intellectual and pragmatic influence over their Sierra Leonean 
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counterparts’;220 a process which might reasonably be described as normative 
isomorphism or cultural osmosis. While the SLAF readily accepted the prospect 
of British training and wartime command and control, IMATT’s ability to change 
deeply-seated SLAF practices and norms through ‘moral suasion’ alone 
appears dubious. British mentors serving at the front failed to convince their 
SLAF colleagues of the merits of British tactics and planning, and nor did British 
direction reduce SLAF belief in the tactical salience of Juju. The impact of 
British “train and equip” capacity building during the Rebel War mirrors the 
mixed success of similar peacetime programmes – a stark example being the 
repeated attempts to create an effective state army in Afghanistan during the 
later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which failed to overcome local 
cultural and political preferences.221 
Instead, much of the change evinced in the SLAF was the product of 
direct British control over the force. During Palliser, the British effectively 
assumed command of the SLAF and co-ordinated the operations of the Unholy 
Alliance. IMATT officers maintained this executive function until after the Rebel 
War finished – the RSLAF Joint Force Command, for instance, was only 
assumed by a Sierra Leonean officer following the 2002 elections, and this was 
not the last executive post in the RSLAF held by an IMATT officer. Arguably, 
this executive control gave the British an ability to rapidly impose change on the 
SLAF to meet the needs of the war. Equally, though, it also meant that the 
durability of many changes became reliant on the presence of British or IMATT 
officers. Certainly, those changes affected in the SLAF broadly followed the 
British institutional model, and the lack of profound cultural acceptance of some 
of these innovations was evident in RSLAF resistance to IMATT’s post-war 
efforts to institutionalise change. Yet many of these changes were not 
inappropriate to the context in which they were implemented, and did contribute 
to an improvement in SLAF capability. In part, this may be because the RSLMF 
originated in a British colonial military model, and so many of the British military 
practices advocated during and after Palliser were not totally alien to the SLAF.  
Farrell has argued that the ability to carry out tactical adaptation during 
wartime is reliant on a series of organisational conditions, namely: poor 
                                                          
220 Simpson, op. cit., p. 10. 
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210 
 
institutional memory, decentralisation of command and control, and personnel 
turnover. Moreover, he suggests that adaptation can either exploit core 
competencies already held, or explore new practices, but it does not 
fundamentally require institutional change at the point of adaptation.222 
Harkness and Hunzeker have added additional criterion to these, including 
flexible leadership, feedback loops, and a clear threat.223 Grissom contends that 
the last of these – the importance of direct threat – was inhibited in the ANA by 
ISAF presence, simultaneously establishing a delineation between internal 
adaptation and external intervention.224 
In Sierra Leone, many of these factors were clearly present before British 
intervention. The RSLMF and SLAF certainly had a poor institutional memory 
and high personnel turn-over. Many of their soldiers were drafted during the war 
and much of the force’s institutional fabric was eroded during the conflict, also 
impeding centralised command and control. The fluid politics of various military 
factions certainly suggests a degree of flexibility in officers’ attitudes, though it is 
unclear whether this extended to tactical praxis. An existential threat to the 
SLAF as an institution was certainly also present prior to British intervention, 
notwithstanding the presence of other international troops in Sierra Leone. Yet 
the RSLMF’s adaptation prior to British intervention appears mediocre and 
certainly uneven to the threat posed by the RUF. The initial expansion of the 
Kamajor militia groups did provide extra military capacity for the fight against the 
RUF, but as seen in Chapter 4, the increasingly political nature of the RSLMF 
led to a rift between the military and the CDF. Some tactical adaptations were 
undertaken; notably the use of improvised “technicals” to compensate for 
reduced tactical competence and task cohesion. Still, instead of pursuing more 
profound military adaptation, the RSLMF proved unequal to the wartime 
pressures it faced, and gradually disintegrated as a coherent military institution. 
Here, Harkness and Hunzeker’s assertion that the political context of conflict 
also affects the prospects for military adaptation is certainly supported by the 
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case of the SLAF,225 in a wartime parallel to Avant’s study of civil-military 
relations and change during peacetime.226  
If British military support impeded some adaptive dynamics, it supported 
others. The existential threat to the SLAF as an organisation may have reduced 
following Operation Palliser, but the British presence undoubtedly strengthened 
feedback loops monitoring performance and change in the SLAF. Initially at 
least, the British presence did not undo those ad hoc SLAF adaptations which 
afforded a degree of capability. Instead, they sought to improve these where 
possible, including through wider institutional reforms. Only subsequently did 
the British seek to replace these adaptations with a more fundamental retraining 
and institutional reform programme. To a certain extent, therefore, some of the 
wartime changes in the SLAF might be characterised as the product of external 
adaptation within the force, rather than a top-down, externally imposed model of 
reform. Consequently, the relationship between external change and wartime 
adaptation in the SLAF appears far more complex than in present 
understandings. The growing delineations in current scholarship between 
wartime adaptation and peacetime reform, and between ground-up, internal 
innovation and external, top-down transformation seem somewhat arbitrary in 
the case of external intervention; especially as many of the changes the British 
pursued in the SLAF were essentially adaptive, simultaneously ground-up and 
top-down, and were supported by later institutional reforms.   
While much of the British effort was aimed at improving SLAF military 
effectiveness, British wartime intervention did attempt to reshape the civil-
military and political behaviours of the force. Indeed, to a significant extent, the 
neo-patrimonial norms of SLAF behaviour undermined both political reliability 
and military effectiveness, necessitating this dual approach. Here, however, in a 
parallel to Grissom’s study of the ANA, British attempts faced resistance from 
RSLAF officers along political or neo-patrimonial lines. SLAF officers were not 
sympathetic to more transparent pay and ration issue practices, limiting the 
pace of change. They actively embraced the reintroduction of honours, but 
sought to subvert British intentions by attempting to apply neo-patrimonial 
norms to awards. After the war, changes which threatened the neo-patrimonial 
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interests of senior officers were resisted with greater alacrity, while the civil-
military aspirations of the MRP were also not realised. The RSLAF resented the 
civilianisation of the MOD, criticised the equal status afforded to civil servants, 
and declined to engage with the White Paper drafting process and areas of 
subsequent civil service supremacy, such as in acquisitions. Even where there 
were tangible gains to be had from IMATT activity, such as in Operation Pebu, 
RSLAF officers’ insistence on maintaining pre-war levels of status effectively 
undermined change. Thus, RSLAF institutionalisation of change, both during 
and immediately after the Rebel War, was complicated by the established 
cultural norms of the force, which proved largely immune to wartime British 
mentoring. Consequently, the limited improvements which were achieved were 
the product of direct British control; in effect, externally-led adaptation, 
notwithstanding the embedding of British officers in the SLAF hierarchy. By 
2003, the lack of fundamental change in RSLAF normative behaviour prompted 
a more concerted IMATT strategy for reform, culminating in the launch of Plan 
2010 in 2004. It is to this period of reform which the next chapter now turns. 
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7. Building the New Model Army: Institutionalising 
Accountability in the RSLAF, 2003-7 
 
This chapter examines the approach to reform developed by IMATT under the 
banner of Plan 2010, which was launched in 2004, until the change of 
government in Sierra Leone in 2007. As the previous chapter concluded, the 
SLAF did adapt following British intervention in the Rebel War, but the limited 
extent of change proved insufficient to defeat the RUF without significant 
international aid. More profound wartime adaptation was largely resisted by 
SLAF officers because it threatened their neo-patrimonial power structures; a 
behavioural norm that proved largely immune to British mentoring and 
leadership. The British sought to displace neo-patrimonial practices in the SLAF 
through institutional reform, but the initial British focus on short-term 
stabilisation meant that these ad hoc attempts were largely frustrated by the 
post-war RSLAF’s continuing neo-patrimonial proclivities. Plan 2010 was 
subsequently drafted to provide a more coherent strategy for the long-term civil-
military reform of the RSLAF. 
Existing scholarship on peacetime military reform derives from Posen’s 
seminal work on the causes of military doctrinal change. Posen concluded that 
because armed forces are inherently resistant to change, civilian elites force 
reform on the military at times of heightened political concern. Thus, for Posen, 
change occurs from the top down, and is either externally derived or externally 
driven. Posen considered that military resistance to change resulted from 
largely rational organisational factors, namely a bureaucratic desire to manage 
uncertainty and risk.1 However, later scholars have demonstrated how the 
cultural attitudes, norms and customs of military organisations – themselves 
reproduced through organisational processes – can equally serve to impede 
change.2 For Posen, the internal agent of external change was the “military 
maverick”; an individual on the fringe of the military profession, whose radical 
views accorded with civilian powerbrokers’ conceptions of the needed change. 
Political elites compelled organisational change in the military by elevating 
these mavericks to senior command, providing them with resources and 
                                                          
1 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the 
World Wars (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1984). 
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214 
 
curtailing opposition.3 Avant later suggested that the structure of political 
institutions helped shape this civil-military interaction, either by providing 
opportunities for the military status quo to resist civilian intrusion by playing off 
one political institution against another, or conversely by providing little scope 
for the military to resist civilian intrusions.4 
In many respects, peacetime reforms enacted by foreign military training 
missions appear to match Posen’s model. Historically, such training missions 
have been employed by national governments to import foreign military models 
into their own armed forces. Thus, foreign military trainers act like Posen’s 
“military mavericks”; they are outside to the established military status quo and 
charged with carrying out externally-mandated change. However, historical 
examples of such training missions have frequently resulted in less change than 
seen in Posen’s cases, despite sometimes enjoying greater levels of co-
operation from host military officers.5 Arguably, this may be because these 
external missions lack the coercive ability to enforce change in the way Posen 
described. Equally though, scholars of peacebuilding have argued that external 
attempts at institution-building have frequently suffered from a lack of “local 
ownership” of change, such that reforms become reliant on the presence of 
external experts, rather than internal mavericks, to persist. This is particularly 
problematic during SSR, as reform typically aims to address the very behaviour 
on which local elites’ status quo interests rely.6 Concerns over “local ownership” 
more broadly form a central tenant of criticism rejecting liberal peacebuilding as 
an approach to intervention.7 Indeed, the sustainability of IMATT’s Plan 2010 
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7 For arguments typical of this school of thought, see Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, ‘Statebuilding 
Without Nation-building? Legitimacy, State Failure and the Limits of the Institutionalist 
Approach’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 3:1 (2009), pp. 21-45; Augustine S. J. 
Park, ‘Peacebuilding, the Rule of Law and the Problem of Culture: Assimilation, Multiculturalism, 
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reforms in Sierra Leone has been repeatedly challenged on this basis. A 
number of international observers have questioned the financial affordability of 
IMATT-designed reforms for the Sierra Leonean exchequer without continued 
external aid.8 Similarly, Albrecht and Jackson have raised concerns over the 
durability of normative change in the RSLAF after IMATT’s withdrawal.9 In 
retrospect, a number of senior British officers certainly felt that it was IMATT 
which kept the RSLAF honest; the implication being that once IMATT left, so 
might the RSLAF’s new-found culture of accountability.10 
Indeed, Posen’s model of externally-directed change has been 
consistently challenged, even in national contexts. Most notably, Rosen has 
demonstrated that political intervention into defence reform has frequently 
occurred after change was already underway, and so had little decisive impact 
on outcomes. Instead, Rosen found that change came from competition 
between competing schools of thought within the military, typically led by 
established and well-respected senior officers. These officers pursued 
campaigns of bureaucratic warfare against rival visions of how the organisation 
should operate, with victory resulting from having convinced sufficient numbers 
of officers of the cause; especially those in critical positions in the institutional 
hierarchy. The winning school would then be in a position to not only affect its 
desired reforms, but also to institutionalise them through the military’s 
socialisation and promotional processes.11 Rosen thus rejected Posen’s 
mechanism of externally-directed reform in favour of an intra-service model of 
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military change. However, IMATT’s approach under Plan 2010 calls into 
question the mutual exclusivity of these two models, at least in the case of 
foreign military capacity building. In order to displace the RSLAF’s existing neo-
patrimonial norms, IMATT developed a generational approach to change reliant 
on processes of military socialisation, professionalization, and promotion. The 
impact of generational change has been seen in other military organisations, 
though largely without external involvement.12 Though externally-directed and 
largely implemented from the top-down, Plan 2010 exploited the RSLAF’s own 
internal processes to effect change from the ground-up. Such a blend of 
external and internal change appears as a counterpoint to concerns over local 
ownership in liberal peacebuilding and SSR, directly addressing Suhrke’s pithy 
criticism that ‘local ownership clearly means “their” ownership of “our” ideas’.13 
This chapter proceeds in five sections. First, it examines the 
development of Plan 2010 and the concept of generational change IMATT 
pursued. Secondly, it examines the development of new organisational 
processes for recruitment, promotion, and professional education, which IMATT 
used to create and institutionalise a new organisational culture via this 
generational model of reform. The third section examines RSLAF resistance to 
these institutional reforms, exploring the limits of IMATT’s influence through the 
case of RSLAF downsizings and redundancies. The fourth, penultimate section 
examines the conduct of the 2007 presidential elections as a microcosm of SSR 
in Sierra Leone, examining the extent of cultural change displayed by the 
RSLAF. Finally, the chapter concludes that IMATT’s approach to promoting 
normative cultural change in the RSLAF adopted a blend of external and intra-
service mechanisms, but IMATT’s ability to exercise sufficient control over the 
institutional processes required to fully harness intra-service change was 
hampered by the persistence of neo-patrimonial attitudes among RSLAF senior 
officers, as well as civilian political intransience. 
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Plan 2010 and Generational Change 
The development of Plan 2010 was a direct response to the initial difficulties 
IMATT experienced in implementing institutional reforms in the post-war 
RSLAF. As was seen in the previous chapter, much of this reform effort was ad 
hoc and lacked strategic focus, despite previous SILSEP planning. 
Consequently, projects like Operation Pebu failed to overcome the ingrained 
cultural preferences of RSLAF officers, and the force remained both heavily 
politicised and deeply patrimonial. As Plan 2010 itself stated, ‘driven by the 
security situation, IMATT (SL) has been largely reactive. Greater stability has 
allowed the development of the IMATT (SL) staff effort. Failure to act will have 
negative implications for the development of the RSLAF and IMATT (SL)’s 
credibility’.14 Staff work on Plan 2010 began in 2003 under Brigadier Adrian 
Freer, and the document was launched the following year by his successor, 
Brigadier Simon Porter. Plan 2010 provided a detailed five-year route-map for 
RSLAF development, which in the word of one IMATT staff officer, ‘set the 
context and…took a more strategic view of what we were trying to do in Sierra 
Leone’.15 Plan 2010 envisioned a smaller, more professional RSLAF, firmly 
under democratic civilian control and able to sustain itself financially through 
international deployments on peacekeeping operations.16 Practically, Plan 2010 
contained four strands: one promoted effective security sector institutions and 
structures; a second was focused on ensuring the RSLAF could effectively 
manage itself; a third aimed to develop ‘the structures, logistics base, material 
and policy framework that underpin the functioning of a disciplined force’; while 
the final strand sought to equip the RSLAF, materially and conceptually, with 
sufficient capacity to fulfil its allotted defence missions and tasks.17 As such, 
Plan 2010 provided a strategy for cultural and institutional change in the 
RSLAF; it was a considered attempt to marry the normative end-state IMATT 
sought with the ways and means available. 
Plan 2010’s objective was to reform the RSLAF’s cultural norms and 
behaviours in line with Western concepts of democratic civil-military relations. 
                                                          
14 Quoted in Albrecht & Jackson, Security Sector Transformation, op. cit., p. 103. 
15 Interview with Participant A16, a senior British officer serving in IMATT in 2003-4, conducted 
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16 Albrecht & Jackson, Security Sector Transformation, op. cit., pp. 103-4. 
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IMATT officers thus viewed Plan 2010 as the military component of the wider 
liberal state-building project in Sierra Leone. As one British staff officer serving 
in IMATT in 2004 observed:  
‘We were simply doing all the little building blocks at the bottom to make the big 
thing at the top of the pyramid work, because there’s no point in reforming that 
strategic structure if you’ve got the same rabble of an army underneath. You’ve 
actually got to have not only a competent but morally aligned army if this new 
democratically accountable civilian controlled security structure is to work. So we 
were trying to provide the hearts and minds to make the overall architecture work.’18 
Consequently, the development of Plan 2010 mirrored broader programming 
trends the British approach to SSR in Sierra Leone emerging at the time. In 
2004, a comprehensive review of the Sierra Leonean security architecture was 
begun under the auspices of GOSL’s Office of National Security (ONS), and 
work was also underway to produce a holistic development plan in the form of a 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, released the following year.19 
Simultaneously, however, Plan 2010 was limited by the resources 
available to the RSLAF and the previous funding commitments IMATT had 
entered into. As one IMATT staff officer noted, Brigadier Freer’s ‘training plan 
had to be then converted into a costed equipment plan that was actually 
viable’,20 and so Plan 2010 became the primary mechanism for ensuring 
continued funding for RSLAF reform from  the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool.21 
The main vehicle for RSLAF expenditure was via the Medium Term Expenditure 
Framework (MTEF), but prior to Plan 2010 significant RSLAF requirements 
remained outside this allocation. In 2003, for example, only the Air and Maritime 
wings had costed equipment plans, and these were still under development.22 In 
2004, the MOD was allocated Le 16.1 billion (US$5.5 million) less than it had 
requested, and even then the funds were not always available.23 GOSL cash-
flow was so unreliable, that as a contingency, IMATT was forced to maintain 
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sufficient cash in its safe to pay the RSLAF.24 Yet equally, IMATT found itself 
unable to back-track on expensive programmes like the Air Wing, despite 
recognising their impracticality. As Colonel Stack argued, 
‘IMATT’s credibility was felt to be possibly at risk, if we turned round and said, “Well 
you know two years ago we said a rotary wing force, and we’re buying it with your 
money? Well actually that was a crap idea, we’re now going for a sensible 
option”.’25 
Consequently, Plan 2010 retained previous commitments like the Air and 
Maritime Wings despite practical concerns, in order to protect its reputation and 
ensure a degree of RSLAF buy-in to the vision.26  
Informed by previous experience of wartime adaptation and attempts at 
post-war reform, IMATT recognised that for normative transformation to occur, 
the way in which Plan 2010 pursued change would have to explicitly tackle the 
political and neo-patrimonial culture of the RSLAF officer corps. This was to be 
achieved through a generational change in the RSLAF’s officer corps. IMATT 
had identified the need to reshape the values of RSLAF senior officers relatively 
early on. As one senior British officer in IMATT in 2002 recalled,  
‘the generation we were working with in terms of the future leadership of the Sierra 
Leone armed forces were the middle ranking officers…we were pretty sure we 
could turn that force into something that was ethically acceptable even through a 
western lens. Yes it would take time, and it’d take a generation, a generation of 
officers’.27 
Brigadier Freer drew similar conclusions the following year. According to one of 
his staff, he developed ‘very strong views about the role of the junior NCO, the 
role of the junior officers, and he had a fairly jaundiced view towards the older 
officers – some of whom couldn’t even read – and the older soldiers he saw 
transitioning out.’28 This emphasis on the role of leadership in changing the 
behavioural norms of the RSLAF was evident even before the release of Plan 
2010. In April 2003, for example, Freer lectured the RSLAF officer corps on the 
importance of new leadership values, inviting President Kabbah and the civilian 
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head of the MOD in order to hammer home the point to his military audience.29 
However, Plan 2010 represented the first codification of this approach.30 
Under Plan 2010, normative change was to be achieved by the careful 
selection and extensive training of new officers under IMATT supervision, 
alongside the retraining and mentoring of existing officers. Through technical 
and civil-military education, IMATT hoped to instil a new, democratically 
accountable professional military culture in these impressionable and ambitious 
younger soldiers.31 To a significant extent, Plan 2010 thus relied on processes 
of military socialisation to imbue specific norms in a new generation of RSLAF 
soldiers. This approach mirrored the institutional mechanisms used by Western 
militaries, including the British Army, to inculcate specifically military identities 
and norms in their soldiers. For example, both Ben-Yehuda and Kachtan’s 
studies of the IDF concluded that military socialisation processes significantly 
accounted for soldiers’ identities,32 while Jowell attributed the integrative 
behaviour of the Rwanda Defence Force soldiers to the Ingando re-education 
scheme.33 Indeed, the power of professional military socialisation has also been 
attributed to improvements in military effectiveness. A number of social 
psychologists have suggested that professional military training enables 
soldiers to overcome psychological impediments to killing,34 while King 
concluded that professionalization ultimately provides the foundation for tactical 
sophistication and improved performance.35 Yet, while professional norms can 
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impel wider organisational changes, a number of academics have highlighted 
the extent to which deeply held norms can impede institutional and behavioural 
change.36 In essence, IMATT’s approach in Plan 2010 was to rely on British-run 
military socialisation and professionalisation to displace the wider cultural norms 
of neo-patrimonial Sierra Leonean society then present in the senior echelons 
of the RSLAF’s existing officer corps. 
IMATT considered that by creating and manipulating new meritocratic 
processes for recruitment, training, and especially promotion, junior and middle-
ranking officers imbued with this new professional ethos would, in time, replace 
the older generation of politicised senior RSLAF commanders. Once in senior 
appointments, this new generation would thus be in a position to promulgate 
IMATT’s normative values themselves, sustaining the change indefinitely. As 
Brigadier Le Grys, Commander IMATT in 2006, explained:  
‘The only way you’re going to change that [standard] is to, sort of, get the new 
Sierra Leone commanders coming through, the younger ones, who understood 
what was required and were less political. Get them through and get them 
delivering and get them in command, and then you would see a sustainable upping 
of standard.’37 
Brigadier Iain Cholerton, who commanded IMATT in 2007, similarly concluded 
that, 
‘it’s a generational thing to change an armed force, you’ve got to start with the 
young officers, you’ve got to start with the recruits, and you’ve got to be in it for the 
long term; you can’t do this over five years. It’s a generation. It’s 25 years to really 
embed all those cultural changes, the institutional strengths, the building blocks of 
the NCOs, it’s a generational piece.’38 
Plan 2010, therefore, actively sought to harness the dynamics of intra-service 
competition that Rosen considered fundamental to military change; especially 
the centrality of promotional systems to institutionalising reform. However, this 
mechanism should not be considered a solely top-down process in the way 
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Rosen described.39 As with the impact of generational turn-over among senior 
officers in Canada’s adaptation to counter-insurgency in Afghanistan, the crucial 
attitudinal shifts were to occur at the bottom end of the RSLAF’s hierarchy, and 
only subsequently move vertically from the ground up to the top.40 
Nonetheless, Plan 2010 remained an externally-imposed exercise. By 
necessity, Plan 2010 was drafted by IMATT officers, with very little consultation 
or input from the RSLAF or MOD, and subsequently ‘pitched’ to DFID to secure 
sufficient funding.41 According to Colonel Stack, IMATT officers drafted Plan 
2010 because the RSLAF’s ‘concentration at that time was existence, not 
development’.42 As one senior British officer in IMATT in 2004 later recalled,  
‘We, IMATT, wrote it, because…[it] was all such a foreign idea to the leadership at 
that time. To them, the leadership at that time, the issues were here, right in front of 
their face. Day to day problems, day to day challenges to be solved’.43 
Consultations on a final draft of the plan were held with the RSLAF’s senior 
cohort, including the Deputy Minister of Defence, CDS, and some directorate 
heads. However, this elicited a limited response, in no small part, because of its 
complexity. As one IMATT staff officer in the MOD recalled:  
‘I do remember my brigadier seeing it. He said, “I don’t really understand it, but if 
you can explain the bits to me that we have got to do, then that’s OK”. The concept 
of a ten year plan was not something they’d ever thought of.’  
This IMATT officer found that while RSLAF commanders were keen to 
implement technical aspects they could readily appreciate, they found the 
strategic nature of Plan 2010 difficult to engage with.44 
Equally, Plan 2010 had to be externally imposed because senior RSLAF 
officers proved unwilling to support a generational model of normative change 
which effectively sought to marginalise them. One senior British officer involved 
in drafting Plan 2010 later argued that the lack of RSLAF involvement was only 
ever intended to be temporary: 
‘[Plan 2010] was a bit of a false plan really…we wrote the plan, and “sold” it to the 
leadership, persuaded them to take it on. But actually the real intent was that so 
soon they could get rid of that plan, because they’ve seen a plan, and now let’s 
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refine it. And as you refine it, you being the RSLAF, it becomes your plan, not one 
imposed by an external organisation.’45 
However, senior RSLAF officers declined to engage with aspects of Plan 2010 
from the start. For example, the measures of effect in Plan 2010 were assessed 
by a traffic light system, running from red through amber to green depending on 
the level of RSLAF progress in a given area. As Plan 2010 was launched, one 
IMATT officer recalled how the RSLAF CDS announced that in his view, the 
RSLAF was green in all areas. The IMATT officer concluded that this ‘was a 
seminal moment really, in terms of their view and our view on things’.46 The 
implications senior RSLAF officers drew from Plan 2010 – even those initially 
favoured by IMATT – is evident from the tone of Major General Alfred Nelson-
Williams when later describing IMATT’s generational model of reform: 
‘IMATT holds the view that with training and the right influences, new officer recruits 
could become commanders who would match the quality of officers that exists 
elsewhere in West Africa. These recruits are a bright, ambitious and restless group; 
it is understandable that IMATT would consider them to be the best vehicle for 
RSLAF reform…IMATT is optimistic that this group will be the first to command the 
RSLAF competently without foreign “guidance” or “hand-holding”.’47 
While Plan 2010 helped Nelson-Williams rise from among the senior RSLAF 
command to become CDS from 2008-10, he himself later fell foul of IMATT’s 
strategy generational of change. Instead, the vision of a fully-equipped RSLAF 
codified by Plan 2010 subsequently became a source of leverage for the 
RSLAF in their attempts to pursue IMATT for greater funding – a mantra of 
Operation Pebu and Puma helicopters, as Albrecht and Jackson characterised 
it.48 
Institutionalising Cultural Change 
Under Plan 2010, IMATT hoped to use training and education to inculcate 
professional behaviours in new a generation of RSLAF officers. Practically, 
IMATT sought to ensure this generation would dominate the RSLAF by creating 
new institutional systems for meritocratic recruitment and promotion, reinforced 
by a more formal and objective disciplinary system. The ascendancy of this new 
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cohort of officers, with their Western professional culture, would underpin 
Western norms of civil-military relations and military effectiveness in the future 
RSLAF. As such, normative generational change was to be enacted in the 
RSLAF through the development of Westernised institutional mechanisms for 
managing training and career progression. 
The first recruiting drives under Plan 2010 were conducted in the autumn 
of 2004, funded jointly by GOSL and DFID. These consisted of four tranches of 
soldier recruiting and one for officers. Applicants attended a selection process 
held at Benguema, supervised by IMATT and carried out according to an 
adapted British Army system based on merit. In the period between 2002 and 
2007, 940 new recruits and 210 newly commissioned second lieutenants 
passed out of training at Benguema.49 To advertise the new meritocratic 
recruitment drives, IMATT and RSLAF officers appeared on Sierra Leonean 
radio, and conducted a series of roadshows across the country.50 In contrast to 
previous recruiting attempts, this resulted in remarkable degree of interest, such 
that IMATT staff found themselves ‘deluged with applications’51 and with ‘an 
embarrassment of riches’.52 IMATT considered that the appeal of service in the 
RSLAF was largely a product of the poor economic circumstances prevailing in 
the country, such that the relatively secure employment, housing and welfare 
provision the RSLAF offered was extremely attractive.53 Nonetheless, given the 
widespread societal distrust of the military prevalent at the end of the Rebel 
War, the ease with which the RSLAF was able to recruit during the period must 
also in part reflect the degree of confidence IMATT’s presence encouraged. 
This was probably helped by IMATT attempts to include local communities in 
RSLAF recruiting, particularly during the early tranches. At one stage, for 
example, lists of prospective RSLAF recruits were presented to local 
communities, who were asked to vet the lists and make comment on the 
character of potential recruits.54 
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IMATT was insistent that RSLAF recruits had to be selected according to 
far more rigorous standards than had been the case during the Rebel War. New 
educational standards formed the centrepiece of this policy, and were 
considered essential for improving civil-military relations. As one IMATT officer 
responsible for redesigning RSLAF education policies explained, this was a 
direct response to the perceived failings of the wartime SLA: 
‘Part of the problem with the old Sierra Leone Army being the high rate of illiteracy 
stemming from frankly unsuitable people recruited during the civil war, and this 
illiteracy had led to all sorts of very bad behaviour and violations of human rights. 
So the thought was [that] if we get a new educated army at both the soldier and 
officer level…we can educate them in civic responsibilities, [and] particularly 
officers, their wider responsibilities, so therefore the education was very prominent 
in the recruiting.’55 
Both officers and soldiers were required to produce education certificates for the 
standardised West African Senior School Certificate Examinations (WASSCE) 
at A Level and O Level/GCSE equivalent grades respectively, and IMATT 
established a relationship with the West African Examinations Council (WAEC) 
which administered the tests in order to verify certificates.56 
Recruit selection itself was to be conducted on the basis of meritocratic 
performance in standardised tests, rather than on tribal or patrimonial 
characteristics. The single officer recruitment tranche run in 2004, for example, 
was conducted through what one IMATT officer described as ‘an equivalent of 
the [British] army’s Regular Commissions Board’.57 Potential officers were 
assessed by a panel of senior brigadiers, chaired by the CDS and the civilian 
director general of the MOD in person. Candidates were scored on their 
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performance across all aspects of the selection process using a British military 
boarding system. In this process, every member of the board scores each 
candidate independently according to their performance against defined 
standards, and divergent scores between board members are then openly 
debated. Scores from the board members are then averaged, and the 
candidates ranked accordingly. Commander IMATT “shadow marked” to ensure 
RSLAF board members scored applicants against the selection criteria rather 
than against undisclosed personal preferences. IMATT felt that the RSLAF took 
the process seriously, and the board’s top scoring officer candidate matched 
Commander IMATT’s ranking. That this individual was a woman, despite the 
patriarchal nature of the RSLAF, was seen as further evidence of IMATT’s 
influence on RSLAF decision making.58 
Although individual selection was done on merit, IMATT did monitor 
recruits’ ethnic background and province of origin. This was necessary to guard 
against ethnic stacking, or the equally dangerous perception of regional 
favouritism. Although the need to ethnically and geographically balance the 
force potentially ran at odds with the concept of meritocratic selection, this issue 
was assuaged by the sheer volume of potential applicants, such that sufficient 
recruits from all backgrounds could be found who were able to objectively meet 
the new entrance standards. However, IMATT recognised a lack of applicants 
from among the Mende groups in eastern provinces during the initial 
recruitment tranches, and conducted a further roadshow to ensure new entrants 
reflected the ethnic and regional demographics of the wider Sierra Leonean 
population. IMATT attributed this initial imbalance to the residual experience of 
the Rebel War, the south east having been most fought over and thus bore the 
brunt of the SLA’s indiscipline during the conflict.59 Given the incumbent SLPP 
government, a lack of eastern Mende applicants likely also reflected the 
widespread view that the army’s senior leadership remained APC loyalists who 
would disadvantage Mende recruits’ careers in the long term. Indeed, Nelson-
Williams later complained that in his view, the first wave of RSLAF restructuring 
had unfairly privileged SLPP supporters, largely Mende from the east.60 But 
despite the potential tension between meritocracy and ethnic balance, the new 
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recruiting process was successful in overturning previous patrimonial 
mechanisms based on the card system; a result in no small part attributable to  
IMATT’s direct control of the system. 
Rigorous recruiting procedures supported a wider programme of RSLAF 
normative re-education. Even before Plan 2010, IMATT had used education to 
reinforce the concept of civilian control. In February 2002, for example, IMATT 
collaborated with the ICRC to run a ‘train-the-trainers’ course at Benguema, 
which instructed 55 RSLAF officers in how to deliver IHL training to their 
soldiers.61 Education was considered particularly important to establishing 
democratic control of the RSLAF, because as Brigadier Freer observed, with a 
30 per cent illiteracy rate in the RSLAF it was ‘easy for the charismatic 
malcontent to sway opinion’.62 Under Plan 2010, this was institutionalised 
through the activities of the Armed Forces Education Centre (AFEC) at 
Wilberforce Barracks. The AFEC ran courses for both soldiers and officers, 
administered by RSLAF education officers but supervised by IMATT. Courses 
were established to provide basic literacy and numeracy for soldiers, and 
IMATT developed relationships with external bodies in order to improve the 
civil-military content of RSLAF education. Education materials for AFEC 
courses focused on civics, and were provided by a local consortium of Sierra 
Leonean universities and education NGOs.63 The ICRC was asked to validate 
the human rights training provided to the RSLAF, and an 80 page booklet was 
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subsequently released in July 2006 entitled ‘IHL Code of Conduct for the 
Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF)’.64 
Under Plan 2010, re-education and training formed an essential 
component of the RSLAF’s restructured model of career progression. IMATT 
established defined career models for RSLAF officers and soldiers, in which 
promotion became contingent upon completing technical courses, performance 
in role, and the requisite levels of professional education. To be eligible to 
promote at each rank, officers and soldiers had first to qualify by variously 
attending specified tactical leadership courses run at Benguema and Brigade 
Battle Schools, or specific professional education courses.65 Historically, the 
SLA had provided professional military education to its officers by sending them 
abroad to complete staff and higher command courses on an ad hoc basis. This 
resulted in the RSLAF’s senior officer cohort having variously received 
professional training from China, Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, the UK and 
the US, or indeed not at all, depending the availability of funds.66 Instead, 
IMATT concentrated on designing short staff courses which could be run in 
Sierra Leone by IMATT instructors.67 
Initially, however, IMATT continued to send officers abroad, particularly 
to the Ghanaian Armed Forces Command and Staff College. In principle, this 
relationship reinforced accountability in the RSLAF as the Ghanaian Staff 
College also benefitted from an embedded British Military Advisory Training 
Team. Stadward, for example, gleefully recalled how one underqualified RSLAF 
captain corruptly secured a place on the Ghanaian course, only to be 
immediately sent home by the embedded British instructors after he failed the 
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course entrance test.68 However, there was insufficient capacity at the 
Ghanaian academy to accommodate the number of RSLAF officers who 
required training, and equally the RSLAF could ill-afford to lose significant 
numbers of officers for a year-long course.69 Moreover, it became apparent that 
extensive use of overseas courses helped perpetuate patrimonial tendencies in 
the RSLAF officer corps. Officers attending an overseas course received an 
additional daily allowance on top of their salary known as ‘per diems’, intended 
to cover officers’ expenses. Per diems were paid at the UN rate,70 while those 
attending courses in Canada, for instance, received an additional subsidy from 
the Canadian government.71 These allowances typically exceeded the actual 
cost of attending the course, and in consequence, overseas courses were an 
extremely attractive financial prospect for RSLAF officers.72 The effective sale of 
course places became a lucrative trade for officers in influential appointments, 
who were suspected of gerrymandering selection processes in return for a cut 
of the appointed officer’s per diems.73  
In late October 2003, President Kabbah opened a newly built staff 
training school for the RSLAF called the Horton Academy.74 The Horton 
Academy subsequently ran two six-week long Junior Staff Courses annually, as 
well as a six-week course for aspiring company commanders, and a 
commanding officers’ course consisting of three four-week modules. These 
courses prepared officers for promotion by providing them with the necessary 
command and staff training to operate at that rank. The first Junior Staff Course 
was planned for November 2003, and up to 150 officers subsequently attended 
some form of training at the Academy each year.75 Although modelled on the 
British Army’s officer career structure, Horton Academy staff courses were 
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tailored significantly to the RSLAF, and civil-military education featured 
prominently.76 Indeed, Brigadier Santa-Olalla, Commander IMATT in 2005, 
described the courses as ‘much more about education than training’.77 IMATT 
funded lecturers from Forah Bay College, University of Sierra Leone, to teach 
security studies and international relations on the senior courses.78 In 2003, 
academics from the University of Bradford similarly ran a seminar in the MOD 
on ‘Peace Education and Human Rights’.79 The ultimate aim of these courses 
was to ensure that if ‘a soldier said, “What’s all this Law of Armed Conflict stuff 
and why are we having to learn it?” the[ir] officer could then explain the bigger 
reasons why it was important’.80  
The design of the Horton Academy itself was intended to promote 
normative socialisation. It was named after James Africanus Horton, a Sierra 
Leonean creole who read medicine in the UK in the 1850s and subsequently 
reached the rank of surgeon-major (equivalent to lieutenant colonel) in the 
British Army.81 The name was intended as an inspirational symbol of Sierra 
Leone’s proud martial past, yet the Horton Academy was not established as 
part of the regular RSLAF defence estate but instead as an adjunct to the 
IMATT compound at Leicester Square.82 In part, this was a way of making 
IMATT money stretch further, as the Horton Academy buildings were designed 
to double up as accommodation for British reinforcements in an emergency.83 
However, it was also a clear attempt to remove those officers receiving staff 
training from the wider RSLAF environment, in order to make them more 
susceptible to IMATT’s professionalising influence. As Lieutenant Colonel 
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Stadward commented, the location of the Horton Academy was deliberately 
intended to ‘get the students away from the RSLAF into the IMATT, [and] look 
after them there…where you can start to influence the young’.84 Both the 
content of courses and their delivery, therefore, reinforced IMATT’s approach to 
RSLAF cultural change. As one IMATT officer remarked, the plan was ‘to work 
very much on the middle and junior officers to get them into the new ethos, 
which is why we had all these courses in human rights, civic education, so that 
even if they were approached with “Let’s stage a coup boys”, they would say 
“No sir, we don’t do this anymore…”.’85 
The Horton Academy did not totally replace overseas courses, and 
higher command and staff training was still provided by overseas academies. 
However, performance at the Horton Academy was used as a mechanism for 
identifying those suitable to attend overseas courses.86 IMATT officers working 
on Plan 2010 thus envisioned a more meritocratic process of selecting officers 
to attend staff courses overseas, based on a transparent application and 
boarding process.87 However, the Horton Academy remained the primary 
mechanism for both the democratic re-education of RSLAF officers, and their 
professional development. As Brigadier Santa-Olalla explained, the Horton 
Academy ‘was where we did all our training in terms of trying to get them to 
understand, particularly the younger officers.’88 IMATT recognised that the 
establishment of in-house staff training would cause some resentment among 
RSLAF officers, who had come to view overseas training opportunities as 
somewhat of a cash cow, and so initially planned to provide students receiving 
in-country staff training with a small special allowance in compensation.89 
However, this attitude was slow to erode. In 2007, Brigadier Cholerton still 
observed a degree of RSLAF resistance to attending Sierra Leonean staff 
training over foreign courses.90 
IMATT recognised that professional education would have little lasting 
effect on the norms of the RSLAF unless promotions themselves were carried 
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out according to the same set of values. GOSL had made a public commitment 
to this in the 2003 Defence White Paper, which promised to ‘ensure that 
recruitment and advancement within the RSLAF is based on merit…In this way, 
political, tribal or religious affiliations will not be the determinate of promotion’.91 
The first rounds of officer promotions were conducted prior to the release of 
Plan 2010 using a version of the British military boarding process, and 
subsequent promotions were to be conducted using the same system.92 For 
each round of promotions, boards of assessing officers were assembled from 
senior commanders across the force, to guard against any accusations of bias. 
This system was not infallible, however, and one IMATT officer acknowledged 
that it was hard for IMATT to be sure that those officers selected to sit on the 
board did not all come from the same ethnic background.93 In compensation, 
boards were typically observed by senior IMATT officers, and in a measure of 
the importance IMATT attached to the new promotional processes, successive 
Commanders IMATT regularly shadow-marked on promotions boards.94 
Selection for promotion was made based on officers’ annual reports and 
personnel records, against defined standards of performance and potential.95 
This was problematic in of itself, as the RSLAF’s record-keeping during the war 
had been generally poor. The RSLAF Armed Forces Personnel Centre (AFPC) 
had to reconstruct personnel files by piecing together available information, or 
create new files from scratch.96 In order to prevent collusion between board 
members, IMATT attempted to limit access to personnel files prior to a board 
sitting.97 This proved similarly challenging, in part because of a shortage of 
trained RSLAF clerks, such that it was ‘very obvious when you pick up a 
personnel file sometimes that something’s been taken out and something 
substituted. That happened all the time, and it was really frustrating.’98 Although 
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ostensibly meritocratic, it took some time for IMATT to develop Sierra Leonean 
confidence in the boarding system. IMATT staff officers from the Sierra 
Leonean MOD conducted visits to RSLAF units in 2004 to train commanders in 
how to write annual reports on their subordinates.99 Lists of those officers 
selected for promotion were traditionally published in the national press, 
providing an additional measure of transparency. One IMATT officer 
subsequently recalled the Deputy Defence Minister’s apprehension at 
publishing a list of promoted officers which was clearly not ethnically 
representative; his concerns were only allayed after IMATT demonstrated that 
its staff had supervised the promotions process and the results were 
meritocratic.100 Equally, not all officer promotions were boarded in this fashion. 
Senior command appointments, including on occasion commanding officer 
appointments, either remained un-boarded or were subject to additional political 
considerations, as the influence these posts conferred typically drew the Deputy 
Defence Minister and the President into appointments.101 However, the majority 
of junior and middling officer promotions were to be boarded; precisely the 
promotions which directly affected the cohort of officers IMATT was most 
heavily invested in.102 
IMATT also attempted to reintroduce a military legal system to underpin 
RSLAF discipline. Although current RSLAF documents reference a 2001 edition 
of the RSLAF’s Manual of Military Law,103 it is clear that military legal concepts 
were not well established prior to Plan 2010. For example, Stadward recalled a 
female junior RSLAF officer asking the IMATT legal adviser during a seminar if 
it was legal for her superiors to order her to sleep with them. When the IMATT 
officer replied that this was not, a male RSLAF officer apparently retorted, ‘You 
know your duty’.104 Brigadier Freer similarly remarked that discipline in the 
RSLAF ‘vacillated between completely ineffectual and overly zealous’.105 IMATT 
assisted with the establishment of a court martial centre at the Joint Forces 
Command in Cockerill Barracks, and initially looked to the civilian legal system 
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to support the re-establishment of military justice until RSLAF military lawyers 
could be trained.106 The subsequent system was modelled on the British Army’s 
structure, and established the civilian Supreme Court as the military court of 
appeal.107 Despite a British Army Legal Corps adviser, however, IMATT 
struggled to re-introduce a formal military legal process into the RSLAF during 
2004.108 As Colonel Stack recalled, ‘We thought it was a bit of domestic 
housekeeping; [in fact] this was a major issue’. 109 This was largely due to the 
legacy of previous court martials, which had been highly politicised. By 2007, 
IMATT officers still described RSLAF discipline as a ‘martinet approach’, but 
noted that indiscipline in the RSLAF was no longer a major issue – in part 
because the rice ration was so vital for the welfare of soldiers’ dependants that 
it served as a major disincentive to bad behaviour.110 
Professionalise or Retire: The Politics of Generational Replacement 
IMATT’s ability to implement these new institutional systems was significantly 
reliant on the political support it enjoyed from President Kabbah. In addition to 
leading the training team, Commander IMATT also served as Military Adviser to 
the President, providing direct access to the highest political levels of GOSL. In 
2003, for example, Brigadier Freer had a weekly audience with President 
Kabbah,111 while in 2005, Brigadier Santa-Olalla had a weekly meeting with the 
President alone, and another on a less frequent basis accompanied by the 
British High Commissioner.112 Commander IMATT’s direct access to the 
President gave IMATT an extraordinary degree of influence over RSLAF reform, 
as one senior officer serving during Brigadier Porter’s tenure as Commander 
IMATT explained: 
‘there were systems and structures in place [in the RSLAF] we perhaps never even 
knew about. What we did have, ultimately, is the ear of the president. So in that 
respect, you could argue we had incredible executive control about what was 
happening. If something was happening that we did not like, the Chief of Defence 
Force knew we would take him to the President and we would say, “President you 
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need to look at this”. That was an access and position that the Commander of 
IMATT had, and could use, and people knew that…So it was a guiding hand, it was 
an arm round the shoulder; but there was an element of steel there.’113 
Colonel Stack, who also served in IMATT in 2004, characterised this 
relationship as akin to patronage, with IMATT becoming the most powerful “big 
man” in the RSLAF as a result: 
‘IMATT’s patronage came from the President, Kabbah. He was the one who called 
the Brits in, effectively. And anyone in the military, if there was resentment of 
IMATT, or “we don’t like what IMATT are doing”, they knew that basically IMATT 
had the ear of the President…That was a very powerful tool, and it was a very clear 
demonstration of where the patronage was coming from, and it was a lever, I 
suppose, over the military.’114 
IMATT’s political “patronage” allowed it to drive through reforms in the face of 
RSLAF resistance, even after IMATT accelerated its transition from executive to 
advisory roles during 2003.115  
However, IMATT did not universally rely on political patronage to achieve 
its aims. Brigadier Santa-Olalla found that despite the reduced number of 
executive posts held by IMATT officers, his control over British funds – on which 
the routine running on the RSLAF relied – meant he retained significant 
coercive influence independent of the President.116 Lieutenant Colonel Harold 
Simpson, who served as the effective head of the Training, Education and 
Recruiting Directorate in the MOD during 2004, likened this relationship 
between the RSLAF and IMATT as akin to ‘Moral Suasion’: 
‘British military and civilian advisors exercised a combination of moral, intellectual 
and pragmatic influence over their Sierra Leonean counterparts often making the 
continued funding of projects conditional on the Sierra Leoneans doing things in the 
British way and according to the British rule-book.’117 
Consequently, IMATT appears to epitomise Posen’s “military maverick”; 
implementing military change in an inertia-bound RSLAF at the behest of 
civilian elites. As the Sierra Leonean civil servant Emmanuel Coker concluded, 
‘the reform that was going on in [the] MoD was dictated by the British – the 
entire reform process was. The government at the time wanted SSR, and the 
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British were willing to do it’.118 However, although IMATT was ultimately 
beholden to the presidency in the face of concerted RSLAF resistance, it was 
not totally reliant on (or compromised by) Sierra Leonean political patronage. 
IMATT’s technical expertise and independent resources provided it with 
alternate sources of leverage, over both the RSLAF and, to a certain extent, the 
President. 
The existence of parallel lines of communication and influence open to 
IMATT caused some discomfort among elements of the RSLAF; not least 
because Commander IMATT frequently enjoyed better access to the President 
than the RSLAF CDS. As Mark White observed, the access Commander IMATT 
enjoyed ‘did lead to some quite difficult relationships with the Chief of Defence 
Staff and the Deputy Minister of Defence, both of whom often had the 
impression that what the UK might be saying in a public forum…and then what 
might be being said to the President separately, was different.’119 Similarly, it 
also provoked resentment from middle ranking RSLAF officers, who did not 
enjoy the same privileges as IMATT staff. In 2004, for example, a senior IMATT 
officer newly arrived in the MOD found that relations with his RSLAF opposite 
numbers were terse, owing to the fact that his predecessors had regularly 
attended Defence Council meetings which were the preserve of RSLAF officers 
two ranks their senior.120 
However, IMATT’s generational approach to normative change, itself 
facilitated by this degree of political leverage, arguably created more profound 
tensions within the RSLAF officer corps. Many junior and middle ranking RSLAF 
officers had little respect for their seniors, largely because they felt these 
officers had been discredited by the SLA’s poor performance during the war.121 
IMATT’s model of generational reform actively exploited this perception, 
something senior RSLAF officers were acutely aware of. Outwardly, many 
senior RSLAF officers were supportive of IMATT’s promotional reforms. Nelson-
Williams, for example, wrote in 2010 that the RSLAF ‘must stop promoting and 
rewarding people according to time served, and start demanding performance. 
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All good militaries separate the wheat from the chaff, and so must we.’122 Yet, at 
the same time, he clearly resented IMATT’s attempts to marginalise his 
generation of senior officers: 
‘IMATT personnel were tempted to turn to these [junior] officers as the best chance 
of consolidating reform efforts to wash away the stains left by their predecessors, 
believing the new officers had the flexibility, open-mindedness and idealism of 
young officers everywhere. However, these new officers viewed senior officers with 
contempt, as they mistakenly believed their only reason for joining the army was to 
rid it of the legacy of such officers.’123 
IMATT’s generational approach thus created antagonisms between senior 
commanders and junior officers, and between those officers perceived by 
IMATT as competent and accountable and those who were not. 
This rift was epitomised by the derogatory slang phrase ‘friend of IMATT’, 
which was typically used by former SLA officers to delegitimise RSLAF officers 
they perceived as favoured by IMATT. The term ‘friend of IMATT’ was heard by 
IMATT officers as late as 2009,124 and was frequently aimed at those RSLAF 
officers who had completed overseas staff courses and who ‘spoke to IMATT in 
IMATT language’ – i.e. IMATT’s new generation.125 The term was intended to 
be both pejorative and threatening, effectively accusing RSLAF officers of 
‘becoming a white man’s friend’. Importantly, IMATT officers felt the term was 
most associated with the cohort of officers serving at lieutenant colonel level 
when Plan 2010 was released; a peer group split between officers leaning 
towards IMATT’s new school of thought and the SLA’s “old guard”.126 The term 
reflected a wider trend in Sierra Leonean society, described by President 
Kabbah as the ‘pull him down’ or ‘phd’ syndrome, through which ‘good 
intentions are often besmeared’.127 Colonel Stack, who served in IMATT in 
2004, certainly recognised that some RSLAF officers were ‘out to get’ so-called 
‘friends of IMATT’, such that being favoured by the British ‘was not necessarily 
a good thing in the long term’.128 
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In some respects, however, this rift was eminently useful for IMATT’s 
chosen model of reform. As a senior IMATT officer in 2002 observed, IMATT 
felt that ‘the senior officers were never going to change, fundamentally. We 
could work with them, we could do our best with them, but that was a 
generation that had already been lost’. Given the record of human right abuses 
condoned by the SLA during the Rebel War, the same officer admitted he found 
it ‘morally uncomfortable working with some of these officers’.129 In 2004, 
IMATT recruited a new cohort of junior officers to command platoons 
specifically to counteract the influence of the wartime generation of senior 
NCOs on newly recruited soldiers.130 Indeed, as one senior IMATT officer 
remarked of his experiences in 2008, ‘effectively you were just having to 
manage the older generation; trying to prevent them from creating more chaos, 
more institutional chaos than was absolutely necessary.’131 Consequently, 
IMATT attempted to act as an “air gap”, insulating ‘friends of IMATT’ from the 
“old guard”. Here, the generational tensions between “new” and “old” RSLAF 
officers suited IMATT’s purposes. 
IMATT did attempt to provide some retraining to senior commanders 
alongside the younger generation. British officers recognised that where senior 
RSLAF officers were so under-trained they could not fully understand the 
functions their better-trained juniors were performing, they would feel 
understandably threatened and attempt to sabotage IMATT efforts. 
Consequently, IMATT ran a series of “catch-up” courses at the Horton 
Academy.132 These did not always purport to be training courses, but were 
instead billed as familiarisation programmes to raise awareness of IMATT’s 
training regime among senior commanders. Participants nonetheless conducted 
the same training exercises run on the Junior Staff Course; instructors simply 
couched them as an opportunity to observe and comment on the sort of training 
IMATT was providing on the RSLAF’s behalf.133 Nonetheless, the tensions 
across the RSLAF chain of command served to highlight the highly political and 
somewhat contested nature of cultural change. While Rosen argued that intra-
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service rivalry provided a vehicle for military reform unrelated to external 
political intervention, in the RSLAF this intra-service rivalry was not only a 
product of IMATT’s politically-sponsored intervention, it was also an active 
agent of change. 
Conflict between IMATT and the RSLAF’s senior cohort was most 
pronounced in the area of RSLAF downsizing and redundancies. Here, the 
contested nature of reform serves to demonstrate the extent to which change 
was externally-led, and hence reliant on garnering either RSLAF or political 
support to endure. Reducing the size of the RSLAF was seen as an essential 
requirement to make the RSLAF financially affordable and therefore 
sustainable, as well as a means of providing ‘financial headroom’ to pay for 
improvements in RSLAF training, infrastructure and equipment.134 Downsizing 
would also reinforce IMATT’s career model for the RSLAF, helping to reshape 
the RSLAF’s rank structure. In 2003, the average age of RSLAF private soldiers 
was just over 30 years, while the average age of lance corporals was just over 
35, and the average age of corporals 38. One lance corporal was still serving at 
the ripe age of 67!135 The age demographics of junior officers were similar. 
While the average age for subalterns was 32,136 12 per cent of RSLAF army 
lieutenants were over 40. Consequently, IMATT wished to introduce manning 
control points to rebalance the age demographics of the RSLAF in line with its 
new rank and career structure. These would compulsorily retire privates at the 
age of 30, lance corporals at 35, and corporals at 40.137 
The RSLAF resisted redundancies, largely for patrimonial reasons. 
Downsizing would reduce commanders’ status and influence, and thus their 
power as “big men”.138 Downsizing was an understandably unpopular prospect 
for junior ranks, who generally relied on their military salaries and allowances to 
support large extended families (by some estimates, the RSLAF ‘welfare state’ 
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saw each soldier support around 10 dependents).139 Both IMATT and the 
RSLAF had periodically sought to bypass this latter issue by transferring 
redundant military personnel into the SLP, which was perceived to be just as 
understrength as the RSLAF was bloated. However, such a policy was keenly 
resisted by the SLP and international police advisers, concerned that the influx 
of large numbers of disgruntled former soldiers into the police without proper 
selection, vetting or training would effectively militarise the constabulary and 
undermine already brittle public confidence.140 
In part, IMATT accepted the political difficulties of making redundancies 
in a harsh economic climate – particularly given that the soldiers most likely to 
face redundancy were those with the lowest educational standards.141 As 
Brigadier Le Grys later observed, ‘there were significant concerns that putting 
ex-combatants on the streets was too dangerous’.142 Equally, one IMATT officer 
confessed that at the end of the Rebel War, ‘The last thing we wanted to do at 
that stage was downsizing. We needed the troops’.143 In 2002, the Defence 
Council had approved a reduction in total RSLAF strength from 15,500 to 
10,500 personnel. Nonetheless, the 2003 MTEF submission provided for 
14,367 personnel,144 and defence planning assumptions that year expected a 
relatively gradual reduction of the force, only reaching 10,500 by January 
2007.145 Nevertheless, Plan 2010 envisaged a smaller, leaner RSLAF of around 
8,500 all ranks.146 The first tranche of redundancies in January 2004 was 
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carried out tentatively, largely composed of voluntary redundancies, medically 
unfit personnel, and the discharge of soldiers already absent without leave.147 
However, subsequent redundancies were used by IMATT to reinforce its 
generational approach to normative change in the RSLAF, and a further 1,000 
redundancies in 2005 proved to be far more controversial.148 In line with 
IMATT’s new career model for the RSLAF, a significant proportion of these 
redundancies were compulsory, with individuals selected based on poor 
discipline records, non-recommendations for promotion in annual reports, low 
medical and educational status, and age.149 Although retraining and a financial 
resettlement package were provided – ultimately funded by DFID – IMATT 
planned to enforce compulsory redundancies with a stick as well as a carrot;150 
something made more necessary due to the extreme reticence RSLAF officers 
exhibited when asked to make decisions about redundancies.151 IMATT briefing 
documents show that soldiers warned off for compulsory redundancy who 
refused to work their year-long notice could be tried by court martial and 
dismissed from service without a redundancy package, pour encourager les 
autres.152 
Although Nelson-Williams later claimed that downsizing in 2005 did not 
affect officers, in fact, IMATT pursued a highly-selective compulsory 
redundancy programme for RSLAF officers as well. This was designed to 
further IMATT’s normative agenda.153 During Brigadier Santa-Olalla’s tenure as 
Commander IMATT, this ultimately resulted in the effective dismissal of around 
70 officers above the rank of major. The selection of these officers was even 
more targeted than with the soldier tranches; so much so that one senior IMATT 
officer later described the retirements as akin to ‘the night of the long knives’.154 
Compulsory redundancies were pursued by IMATT in line with its wider policy of 
                                                          
147 IMATT, ‘Why Restructuring’, op. cit., slide 2; ‘1,000 Soldiers to be Retired this Year’, IRIN 
News, 14 August 2003, online at http://www.irinnews.org/report/45491/sierra-leone-1000-
soldiers-be-retired-year, accessed on 27/05/16. 
148 Alfred Nelson-Williams, op. cit., p. 129. 
149 IMATT, ‘Why Restructuring’, op. cit., slide 16. 
150 Soldiers with more than ten years’ service would receive a pension, those with less were 
eligible for resettlement training and a reduced financial package. Alfred Nelson-Williams, op. 
cit., p. 129; Interview with Brigadier David Santa-Olalla, op. cit. 
151 Interview with Participant A16, op. cit. 
152 IMATT, ‘Why Restructuring’, op. cit., slides 10-13. 
153 Alfred Nelson-Williams, op. cit., p. 129. 
154 Interview with Brigadier David Santa-Olalla, op. cit.; Interview with Participant A19, op. cit. 
242 
 
insulating junior officers from the worst habits of the older generation, and 
making space for younger officers to promote. Brigadier Santa-Olalla stated that 
these redundancies were ‘highly targeted at senior officers’, and driven by 
IMATT’s: 
‘wish to remove the corrupt element of the hierarchy. These were the ones we 
hadn’t been able to educate. It was the younger ones down below who understood 
what we were trying to achieve, they wanted to go where we were pointing them, 
but to some degree they were held back by the hierarchy’.155 
The targeted nature of officer redundancies was characteristic of the highly 
choreographed restructuring of senior RSLAF command appointments in which 
IMATT engaged. This started as early as late 2002, and was continued by 
successive British commanders and their staffs at least as late as 2013.156 
Known as ‘succession planning’, IMATT maintained spreadsheets tracking the 
progression of senior RSLAF officers to identify preferred candidates for key 
RSLAF command appointments. Although such planning is standard practice in 
many Western armies, IMATT used its political influence over senior 
appointments to defend its chosen mechanism of normative change; both by 
trying to ensure officers from IMATT’s new generation were advanced, and to 
limit the influence of officers IMATT viewed as pernicious. By 2008, the only 
routine meetings held between Commander IMATT and the Defence Minister at 
which RSLAF officers were not present involved succession planning.157  
This dynamic was most dramatically evident in the removal of the RSLAF 
CDS at IMATT’s behest in 2003, as Plan 2010 was being drawn up. Although 
initially favoured, by 2003 IMATT perceived Major General Tom Carew as an 
obstacle to its developing reform agenda. General Carew had been initially 
appointed CDS following the unexpected death of the previous Nigerian 
incumbent, Brigadier Maxwell Khobe. Carew enjoyed a reputation as a fierce 
wartime leader, though the unexpected circumstances surrounding his 
appointment may have rendered him initially reliant on IMATT advice.158 These 
factors clearly suited the British during the immediate wartime intervention. 
However, as the post-war reforms of the RSLAF began to gather pace, British 
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officers increasingly felt General Carew was an obstacle to reform, and lacked 
some of the personal qualities they wished to see in a Sierra Leonean military 
figurehead.159 For example, IMATT became convinced that General Carew was 
involved in various patrimonial practices, including using RSLAF resources to 
build a personal residence on the outskirts of Freetown.160 
In 2003, rumours circulated that General Carew was using his position to 
sleep with his subordinates’ wives and daughters, either in return for favours or 
under threat of punishment. One IMATT officer working in the MOD recalled 
that, ‘I often saw young women being taken down to his office, not looking very 
happy, and coming back not looking very happy…With their parents, daughter, 
coming to meet the CDS.’161 Another senior IMATT officer remarked that, 
‘Carew was a serial shagger. I mean, I lost all respect for him when he used to 
drag officers up to his office and if he fancied their wives he would have their 
wives’.162 Brigadier Freer, Commander IMATT at the time, later stated that 
‘once you realise that’s going on, you realise that this isn’t someone who could 
possibly remain as the head’. After drawing up succession plans, Freer 
approached President Kabbah and persuaded him to replace Carew.163 
President Kabbah publically announced General Carew’s retirement, and his 
virtually immediate replacement by Brigadier Sam M’Boma, at an RSLAF 
commissioning parade in November 2003.164 The allegations about Carew’s 
conduct were never proven, but whether they were true or not, they provided 
sufficient scope for IMATT to have Carew replaced. The incident demonstrated 
both IMATT’s influence in the RSLAF’s internal affairs, but also its commitment 
to the generational model of reform later codified in Plan 2010. 
The relationship between Carew and Alfred Nelson-Williams in particular 
was emblematic of the deeply political and viscerally personal divisions among 
senior RSLAF officers, which IMATT hoped Plan 2010 would eliminate. 
Following the 1997 coup, Alfred Nelson-Williams, then a colonel, continued to 
                                                          
159 Interview with Participant A16, op. cit.; Interview with Major General Adrian Freer, op. cit. 
160 Interview with Participant A13, a senior British officer in IMATT; Interview with Participant 
A14, op. cit.; Interview with Participant A16, op. cit.; interview with Major General Adrian Freer, 
op. cit. 
161 Interview with Participant A16, op. cit. 
162 Interview with Participant A3, a senior British officer in IMATT. 
163 Interview with Major General Adrian Freer, op. cit. 




serve under the new AFRC/RUF junta. In contrast, Tom Carew, also then a 
colonel, was arrested along with a number of other pro-SLPP officers and 
accused of attempting to orchestrate a counter-coup, only narrowly surviving 
with his life.165 The following year, after the AFRC/RUF junta had been evicted 
from Freetown, Kabbah’s returning government court-martialled 34 soldiers for 
their association with the AFRC – including Nelson-Williams – and 24 were 
publically shot a few days later on the outskirts of Freetown.166 Tom Carew 
chaired the court martial,167 and not only sentenced Nelson-Williams to death, 
but in a move widely condemned by the international community also denied 
the condemned soldiers right of appeal.168 Nelson-Williams was spared by the 
personal intervention of President Kabbah, who commuted his sentence to life 
imprisonment,169 and both subsequently served under the British during 
Palliser.170 Carew’s role in this court martial may have contributed to his 
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selection as CDS to replace Nigerian Maxwell Khobe,171 but was it was also 
cited by Brigadier Freer as a contributory reason why Carew could not remain 
as CDS.172 After Nelson-Williams was brought back into the army, he served as 
Assistant CDS for Operations and Plans under Carew.173 IMATT officers 
working in the MOD subsequently found that the two officers refused to talk to 
each other, and instead asked IMATT staff to act as go-betweens, further 
diluting the already weak RSLAF chain of command.174 
In 2005, GOSL initiated a root-and-branch review of the MOD and 
RSLAF known as the Core Review, partly precipitated by the impact of 
downsizing.175 Heavily influenced by IMATT, the Core Review eventually 
confirmed the need to draw down the RSLAF in line with Plan 2010’s 8,500 
target.176 Despite obfuscation of the agenda by use of terms such as 
‘rightsizing’ and ‘rebalancing’, IMATT proved unable to enforce further 
redundancies in 2006, highlighting IMATT’s reliance on political support to enact 
controversial reforms.177 By 2006, President Kabbah was focused on domestic 
policies and had little time for defence issues. Moreover, both political parties 
had one eye on the upcoming elections, and any large-scale redundancies 
would undoubtedly prove politically unpopular. Consequently, the mid-year 
2006 Defence Council meeting was not held, drawing out the issue.178  
Instead, IMATT attempted to pursue downsizing by softening the blow to 
the RSLAF. IMATT argued that downsizing should be accompanied by 
reinvestment in modern equipment, which would act as ‘force multipliers’ to 
offset the reduction in establishment. IMATT also lobbied for greater Defence 
independence over its budget allocation. During his hand-over meeting with 
Brigadier Cholerton at the end of 2006, Brigadier Le Grys secured President 
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Kabbah’s assent to this proposal in principle.179 However, Cholerton 
acknowledged that there was still little will to push downsizing ahead of 
elections:  
‘we, sort of, took the foot off the accelerator and accepted that the political 
imperative was to ease off a bit…Early on in my time they [Whitehall] said, “Hold, 
wait. Because of the elections let’s not rock the boat. Anything that undermines 
confidence potentially undermines stability, let’s just wait and then we’ll take it up 
afterwards”. And that’s what we did.’180  
Mark White, the DFID ACPP programme manager, similarly recalled how: 
‘It was clear to me in 2006 that the entire [security] sector was getting more and 
more nervous about what would happen in the election, so frankly there was no 
point in us flogging dead horses of other policy objectives that were in the log frame 
that we wanted the government to think about…if the hook is the election let’s use 
the election, let’s not do the thing that we said was in the document that was signed 
off two years ago that’s not appropriate anymore.’181 
While it was clear that electoral considerations rendered IMATT’s policy 
objectives unachievable in the short term, this did not represent a total 
abandonment of the policy; instead, it represented a pragmatic attempt to “box 
clever” on the part of British advisers. Yet, the reduction in political will meant 
that IMATT was unable to implement its policies in toto. For example, manning 
control points were originally due to come into effect in 2007, yet the system 
remained unimplemented:  
‘as far as we could see, there wasn’t anything falling off the end of the conveyor belt 
being made redundant. And so you had quite senior people, notionally drawing pay 
but not doing any work. Well, old people I should say…But as the mortality rate in 
Sierra Leone is huge, and average life expectancy is 47, it has its own natural 
wastage…So people were falling off the end of the conveyor belt by dying.’182 
The prospect of manning control points proved too unpalatable for the RSLAF 
to digest, and after IMATT had transitioned to an advisory function, it lacked the 
ability to impose fundamental change on the RSLAF without political will. 
The 2007 Elections: Democratic Soldiers Lacking Democratic Masters? 
The 2007 elections in Sierra Leone saw a transition of power from the 
incumbent SLPP to the opposition APC, and were consequently viewed as an 
indicator of democratic progress.183 The RSLAF did not intervene politically, but 
                                                          
179 Interview with Brigadier Barry Le Grys, op. cit. 
180 Interview with Brigadier Iain Cholerton, op. cit. 
181 Interview with Mark White, op. cit. 
182 Interview with Brigadier Iain Cholerton, op. cit. 
183 Department for International Development, ‘Elections in Sierra Leone in 2007 and 2008’ 
(London, 2008), p. 1, online at 
247 
 
did provide significant support to enable the elections to take place. 
Nonetheless, the political conduct of the elections remained both violent and 
neo-patrimonial, threatening to draw the security sector back into the political 
process. Therefore, just as the election cycle displayed a normative change in 
RSLAF behaviour, it also revealed significant weaknesses in IMATT’s approach 
to defence reform. The 2007 presidential elections consequently acted as a 
microcosm of SSR in Sierra Leone. 
The democratic change in government produced by the 2007 elections 
belied the continuing neo-patrimonial character of Sierra Leonean party politics. 
The three main parties contesting the election – the SLPP, the APC and the 
People’s Movement for Democratic Change (PMDC) – all attempted to buy 
votes in an open fashion. International observers even witnessed crowds 
queuing outside the SLPP candidate’s personal residence to receive cash and 
rice in return for promises of electoral support.184 Such practices, though 
pernicious to multi-party democracy, reflected deep trends in Sierra Leonean 
society in which patrons historically presented cola nuts to clients, symbolically 
reflecting their obligation in a similar vein to the idiom ‘true to his salt’.185 
Despite the degree of patronage disbursed by the SLPP during the 2007 
elections, many recipients nonetheless voted for the opposition come the 
election day. This became known as ‘watermelon politics’, immortalised in a hit 
Sierra Leonean pop song during the election period by the same name. As 
Jörgel and Utas highlighted, ‘Green is the colour of the SLPP party and the rind 
of the watermelon. Red is the colour of the APC and the flesh of the 
watermelon…The idea is that you can take money from the green party and 
wear their green t-shirt while your inside is actually red – like the 
watermelon’.186Jörgel and Utas concluded that watermelon politics represented 
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‘a small step towards democratic consolidation’ by ‘disconnecting money from 
vote’.187  
However, the elections also saw a remobilisation of party militias. The 
SLPP largely drew its militiamen from former rebel military factions, such as the 
NPRC, AFRC and West Side Boys, with the APC relying on ex-RUF members, 
and the PMDC on former CDF fighters. Initially, these security details were 
armed with hand weapons, but rapidly appeared with firearms and began 
adopting wartime rebel customs once again.188 In consequence, the election 
period witnessed significant outbreaks of violence, largely during the tense 
period between the first and second rounds, although there was also some 
violence in the run-up to the first round.189 Most of the fighting occurred between 
party retainers in Freetown, though there were clashes up-country in Pajehun, 
Makeni, Bo and Kono.190 A week before the second round, clashes between 
SLPP and APC party militias in Freetown sparked riots and significant looting, 
but were contained by police using tear gas.191 Following the APC victory, the 
SLPP party headquarters was burnt down and houses in Freetown 
vandalised.192 Some areas of the country also witnessed sporadic violence and 
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intimidation over the following months, as the SLPP and APC came to terms 
with the new governing order.193 
In contrast to the unreformed nature of Sierra Leonean politics, the 
RSLAF provided significant support to the 2007 election process under the 
auspices of civilian control. This was chiefly achieved through the concept of 
“police primacy”. Under this doctrine, the civilian SLP held primary responsibility 
for civil order, confining the RSLAF to external defence unless formally 
requested by the civilian authorities via a set protocol. Thus, police primacy 
supported democratic civil-military relations by delineating the role of the military 
and insulating it from domestic political tasks. A formal agreement was 
necessitated by the blurring of responsibilities between police and military that 
had occurred during the Rebel War. After the 1992 NPRC coup, the military 
junta had replaced a number of senior police officers with their own appointees, 
leading to a significant deterioration in relations between the two organisations. 
Subsequently, the military’s own intelligence branch became involved in law 
enforcement investigations relating to the war effort, such as smuggling.194 
Although akin to the British experience of Northern Ireland, police 
primacy was not an IMATT concept. First mooted by President Kabbah’s 
administration in 1996, it remained high on his agenda throughout the war, likely 
in response to the continued unreliability of the military.195 In September 1998, 
the British SLP Inspector General, Keith Biddle, put together a policy to 
implement police primacy, but its application was ultimately hampered by 
continued hostilities. Nonetheless, Biddle oversaw the attendance of the 
RSLAF’s senior military police officer on the UK police command course at 
Bramshill, in an effort to import police primacy into the RSLAF.196 The concept 
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was similarly reasserted in the 2003 Defence White Paper.197 As Plan 2010 was 
being launched in 2004, however, IMATT officers felt that the concept was still 
culturally alien to the RSLAF, and consequently IMATT viewed one of its 
functions as ‘buy[ing] the space and time to build the police up’.198 Biddle too 
recognised this, and attempted to improve police capabilities by securing riot 
control equipment for the SLP from DFID.199 By 2005, Commander IMATT felt 
that the RSLAF ‘were prepared to give it a go, but deep down they were pretty 
mistrustful of the police’; in no small measure because they felt the SLP lacked 
the capability to actually carry out their allotted function.200  
The concept only really matured after the Office of National Security 
(ONS) co-ordinated a formal Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) process in 
2005 to define how the RSLAF could augment the SLP during civil unrest.201 By 
2006, Brigadier Le Grys observed that the RSLAF ‘firmly understood civil-
military interface, [and] firmly understood the role the police would have’, but 
were still not universally receptive to the concept.202 Nonetheless, this 
represented a significant shift in of itself. According to a perception study 
undertaken by British Defence Intelligence, in 2004 ‘participants perceived 
RSLAF and police roles to be unclear and overlapping’. By 2006, however, 
perception studies suggested that the RSLAF understood ‘their role in relation 
to the police more clearly with less need to make direct comparisons between 
themselves and the police’, such that relations between the two organisations 
had ‘become, if not stronger, then more accepting’.203 Indeed, slow adoption of 
the police primacy concept on the part of the RSLAF was attributed to a 
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‘perceived discrepancy in reward levels rather than in an RSLAF desire to take 
back elements of the police’s domestic security role’.204 
Police primacy during the elections was enabled by close liaison 
between the different components of the security sector and their international 
observers and mentors. At national level, National Security Council meetings 
were focused towards elections, on which Brigadier Cholerton and the senior 
police advisor sat alongside the head of the National Electoral Commission 
(NEC).205 The NEC also invited representatives of the SLP and RSLAF to its 
own coordination meetings, while the ONS provided intelligence support.206  
Initially, direct RSLAF support to elections was primarily logistical. Deploying 
ballot boxes and papers to polling stations up-country and withdrawing them 
within the correct timeframe proved a significant logistical challenge.207 A 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed between the NEC and the 
RSLAF, facilitating the use of military vehicles for election support. In all, the 
NEC gathered a fleet of around 350 vehicles to support the 2007 elections, of 
which around 80 vehicles were provided by the RSLAF – somewhat over a fifth 
of the NEC’s total pool. In principle, the NEC could reduce the number of 
vehicles it was required to hire by using RSLAF vehicles, thus minimising 
expenditure. In the event, however, the RSLAF only agreed to the MOU on the 
condition that the NEC (using donor money) agreed to maintain, run, and in 
some instances refurbish the provided vehicles; a boon for the RSLAF, but one 
which likely negated the supposed cost benefits over private rentals.208 
However, the RSLAF also performed a more traditional “Military Aid to 
the Civil Power” (MACP) role by providing additional personnel to reinforce 
election security. Although public order during the elections remained an SLP 
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responsibility under the doctrine of police primacy, it was clear that the SLP had 
insufficient personnel to police the elections. Additional manpower was brought 
in from the prison service, the Chiefdom police, and even traffic wardens, as 
well as elements of the RSLAF.209 Although the majority of the security 
presence during the election period was provided by the civilian SLP, the 
RSLAF’s military police were also deployed to patrol in the vicinity of some 
polling stations.210 The RSLAF was also requested to deploy under the police 
primacy framework in order to maintain public order in areas where the SLP had 
been locally overwhelmed by violence. In Kono, for example, the SLP were met 
by petrol bombs in a prepared attack against local authorities. Although 
identified in advance by intelligence, police reinforcements specially trained in 
public order duties were overrun and the RSLAF was called in.211  
The conduct of the RSLAF during the 2007 elections was perceived by 
IMATT as a vindication of both the concept of police primacy, and Plan 2010’s 
institutional redevelopment of the RSLAF. In the words of Brigadier Cholerton, 
Commander IMATT during the elections, where deployed under MACP, ‘the 
military didn’t shoot, they just turned up, looked smart, showed discipline, didn’t 
have to use firearms, and it completely quelled the situation’. Perhaps more 
importantly, after the situation had been stabilised the RSLAF withdrew and 
handed responsibility back to the SLP.212 For Brigadier Cholerton, the elections: 
‘proved one of the long term strands of our activity, or our vision, which was to 
make them democratically accountable. And I think the election was actually a very 
big tick in that process; proving that they were democratically accountable ‘cos they 
worked to the direction of the politicians in support of the police’.213 
There were some instances of soldiers wearing mixed uniform and party colours 
on the election day, despite instructions to the contrary, but overall the military 
emerged from the election cycle without becoming publically tarnished by overt 
partisan political activity, as had been the case during the 2003 presidential 
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race. This was undoubtedly helped by the fact the military voted on the same 
day as the rest of the electorate in 2007.214 Thus, the 2007 elections, while 
flawed as a political process, were deemed to demonstrate significant progress 
in terms of Sierra Leonean civil-military relations, and in particular in terms of 
the norms of democratic accountability in the RSLAF. 
Yet, the transition of power between the SLPP and APC following the 
election result was still dependent on international support, particularly in 
insulating the country’s security institutions from patrimonial advances. The 
NEC made it clear that it viewed some of the activities of the incumbent Vice 
President and SLPP presidential candidate, Solomon Berewa, as 
unacceptable.215 Kabbah himself attempted to declare a state of emergency 
between the two rounds of elections on no less than three occasions. As 
Brigadier Cholerton recalled,  
‘I had a very robust conversation with President Kabbah who did not believe the 
police could handle it without the military on the streets immediately…he was 
reluctant for them to assume a subordinate role to the police. He thought they’ll be 
blood on the streets if you don’t have the army out immediately – he said that to 
me’.216 
In some quarters, this desire to deploy the military, effectively under martial law 
rather than police primacy, was seen as a ploy to suspend the run-off elections 
after the first round proved unfavourable for the SLPP. It was only prevented 
through concerted international pressure.217 This dynamic is particularly 
problematic, given that continued normative reform of the RSLAF relied largely 
on political will to sustain externally-led change; at least until such time as 
IMATT’s new generation of young officers had progressed in their careers 
sufficiently to oversee the force themselves. 
While the 2007 elections demonstrated the distance the RSLAF had 
travelled since 2002, the success of the 2007 elections was in no small 
measure a testament to the guiding hand of the international community; IMATT 
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included. Yet, the successful application of police primacy was widely viewed a 
measure of the security forces’ developing integrity; a view shared by IMATT, 
but also somewhat grudgingly by President Kabbah, who had not expected the 
SLPP to loose office.218 The elections were also a milestone for IMATT, as the 
RSLAF’s conduct during the elections was used to justify greater British 
withdrawal from Sierra Leone. The impact of IMATT’s withdrawal on the 
RSLAF’s civil-military behaviour, and its military effectiveness, will be examined 
in the next chapter. 
Conclusions 
Plan 2010 marked a shift in British thinking on defence reform in Sierra Leone, 
away from stabilisation-focused “train and equip” capacity building towards a 
more long-term, strategic plan for normative change in the RSLAF. This was in 
no small measure the result of evident shortcomings in the previous wartime 
approach. As Plan 2010 took shape, and increasingly after its launch, IMATT 
attempted to produce normative civil-military behaviour in the RSLAF by 
promoting new cultural norms, inculcated by institutional mechanisms for 
socialisation and propagated by a managed process of generational change. 
The primary vehicle for this normative re-socialisation of a generation of RSLAF 
officers was professional military education. This was chiefly carried out at the 
Horton Academy, an environment controlled by IMATT, but also during tactical 
training courses (at Benguema and elsewhere) and civil education at the AFEC. 
IMATT sought to create the conditions for this socialisation through new, 
meritocratic recruitment procedures. It hoped to propagate these socialised 
officers and their new culture up the chain of command and, eventually, into key 
senior appointments from which they could sustain the normative change. The 
new career structure emphasised the importance of professional education at 
each promotional rung of the ladder, and depended on British-style boarding 
processes for selecting officers according to merit rather than patronage. Here, 
the British model effectively equated professional effectiveness with political 
accountability, largely because the absence of professional effectiveness in the 
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255 
 
RSLAF had tended to stem from neo-patrimonial appointments, which had also 
rendered the force unamenable to democratic oversight. 
By 2007, Plan 2010’s reforms had had some effect. Not only did the 
RSLAF remain politically neutral during an electoral cycle which saw the 
incumbent government leave power in favour of the political opposition, but they 
did so while providing significant logistical and security support under a rubric of 
police primacy. While much of the RSLAF senior leadership had historically 
been pro-APC and so were likely relieved to see Kabbah go, it should be 
remembered that the first successful coup in Sierra Leone’s post-independence 
history occurred during an electoral transition of power between the incumbent 
SLPP government and their APC opposition.219 At the same time, however, the 
2007 elections revealed the continuing prevalence of neo-patrimonial practices 
in Sierra Leonean party politics, which threatened to re-politicise the military. 
Indeed, the largest restraining influence on political interference during the 2007 
elections was the actions of the international community, rather than any new-
found democratic convictions in the RSLAF. 
The process of implementing institutional reforms in the RSLAF, in line 
with Plan 2010’s model of generational change, proved to be highly contested. 
This was particularly so with regard to promotions and redundancies. IMATT 
used these two mechanisms in tandem to reshape the RSLAF officer corps. 
However, the prospect of downsizing in particular proved highly controversial, 
and was resisted by senior RSLAF officers for neo-patrimonial reasons. 
Although the first tranche was accepted without major incident, subsequent 
tranches of downsizing were used by IMATT to remove “old guard” individuals 
who IMATT viewed as obstacles to reform, and to reinforce IMATT’s new career 
structure. This was bitterly resented by factions in the RSLAF, but was imposed 
owing to political support. IMATT also used succession planning of senior 
appointments to maintain the momentum of reform. To a significant extent, 
IMATT’s ability to drive through changes in the face of senior RSLAF resistance 
was a product of successive IMATT commanders’ relationships with President 
Kabbah. Through direct access to the President, and parallel chains of 
command and reporting lines in the RSLAF, IMATT was generally able to 
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outmanoeuvre RSLAF opposition to enforce change. To a degree, this political 
will was likely underpinned by conditionality in wider British aid to Sierra 
Leone,220 but it also seems to have been the product of personal trust between 
Kabbah and a number of British IMATT commanders. Despite this use of 
political patronage, IMATT was not totally reliant on Kabbah to encourage 
change. IMATT’s access to independent British and international sources of 
resource, which it could disburse or withhold depending on the RSLAF’s attitude 
to change, allowed IMATT to promote reform somewhat independently of Sierra 
Leonean politics. Ultimately though, IMATT was unable to compel change in 
face of concerted political reluctance. This relationship thus rendered IMATT 
immensely influential on some occasions, as with the dismissal of the RSLAF 
CDS in 2003, and virtually impotent on others, as in the case of downsizings in 
the run up to the elections. IMATT’s relationship with the RSLAF conforms to 
Posen’s conception of the “military maverick”, drawn from outside the status 
quo and enacting externally-imposed change on a reluctant military.221 
However, the generational approach to reform was far more 
sophisticated than Posen’s archetype of externally-derived coercion. IMATT’s 
institutional changes sought to create norms by using the structure of a 
professional armed force as a vehicle for change. This matches Rosen’s 
emphasis on institutional and bureaucratic processes, like promotional 
pathways and feedback loops, in pursuing intra-service rivalries.222 While 
IMATT certainly used external sources of influence to impose change, these 
changes were primarily aimed at creating and leveraging intra-service 
dynamics, through which a younger generation of officers would “promote out” 
the “old guard”. Tensions between RSLAF officers, epitomised by the ‘friend of 
IMATT’ phenomenon, and the conflict between threatened senior commanders 
and IMATT, demonstrate the extent and power of this dynamic in the RSLAF. 
Ironically, IMATT’s dual mechanisms of political patronage and intra-service 
conflict to encourage change make IMATT appear like the “biggest man” 
amongst the “big men” of the RSLAF command; using political influence and 
somewhat subversive alternate chains of command to build a particular 
powerbase in the RSLAF – but one orientated around normative values and 
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performance rather than region, party or tribe. In this sense, Plan 2010 
represented a blend of both Posen and Rosen’s characterisations of military 
change, but with each mechanism becoming mutually reinforcing rather than 
being mutually exclusive. While normative change was clearly incomplete by 
2007, exacerbating the danger of externally-led re-politicisation, IMATT’s model 
of generational change undoubtedly offers an example of one mechanism 
through which, to paraphrase Suhrke, “our” norms might become “theirs”.223 
IMATT’s deliberate manipulation of generational divisions also suggests 
that the characterisation of peacetime reform as exclusively top-down in extant 
literature is overstated.224 The institutional systems of recruitment, promotion 
and education IMATT implemented were established from the top, but their 
impact was aimed primarily at the junior and middle ranks of the RSLAF – at the 
ground – where normative socialisation was considered to be more effective. 
Ultimately, sustainable reform was to come about from within the RSLAF, 
through cultural change at the bottom of the military hierarchy being transported 
up the chain of command to the top. While a growing number of studies of 
military adaptation and learning have highlighted the importance of the 
reciprocal interaction between top-down and ground-up processes in 
institutionalising change,225 the extent to which these dynamics are purely 
confined to cases of wartime adaptation appears questionable. As IMATT’s 
interaction with the RSLAF under Plan 2010 shows, future studies of peacetime 
reform in Western armies may well reveal ground-up change and even 
peacetime adaptation,226 especially given that Plan 2010 was primarily 
designed by the British and derived from British military practice. 
The ultimate success of Plan 2010 in remaking the RSLAF can only be 
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judged in the light of RSLAF behaviour in IMATT’s absence. The 2007 elections 
marked an increase in IMATT’s drawdown in Sierra Leone, while also heralding 
a new political relationship between GOSL and IMATT. The next chapter will 
examine the impact of IMATT’s withdrawal and political change on the changing 
cultural norms of the RSLAF. It will also explore the implicit relationship 
between normative civil-military culture and military effectiveness, which much 





8. Sustaining a Culture of Accountability: RSLAF Effectiveness 
and IMATT Withdrawal, 2007-2015 
 
In 2007, Sierra Leone went to the polls for the second time since the end of the 
Rebel War, electing a new APC government led by President Ernest Bai 
Koroma. Presidential elections were conducted again in 2012, and on both 
occasions the RSLAF facilitated, but did not intervene politically. This was seen 
as the definitive measure of normative cultural change in the RSLAF, and 
enabled IMATT’s replacement with the smaller civilian-led International Security 
Advisory Team (ISAT) in 2013. Indeed, the British Army continues to consider 
that IMATT ‘set the template for future operations’.1 Yet, the period following the 
2007 elections, characterised by IMATT’s slow draw-down and eventual 
withdrawal, also witnessed a gradual re-politicisation of Sierra Leonean civil-
military relations; a rolling back of IMATT’s professionalising vision for the 
RSLAF in favour of neo-patrimonial practices. Scholars such as Albrecht and 
Jackson have concluded that this does not simply reflect the contradictions 
inherent in exporting liberal democratic civil-military relations,2 but specific flaws 
in IMATT’s model of institutional change, which they consider overly reliant on a 
small coterie of local clients.3 The apparent inability of Western cultural norms 
to persist in the RSLAF after IMATT’s withdrawal lends credence to Krebs’ 
argument, that a military’s internal practices are simply a product of wider social 
and political trends.4 Yet, this period was simultaneously defined by the 
RSLAF’s increasing commitment to Peace Support Operations (PSOs), which 
increased military effectiveness, and also limited the worst excesses of neo-
patrimonial re-politicisation of the RSLAF. This chapter examines the 
relationship between IMATT withdrawal, RSLAF participation on PSOs, and the 
political character of military culture in Sierra Leone. 
                                                          
1 British Army, ‘Sierra Leone Case Study: The British Army’s Contribution 1997 – 2015’, Warfare 
Branch (Warminster, February 2016), p. 36; Lieutenant Colonel Harold Simpson MBE, ‘UK 
Sponsored Stabilisation and Reform in Sierra Leone 2002-2013: A Unique Case or a Template 
for Future Intervention(s)?’, Sandhurst Occasional Papers No. 19 (Camberley, 2014). 
2 Peter Albrecht & Paul Jackson, Securing Sierra Leone 1997-2013: Defence, Diplomacy and 
Development in Action (London, Routledge, 2014), p. 3, pp. 171-9; Paul Jackson, ‘Security 
Sector Reform and State Building’, Third World Quarterly, 32:10 (2011), pp. 1803-1822. 
3 Peter Albrecht & Paul Jackson, Security System Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997-2007 
(Birmingham, GFN-SSR, 2009), p. 7. 
4 Ronald R. Krebs, ‘One Nation under Arms? Military Participation Policy and the Politics of 




As the previous chapter demonstrated, IMATT’s normative model of 
generational reform implicitly associated professional military behaviour, 
characterised by an emphasis on meritocracy and operational output, with civil-
military accountability. This was largely the result of the previous neo-
patrimonial decline of the RSLMF, during which politicised promotions and 
appointments undermined both military effectiveness and democratic 
accountability. More generally, this relationship between military effectiveness 
and civilian control has formed a consistent theme in scholarship on Western 
civil-military relations. Huntington’s concept of objective control conceived of a 
self-governing military separate from political interference, in which professional 
values underpinned both effectiveness and accountability.5 Although scholars 
have argued that military effectiveness, particularly at the strategic level, 
requires a more intimate interface between the civil and military spheres than 
Huntington’s typology allows, they have nonetheless supported the relationship 
between professionalism, effectiveness, and accountability to civil order.6 
Bruneau and Matei’s advancement of a new trinity of civil-military relations, in 
which civilian control is inseparable from military effectiveness and financial 
efficiency, maintains this relationship.7 Equally, King has demonstrated the 
relationship between professionalisation and operational effectiveness in his 
work on task cohesion in Western armies.8 
However, this relationship remains over-theorised and under-examined. 
Indeed, Bruneau and Matei’s new model is itself an attempt to ‘escape from 
Huntington’s labyrinth’ by providing a more empirically testable construction of 
civil-military relations.9 In the case of Sierra Leone, Albrecht and Haenlein have 
argued that PSOs provided the RSLAF with a new, external locus of military 
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identity; at once providing the force with a focus and keeping it busy.10 Yet, this 
observation only provides further questions. If, as Haenlein and Albrecht assert, 
PSOs created a particular identity in the RSLAF, presumably with specific 
normative behaviours attached, how do these norms of overseas intervention 
preclude domestic political intervention? Indeed, the presumption that military 
effectiveness and civil-military accountability are mutually supported by military 
professionalism is openly questioned in much scholarship on non-Western civil-
military relations; not least because of differing conceptions of military 
professionalism. Although ethnically stacking the military is not universally 
accepted as an effective method of coup-proofing a regime,11 at least one study 
of the Syrian officer corps acknowledged that while this practice undermined 
military effectiveness, it did provide the regime with a degree of political control 
over its armed forces.12 Equally, the influence of the military during processes of 
democratisation has led to overt campaigns of political education and 
supervision, alongside military professionalisation, in some young 
democracies.13 Anecdotally, the 15 July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey 
demonstrates that even relatively Westernised, professionalised and effective 
armed forces are not immune from political behaviour.  
This chapter argues that promotions and appointments define military 
culture. It was not the supposed identity-producing benefits of PSOs that curbed 
the worst excesses of re-politicisation in RSLAF, but the practical need to 
ensure military effectiveness on PSOs, which necessitated the maintenance of 
a degree of meritocracy even as IMATT withdrew, simultaneously helping to 
underpin civil-military accountability. This chapter proceeds in four sections. 
First, the impact of IMATT’s withdrawal on the institutional dimensions of Plan 
2010 reforms is examined, alongside the RSLAF’s associated re-politicisation. 
The chapter then turns to the RSLAF’s operational deployments during the 
period, exploring the levels of military performance displayed by the RSLAF 
                                                          
10 Peter Albrecht & Cathy Haenlein, ‘Sierra Leone's Post-Conflict Peacekeepers’, RUSI Journal, 
160:1 (2015), pp. 26-36. 
11 Philip Roessler, ‘The Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War in Africa’, World 
Politics, 63:02 (2011), pp. 300-346. 
12 Hicham Bou Nassif, ‘“Second-Class”: The Grievances of Sunni Officers in the Syrian Armed 
Forces’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 38:5 (2015), pp. 626-649. 
13 Marco Jowell, ‘Cohesion Through Socialization: Liberation, Tradition and Modernity in the 
Rwanda Defence Force (RDF)’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 8:2 (2014), pp. 278-93; 
Zoltan D. Barany, The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, 




during PSOs, election security and the Ebola response. The third section then 
examines the relationship between operational effectiveness and military 
accountability. The chapter concludes that the drive for military effectiveness did 
help reinforce processes of democratic accountability in the RSLAF, but only in 
the context of Plan 2010’s existing normative agenda. 
IMATT Withdrawal and the Limits of External Influence 
The 2007 elections provided an opportunity for the British Government to 
reduce its commitment in Sierra Leone, precipitating the gradual drawdown of 
IMATT. Although IMATT had been slowly reducing in size since the end of the 
Rebel War, this was accelerated following the elections. By the end of 2008, 
IMATT had reduced to approximately 70 personnel. IMATT’s Brigade Advisory 
and Support Teams (BASTs), responsible for mentoring brigade staffs and their 
subordinate battalions, were first reduced in strength, then amalgamated, and 
finally withdrawn altogether in 2009, bringing IMATT’s strength down to around 
50. IMATT subsequently became entirely reliant on importing STTTs to conduct 
any direct tactical training in the RSLAF.14 This draw-down continued until the 
2012 presidential elections, after which IMATT was replaced by the joint civil 
and military ISAT. This was to oversee all enduring aspects of the UK’s 
development and SSR activity in Sierra Leone, although the British military 
presence in the country was subsequently augmented in response to the West 
African Ebola pandemic under the auspices of Operation Gritrock.15 The 
reduction in strength during this period had significant implications for IMATT’s 
influence, both in the RSLAF, and politically, limiting IMATT’s ability to pursue 
further reforms. It also impeded IMATT’s capacity to protect the institutional 
changes implemented under Plan 2010, which were so fundamental to its 
original model of generational cultural change. 
IMATT’s diminishing size and status had a direct impact on its ability to 
implement change in the RSLAF. Initially, Brigadier Cholerton did not witness 
any immediate change in defence policy as a result of the APC’s electoral 
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victory, and the incumbent CDS, Major General Sam M’Boma, was retained for 
nine months by the new government, in what Cholerton described as ‘a decent 
degree of leaving alone’.16 Following the elections, IMATT took up the issue of 
RSLAF downsizing once again, and in February 2008 the Defence Council 
agreed to a further reduction in the RSLAF’s establishment through the 
disbandment of one brigade and two infantry battalions. This was achieved by 
merging the Freetown Garrison with a provincial infantry brigade.17 Although the 
RSLAF did eventually reduce to around 8,500 all ranks, redundancies were only 
to affect junior ranks despite the loss of command appointments.18 In 2010, 
IMATT was still struggling to implement manning control points.19 The new 
Defence Minister was not implacably opposed to further redundancies – one 
senior IMATT officer characterised his attitude as one of, ‘As long as it’s really 
good and the brightest, shiniest thing in West Africa, I don’t really mind too 
much how big it is’ – but this view was not shared by the RSLAF.20 The 
RSLAF’s opposition to further reductions, combined with IMATT’s reduced 
ability to influence RSLAF behaviour, consequently led to tensions between 
IMATT staff and Whitehall. As Colonel Jamie Martin, the final Commander 
IMATT, recalled: 
‘I felt the UK was fixated on 8,500, never a soldier more…it became a little bit of a 
mantra, and I became a bit bored of banging the drum endlessly, because no-
one…would actually listen to the logic that we shouldn’t beat them up about 
it…we’re not really spending a huge amount of UK tax payers’ money here 
anymore. We’re downsizing. We might not want to find ourselves hanged by this 
particular thing for ever more.’21 
Indeed, contrary to both Whitehall and GOSL’s view, the RSLAF still hoped to 
re-expand should sufficient funds become available.22 As each phase of RSLAF 
downsizing was accompanied by further reductions in IMATT’s establishment, 
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IMATT’s ability to pursue further RSLAF reductions diminished the closer the 
RSLAF got to Plan 2010’s target.23 
IMATT’s political influence was also reduced by the change of 
government in 2007. Under the previous SLPP government, Kabbah had 
simultaneously served as President, and therefore, commander-in-chief, and as 
the Minister of Defence, appointing a Deputy Defence Minister to oversee day-
to-day matters. Mark White, DFID advisor in Sierra Leone in 2005-6, felt that 
this presidential trinity effectively arrested decision making in the MOD, as no 
important decisions could be made without Kabbah’s approval, but he had 
insufficient time (or inclination) to devote to the MOD alongside his other 
presidential duties.24 Consequently, IMATT had lobbied for the appointment of a 
separate Minister of Defence since at least 2005. IMATT officers felt that 
Kabbah had been reluctant to relinquish the role for fear of a coup.25 But 
equally, because the President was automatically commander-in-chief, it was 
difficult for IMATT to demonstrate sufficient need for an independent minister 
with a clearly separate role.26 However, the incoming APC administration did 
separate the roles, appointing a Paolo Conteh as Minister of Defence and 
National Security. Yet this concomitantly reduced IMATT’s political influence, as 
it served to insulate Commander IMATT from the new president, Koroma. 
Consequently, IMATT became increasingly reliant on Paolo Conteh to drive 
change. 
Although the military’s reputation as an APC stronghold helps explain 
why President Koroma was willing to divest himself of the Defence ministerial 
portfolio, the APC government evidently remained somewhat sceptical about 
both the SLP and the RSLAF’s reliability. In 2008, for example, the storage and 
destruction of a large quantity of seized cocaine was entrusted to IMATT over 
both the SLP and the RSLAF, by presidential decree.27 Conteh’s ability to make 
decisions independently from the President thus remained severely constrained 
and Colonel Martin found that he still deferred most important decisions to the 
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President. Any democratic benefit from distributing control of the military 
through the appointment of a separate Defence Minister was also limited by the 
fact that Conteh was not a Member of Parliament, and so served in an 
executive capacity answerable to the President in person; something typical of 
what White described as Sierra Leone’s ‘sofa politics’.28 Conteh’s appointment 
also proved divisive in the RSLAF, at least initially. Colonel Martin recalled his 
habit of attending RSLAF events dressed in camouflage uniform and wearing a 
bush hat and aviator sunglasses, which drew considerable comment in the 
Sierra Leonean press: 
‘He just had a style about him that occasionally grated…maybe I should have had 
the balls to say, “Look, you know Minister, I don’t think that’s a very good idea”…if 
there was a problem, if something had gone wrong, he would tend to rant and 
harangue the senior officers…they would be more worried about apportioning 
blame and deciding whose fault it was, than actually working out why it had gone 
wrong and trying to fix the problem. So his style occasionally I thought was 
inappropriate. But he was well connected with the president’.29 
Nonetheless, as a member of a prominent APC dynasty, Conteh was politically 
well connected. He was the nephew of former APC president Major General 
Joseph Momoh, and had previously served as a major in the RSLAF military 
police. When Momoh was overthrown by the NPRC early in the Rebel War, 
Conteh moved to the UK, where he trained as a lawyer and worked for the 
Department for Work and Pensions. Prior to the 2007 elections, Conteh had 
been the APC’s primary fundraiser in the UK, and it was widely believed that he 
had received the post in return for his loyal services to Koroma and the party.30 
This did give Conteh a degree of political surety, which may have facilitated a 
degree of political independence for the MOD.31  
In a statement of IMATT’s diminishing status, Commander IMATT was 
reduced from a one star appointment to a full colonel role in late 2008, 
beginning with the appointment of Colonel Hugh Blackman. In an attempt to 
offset IMATT’s diminishing influence, Blackman persuaded Whitehall to extend 
the tour length of senior IMATT staff from one to two years. Subsequently, 
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IMATT attempted to make up for its reduced size by developing more sustained 
personal relationships with its Sierra Leonean counterparts.32 Conteh did prove 
amenable to RSLAF reform in principle, and Brigadier Cholerton felt he was 
‘receptive to change…a new broom’.33 Indeed, a senior IMATT officer serving in 
2009 recalled Conteh’s apparent enthusiasm for generational change: 
‘Sometimes Paulo would say, “I’ve got the perfect plan. Let’s just get so-and-so, 
promote him straight to one star, find him a job, and then next year he can become 
the X”, and I’d say, “Well, that’s all very well, but he’s got to be credible”, while at 
the same time saying, “There’s nothing I want more, but all of these lieutenant 
colonels we’ve invested so much British energy in, being promoted straight into the 
senior management level, they’ve got to succeed not fail otherwise the great new 
scheme is immediately undermined”.’34 
British officers were conscious that RSLAF staff training remained ‘quite 
superficial’, implicitly limiting the speed at which generational change could 
occur.35 Consequently, IMATT officers found themselves attempting to 
periodically manage Conteh’s expectations, while simultaneously still agitating 
for change. Hence presidential patronage for IMATT-led reform was 
consequently replaced by ministerial patronage following the 2007 change of 
government. 
Despite IMATT’s reducing size, Commander IMATT was nonetheless still 
able to exercise significant influence at critical junctures. This was most obvious 
in the replacement of the Sierra Leonean CDS, Major General Alfred Nelson-
Williams, following a rift with IMATT in 2010. Though drawn from the wartime 
generation of senior RSLAF officers, IMATT initially perceived Nelson-Williams 
as a competent and reform-minded professional soldier. One senior IMATT 
officer commented that Nelson-Williams ‘was clever enough to play a good 
game with IMATT, sufficient that we were convinced that he was the rising star 
and the new future for the RSLAF’.36 Indeed, IMATT had recommended him for 
appointment to CDS in 2003 and again in 2008.37 By 2010, however, senior 
IMATT officers believed that Nelson-Williams was surreptitiously undermining 
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the RSLAF’s accountability. Tensions came to a head when IMATT concluded 
that Nelson-Williams was involved in serious mismanagement of procurement, 
by arranging contracts to acquire equipment for PSOs from dubious sources.38 
Colonel Blackman appealed to Conteh, and Nelson-Williams was duly replaced. 
As one senior British officer serving in IMATT at the time remarked, senior 
RSLAF appointments remained to a certain degree ‘inevitable, as in inevitably 
we have an IMATT solution because we know the bloke, we get on with him 
really well, we think he’s quite competent. And to a degree we can influence 
him, it’s all about internal management, but he’s competent to do the job’.39 
However, the fractious relationship between Nelson-Williams and IMATT 
was itself the product of IMATT’s reduced influence and power. In particular, 
IMATT officers believed that Colonel Blackman’s rank – formally, two below 
Nelson-Williams – played an important role, and was certainly a clear indication 
to the RSLAF that the UK was seeking to disengage from Sierra Leone.40 
Nelson-Williams’ attempts to limit IMATT’s influence in the RSLAF were 
certainly more vocal than his predecessors. In 2009, for example, Sierra 
Leone’s The Lion newspaper ran the front-page headline ‘Racism at IMATT?’ 
alongside a photo of Colonel Blackman captioned ‘Colonel Huge Blackman…is 
he a racist?’, in a story at least one IMATT officer attributed to Nelson-
Williams.41 The article alleged that Colonel Blackman exercised a ‘constant 
threat to submit derogatory reports against the RSLAF to Britain’ and railed 
against Blackman’s alleged disrespect for senior Sierra Leonean officers and 
his privileged access to the President.42 As the previous chapter demonstrated, 
these mechanisms had been consistently employed by IMATT to encourage the 
RSLAF to reform since at least the launch of Plan 2010 in 2004, but senior 
RSLAF officers only appear to have been in a position to openly contest their 
legitimacy after IMATT began to downsize; perhaps because the RSLAF was 
becoming less reliant on IMATT, but undoubtedly also because IMATT’s 
influence had waned. Nonetheless, Alfred Nelson-Williams was still replaced in 
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2010 at IMATT’s insistence, while Colonel Blackman remained until the end of 
his posting in early 2011.43  
While IMATT was able to exercise periodic influence at critical junctures, 
it proved unable to prevent neo-patrimonial practices seeping back into RSLAF 
recruitment and promotions. In 2007, Brigadier Cholerton became aware of 
significant corruption occurring in RSLAF recruitment processes. New recruits 
reporting for initial training at Benguema were not the same individuals who had 
passed the selection process. Instead, a senior RSLAF officer was effectively 
selling enlistments to illiterate soldiers and allowing literate surrogates to take 
the selection tests in their name. Yet Brigadier Cholerton had some difficulty in 
clamping down on this pernicious practice, as the officer responsible benefitted 
from better political patronage than the then CDS, and Cholerton was forced to 
take the matter up with the President.44 By 2008, the RSLAF had effectively 
formalised an ethnic quota system in recruitment, with regional teams 
established to recruit from among their own regional groups. In principle, this 
encouraged competitive selection, as Sheka Mansaray recalled: 
‘I made the public statement that if you recruit lemons, you end up with lemons in 
the army. Don’t blame anybody, no government, if they become sergeant majors for 
the rest of their lives instead of becoming brigadiers, that’s your fault…Now in the 
army when they want to recruit they go to the regions, they ask people to send 
nominations.’45 
However, it also reinforced the salience of ethnicity and region as defining 
career attributes in the RSLAF, potentially reinforcing the force’s patrimonial 
character. By 2011, regional brigades were sifting applicants prior to the central 
selection process, introducing even greater subjectivity into the system.46 
Recruitment drives had also become less routine as the RSLAF increasingly 
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struggled to find sufficient capital to regularly fund the process. IMATT remained 
heavily involved in recruiting,47 but attempted to further indigenise the RSLAF’s 
recruiting processes in 2012, ahead of its own withdrawal.48 As one IMATT 
officer involved in this process observed, ‘the younger generation got it…[but] 
would do it in their own way’. Worryingly though, the same officer noted how 
increasingly the RSLAF ‘would just look at their [recruits’] reports and just know 
they were a good egg’.49 As one British officer later commented of this 
transitional period at Benguema, where recruits were selected and trained: 
‘there’s always a challenge when you build and institution like that, or rebuild it, 
and the point at which you step back, [and] that particular bit wobbled badly.’50 
Despite IMATT’s attempts to maintain meritocratic objectivity, RSLAF 
promotions also became increasingly subject to political or patrimonial 
influence. One senior British officer serving in IMATT from 2008 estimated that 
about 20 per cent of board results were interfered with in some way, with ‘all 
sorts of nonsense going on behind closed doors’.51 Consequently, IMATT 
retained a staff officer inside the MOD’s personnel directorate after most other 
posts had been withdrawn in order to maintain oversight of RSLAF promotions. 
One IMATT officer serving in the MOD in 2010-12 found that while the RSLAF 
still went through the motions of conducting promotions boards, officers’ tribal 
and familial background were now openly discussed during selections. RSLAF 
officers were well aware that IMATT disapproved of their patrimonial 
tendencies, and so RSLAF board members tended to slip in Krio when 
discussing candidates’ social and ethnic backgrounds to try and avoid IMATT 
oversight.52 A British officer serving as part of Freetown Garrison in 2008-9 
observed how even relatively junior RSLAF officers were attuned to these 
patrimonial dynamics: ‘You’ll hear the comment all the time, “That’s Sesay’s 
man, that’s his man”, and they’ll align themselves to people they see as being 
powerful, people who can help them.’53  By the time Ebola hit Sierra Leone, a 
UK Stabilisation Unit civilian expert found little correlation between rank and 
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experience among the RSLAF, with some officers’ careers having visibly 
stagnated under a neo-patrimonial glass ceiling.54 
As IMATT’s influence diminished, its approach to neo-patrimonial 
practices in the RSLAF subtly changed. Rather than attempt to rigorously 
contest the results of every board, one senior IMATT officer considered that ‘the 
fundamental debate was much more about accelerating youngsters into the 
hierarchy, and the rate at which you could reasonably do that’.55 Similar 
sentiments applied to IMATT’s approach to neo-patrimonial corruption. Colonel 
Martin recalled that ‘we were always aware that there was a certain amount of 
corruption going on, that it was probably inevitable, and unless it directly 
impacted on military effectiveness there probably wasn’t much point in us trying 
to do anything about it.’56 To a certain extent, both RSLAF patrimonialism and 
IMATT’s desired generational change were constrained by the RSLAF’s own 
obsession with seniority. Colonel Martin, Commander IMATT in 2011-13, 
considered that seniority was more important to the RSLAF even than tribal 
background, perhaps as a hangover from the SLA’s origins in the Victorian 
British military system.57 Nonetheless, rigid adherence to seniority also impeded 
meritocracy, as officers were promoted by seniority rather than competence.58 
Some IMATT officers did feel that although the RSLAF did not maintain a 
professionalised promotional system based solely on merit, they were 
nonetheless aware of the dangers of ethnically stacking the military.59 IMATT’s 
reduced influence over the RSLAF’s promotional system was nonetheless a 
product of its diminishing political impact. While Conteh was generally 
supportive of IMATT’s reform agenda, he also pursued his own political 
agendas, which IMATT was increasingly unable to resist. One frustrated IMATT 
officer recalled conversations with Conteh over politically-motived senior 
promotions, thus: 
‘“Minister, let me show you a succession plan. This is what I recommended, this is 
what you did. Here are clear points of failure, the evidence is self-explanatory. Let 
us try and ensure places like the Horton Academy” – hence the enormous 
development placed in that – “develop young officers, mark them honestly, report 
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on them honestly, they have annual reports, they have records kept”. All that basic 
stuff which my predecessors must have fought over since 2000 and dot, and we 
were still fighting over then.’60 
Yet in 2010, senior officers still did not receive formal reports, resulting in ‘some 
frankly idiot decisions’.61 Allegations and recriminations over politicised 
promotions and dismissals were even played out in the Sierra Leonean press, 
publically highlighting the power struggles between Conteh and elements of the 
RSLAF’s senior officer corps.62 
Continued resistance to the norms of Western democratic civil-military 
relations raises questions about the efficacy of Plan 2010’s institutional reforms. 
As in the MOD personnel directorate, IMATT retained officers in the Horton 
Academy long after other posts were withdrawn. Indeed, these two functions – 
promotions and professional education – represent the twin bastions of Plan 
2010’s approach to generational and cultural change. However, the 
generational model of change IMATT had embarked upon meant that the fruits 
of such labours were only starting to be seen as IMATT was leaving. The first 
RSLAF officers to receive junior staff training at the Horton Academy as 
subalterns and captains were only beginning to return as majors and lieutenant 
colonels on the intermediate courses in 2010. In Martin’s view, these officers 
‘were beginning to be quite good, but in the context of an African army’.63 By 
that stage, the Horton Academy itself was also beginning to be more self-
sustaining. Although the Director of the Horton Academy was still an IMATT 
officer, by 2012 the Chief Instructor was an RSLAF lieutenant colonel who had 
himself passed through the Horton Academy system.64 As one British lieutenant 
colonel, himself a veteran of IMATT, found when he visited the Horton Academy 
to teach a defence diplomacy course, junior RSLAF officers he’d worked with in 
2004 were just starting to occupy positions of influence in 2013.65 But by then, 
IMATT had long since ceased to exercise oversight or influence over the daily 
behaviours of the wider RSLAF. As a British officer in Freetown Garrison 
following the 2007 elections perceptively observed, ‘Do you affect the younger 
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officers? Yes you do, but not as much effect as that brigade commander, that 
commanding officer, that company commander.’66 Thus, the Horton Academy 
and the increasingly limited British mentoring could not fundamentally displace 
the wider Sierra Leonean milieu in which RSLAF soldiers were immersed. 
In particular, the closure of the BASTs resulted in a dramatic reduction in 
IMATT’s capacity to effect change in the RSLAF. This was largely due to the 
continuing unreliability of the RSLAF’s own chain of command. A British officer 
serving in 3 BAST immediately after the 2007 elections found that RSLAF 
officers habitually submitted inaccurate reports to their superiors. RSLAF 
commanders at all levels attempted to conceal issues and inflate achievements, 
believing that any reports which were less than rose-tinted would reflect badly 
on their leadership and harm their career progression. The IMATT officer felt 
that this dynamic was exacerbated by a lack of genuine opportunities to 
demonstrate competence available to RSLAF officers, and the continued 
prevalence of favouritism and patrimonialism among commanders. This 
effectively produced ‘two lines of communication: there was the RSLAF line of 
communication, the normal brigade reporting chain, and there was the IMATT 
[one], which was almost an external validation system.’67 Unfortunately, the 
closure of the BASTs deprived IMATT of real knowledge of RSLAF activity at 
the ground level, closing the feedback loop through which IMATT could assess 
the progress of reform and intervene in issues; something Rosen described as 
essential to change.68 As Brigadier Cholerton, who left post as Commander 
IMATT after the 2007 elections concluded, ‘By reducing size you reduce 
influence, [and] reduce oversight’ – the two being intrinsically linked.69 
IMATT’s reduced presence allowed long-standing RSLAF resentments at 
civilian control over the armed forces to re-emerge. In 2007, Brigadier Cholerton 
believed that the RSLAF had accepted that the reformed national security 
architecture was now a fact of life.70 Yet five years later, Colonel Martin found 
that while the senior officers generally understood the need for civilian control in 
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the MOD, IMATT’s younger generation chafed at its perceived inefficiencies.71 
Salaries went unpaid for several months on occasion, and GOSL’s financial 
instability had knock-on implications for RSLAF planning.72 These frustrations 
led RSLAF officer to regularly try to bypass official procurement and financial 
oversight mechanisms.73 Colonel Martin consequently described the 
relationship between civilian and military elements in the MOD as ‘Fractious’, 
and noted a ‘strong antipathy between the MOD civil servants and the serving 
officers. The serving officers I think felt that, and probably with a degree of truth, 
that they could do a much better job if they were just allowed to get on and do 
what they wanted.’74 
However, this discontent was symptomatic of a more profound legitimacy 
crisis. IMATT recognised that many RSLAF officers continued to view the 
British-imposed model of a joint civil-military MOD as alien and inappropriate; 
something likely not helped by the increasingly politicised nature of RSLAF 
appointments. One British officer serving as IMATT transitioned to ISAT 
considered this debate broadly healthy:  
‘you don’t hear the military talking about whether the military should be subordinate 
to the national government – they talk about how it should be, but not whether it 
should be – and that’s a significant and important transition’.75 
This officer considered that open debate about the mechanisms of civilian 
control represented an improvement from the RSLMF’s previous proclivities, 
described as ‘muttering in the corners or suddenly deciding that the Minister 
needed to go’. He concluded that, ‘However much the military were frustrated at 
times by that manifestation of political control, it was a frustration that they 
talked about not something that they acted on.’76 Yet as IMATT’s presence 
faded, RSLAF soldiers did increasingly act. In early 2009, a letter was circulated 
in the RSLAF written by an anonymous group of soldiers threatening a coup if 
the unreliable payment of salaries and allowances was not addressed, blaming 
corruption among the senior command.77 In August 2013, a group of soldiers 
from Teko Barracks in Makeni were arrested for allegedly mutinying and plotting 
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to overthrow the President. The soldiers, including at least one junior officer, 
were eventually court-martialled and subsequently acquitted, which some in 
IMATT pointed out was a positive step towards due process and the rule of 
law.78 Yet, these incidents equally demonstrate a degree of fragility in the 
RSLAF’s democratic accountability. 
The Development of Military Effectiveness in the RSLAF 
As IMATT began to withdraw following the 2007 elections, the RSLAF’s focus 
shifted towards PSOs. This resulted in demonstrable improvements in the 
RSLAF’s military effectiveness, despite IMATT’s reduced presence. In 2009, the 
RSLAF provided a reconnaissance company to UNAMID in Darfur for a number 
of roulements. They then progressed to supplying a battalion strength formation 
to UNAMSIL in Somalia. Yet the RSLAF’s new operational focus on PSOs did 
not immediately detract from the RSLAF’s democratic accountability 
domestically. Indeed, the RSLAF provided election support to the 2012 
elections under the rubric of police primacy, and troops earmarked to deploy to 
Somalia formed the spearhead of the RSLAF’s much-vaunted response to the 
Ebola Pandemic. 
Despite the RSLAF’s later interest in PSOs, the RSLAF’s primary task in 
the 2003 Defence White paper was to guarantee Sierra Leone’s territorial 
integrity.79 This centred on border security and conventional deterrence, but 
was a role that the RSLAF struggled to fulfil. In early 2003, for example, there 
were a number of incursions by Liberian rebel groups into Sierra Leone. On 10 
January, Liberian militiamen burned 13 houses during one such incursion, and 
made off with abandoned RSLAF weapons and radios. Local villagers refused 
to return to the area, citing the RSLAF’s inability to protect them. On 17 
February, Sierra Leone officially closed the bridge over the Mano River into 
Liberia, and the RSLAF did rebuff some minor raids in April. However, evidence 
of collusion between the RSLAF and Liberian rebel groups continued, despite 
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official prohibitions.80 Equally, the RSLAF only had the capacity to man 32 of the 
150 border crossing points.81 Of his visits to the border during the 2003 
tensions, Colonel Stadward later remarked that, ‘There were times when I was 
extremely pleased when I had weapons with me’.82 Although tensions along the 
Liberian border did later subside, they did not disappear. Brigadier Le Grys, for 
example, commented that although by 2006 the level of cross-border threat was 
‘Nothing untoward on any scale….it wouldn’t have taken much to get it 
completely pear shaped’.83 Thus, border security represented a genuine 
defence mission, but one for which the RSLAF was not well prepared. 
Developing a credible military capability in the RSLAF proved a slow and 
painful process. Brigadier Freer, Commander IMATT in 2003, assessed Sierra 
Leone’s neighbours as only capable of operating at company strength. He 
concluded that providing the RSLAF could ‘seize and hold ground at company 
level’ it would defeat or deter any cross-border threats and fulfil its defensive 
mission.84 In 2003, Stadward felt the RSLAF ‘were OK. They were better off 
when they were led by Brits than when they were led by Sierra Leoneans, ‘cos 
the Sierra Leoneans don’t really want to do it. It’s a bit hard.’85 Concerns were 
repeatedly raised in 2003 and 2004 that the RSLAF was unprepared to take 
over UNAMSIL’s functions – which ultimately provided a guarantee of Sierra 
Leone’s territorial integrity – as the UN mission drew down.86 Indeed, 
UNAMSIL’s final departure date was extended to allow the RSLAF more time to 
develop its own capabilities, in what one IMATT officer described as ‘a big, big 
comfort blanket’.87 By 2005, IMATT judged that section and platoon operations 
were about the limit of RSLAF capability; in part because shortages of 
communication equipment prevented effective manoeuvre in larger 
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formations.88 Equally though, collective training remained absent during much of 
the period, not least because Operation Pebu ‘consumed the infantry 
component of the force’.89 In 2006, Brigadier Le Grys nonetheless decided to 
move away from tactical mentoring. Le Grys felt that if ‘you work at that tactical 
level whenever you walk away it looks messy, so actually, whilst you’re there it 
looks OK and when you’re not it isn’t’, and consequently ‘if there was ever a 
conflict between accountability and capability…accountability came first and 
then the capability would just have to live with the shortfalls…Which is a bit 
frustrating in the field, but it just had to be.’90 
By 2007, the RSLAF’s operational capacity at the borders had not 
dramatically improved. Brigadier Cholerton remarked that ‘notionally they could 
conduct a patrol, notionally they could erect a border post, but they didn’t have 
the ability to do them effectively’. In part, this resulted from the RSLAF’s 
institutional, logistical and financial limitations. Logistical resupply of units at the 
border was woeful, and in Cholerton’s words, soldiers ‘almost had to live off the 
land’; something which likely contributed to IMATT’s suspicions that the RSLAF 
were involved in cross-border smuggling and illicit tax collection.91 RSLAF 
border patrols were implicitly limited by the lack of vehicles, fuel, radios, rations 
and even maps required to mount anything but the most limited foot patrol.92 
Even these, however, Cholerton believed were only really conducted if IMATT 
were watching.93 One British officer serving in a BAST shortly after the 2007 
elections concluded that border operations ‘fell down unless very quickly there 
was some form of constant supervision’. The BASTs conducted an annual audit 
of RSLAF units’ military effectiveness, called Operation Evaluation, which 
included field exercises. The officer recalled that certain battalions could 
conduct an advance to contact at company level, but only in very simple 
conditions. As soon as the circumstances were varied unexpectedly, RSLAF 
units were out of their depth. Moreover, as units had prior warning of the 
exercise, their orders were all rehearsed in advance, such that a tactical 
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scenario involving advancing to find and destroy an unseen enemy position 
became ‘a set piece’.94 Cholerton concluded that the RSLAF could certainly not 
operate at battalion level, not least because most units were understrength and 
could not actually field a battalion.95 
By 2008, however, the RSLAF was actively looking to deploy a company 
group on PSOs abroad. Sierra Leone had previously deployed troops on 
international missions before the Rebel War, and the ambition to redeploy on 
PSOs had emerged as an as early as 2003.96 Albrecht and Haenlein have 
argued that although PSOs offered a source of remuneration for the RSLAF, the 
primary motive for deployments lay in Sierra Leone’s history and identity. In 
particular, they argued that the country’s receipt of significant international aid, 
including via various UN PSOs, generated a significant desire to “give back” to 
the international community. In so doing, Sierra Leone could retake its place on 
the international stage, and keep the RSLAF occupied with tasks unrelated to 
domestic politics.97 IMATT officers did not dismiss such motives entirely, but 
were generally more cynical regarding the RSLAF’s motives. Brigadier Le Grys 
noted that in 2006, there was significant debate about how best to approach 
PSOs, with RSLAF officers pushing for high-risk, high-status, high-reward 
options.98 IMATT was more cautious, conscious that ‘they would go to wherever 
they went taking our reputation with them…and our reputation as a training 
organisation…would have been on the line’.99 One senior officer serving in 
IMATT as the RSLAF deployed to Darfur, observed that while the decision was 
largely a matter of principle for the President, it was one equally motivated by 
financial returns for the Defence Minister, and the RSLAF’s command appeared 
to be predominantly interested in the pecuniary rewards to be had.100 Another 
IMATT officer serving as the RSLAF later deployed to Somalia felt that ‘They 
would spin it up as, “Oh, when we had our problems twelve years ago, our 
brothers from Africa came to help us…now it’s our turn to go and help our 
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brothers around Africa”’, but at a personal level the financial returns proved far 
more animating.101 
In 2009, the RSLAF deployed a Sector Reconnaissance Company to 
Darfur as part of UNAMID, and rotated a further four companies through the 
deployment until 2011.102 The deployment was conducted under ‘wet lease’ 
arrangements, meaning Sierra Leone was entitled to reimbursement from the 
UN for equipment it purchased for the mission.103 The deployment also provided 
a framework for injecting training and resources into the RSLAF. IMATT 
arranged for the purchase of “technical”-style pick-up trucks to support the 
company’s mobility in theatre, and substantially funded the deployment. The US 
also provided support, with equipment delivered by the US firm PAE and pre-
deployment training provided by the US State Department’s ACOTA 
programme. Not only did this relive IMATT from the burden of funding the 
deployment alone, but ACOTA also offset IMATT’s lack of first-had experience 
of (and access to) Darfur. Instead, IMATT supported the development of 
training facilities in Sierra Leone for the deployment, including construction of a 
Forward Operating Base for training purposes at Benguema.104 
While pre-deployment preparations provided a much-need uplift in 
capability, the deployment itself was less successful. Equipment in theatre could 
not be maintained, and the RSLAF were entirely reliant on donors to move their 
troops and equipment to and from theatre.105 This not only reflected a lack of 
RSLAF logistical and financial resources, but also the RSLAF’s limited 
understanding of the requirements of PSOs. Operational planning visits to 
Darfur ahead of the deployment – of necessity conducted by RSLAF officers 
due to prohibitions on IMATT staff – proved inadequate. In one IMATT officer’s 
words, ‘intelligent men went there and made intelligent judgements, but there 
was a complete disconnect between our understanding of the world and Sudan 
and their understanding of what we were asking them to do in terms of logistic 
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and expeditionary planning’.106 The vehicles IMATT had procured for the 
company also proved inadequate to the role and environment, limiting the 
RSLAF’s utility in theatre.107 Consequently, Colonel Martin, who took over as 
Commander IMATT as the Darfur deployment came to an end, found that the 
RSLAF presence in theatre ‘gradually deteriorated to the point where I think 
they were pretty much combat ineffective. And it came as no surprise…when 
they were one of the first force elements to be dropped out of the UNAMID 
ORBAT as UNAMID downsized.’108 While the RSLAF’s performance in 
UNAMID was mixed, the experience was nonetheless invaluable, and simply 
deploying a formed unit on PSOs was a notable achievement.  
In April 2013, a battalion strength contingent was deployed to the 
AMISOM force in Somalia, known as LEOBATT 1.109 This deployment 
represented a significant step-up in terms of commitment and ambition. With 
LEOBATT 1 structured as a standard 850 strong light infantry battalion, around 
a tenth of the RSLAF’s total manpower would be deployed. The RSLAF aimed 
to deploy several roulements, and so training for LEOBATT 2 began shortly 
after LEOBATT 1 deployed. This commitment ultimately envisaged one 
battalion deployed to Somalia, while another underwent training to relieve it and 
troops recently returned from Somalia went through a rest and reconstitution 
period. With each subsequent roulement, therefore, around a third of the 
RSLAF’s land force would be continuously devoted to the mission at any one 
time.110 Training for AMISOM was again provided by ACOTA, though IMATT 
ran an additional confirmatory exercise and arranged for STTTs from the British 
Army’s team in Kenya to provide specialist training.111 Although the confirmatory 
exercises the British ran were held at company level within a battalion 
framework,112 Colonel Martin felt that at the point of deployment, LEOBATT 1 
was capable of operating as a battalion.113 
In theatre, however, LEOBATT 1 was not retained as a formed unit. 
Instead, the battalion was posted to the Kenyan sector and each of the rifle 
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companies assigned to a parent Kenyan unit.114 This caused some upset in the 
RSLAF, largely because it meant that LEOBATT 1’s battalion headquarters had 
no troops to command.115 The Kenyan Defence Force was evidently unwilling to 
cede an independent battalion area to the RSLAF, which they viewed as an 
untested quantity, in part because the Kenyan deployment in AMISOM was 
heavily orientated to protecting the Kenyan border and national interests in 
southern Somalia.116 Nonetheless, LEOBATT 1 performed well. Despite the 
demanding counter-insurgency role and the unit’s lack of specialist counter-
insurgency equipment, LEOBATT 1 gained a reputation for efficiency and 
aggressive action against Al Shebab militants. IMATT received favourable 
reports from Kenyan and AMISOM officers – some of whom were particularly 
surprised at the RSLAF’s effectiveness, having themselves deployed to Sierra 
Leone under UNAMSIL during the Rebel War.117 As one British officer 
commented, the RSLAF ‘were there to make an impression, and they did.’118 A 
LEOBATT soldier later remarked, ‘we fought war, Kenya never did’.119 At the 
least, the AMISOM deployment demonstrated the RSLAF’s ability to effectively 
operate collectively at company group level during a complex operation – 
IMATT’s original training target for border operations in 2003. Moreover, 
LEOBATT 1’s performance – helped by their position as a West African military 
with little national interest in Somalia – allowed the RSLAF to successfully lobby 
for a greater role in AMISOM. LEOBATT 2 was awarded its own sector, with an 
RSLAF sector commander and responsibility for the port city of Kismayo. The 
increased responsibility attracted greater UN remuneration, and the additional 
complexity of urban operations was touted by IMATT as a sign of confidence in 
the RSLAF’s military effectiveness.120 
Although LEOBATT 1’s deployment was conducted under ‘dry lease’, 
entitling it to greater support from AMISOM, the logistical issues which had 
plagued the RSLAF’s Darfur deployment persisted.121 The RSLAF still proved 
unable to resupply its forces abroad, and the RSLAF chose to pursue donors for 
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logistical aid over planning and resourcing its own solutions. Consequently, 
living conditions for LEOBATT 1 degraded significantly, and at one stage, the 
RSLAF’s inability to provide effective logistical support led to emergency deals 
with other nations just to resupply LEOBATT 1 with ammunition. This situation 
was exacerbated by the outbreak of Ebola in Sierra Leone, which called into 
question the deployment of LEOBATT 2 to replace the in-country force. 
LEOBATT 1 became stranded in Somalia for an additional six months while 
GOSL, IMATT, AMISOM and Somali authorities negotiated the deployment of 
LEOBATT 2. This resulted in significant fatigue in LEOBATT 1, which had been 
in theatre for 18 months by the time it was withdrawn without replacement.122 
Although the RSLAF had demonstrated it could perform at company level on 
the ground, it remained reliant on external partners like IMATT to logistically 
resource its PSO deployments. 
To a certain extent, IMATT officers considered that the RSLAF’s new-
found emphasis on PSOs reduced the RSLAF’s operational effectiveness in the 
remainder of the force not deploying, detracting from its domestic role. Training 
for PSOs consumed the RSLAF’s limited resource base, and still required 
significant injections from donors. Consequently, there was a significant drop in 
capacity across the remainder of the force. Colonel Martin observed very little 
training or activity among the rest of the RSLAF, while another senior British 
officer considered that PSOs caused an ‘operational capability loss in all of the 
brigades and in the rural areas in particular. Their ability to do national security 
tasks, whilst they said they did them, I don’t believe that they actually were able 
to do them to the level and competency that they would have been able to 
before’. Certainly, a high proportion of the fitter and more effective soldiers in 
the RSLAF were earmarked for PSOs.123 This exacerbated the extant 
discrepancy between the RSLAF’s capability and the demands of properly 
securing the border. Before the 2012 election, for example, Commander 
Seward counted 121 border crossing points in the north-east, only two of which 
were official and therefore manned.124 One senior IMATT officer serving in 
Sierra Leone during the RSLAF’s UNAMID deployment concluded that the 
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revenue to be generated from PSOs marginalised all other RSLAF tasks: ‘It was 
a bit like the toddlers’ football game; everyone was chasing the ball’.125  
However, the Darfur deployment did not detract from the RSLAF’s 
capacity or willingness to support the 2012 presidential elections. During the 
elections, the RSLAF one again provided significant support to the SLP under 
MACP arrangements, deploying around 1,500 troops.126 Despite the RSLAF’s 
increasing neo-patrimonial tendencies, IMATT felt that the RSLAF behaved 
remarkably impartially during the election period. A year out from the vote, the 
CDS made a public statement warning the RSLAF that political campaigning 
would not be tolerated, and the few soldiers who were caught openly 
participating in political rallies were dismissed.127 One IMATT officer even went 
so far as to suggest that the RSLAF’s democratic conduct during the 2012 
elections was reinforced by its newfound interest in PSOs: 
‘The 2012 elections demonstrated that the RSLAF was a reasonably safe 
organisation in the sense of apolitical, by and large, but ensuring that it was linked 
into a national vision of a expeditionary capability was probably a good thing, and 
certainly the party in power made that connection’.128 
The RSLAF’s good conduct was taken as confirmation of the progress made in 
the RSLAF’s attitudes. The 2012 elections thus became a significant enabling 
factor in the replacement of IMATT with ISAT in 2013.129 
However, the continuing neo-patrimonial character of Sierra Leonean 
elections threatened to draw the RSLAF back into domestic politics. The 2007 
elections had highlighted the political polarisation of Sierra Leone along ethnic 
and geographic lines.130 Subsequent local council, chieftaincy and by-elections 
held in 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 were all marred by violence between the 
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SLPP and APC.131 In July 2011, the SLPP elected Julius Bio as their 
presidential candidate, himself a former NPRC junta leader, prompting fears 
that Sierra Leone’s political past might destabilise its democratic future.132 
Various stand-off’s occurred during run-up to the 2012 elections. On 3 October 
2011, a government minister was threatened by crowds in Kono, resulting in his 
security detail shooting three people.133 Less than a week later, Bio was stoned 
by an APC mob in Bo, resulting in SLPP supporters rioting and burning down 
the local APC headquarters.134 On 22 September, a ban on political party rallies 
was announced, though its legality was contested. A by-election in January 
2012 returned an SLPP MP, who was promptly arrested and charged with 
attempted kidnapping.135 President Koroma subsequently made overtures to 
leading SLPP politicians, resulting in three prominent defections.136 Tensions 
between the two party nominees reached a head on 12 October 2012, when 
Bio’s convoy refused to give way to President Koroma’s motorcade in 
Freetown.137 
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IMATT became concerned that the November 2012 elections might entail 
significant violence. Specialists from the UK conducted contingency planning to 
ensure the security of deployed UK personnel,138 and IMATT was reinforced by 
a team of 35 Royal Marines and loan service personnel from neighbouring 
countries. These were used as a surge capacity to reinsert British military 
observers into RSLAF brigade and unit headquarters; providing direct advice 
and increased situational awareness for Commander IMATT. In the run-up to 
the 2012 elections, known SLPP army officers were closely monitored,139 and 
allegations emerged in the months after the elections that the Minister of 
Defence was inappropriately conniving to remove one pro-SLPP brigadier.140 
However, as one IMATT officer shrewdly observed, RSLAF officers knew that 
whichever candidate was elected, he would exercise significant influence over 
senior appointments, and so showed little inclination to “stick their head above 
the parapet”.141 Nonetheless, as in 2007, a number of critical incidents were 
only contained by IMATT’s intervention. Colonel Martin recalled how some 
uncounted ballot boxes were discovered after the election in Bo, an SLPP 
dominated area, leading to allegations of vote rigging and a riot: 
‘The police folded very quickly, didn’t put up any resistance, you know, didn’t try 
and impose any order, and it was the RSLAF – actually to be quite honest it was an 
IMATT lieutenant colonel with his driver, and a couple of other guys, who pretty 
much stemmed the mob – and then the RSLAF took control.’142  
Martin did note, however, that the RSLAF handed control back over to the SLP 
as soon as possible. The British Defence Attaché at the time, Commander 
Seward, concluded that such incidents reflected the incapacity of the SLP as 
much as the military.143 
Concerns that PSOs would prevent the RSLAF from contributing 
effectively to domestic national security tasks also proved unfounded during the 
Ebola crisis. The first case of Ebola was confirmed in Sierra Leone on 24 May 
2014, having appeared in neighbouring Guinea the previous month. While 
Ebola cut short the RSLAF’s role in AMISOM, the commitments made to troop 
readiness in preparation for that deployment paid dividends during the resulting 
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domestic emergency. The end of the AMISOM deployment left LEOBATT 2 
without a task, but as the Ebola pandemic in Sierra Leone deepened, it was re-
rolled as an emergency reserve to support the British military surge in Sierra 
Leone. LEOBATT 2 was trained in the use of personal protective equipment, 
and subsequently spearheaded the RSLAF’s efforts to combat Ebola. 
LEOBATT 2 soldiers were used to provide extra security at Lungi International 
Airport. They provided both security and administrative support at Ebola 
hospitals, including the disposal of waste. LEOBATT 2 drivers were used to 
ferry blood samples to testing labs, and the unit also provided a quick reaction 
force, which helped establish checkpoints and quarantine zones. Many of these 
tasks were subsequently taken over by regular RSLAF units, which took longer 
to mobilise. The RSLAF also provided extensive support to the SLP, particularly 
in manning roadblocks, checkpoints, and quarantine lines around infected 
households. The RSLAF’s standing border security task also increased in 
salience, as efforts to prevent cross-border transmission became important.144 
In comparison to virtually every other agent of the Sierra Leonean state, 
the RSLAF proved remarkably durable during the Ebola crisis. British officers 
felt that the RSLAF proved better at logistically supporting its soldiers deployed 
on checkpoints and quarantine tasks than the SLP, noting that constables 
frequently abandoned posts to try and feed themselves.145 British civilians 
working up-country, however, found that the RSLAF’s logistical superiority did 
not extend far beyond Freetown.146 Nonetheless, the RSLAF worked full in the 
knowledge that donor aid for Ebola relief would have little direct military benefit: 
‘They weren’t financially driven, and [in] a lot of the other departments it was all 
about getting the resources, getting the international aid. The RSLAF knew that no-
one was going to pay for new uniforms for them, not going to buy them new 
vehicles…Aid money would never do that…but nonetheless they were still out there 
using up their resources, using up their soldiers, and getting on with it.’147 
Equally, the RSLAF did not experience discipline problems among its soldiers 
or medics during the Ebola response, in stark contrast to Ministry of Health 
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employees.148 In comparison to the rather more pecuniary motives exhibited by 
the RSLAF during PSOs, the military’s commitment to the Ebola response 
should thus be characterised as one of national service. The RSLAF was 
subsequently lauded both domestically and internationally for its conduct during 
the Ebola pandemic.149 
While the RSLAF performed credibly during the Ebola outbreak, the 
pandemic highlighted the continuing political infighting over ownership of the 
country’s security apparatus. Given the pathogenic nature of the threat, 
responsibility for its management was initially given to the Ministry of Health. 
However, the ministry imperfectly appreciated the wider national security 
aspects of the crisis, and proved insufficiently robust to deal with the spiralling 
epidemic, leading to a virtual collapse of the country’s public health 
institutions.150 The initial decision to treat the situation as a Ministry of Health 
matter bypassed the Office of National Security (ONS), which had been 
established specifically to co-ordinate nationwide security responses. Although 
the ONS did not have sufficient capabilities to manage the crisis alone, it did 
contain personnel trained in disaster response.151 Eventually, President Koroma 
sacked his Health Minister and appointed Paolo Conteh, the Defence Minister, 
to head a new National Ebola Response Centre (NERC).152 The creation of the 
NERC continued to side-line the ONS, especially given that the NERC 
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effectively created parallel provincial and district co-ordination mechanisms 
which duplicated those already established in the ONS structure.153 
The politics of Sierra Leone’s initial Ebola response reflect more than an 
underestimation of the impending crisis. They are symptomatic of political 
infighting within the senior ranks of the APC government. The ONS, which had 
been created by the British under President Kabbah’s tenure, was perceived as 
an SLPP institution and therefore not trusted.154 Moreover, the ONS reported to 
the Vice President, whose relationship with President Koroma had publically 
deteriorated. Vice President Sumana had been accused of attempting to form a 
breakaway movement from the APC, eventually leading to his expulsion from 
the party.155 During the Ebola crisis, these tensions came to a head after 
Sumana quarantined himself in his residence following the death of one of his 
security detail from the virus.156 The RSLAF was subsequently drawn into the 
fracas by deploying to enforce an Ebola cordon, simultaneously disarming 
Sumana’s security detail. Sumana subsequently fled to the US Embassy, 
claiming his life was in danger, and was swiftly removed from office by 
President Koroma.157 The RSLAF’s role in the incident raises questions about 
the military’s susceptibility to domestic party political intrigue, regardless of its 
own civil-military integrity. Equally, while the security response to Ebola was 
undoubtedly helped by the appointment of Paulo Conteh to head the NERC, the 
fact that the politician who replaced him was appointed as a Deputy Minister 
rather than a full Minister (a portfolio which reverted back to President Koroma), 
suggests that civil-military change at the political level was reliant on a small 
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number of individuals rather than a more systemic change in Sierra Leonean 
political culture, as Albrecht and Jackson suggest.158 
Effectiveness and Accountability in the RSLAF 
As IMATT downsized, normative British influence over RSLAF officers’ 
behaviour diminished. This saw a partial roll-back of Plan 2010’s institutional 
mechanisms for effecting generational change, accompanied by reduced 
normative socialisation of IMATT’s new generation of RSLAF officers, resulting 
in a resurgence of neo-patrimonial practices and a partial re-politicisation of the 
military. To a certain extent, this was limited by continued British oversight at 
critical junctures. Albrecht and Jackson have consequently argued that Plan 
2010 failed to provide a sustainable mechanism for normative SSR in the 
RSLAF, being overly reliant on the presence of IMATT officers and a select few 
Sierra Leonean elites. The pair concluded that IMATT’s withdrawal, and 
democratic political change, rendered both mechanisms unsustainable.159 Yet, 
at the same time, the RSLAF began to deploy troops on PSOs. Although not 
universally successful, these PSO deployments did demonstrate an increase in 
the RSLAF’s tangible operational output, and the eventual realisation of 
IMATT’s goal of producing an RSLAF capable of operating effectively at sub-
unit level. Moreover, the RSLAF’s new-found operational role, increased 
revenue, and improved military effectiveness did not lead to a crisis of domestic 
civil-military relations. Nor did it lead to a reduction in the RSLAF’s capacity in 
times of domestic national emergency, as seen during the 2012 election cycle 
and the Ebola pandemic. How then can these two apparently contradictory 
trends be explained? 
Albrecht and Haenlein have argued that the RSLAF’s reorientation to 
PSOs provided an external locus of identity, which helped underpin democratic 
civil-military relations domestically. Not only did this provide a tangible task to 
occupy and financially sustain the military, but it was one fundamentally 
separate from domestic politics. For Albrecht and Haenlein, the benefits of 
PSOs on the RSLAF were primarily about the role’s contribution to ‘military 
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identity generation’.160 The pair concluded that ‘contributing to peacekeeping 
has…given the force a keen sense of purpose. Removing this sense of direction 
could have profound political implications if it is not replaced with and equally 
meaningful focus’,161 potentially leading ‘to a crisis of identity’ in the RSLAF.162 
This relationship between military identity and operational output was observed 
by number of British advisers in Sierra Leone. One British officer, serving as the 
RSLAF was deployed to Somalia, argued that: 
‘If you’re actually part of an organisation that is delivering what it’s supposed to do 
and you’re part of that, that’s quite a powerful thing. And so a combination of a 
common heritage and an understanding of what a military looks like and how it 
behaves, combined with just the everyday practicalities of being a soldier, is quite 
powerful.’ 
He concluded that PSOs ‘gave them a focus which became extremely powerful 
and almost self-fulfilling. You trained in order to deploy, and through doing that 
you generated capacity and capability that wouldn’t be there otherwise.’163 
Yet, as these observations attest, participation in PSOs only reinforced 
the RSLAF’s existing martial identity, which was itself a product of its heritage. 
IMATT had actively sought to develop this identity throughout its reform 
programme. In 2003, for example, Colonel Stack noted how IMATT training 
programmes sought to develop unit cohesion through inter-unit competitions.164 
Courses at the Horton Academy also emphasised the RSLAF’s history through 
functions at the RSLAF’s Myohaung Mess.165 This had been the officers’ mess 
of the RSLAF’s British colonial predecessor, and proudly retained the Colours of 
its antecedent regiments.166 Indeed, the RSLAF remained extremely proud of 
Sierra Leone’s military contribution to the British effort in Burma during the 
Second World War.167 The Royal West African Frontier Force, which included a 
Sierra Leonean battalion, was awarded four battle honours for its role in the 
Burma campaign, including Myohaung, which the RSLAF celebrated annually 
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on 24 January as Myohaung Day.168 Brigadier Le Grys was keen not to 
overstate the influence of the trappings of mess life on the RSLAF, noting that 
conditions up-country were significantly less civilised. Nonetheless, even here 
social rituals still appeared to reinforce the military community’s identity, like the 
use of military vehicles to transport service families, decked out in their best 
attire, to church or mosque.169 Indeed, much of IMATT’s activity in the RSLAF 
prior to PSOs was focused on normative behavioural change, primarily through 
fostering a new professional military identity. 
That said, participation in PSOs did reinforce the gradual improvements 
seen in the RSLAF’s public reputation. As one IMATT officer observed, ‘one 
should not underestimate the psychological importance of that demonstrable 
external role, both of the army’s vision of itself and the nation’s vision of its 
army’.170 In 2003, for example, the GOSL Security Sector Review identified an 
understandable public perception that threats to stability in Sierra Leone were 
primarily internal, and substantially related to the military itself.171 Studies the 
following year found that while perceptions of the RSLAF were improving in 
Freetown, they remained poor in the rural areas, and the SLP was generally 
held in higher regard.172 By 2006, public opinions of the RSLAF were more 
positive, with 65 per cent of respondents in one urban perception study now 
believing that the RSLAF was very important to their personal security.173 A 
parallel study conducted in early 2008 found that citizens’ security concerns 
were now overwhelmingly focused on issues of criminality and under-
development rather than security force abuses.174 By 2011, a perception study 
in Freetown found that negative views of the RSLAF were notable by their 
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absence.175 As one IMATT officer commented, ‘the fact that the RSLAF was 
able to…deliver an effective expeditionary capability reinforced its credibility 
both nationally and internationally, and the national part’s quite important; it was 
seen as an effective institution, and was regularly reported as such locally, and 
that’s quite a big deal given its history’.176 
Yet here, again, it difficult to separate the impact of PSOs in changing 
the RSLAF’s reputation from the wider impact of earlier, IMATT-led reforms. 
Under IMATT guidance, the RSLAF had worked hard to rehabilitate its image 
among the population, even before the reputational benefits of PSOs. It adopted 
the slogan “a force for good”, and regularly conducted unarmed parades 
through Freetown, during which disciplined, unarmed soldiers would jog in 
formation through the streets, wearing white vests and singing. IMATT believed 
such activities were a useful ‘way of getting to the people and saying “This is 
your army and this is what we can do for you”’ and were well received by the 
public.177 IMATT itself also engaged in “civil-military co-operation” (CIMIC) 
projects, with the aim of improving relations with communities around RSLAF 
bases. Typically, these supported local initiatives by developing infrastructure. 
In 2008, for example, IMATT supported 3 Brigade RSLAF to refurbish local 
markets in Kenema and Kuiva, established a local women’s sewing school, and 
supported a blacksmith’s forge staffed by polio victims.178 The brigade also 
hosted a football tournament in Kailahun with local teams.179 
Consequently, separating out the impact of PSOs in normative identity 
generation from IMATT’s earlier socialisation activities appears deeply 
problematic. This is particularly so, as that the RSLAF’s martial identity was not 
always conducive to operational effectiveness, given the force’s low resource 
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base. For example, the RSLAF maintained a military marching band, of which 
they were extremely proud. As Colonel Martin recalled, ‘They were very proud 
of their uniforms, and they would happily spend more money on uniforms than 
other stuff.’180 Although IMATT did eventually facilitate the donation of second-
hand instruments from the British Army to the band, and provided some military 
band training, the pride the RSLAF derived from its band was sometimes 
problematic for sound financial decision-making. As one IMATT officer serving 
in 2004, recalled:  
‘At times band uniforms were coming higher than things to run the force...I did 
accompany [Brigadier] Porter and [CDS] Sam M’boma to a meeting with the IMF to 
discuss how we were moving forward and what funding we needed, and I got dug in 
the ribs by Sam M’boma saying “What about our band uniforms?” “I don’t think the 
IMF are interested!” That was the sort of thing that went on’.181 
Nonetheless, PSOs do appear to have helped arrest neo-patrimonial trends in 
the RSLAF. Instead of generating a unique identity centred on peacekeeping, 
this can be attributed to – in principle – the importance of resources generated 
from PSOs, and – in practice – the relationship between military effectiveness 
on operations, and accountability in those intuitional processes which also 
underpinned RSLAF political neutrality. 
In principle, PSOs provided an opportunity for the RSLAF to establish an 
external resource base with which to maintain itself. The reimbursement 
provided by the UN or African Union (AU) is designed to offset the costs of 
deploying troops on a PSO, but is typically greater than the costs borne by a 
small military. On the one hand, it can reasonably be argued that the RSLAF’s 
shift to PSOs might be problematic for democratic civil-military accountability. 
By providing an external source of funding, PSOs potentially provided the 
RSLAF with a means of evading GOSL control by increasing the RSLAF’s 
independence from civilian-controlled tax revenues. The RSLAF did eventually 
downsize, but as Brima Sesay, the RSLAF Joint Force Commander in 2013 
noted, without PSOs ‘the shock [of downsizing] would have been difficult to 
accept’.182 On the other hand, the APC government showed little inclination to 
increase defence spending, and even after downsizing, the RSLAF lacked 
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sufficient resources to keep the military functioning – something which had been 
a significant factor in a number of previous RSLMF coups.  
Undoubtedly, the RSLAF was in chronic need of additional funding to 
maintain the institutional developments undertaken since the Rebel War. By 
2007, the RSLAF’s resource shortage had become sufficiently critical that 
virtually no routine training could occur without IMATT support. IMATT 
supported the training of recruits as well as line units, maintained the RSLAF’s 
training infrastructure, and even provided the majority of training ammunition.183 
As one IMATT officer observed, ‘a military will stagnate unless you continue to 
put resource into it’. By 2012, the RSLAF’s unit rotation between training and 
border operations ‘had pretty much broken, and that was a function of lack of 
state resource being put into the RSLAF, ‘cos it wasn’t seen as a priority by 
government. Whilst that might be a legitimate political choice, the consequence 
on the military is quite profound.’184 The RSLAF’s lack of resources 
necessitated significant donor investment to train the RSLAF to a point where it 
could meet peacekeeping deployment standards. Colonel Martin was obliged to 
pay for rations and fuel to facilitate the training of LEOBATT 1, because the 
Bank of Sierra Leone was so insolvent that it was frequently unable to release 
the MOD’s allocated funds to the RSLAF on time.185  
In practice, however, the RSLAF found it difficult to use PSOs as a 
vehicle for sustainably investing in the force. For the first UNAMID deployment, 
GOSL received a standard UN/AU rate of US$1028 per deployed soldier, per 
month, in reimbursement. In 2008, IMATT spent considerable time working up 
costings to ensure that the RSLAF would be able to use these funds to sustain 
the training and deployment costs of future roulements. The expectation was 
that as future companies rotated through the deployment, the training benefits 
would cascade throughout the force. Any remaining capital would be used to 
pay an operational allowance to soldiers deploying on the operation. IMATT 
suggested that a daily rate of around $5 per soldier – i.e. $150 a month – would 
allow permit sufficient reinvestment to sustain the deployment. In the event, 
however, the RSLAF decided to pay each soldier an allowance of US$15 per 
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day – $450 a month – which, in the words of one IMATT officer, ‘blew it [the 
funding model] out of the water’ and ‘squandered’ the RSLAF’s opportunity to 
invest in its training and institutional fabric.186 This dynamic became worse 
during the AMISOM deployment. Although the RSLAF received the same 
US$1028 monthly rate per head in reimbursement, it only retained $200 per 
head a month, passing on the remaining $828 to individual soldiers.187 Although 
IMATT officers believed that the RSLAF might still financially sustain the 
deployment, this large allowance precluded significant reinvestment in RSLAF 
equipment, training and infrastructure. Instead, the RSLAF chose to rely on the 
assumption of future donor aid, accounting for the poor RSLAF logistical 
support during the AMISOM deployment. As one British officer commented, the 
‘mentality of reinvestment was not there’.188 This mentality extended to wider 
defence planning. For example, in order to facilitate the AMISOM deployment, 
IMATT arranged to train RSLAF machine gun instructors. However, the RSLAF 
decided to deploy these as part of LEOBATT 1, meaning no instructors were 
available to train LEOBATT 2. When LEOBATT 1 was eventually recovered, the 
RSLAF did not post the instructors to the training school in readiness to train a 
potential future LEOBATT 3, but instead returned them to their units.189 
Nonetheless, the fact that deploying on PSOs entailed significant sums 
of money – both for the RSLAF and the individual soldiers concerned – 
introduced a significant necessity for accountability into the exercise. RSLAF 
soldiers on PSOs could expect to make around ten times their annual salary in 
one deployment through operational allowances; as one IMATT officer 
remarked, this was a ‘fundamentally life-changing’ sum.190 Consequently, 
soldiers continually agitated about the proportion of reimbursement retained by 
the RSLAF, under the perception that it was inevitably being corruptly used. 
This resulted in repeated explanations from the RSLAF and IMATT that the 
funds were being used to provide equipment, rations and training for LEOBATT 
2, and to offset those costs for LEOBATT 1. The RSLAF even publically 
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published its policies regarding reimbursement.191 IMATT also ensured that 
reimbursement funds went into a dedicated PSO account, with proper 
safeguards over its use.192 This did not prevent patronage and corruption during 
procurement processes, but the process of providing operational allowances did 
provide public scrutiny of, and a degree of accountability in, the RSLAF’s 
handling of PSO reimbursements. 
Similar concerns also shaped how the RSLAF selected soldiers for 
PSOs. The initial UNAMID deployment was based around the RSLAF’s Force 
Reconnaissance Unit (FRU). This company-sized organisation had been 
established by IMATT some years previously as a special force for the RSLAF, 
intended for military reconnaissance tasks. It was provided with a higher level of 
training, an embedded IMATT advisor, and was held as a national reserve in 
Freetown. Nominally, a selection process was run to select volunteers from the 
wider military for service with the FRU. Subsequently, the FRU ‘all grew 
moustaches…and they all got hold of slightly different combats’.193 IMATT 
officers considered the FRU to be relatively capable; as Brigadier Cholerton 
remarked, ‘we invested quite heavily in…the FRU trying to make them better as 
a potential deployable unit’.194 However, the lure of operational allowances 
brought out the worst patrimonial tendencies in the RSLAF. As one IMATT 
officer found: 
‘they wholesale ransacked the C2 structure of the FRU…Again, it comes down to 
patronage…You’d see senior staff car driver, lance corporal, suddenly ends up 
being a section 2ic. Absolute nonsense through and through…at every moment 
somebody was being smuggled onto the ORBAT. Guys who were inappropriately 
qualified being put into the mechanics posts. It fundamentally undermined the 
whole process.’195 
However, the external scrutiny required by the UN to deploy on UN-sponsored 
operations also provided IMATT with a means of curbing the worst excesses of 
the RSLAF’s neo-patrimonial behaviours. While IMATT was unable to prevent 
FRU soldiers being substituted with senior RSLAF officers’ “little men”, the UN 
inspection process did require the RSLAF to demonstrate that all deploying 
soldiers met minimum standards of training and effectiveness. This involved UN 
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audits of both training standards and physical equipment, and required the 
RSLAF to meet two consecutive benchmarks in order to be recognised first as 
suitable for deployment, and then actually fit to deploy. As the same officer 
recalled, ‘We used the UN test process…as the stick with which to beat 
them’.196 Nonetheless, changes were still being made up until the unit deployed, 
such that some individuals ‘hadn’t conducted any training and then were then 
taken into theatre as a brazen liability’.197 
However, when the RSLAF began to establish LEOBATT 1 for AMISOM, 
it took a fundamentally different approach. The UNAMID deployment was 
recognised, at least by IMATT, as less than totally successful. Equally, a degree 
of resentment had developed among the RSLAF because the financial benefits 
of the UNAMID deployment had been largely confined to the FRU. For the 
Somalia deployment, therefore, the RSLAF decided not to base LEOBATT 
around an existing unit, but to form a composite battalion selected from across 
the RSLAF.198 There was still a degree of patronage in selections for LEOBATT 
1. Although selection boards were held to select officers, one IMATT officer 
involved in the process stated that ‘it was very much…for the officers, muggins’ 
turn’.199 Soldiers were nominated for LEOBATT from each battalion, but Colonel 
Martin similarly suspected that ‘battalion commanding officers [were] putting 
forward their preferred, chosen men. We were never able to drill down into that 
level of detail’.200 Nonetheless, the CDS was determined to ensure the 
LEOBATT 1 fairly represented the demographics of the force, and did not 
disproportionately favour any ethnic or regional group. He personally scrutinised 
the nominal roll for LEOBATT 1 name by name; an oversight exercise which 
ended up delaying the initial deployment.201 
For LEOBATT 2, which was also formed as a composite unit, the 
selection process became more formalised and meritocratic, at least overtly. 
The RSLAF published guidelines for selecting soldiers for deployment on PSOs. 
Although RSLAF units were still allocated a quota of soldiers to appoint to 
LEOBATT 2, the RSLAF formally highlighted additional selection mechanisms 
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in place once nominees arrived at the Peace Mission Training Centre at 
Hastings Battle Camp. These included fitness, educational and medical 
screenings, as well as field training exercises.202 While the RSLAF’s published 
criteria remained somewhat vague, British officers continued to oversee the 
process: ‘while we didn’t put our fingers in the mangle doing the physical 
selection, we tried to sit on the fringes and act as that honest broker’.203 There 
remained a significant degree of nepotism in the selection process for 
LEOBATT 2, and as another British officer supervising the process remarked, 
‘there were undoubtedly individuals who got selected on the basis of 
patronage’.204 However, the RSLAF also recognised that the process had to be 
perceived as transparent and fair to avoid wider schisms within the military. As 
one British officer noted, the perception of patrimonial selection created 
significant anger among RSLAF soldiers, played out through ‘barrack room 
lawyers and internet chat, and that sort of thing of disgruntled soldiers’.205 In 
consequence, the deliberate efforts to ensure tribal and regional balance, 
together with publication of selection processes, represented an overt attempt 
to approach the process in an open and transparent fashion.206 As with the 
UNAMID deployment, this accountability was reinforced by the UN’s inspection 
process, augmented by ACOTA training and a British-led test exercise. 
The experience of deploying on PSOs had a wider beneficial impact on 
accountability in the RSLAF’s broader institutional processes. The need to 
ensure that RSLAF units deploying on PSOs met the UN’s standards provided 
IMATT with ‘opportunities to go back into business that we had perhaps 
become less familiar with’ as IMATT had downsized. As one senior IMATT 
officer supporting the UNAMID deployment recalled: 
‘You put people on senior armourers courses and they’re running armouries of 600 
weapons, and you just know when you open the door that the 600 SLRs would not 
be in fit working order, there’d be rust in the barrels. Simple, tactical stuff. “Oh yes, 
sure enough, that’s exactly how they are”. So disappointing but unsurprising.’207 
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While IMATT’s gradual drawdown had meant it could no longer monitor and 
enforce compliance at the tactical level, the drive to deploy on PSOs meant that 
the RSLAF itself was forced to acknowledge its failings in these areas: 
‘because it was an operational deployment, it was no longer really satisfactory [for 
IMATT] to say “It’ll be fine, we can’t make them do it, we’re only advisors now, if 
they don’t want to do their Annual Personal Weapons Test they don’t have to”. We 
had…the stick of, “Well you’ve at least got to show your records and we’ve got to 
verify your records, and the UN will see your records. They may even take you up 
the ranges and ask you to do an APWT’’’.208 
Crucially, however, the focus on PSOs mean that the objective standards of 
behaviour required, while still external, were no longer set by IMATT, but by the 
UN, and were tangibly linked to a goal even senior “old guard” RSLAF 
commanders were uniformly committed to.  
This dynamic also extended to command appointments in the deploying 
units, and wider RSLAF promotions. Under Plan 2010, IMATT had attempted to 
use defined performance objectives as a means of displacing patronage and 
favouritism in RSLAF promotions, as it provided an objective metric against 
which to measure RSLAF commanders’ subjective recommendations.209 PSOs 
provided a particularly important means of reinforcing this relationship between 
performance and promotions, with wider benefits for professionalism and thus 
political accountability in the RSLAF. This was because when officers who were 
selected according to neo-patrimonial preferences did not perform on PSOs, it 
had significantly greater implications for the RSLAF than in a purely national 
context: ‘The benefit again was it was an operational deployment, which meant 
it was a public embarrassment, both internally in Sierra Leone and externally 
because of course they were deployed.’210 Indeed, the first officer appointed to 
command LEOBATT 1 was eventually sacked and replaced by a more capable 
officer.211 A senior IMATT officer serving at the time of the UNAMID deployment 
recalled this dynamic playing out in conversations with the Defence Minister: 
‘at points when things were going badly – take a range of examples, the 
deployment just being one – “This officer is not performing.” “No minister, well he 
wouldn’t be if he’s so-and-so’s nephew and he’s selected purely on that basis, as 
opposed to on the basis of merit, that’s what you get. If you send an officer on staff 
course at enormous cost”, either to Sierra Leone, or probably more importantly to 
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the UK Government, because of course we were funding everything, “and he fails 
to perform, I’m irritated and you are rightly embarrassed.”’212 
The public embarrassment of failing to perform on the international stage, which 
deployment on PSOs potentially provided, had wider benefits for arresting neo-
patrimonial proclivities, as the same officer argued: 
‘there was a great opportunity to say to him [Conteh], “You promoted him, you got 
that complete idiot doing that job, and you are lambasting your staff and 
me…because we’ve all collectively failed to educate and train and prepare this 
officer for this post. You will note however that he is bottom on the list of 46 majors 
for promotion and you still promoted him.” Almost inevitably there was irrefutable 
evidence as to why the bloke was still an idiot and shouldn’t have been there.’213 
Hence, PSOs not only provided a vehicle for improving RSLAF military 
effectiveness, but were also important in reinforcing meritocracy in RSLAF 
functions like promotions. These were crucial to Plan 2010’s approach to 
normative generational change, but British withdrawal meant IMATT could no 
longer otherwise protect them. 
The impact of PSOs extended to the wider organisational structure of the 
RSLAF. With the AMSIOM mission projected to absorb around a third of the 
RSLAF’s manpower, PSOs also had the potential to force the RSLAF to review 
its own internal composition. Ever since the 2003 Defence White Paper, both 
GOSL and the RSLAF had failed to carry out a proper defence review. Yet, to 
sustain the AMISOM commitment, British officers recognised that the force 
would have to undertake a fairly significant restructuring, as it would be unable 
to continue to generate ad hoc composite battalions on that scale indefinitely. 
Yet this would also mean challenging some of the RSLAF’s “sacred cows” 
about its overall strength and organisation. As one British officer observed, 
there ‘was an unwillingness on the part of the military to embrace some of those 
difficult issues, so it was a sort of head in the sand syndrome’.214 Had Ebola not 
intervened to curtail the AMISOM deployment, however, the RSLAF’s 
commitment to PSOs would likely have forced the issue. 
Conclusions 
As IMATT downsized, its ability to exercise influence over the RSLAF also 
declined. Although it still retained the ear of strategic decision makers, like the 
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President and the Defence Minister, its political influence was nonetheless 
diminished. It part, this was a product of the reduced British political 
commitment to Sierra Leone, which by 2007 was no longer high on the UK 
Government’s strategic agenda. But equally, reductions in IMATT’s strength 
also reduced its direct oversight and situational awareness of RSLAF activity, 
especially at the tactical level. The increasing RSLAF resistance to IMATT 
oversight was particularly noticeable in the relationship between IMATT and 
Major General Nelson-Williams. Although Nelson-Williams was ultimately 
replaced, IMATT was less able to constrain the new Defence Minister, Paolo 
Conteh. Consequently, as IMATT withdrew, the RSLAF’s old neo-patrimonial 
culture reappeared. This undermined the foundations of normative civil-military 
behaviour, and jeopardised Plan 2010’s mechanisms for sustaining long-term 
transformation through cultural re-socialisation and generational change. 
Although this does not detract from the concept of normative 
generational change itself, as IMATT was ultimately replaced by ISAT before 
the “new generation” had acceded to senior command, it does raise 
fundamental questions about the suitability of this model in the Sierra Leonean 
context. This is especially so, given that senior IMATT officers recognised 
IMATT’s likely timespan even as Plan 2010 was launched in 2004. In fact, 
IMATT persisted until 2013 – over two years longer than Plan 2010 envisaged. 
To a certain extent, therefore, Albrecht and Jackson’s criticisms of IMATT 
reforms as only partially sustainable, and therefore somewhat inappropriate, are 
justifiable.215 However, the period of IMATT withdrawal also witnessed some 
significant improvements in RSLAF military effectiveness. Although this was 
somewhat faltering, and confined to distinct elements of the force, both PSOs 
and the Ebola pandemic demonstrated a degree of military effectiveness well in 
excess of that seen during the Rebel War. Ultimately, the RSLAF even 
managed to somewhat out-perform British aspirations of operating at sub-unit 
level, though not with regard to logistical or operational support. Moreover, as 
the RSLAF’s conduct during the 2012 elections highlighted, the new-found 
focus on PSOs does not appear to have undermined the RSLAF’s democratic 
accountability per se. Indeed, even given the gradual increase in patrimonial 
behaviour in the force, the behaviour of civilian political elites appeared far more 
                                                          




dangerous to democratic civil-military relations during the election period than 
any RSLAF behaviour. 
Yet, Albrecht and Haenlein’s description of the identity-generating 
benefits of PSOs underpinning democratic civil-military relations in the RSLAF 
is problematic.216 It is not clear that PSOs produced any specific identity that 
was not already present in the RSLAF; in fact, much of Plan 2010’s reforms had 
aimed to produce new cultural norms through institutional regeneration, and the 
RSLAF’s existing history and identity clearly played a role in this. PSOs do, 
however appear to have supported democratic civil-military relations in Sierra 
Leone. In principle, the revenue to be made from PSOs provided one 
mechanism through which this may have occurred, as it might potentially have 
allowed the RSLAF to financially sustain its intuitional development. In reality, 
however, the high proportion of PSO reimbursements paid out in operational 
allowances negated much of the financial benefit of PSOs. The impact of PSO 
training did provide some wider institutional benefit. More profoundly, however, 
the need to perform on PSOs, in order to maintain face and keep the revenue 
stream open, implicitly limited neo-patrimonial practices. Competence had to be 
considered when appointing officers and soldiers, and training and equipment 
could not be ignored. Even the payment of operational allowances to soldiers 
partially supported accountability; while it encouraged neo-patrimonialism, it 
also raised the stakes, necessitating a degree of transparency. Ultimately, 
PSOs acted like an external audit mechanism on the RSLAF, which served to 
reinforce meritocratic and professional practices (at least at a minimum level) 
helping both accountability and performance. Unlike some of Plan 2010’s 
reforms, however, PSOs provided an operational goal which even senior 
RSLAF officers could buy into, even if much of path there was still dictated by 
externals. Although not carried out through wartime adaptation, this challenges 
Grissom’s assertion that external intervention may impede local desires for 
change.217 
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This conclusion has wider implications for the study of civil-military 
relations in the non-Western world. It suggests that local ownership of 
externally-required defence reforms (including some cultural change) is 
possible, providing the justification for change is acceptable to local actors. In 
the case of the RSLAF, a degree of meritocracy in promotions and 
appointments proved acceptable, but only because it was a necessary 
requirement for PSOs. The same reforms had proved far more contested when 
presented as a means of achieving civilian control under Plan 2010. Yet in both 
cases, the net result was similar – if on a somewhat different scale. Moreover, 
the relationship between effectiveness and accountability seen in the RSLAF 
differs significantly from Huntington’s model of objective control. Indeed, the 
active involvement of Paolo Conteh in RSLAF appointments and PSOs does 
not appear to have undermined RSLAF effectiveness or accountability any 
more than the cultural proclivities of senior RSLAF officers. While GOSL 
undoubtedly made political appointments, it also intervened in the RSLAF to 
ensure effectiveness, as with the removal of Nelson-Williams. 
Instead, the case of the RSLAF supports Bruneau and Matei’s view that 
democratic civil-military relations are based equally on accountability and 
effectiveness, neither of which are the unique preserve of a professional 
military.218 Not only does effectiveness define the purpose of the military 
profession, but it can help to reinforce accountability. By the same token, Kreb’s 
assertion that internal military processes are simply the product of wider social 
and political trends does not appear sustainable.219 While the RSLAF 
undoubtedly found itself at the mercy of civilian elite’s patrimonial proclivities, 
the relationship between the RSLAF and GOSL was equally tempered by the 
need to maintain a degree of operational effectiveness – and therefore a 
somewhat distinct professional military culture. This limited GOSL’s neo-
patrimonial meddling as much as it did senior RSLAF officers’. Thus, while the 
relationship between military and society may not be totally reciprocal, the 
military was not entirely suborned either. 
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This thesis has sought to understand how and why externally-led military 
change occurs. As ambitious attempts at liberal peacebuilding, it is unsurprising 
that the state- and nation-building projects in Iraq and Afghanistan have been 
difficult, contested and problematic. Yet, the inability to produce capable local 
armed forces during those interventions is noteworthy, given the long history of 
military capacity building displayed by those same intervening Western armed 
forces. This thesis has aimed to better understand this incongruity by examining 
the conduct of one case of externally-led military change that enjoyed relative 
success: the reform of the RSLAF. The rebuilding of the RSLAF was not 
focused simply on improving its military effectiveness, but also on its improving 
democratic civil-military behaviour. As such, it was a bold attempt to remake the 
internal culture of the RSLAF, and with it, the dominant norms of military 
behaviour in Sierra Leone. As one IMATT officer observed, normative change in 
the RSLAF’s organisational culture was critical to SSR, because ‘you can’t have 
a force that is capable of defending the borders and [simultaneously] incapable 
of conducting a military coup.’1 IMATT’s relatively successful experience 
advances our understanding of the dynamics of extraneous military change, 
and with it, the relationship between military culture and military change which 
has come to play such a central – if confused – role in the broader scholarship 
on military innovation. In so doing, this thesis concludes that IMATT’s 
experience in remaking military culture in the RSLAF offers some troubling 
insights into the contemporary praxis of building other people’s armies, and the 
recent conduct of Western interventions more widely. 
Military Culture and Military Change 
Military organisations change for many different reasons, but current 
scholarship has advanced relatively few mechanisms through which such 
changes actually occur. Initially, Posen concluded that as risk-conscious 
bureaucracies, military institutions should be inherently difficult to change. 
Consequently, external civilian intervention was required to overcome the 
military’s status quo resistance to innovation; the mechanism of reform being 
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civilian patronage of military mavericks. Thus, Posen advocated a civil-military 
model of top-down change, in which external drivers of change interacted with 
internal ones; civilian political oversight advanced military mavericks 
uninfluenced by the military’s existing norms.2 Avant developed this civil-military 
school further, arguing that the structure of civilian political oversight affected 
civilian elites’ ability to interject effectively in military affairs.3 Later, Rosen 
developed a competing explanation for military change which privileged internal 
military dynamics. Rosen found that in many instances, change resulted from 
competition within the officer corps over rival visions of military best practice. 
Competing factions pursued campaigns of bureaucratic warfare against their 
rivals, seeking to co-opt influential leaders, enlist civilian policy-makers, control 
important departments, and, once in the ascendancy, used the military 
institution’s own processes of socialisation, training and career incentives to 
perpetuate their reforms.4 
Recently, these top-down mechanisms of peacetime military change 
have been complemented by study of grass-roots adaptation during wartime. 
Grissom observed how military innovations can result, almost inadvertently, 
from the practical experience of war, by stimulating change either through 
inventive problem-solving or the test and adjustment of existing concepts.5 
Farrell concluded that improvements in the British military’s conduct of counter-
insurgency in Helmand resulted from successive adaptations, each building on 
the observed fate of previous tactical iterations during active campaigning.6 
These insights have given rise to a significant body of literature examining 
armed forces as “learning organisations”, in which organised lesson learning 
processes capture, evaluate and disseminate useful adaptation throughout the 
military institution. In this fashion, it is contended that battlefield adaptations can 
be converted into more profound and lasting organisational and institutional 
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change, based on their proven functional utility in war.7  This literature has not 
been confined to recent military campaigns, however, and research has 
similarly demonstrated the importance of equivalent formal or informal 
processes to major historical innovations in warfare.8 Most significantly, 
Grissom concluded that ISAF’s failure to produce an effective ANA stemmed 
from a mixture of active ISAF combat operations, which insulated the ANA from 
adaptive pressure, and Western interventionists’ inability to displace the Afghan 
military’s neo-patrimonial culture, which consequently subverted top-down 
reforms.9 
Indeed, the power of military culture to compel or preclude innovation, 
and in so doing shape other mechanisms of military change, forms a significant 
theme in the academic literature. Kier, for example, demonstrated that civil-
military mechanisms of change are mediated by the military’s own institutional 
culture, observing how politically-driven changes in the French military’s 
organisation in the form of reduced lengths of conscription did result in military 
change, but that the resulting reorientation – from a French military attuned for 
offense to one calibrated for defence – was defined primarily by the 
preconceptions (or rather, misconceptions) of the French military’s internal 
culture.10 Similarly, Farrell found that the interwar Irish army adopted a small, 
professionalised military model which was strategically inappropriate, largely 
because prevailing military cultures viewed this structure as more normatively 
legitimate.11 Here, military culture proved equally strategically misguided, but 
actively served to impel military change to a far greater degree than in Kier’s 
case study, in which French military parochialism largely precluded the adoption 
                                                          
7 Robert T. Foley, Stuart Griffin & Helen McCartney, ‘“Transformation in contact”: Learning the 
Lessons of Modern War’, International Affairs, 87:2 (2011), pp. 253-70; Paddy O'Toole & Steven 
Talbot, ‘Fighting for Knowledge: Developing Learning Systems in the Australian Army’, Armed 
Forces & Society, 37:1 (2011), pp. 42-67. 
8 Robert T. Foley, ‘A Case Study in Horizontal Military Innovation: The German Army, 1916–
1918’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 35:6 (2012), pp. 799-827; Robert T. Foley, ‘Dumb Donkeys 
or Cunning Foxes? Learning in the British and German Armies During the Great War’, 
International Affairs, 90:2 (2014), pp. 279-98. 
9 Adam Grissom, ‘Shoulder-to-Shoulder Fighting Different Wars: NATO Advisors and Military 
Adaptation in the Afghan National Army, 2001-2011’, in Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga & James A. 
Russell (eds.), Military Adaptation in Afghanistan (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 
2013), pp. 263-87. 
10 Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars 
(Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1997). 
11 Theo Farrell, ‘World Culture and the Irish Army, 1922-1942’, in Theo Farrell & Terry Terriff, 
The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology (Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 




of more novel (and ultimately successful) ways of war. The durability of military 
culture and its norms of behaviour have also been cited as a significant 
impediment to successful adaptive change, despite the immediately observable 
impact of military missteps during warfare. Thus, Kollars highlighted how 
adaptive ‘adhocracies’ in the US military failed to survive the wars they were 
created to support. Catignani observed how adaptive changes to counter-
insurgency in the British military were frequently ignored or imperfectly applied, 
because lessons learnt systems stopped short of producing profound 
institutional change, and so failed to displace the predominant British military 
culture of convention warfighting.12 King likewise observed how culture 
conditioned – often inappropriately – the very adaptive responses Farrell 
characterised as the product of dynamic interaction with the enemy.13 
The difficulty in overcoming contradictory local (including military) culture 
has formed a significant critique of SSR, and liberal intervention more generally. 
SSR has been criticised as an overly technocratic process of institutional 
reform, which has traditionally made insufficient attempts to engage with local 
political realities.14 In Sierra Leone in specific, Albrecht and Jackson concluded 
that this has potentially resulted in unsustainable change, precariously reliant on 
an isolated handful of local clients after British supervision was withdrawn.15 
More broadly, dissatisfaction with the reality of liberal peacebuilding – and 
particularly the form of state- and nation-building seen in Iraq and Afghanistan – 
has led to a plethora of calls for greater ‘local ownership’ of grass-roots change. 
Here, liberal intervention has largely been dismissed because of its insistence 
on imposing inappropriate Weberian governance systems on culturally 
unreceptive societies – or to put it another way, the inability to remake local 
politics and society sufficiently to legitimate such institutions (irrespective of the 
ethics of attempting to do so). This, so it is argued, accounts for liberal 
peacebuilding’s failures. In like fashion, the difficulty of reshaping military 
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institutional culture in separation from wider society forms a significant critique 
of military integration and national army building as a tool of SSR.16 Yet, the 
relationship between military culture and military change has come under 
scrutiny of late. Griffin has highlighted how, despite the emphasis placed on 
cultural factors, constructivist scholars have consistently failed to demonstrate 
the explanatory power of culture in causing military change over and above the 
structural and functional mechanisms advocated by the civil-military, 
institutional, and adaptive explanations.17 In consequence, the relative 
significance of culture in actually initiating military change – and by implication, 
therefore, also in preventing it – has been called into question. 
Here, the analysis of IMATT’s reform of the RSLAF presented in this 
thesis offers a particularly insightful case study. As a rare example of successful 
military change, in which the object was a reformed local military culture as 
much as improved battlefield capability, how and why IMATT was able to 
produce normative change in the RSLAF is vital to understanding whether SSR 
is a useful tool of liberal intervention, and whether military culture does 
independently account for military organisational or institutional change. Does 
military culture explain why military organisations change, or simply affect how 
they do so? Can, therefore, external interventionists produce military change in 
local armed forces regardless of the prevailing organisational norms, or only 
when the advocated changes accord with them? 
By examining the process of military change IMATT pursued in the 
RSLAF, this thesis has shown that just as culture may affect the course of 
military institutional change, so certain types of military institutional change 
directly shape military culture. The relationship between organisational change 
and culture is dynamic and reciprocal. This is not to diminish the clear influence 
institutional culture has over soldiers’ decisions and actions; far from it. It is the 
institution which gives form to that culture, and defines the norms which shape 
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soldiers’ behaviour – their decisions in relations to civilian politics just as their 
decisions on the battlefield. In consequence, changing the military institution 
can directly reshape military cultural norms. However, only explicitly institutional 
mechanisms of military change can account for changes in military culture, and 
with it, profound military transformation – and in the RSLAF, these changes 
could only be driven extraneously by IMATT. 
Intervening in the RSLAF’s Military Culture 
Prior to British intervention, the Sierra Leonean military was deeply politicised. 
In the years following independence, the SLA’s organisational culture (and with 
it, the norms of military behaviour) became intensely neo-patrimonial, as 
demonstrated in Chapter 4. Recruitment and promotion were defined by 
patrimonialism, politicising the military along party-political and ethnic bloc lines. 
The “card system” made officers’ and soldiers’ careers beholden to political “big 
men”, either directly, or via intervening military patrons who themselves acted 
as political clients.18 As Sierra Leone descended into civil war, the hollowed-out 
neo-patrimonial state crumbled and the RSLMF proved itself unable to contain 
the growing RUF threat. Early in the war, the military did attempt to adapt to the 
RUF insurgency by promoting local defence militias, and by rapidly increasing in 
strength. However, these measures proved insufficient to contain the spiralling 
violence, which the RSLMF’s predatory tendencies further exacerbated. Unable 
to militarily adapt sufficiently, the RSLMF’s underlying political proclivities rose 
to the surface in a series of military coups, each leading to the further 
politicisation and fragmentation of the military. As Gberie argued, civil-military 
interactions drove these coups, as civilian big men supported and encouraged 
political factions within the military to their mutual advantage.19 Yet, the wartime 
collapse of the RSLMF also reflected the military’s pre-war political culture. 
Keen has demonstrated how the rise of the “sobel” phenomenon was a 
response to the pre-war privatisation of politics under neo-patrimonialism.20 
Thus, groups like the West Side Boys came to view armed force as a legitimate 
tool of political negotiation, switching sides and allegiances for personal gain as 
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a means of navigating in the kaleidoscopic milieu of wartime armed politics.21 It 
was this politicised neo-patrimonial culture which IMATT aimed to address in 
the RSLAF. 
Following British military intervention in the Rebel War in 2000, the SLAF 
received significant military aid from the UK, eventually leading to the 
restoration of GOSL sovereignty throughout the country and the resumption of 
democratic governance in 2002. Much of combat power required to defeat the 
RUF was provided by British and UN troops, and mercenary airpower serving 
under the flag of Sierra Leone. However, British intervention did result in some 
tentative improvements in the SLAF’s military capacity, which as Ucko pointed 
out, were pivotal to the eventual success of the British-led stabilisation 
campaign.22 During the Rebel War, British officers effectively assumed 
operational command of the SLAF. Mentors embedded in the SLAF provided a 
link between Sierra Leonean tactical formations and British campaign direction, 
simultaneously supporting incremental improvements in SLA performance 
through the provision of tactical advice and support to unit-level command and 
control. Under the auspices of Operations Basilica and Silkman, British STTTs 
also reconstituted and retrained entire SLA battalions and brigades. This “train 
and equip” capacity building did result in a noticeable improvement in SLAF 
capabilities. Despite the STTT’s emphasis on tactical training and organisational 
reconstitution, these activities were fundamentally adaptive in nature. As one 
British adviser remarked, the aim of tactical mentoring was to ‘reinforce and 
make better what they’re going to do anyway’.23 STTTs focused on rudimentary 
military skills like drill, marksmanship and small-unit tactics using existing British 
military techniques as a model. While this low-level retraining made the SLAF 
far more militarily useable, it did not fundamentally reshape the norms of the 
force, nor totally displace previous SLAF adaptations to the character of the 
Rebel War, like the continued use of “technicals”. Indeed, one of the more 
significant improvements in SLAF wartime capacity resulted from procedural 
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adaptations in the SLAF’s logistics systems, which reduced the window of time 
SLAF units were combat ineffective.24  
The limitations of the wartime adaptation facilitated by British “train and 
equip” capacity building were evident in the failure of a number of IMATT’s 
immediate post-war reforms. The normative agenda of the 2003 White Paper, 
as well as the barracks rebuilding programme known as Operation Pebu, were 
both frustrated by the post-war RSLAF’s continuing neo-patrimonial culture. The 
RSLAF resented civilian oversight of the armed forces, manifested in the new 
joint civilian-military MOD, and actively resisted civilian intrusions into its internal 
affairs. Equally, RSLAF commanders were less than committed to Operation 
Pebu despite the fact that a lack of proper barracks precluded further training 
and development of the force, largely because the standard of accommodation 
Pebu offered did not accord with the elevated social and political position the 
RSLAF felt it was entitled to. Despite the limited tactical improvements wartime 
British adaptations had produced, the RSLAF’s organisational culture was 
unchanged. The force remained politically unreliable in the immediate post-war 
period, to the extent that British officers found it necessary to redeploy the 
RSLAF away from population centres in advance of the 2002 presidential 
elections. This concern was significantly borne out by the military’s voting 
patterns during the election, which supported the former “sobel” commander 
and junta leader, Johnny Paul Koroma. Even the influx of former militiamen and 
rebels via the MRP proved unable to shake the RSLAF’s established military 
culture. 
The lack of profound normative change in the RSLAF also precluded 
significant improvements in military effectiveness. Unlike in Grissom’s study of 
ISAF’s relationship with the ANA, British intervention did facilitate some 
improvements in SLAF capacity during the Rebel War. These were largely the 
result of British-led adaptations, either through mentoring, direct control, or 
“train and equip” capacity building. However, they were not sufficient to alter the 
military balance of power on the ground in favour of GOSL without significant 
additional combat power provided by British, UN and mercenary troops. 
Moreover, these adaptations did not radically alter the behavioural or cultural 
norms of the Sierra Leonean military. Consequently, the RSLAF’s military 
                                                          




effectiveness and democratic accountability remained poor in the immediate 
aftermath of war. The continued military incapacity of the RSLAF was laid bare 
during post-war border security operations. Here, IMATT officers attributed 
operational failings as much to the institutional culture of the RSLAF as to its 
logistical deficiencies; as Colonel Stadward remarked, RSLAF operations ‘were 
better off when they were led by Brits than when they were led by Sierra 
Leoneans, ‘cos the Sierra Leoneans don’t really want to do it. It’s a bit hard.’25 
The presence of international forces did not preclude adaptive change in the 
SLAF – in fact, it facilitated it – but rather, the short-term and tactical focus of 
these adaptive changes failed address the neo-patrimonial proclivities of the 
SLAF’s military culture. 
However, the institutionally-focused approach IMATT adopted during 
2003-4, as Plan 2010 was formalised, had significantly more success. As 
Chapter 7 demonstrated, under Plan 2010 IMATT pursued a more coherent 
strategy of change in the RSLAF, using the military’s rebuilt institutional 
processes as a tool to realign RSLAF norms. New recruitment processes 
eroded the neo-patrimonial practices of the “card system”, ensuring a degree of 
ethnic, regional and political balance through meritocratic recruitment. New 
educational and training standards were used to directly address the civil-
military norms of the force, with a focus on civic education and military law. 
Formal military disciplinary systems were reintroduced into the RSLAF, 
including a new court martial process. However, the centre-piece of this 
socialising endeavour was a new career structure which emphasised 
meritocracy and PME. RSLAF officers were inculcated with new, 
professionalised values during courses at the Horton Academy, and overseas. 
During these courses, officers were deliberately isolated from the wider social 
milieu of the RSLAF to improve their socialising effect. Not only did these 
courses aim to improve the RSLAF’s military capability by providing technical 
instruction, they were also intended to reshape the Sierra Leonean officer corps’ 
cultural outlook. By linking PME to career progression, and by making 
promotion contingent on a degree of meritocratic performance through boarding 
processes, IMATT began to re-orientate the career incentives of military service 
away from political and neo-patrimonial transactions, and towards a more 
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professional, inward-looking military culture grounded in specifically military 
identities. 
To reinforce the socialising power of training, education and career 
progression, IMATT focused its normative efforts on junior and middle-ranking 
RSLAF officers who it believed would be more susceptible to IMATT’s influence 
– and to the influence of new career incentives. These officers were also 
perceived to have fewer stakes in the established neo-patrimonial economy of 
the RSLAF. Here, IMATT deftly manipulated existing inter-generational tensions 
in the RSLAF’s officer corps, between senior commanders from the SLA’s “old 
guard” and younger officers, who believed that the military’s war record had 
delegitimised the senior cohort – and with it, potentially, their values as well. 
Hence, IMATT overtly pursued a generational model of change, in which 
normative re-socialisation was focused on more impressionable junior officers, 
and sympathetic middle-ranking ones, while IMATT accepted that ‘the senior 
officers were never going to change, fundamentally…that was a generation that 
had already been lost’.26 IMATT recognised that it still required senior RSLAF 
commanders to make the force function and to provide indigenous legitimacy, 
but attempted to create an “air gap” between politicised senior commanders and 
more junior officer cohorts, in an attempt to ‘manage the older generation; trying 
to prevent them from creating more chaos, more institutional chaos than was 
absolutely necessary.’27 Here, succession planning, and highly targeted 
redundancy campaigns were used to enforce a degree of conformity among the 
senior echelons of the RSLAF’s command, remove threats to the new 
normative culture IMATT was promoting, and hasten the replacement of senior 
commanders with more normatively aligned subordinates. This included the 
dismissal of two RSLAF CDS at IMATT’s behest, in a more consciously 
constructed parallel to Saideman’s observation of cultural change in the  
Canadian military through generational turnover in senior leadership.28 
The implementation of institutional reform, especially those elements 
which directly challenged neo-patrimonial norms and so had the greatest re-
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socialising value, proved to be a deeply political and contested process. To a 
significant extent, IMATT therefore relied on civil-military mechanisms of 
change, similar to those described by Posen. As one IMATT officer stated, 
‘IMATT’s patronage came from the President, Kabbah…if there was resentment 
of IMATT, or “we don’t like what IMATT are doing”, they knew that basically 
IMATT had the ear of the President…it was a lever, I suppose, over the 
military.’29 As an external in the RSLAF, IMATT used this political influence to 
enact (and at times impose) institutional change in RSLAF; not unlike Posen’s 
politically-backed military mavericks. For a time, IMATT became the biggest “big 
man” in the RSLAF. Equally though, IMATT was not totally reliant on Sierra 
Leonean politicians for influence, maintaining its own sources of patronage – 
like expertise and funding – which it could use conditionally to encourage 
compliance even in the absence of direct political support. 
As this thesis has demonstrated, institutional reconstruction was not an 
end in of itself, but a means of reshaping the norms of Sierra Leonean military 
culture. Here, institutional change was used to re-socialise RSLAF officers and 
ensure generational replacement of the existing neo-patrimonial culture. In this 
fashion, institutional reconstruction, implemented using a civil-military model of 
change, was a vehicle to creating a new culture among younger cohorts of 
RSLAF officers, which would ultimately replace older norms of behaviour 
through a structured process of intra-service rivalry. Thus, externally-led change 
in the RSLAF occurred in exactly the reverse of Rosen’s description of internal 
military change. IMATT used institutional mechanisms of socialisation to 
engender and promote cultural competition in the RSLAF, rather than to 
institutionalise victory. IMATT would then ensure this intra-generational rivalry 
would result in normative cultural change, but without having to first convince a 
critical mass of senior RSLAF officers of its necessity. Normative change was 
directed from above and outside, but occurred from the ground up. 
This blend of civil-military and intra-service imperatives for institutional 
change did have some impact on RSLAF behavioural norms, as this thesis has 
shown. The RSLAF’s conduct during the 2007 and 2012 elections 
demonstrated a degree of democratic realignment – notwithstanding criticism 
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that the RSLAF’s positive conduct was largely a product of continued IMATT 
supervision.30 In both instances, while IMATT was undoubtedly highly influential 
– and indeed, maintained the notional ability to call on British reinforcements – 
IMATT would not have been physically able to prevent a coup, had the RSLAF 
made a concerted attempt. Equally, the “friends of IMATT” phenomenon 
demonstrates a degree of intra-service rivalry over fundamentally cultural norms 
of military service in the RSLAF. While the continued presence of such 
antagonisms highlight the fact that generational change was by no means 
complete as IMATT began to withdraw, it clearly shows the impact of externally-
directed institutional change on normative resocialisation. As this thesis has 
argued, military change, primarily directed and enacted by external 
interventionists, did alter local military culture, but only through recourse to the 
socialising power of the military as an institution. However, the interaction 
between civil-military and intra-service mechanisms of change, and with it the 
relative balance of power between internal and external actors in the RSLAF, 
was challenged after the 2007 change of government and concomitant IMATT 
drawdown. 
The Politics of Cultural Change: External Intervention and Military 
Effectiveness in Sierra Leone 
As Chapter 5 discussed, British intervention in Sierra Leone resulted from a 
convergence of strategic circumstances which limited other options, rather than 
from any clearly identified British national interests at stake in the Rebel War 
per se. As Dorman and Ucko have highlighted,31 Britain’s military and political 
commitment to Sierra Leone expanded largely as a product of circumstances on 
the ground, driven by operational necessities rather than from any deliberate 
metropolitan calculus. While the British post-conflict commitment to Sierra 
Leone was nonetheless remarkable for its duration, it was clear to IMATT from 
relatively early in its existence that the mission’s length would be limited. The 
successful transition of power between the SLPP and the APC in elections in 
2007 was a sufficient reputational indicator of success to precipitate British 
drawdown. IMATT’s relationship with the incoming government, while largely 
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positive and in many respects still unrivalled in terms of access, was less 
accommodating than it had been previously. IMATT’s sway over the RSLAF’s 
behaviour diminished as IMATT drew down, reducing its ability to maintain 
direct control over institutional changes and thus manipulate intra-generational 
dynamics. Though IMATT retained significant influence, its institutional and 
normative authority diminished, jeopardising the hoped-for generational change 
in RSLAF organisational culture which was only partially underway. As one 
IMATT officer serving just after the 2007 change of government remarked, ‘Do 
you affect the younger officers? Yes you do, but not as much effect as that 
brigade commander, that commanding officer, that company commander.’32 
The limited extent of generational change in the Sierra Leonean officer corps 
meant that on withdrawal, the re-socialising effect of IMATT’s institutional 
reform of the RSLAF was partial rather than total, and the RSLAF’s old neo-
patrimonial culture began to re-assert itself. 
This resulted in partial normative change in the RSLAF at best, calling 
into question its long-term durability once IMATT was replaced by ISAT. 
Simultaneously, it highlights the importance of profound institutional change to 
remaking organisational culture – and the centrality of external actors in 
effecting such contested reforms. Anecdotally, the comparable experience of 
Western-led reform of the SLP is insightful here. Like the RSLAF, the SLP also 
underwent an institutional rejuvenation, which included police station and 
barracks rebuilding, rank restructuring, and a retraining programme called ‘Back 
to Basics’.33 This was supported by police mentors, first from the 
Commonwealth Police Development Task Force, and subsequently from the 
Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project. GOSL also appointed 
a senior British police officer as Inspector-General, Keith Biddle, with executive 
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powers to command the force. As Charley and M’Cormack noted, Biddle used a 
generational mechanism of change to address the neo-patrimonial and 
predatory norms of the SLP.34 
Just as with IMATT’s experience in the RSLAF, Biddle found that ‘the 
senior officers in place would not be able to take things forward and certainly 
wouldn't allow anything to change because they had their hands in the honey 
jar’.35 Consequently, Biddle identified a cohort of middle-ranking SLP officers 
who could be groomed for senior command and would promote out older 
officers, whose behaviours he considered to be an impediment to change: 
‘what I was really trying to do was to capacitate a team of 20 or 30 people who 
could manage the force for the next 10, 15 years; this generational thing…I had a 
top triangle of about 50 to 100, who were the people who in a reasonable amount of 
time would be fit for promotion to higher ranks, then I had a bottom tier of the 
triangle, who were people who were showing glimpses of potential which would 
enable them to advance up the triangle.’36 
As part of this succession planning, British police mentors also arranged for up-
and-coming SLP commanders to receive extensive re-training in the UK at the 
Police Staff College at Bramshill.37 As with elements of Plan 2010, Biddle found 
that this process of normative generational change was contested by some SLP 
officers: 
‘A lot of the ones who wanted to cause you the most trouble had been the ones 
who’d been the most corrupt. Quickly spotted that. So you had to deal with them. 
The minute they passed the retirement age you retired them, with full benefits, 
and they went. And to give the younger, keener, more forward-thinking generation 
the space to go, because if you allow these people to stay at the top, they 
eventually become a cork in a bottle of champagne, so bubbles can’t get out. So 
you’ve got to ensure they’ve got a changeover of staff, and you don’t allow people 
to cork the bottle for their own gains or their own reasons, and stop progress.’38 
This led to some notable advances in SLP capabilities. One prominent example 
was the creation of the Families Support Unit – championed by one of the SLP’s 
new cohort of leaders, Assistant Inspector General Kadi Fakondo – another, the 
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newly-formed Complaints, Discipline and Internal Investigation Department.39 
Such innovations heralded a more normative approach to policing, which 
included the introduction of community-based policing structures,40 police 
primacy, and the demilitarisation of standard SLP training.41 As in the RSLAF, 
these reforms did not simply result in organisational change, but according to 
Fakondo, ‘actually changed the mindset of the police officers that are in the 
SLP’.42 
However, the institutional aspects of reform were less prominent in the 
SLP than in the RSLAF, resulting largely in leadership change without 
accompanying intra-service competition over cultural norms. It therefore 
produced little immediate normative change in the SLP at the tactical level. 
Although Biddle was able to assemble a team of reform-minded senior officers 
as a succession plan to sustain the reform of the SLP, these officers were hand-
picked and many had been accelerated through the ranks into senior 
appointments. Consequently, while there was a cadre of reform-minded senior 
commanders, they did not represent a wider cohort of normatively re-socialised 
SLP officers. Indeed, the attitudes and behaviours of many of the junior officers 
underneath this senior tier remained unchanged, as Fakondo recalled: 
‘when the restructuring of the SLP came [it was as if] we (all SLP officers) were all 
standing on the platform…There were those of us who were ready to jump on board 
this [restructuring] train. There were those standing in the middle very confused – 
should I get on the train or not, what benefit am I going to get from this? And then 
there was a third group – I do not want change. I’m not going to get on board this 
train. So we had this task of actually working hard to convince others to come on 
board’.43 
As the UN Police Chief of Staff in Sierra Leone in 2008, Vincent Dzakpata, later 
observed, this led to long-term difficulties in sustaining reforms in the SLP: 
‘you see a very big change in the attitude of the AIGs (Assistant Inspector-General 
of Police), the Deputy Inspector-General of Police and the Inspector-General of 
Police…But the major problem is the middle level management, which is a big 
problem for executive management now…without the support of the middle level, 
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the divisional commanders…they have problems, they have big problems with 
these people.’44 
The more vertical generational and intra-service dynamics produced by 
IMATT’s institutional socialisation thus offered some significant advantages for 
reforming RSLAF organisational culture, in comparison to the leadership-
focused model of generational replacement adopted in the SLP. 
Equally, SLP reform was initially facilitated by political support, akin to 
IMATT’s use of civil-military influence to enforce institutional reform. When 
Biddle left office in 2003, Brima Acha Kamara was appointed IG by the SLPP 
government on Biddle’s recommendation, despite his alignment to the APC. As 
one of Biddle’s new cohort, Kamara proved a reformist officer who continued 
Biddle’s professionalising drive. International advisers hoped that the 
establishment of an Executive Management Board to run the SLP would help 
sustain these reforms, by preventing undue political interference on 
commanders, insofar as collective responsibility for the management of the SLP 
helped insulate individual senior officers from political pressure.45 However, 
international attention shifted away from the institutional dimensions of SLP 
reform following the introduction of DFID’s Justice Sector Development 
Programme in 2005, which was intended to be led by GOSL.46 Concerns were 
subsequently raised that the SLP was increasingly unable to resist neo-
patrimonial political interference, particularly after the change of government in 
2007.47 One Sierra Leonean NGO member working with the National Electoral 
Commission during elections in 2007 and 2008 observed, for example, that ‘the 
police…are afraid of losing their jobs because some of the appointments are 
political appointments…[In Kono] They will tell you that “Man, make an arrest 
and someone from Freetown will just call and release that person.”’48  
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Thus, the limitations of SLP reform were equally the product of political 
interference in the institutional processes of the SLP, which in the absence of 
significant international oversight, proved more pernicious than beneficial. This 
was typified by the police component of the Presidential Guard, which was 
manned jointly by police officers from the OSD and RSLAF soldiers. During the 
2007 election cycle, both the SLPP and APC hired former wartime combatants 
to provide personal security for their candidates, contributing significantly to the 
violence during those elections. The SLPP hired Tom Nyuma, a former SLA 
lieutenant colonel who had been involved in the NPRC coup, while the APC 
hired Idrissa ‘Letherboot’ Kamara. Kamara was also a former “sobel”, first a 
member of the AFRC and subsequently an RUF deputy minister. During the 
elections, Kamara acted as Koroma’s personal bodyguard, and was involved in 
a brief skirmish with Nyuma at a hotel in Bo, at which it was alleged Nyuma 
attempted to assassinate Koroma and was himself wounded.49 After Koroma 
was elected to the Presidency, Kamara was appointed to the Presidential Guard 
close protection team, and given senior rank in the SLP. This caused significant 
consternation in the SLP, which proved unable to resist the appointment.50 It 
also caused concern in IMATT, as in Brigadier Cholerton’s view, ‘there was a 
degree of unofficial-ness around some of these people doing presidential 
guard…[a] whiff of, a sort of, private army about them, which didn’t look good’.51  
To an extent, the RSLAF was insulated from such overtly political 
appointments because of the continued international oversight IMATT provided, 
which remained far more substantial than the international presence in the SLP. 
Undoubtedly though, the fate of the SLP also underlines the fragility of 
contested normative change, which is highly reliant on either conducive political 
conditions or the presence of external reformers for a prolonged (in fact, 
generational) period of time. In both the RSLAF and the SLP, this proved far 
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longer than the UK was willing to remain, raising fundamental questions about 
the ambitions of the reform agendas undertaken.  
To a certain extent, similar criticisms can be levelled at IMATT’s reform 
mechanisms in the RSLAF, which, relying to a significant extent on civil-military 
influence to enact IMATT’s chosen changes, had little reciprocal impact on the 
quality of Sierra Leonean political oversight. Indeed, Sierra Leone’s political 
culture remained tenuously democratic at best throughout IMATT’s existence. 
Voting patterns in both the 2007 and 2012 presidential elections remained 
decidedly regional and ethnic, and politicians of all hues appear to have 
attempted to garner electoral support along neo-patrimonial rather than policy 
lines. Moreover, both elections were marred by violence and public disorder, 
including extensive use of political paramilitaries composed of former wartime 
militiamen.52 Although formally supportive of SSR as a concept, Sierra Leonean 
political elites continued to approach the RSLAF in a broadly neo-patrimonial 
ways – with increasing success as IMATT’s influence diminished. Even in 
technical terms, the architecture of civil-military relations put in place by British-
led SSR was most lacking with regard to the democratic oversight mechanisms 
exercised by civilian politicians. In 2008, for instance, Osman Gbla, then the 
Dean of the faculty of Social Science and Law for Fourah Bay College, 
University of Sierra Leone, concluded that civilian oversight of the security 
sector in Sierra Leone still needed ‘very serious attention’: 
‘how do we get civil society to ensure the security forces to be accountable and 
transparent? How do we get Parliament to ensure that funds given to the security 
forces are being used judiciously? How do we get them to account? That aspect is 
a challenge.’53  
By the time Colonel Martin took command of IMATT, the parliamentary 
oversight committee on defence had not sat for some considerable time. Martin 
concluded that, 
‘so long as the political architecture above them remains steady, the armed forces 
below will remain steady. If the political architecture above them starts unravelling, 
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in other words if the democratic system is undermined…then I’m not sure how long 
the armed forces can hold up’.54 
Although SSR as a concept was only originally intended to reshape security 
forces in line with wider democratisation, the potential vulnerability of the 
RSLAF to political subversion despite the presence of a proto-democratic 
system highlights the fragility of liberal peacebuilding endeavours. At best, 
normative defence reform can only hope to prevent military subversion of 
democratic civil-military relations; it cannot prevent political subversion. This 
adds credence to claims made by Bruneau that the most significant impediment 
to normative military change by external interventionists remains the Western 
military inability to address local political circumstances.55 
Yet, as a whole, the RSLAF appears to have retained Western 
behavioural norms to a far greater degree than the SLP, despite the same 
political environment. IMATT’s generational change was significantly 
undermined by the process of British withdrawal, but concurrently, the RSLAF’s 
increasing focus on PSOs prevented the total dismantling of IMATT’s 
institutional reforms, by necessitating a degree of objective military capacity and 
capability reliant on the maintenance of meritocratic rather than political 
processes. Thus, the reciprocal dynamic between effectiveness and (non-
patrimonial, meritocratic) military culture was reinforced by PSO deployments. 
The demand for operational military effectiveness, which in other circumstances 
might have necessitated battlefield adaptation, in Sierra Leone bolstered 
normative institutional reform. Although the RSLMF had deployed troops on 
ECOWAS operations prior to the Rebel War, the RSLAF’s UN-affiliated 
operations appear to have had a far more significant impact on the military.56 
PSO deployments may well have supported the RSLAF’s identity as a 
rejuvenated and more professional military organisation, as Albrecht and 
Haenlein contended,57 but their primary benefit for sustaining democratic civil-
military relations was as a practical bulwark against the neo-patrimonialism 
which had characterised previous RSLMF decay. Here, PSOs proved a 
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uniquely potent mechanism, because they established a degree of external 
oversight over RSLAF internal processes, via UN inspections and pre-
deployment conditions, which even the RSLAF’s “old guard” or political “big 
men” were willing to accept. As one senior IMATT officer involved in preparing 
the RSLAF for PSOs remarked, the deployments helped to institutionalise 
change because failure on PSOs would have been  ‘a public embarrassment, 
both internally in Sierra Leone and externally because of course they were 
deployed.’58  
Indeed, the institutional reform of the RSLAF, by promoting a more 
meritocratic, less patrimonial, and more professional military culture, directly 
supported improvements in RSLAF operational effectiveness. This was seen 
not only in the RSLAF’s PSO deployments, but also in its Ebola response. The 
fact that RSLAF resourcing and equipment levels remained woeful throughout 
the period – requiring significant foreign investment to enable PSO deployments 
– highlights the cultural aspects of this improvement in effectiveness. That PSO 
deployments continued despite IMATT’s withdrawal also suggests that PSOs 
provided a degree of external oversight, maintaining institutional reforms in lieu 
of IMATT’s protecting influence, despite limited political change. In Sierra 
Leone, cultural change in the RSLAF was instituted by external intervention, but 
maintained (albeit imperfectly) because of its functional value. 
Accordingly, by examining the institutional mechanisms of military 
change, this thesis has provided an insight into how military accountability and 
effectiveness relate, without descending into Huntingtonian tautology.59 Armed 
forces are not automatically accountable to civilian government because they 
are “professional” per se; nor because they are either specifically separated or 
particularly supervised by civilian elites. They are subordinate to civilian control 
because they have become inculcated with particular norms of military 
behaviour that inform democratic civil-military relations, and which are 
continually maintained and reinforced through military training, education and 
promotional systems. Civilian involvement in these mechanisms is not 
automatically problematic; indeed, it may indeed be beneficial, providing it 
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reinforces the meritocratic standards required for operational effectiveness. In 
reciprocal fashion, the need to maintain military effectiveness can limit political 
usurpation of the military’s internal norm-shaping career processes. Thus, the 
nature of the military’s career system and the values against which this 
operates is the defining element of both military change and military 
accountability. As shown by this thesis, in the case of exporting democratic civil-
military relations, the exact model of civilian control – be it objective or 
subjective – appears less important than establishing both political and military 
consensus over the functioning of military career mechanisms, and ensuring 
that however this is established, it does not impede military effectiveness. In 
Bruneau’s ‘trinity of money, careers, and culture’,60 it is the reform of the 
institutional dimensions of military career structures which affords the best 
opportunity to change military culture. 
This conclusion partially challenges the dominant narrative of liberal 
intervention, which contends that institutional approaches to instability (like 
SSR) are intrinsically unable to produce the requisite cultural or behavioural 
changes required to succeed, and so fail because they are incompatible with 
pre-existing social and political norms. Instead, it is argued that interventionists 
– if they must intervene at all – should privilege ‘local ownership’ and grass-
roots agency over the institutions of Weberian statehood or else the social 
legitimacy of governance will always prove elusive.61 Accordingly, Krebs argued 
that organisational change in armed forces has little merit, save when it echoes 
pre-existing social and political currents in wider society.62 Yet, the experience 
of IMATT in Sierra Leone suggests that organisational change in military 
institutions can reshape local military cultures, and while this cannot 
fundamentally change local political habits, military habits can nonetheless differ 
from them. As Suhrke has observed, ‘local ownership clearly means “their” 
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ownership of “our” ideas’,63 and IMATT was able to generate significant RSLAF 
ownership of IMATT’s norms through institutional redevelopment and 
socialisation processes, despite the presence of a competing neo-patrimonial 
culture in the RSLAF and in wider society. 
Military Mentoring as a Strategy for Intervention 
To a certain extent, the conceptual approaches to overseas intervention 
advanced by the British military following intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan 
appear somewhat schizophrenic. On the one hand, the British Army has 
produced a new and all-encompassing stabilisation doctrine based on its 
experiences of counter-insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan,64 which has been 
lauded for its ambition and simultaneously criticised for its incoherence.65 On 
the other hand, the British public has increasingly eschewed such large-scale 
projects in liberal intervention. Somewhat unexpectedly, the British Parliament 
rejected the possibility of limited conventional intervention into the Syrian civil 
war in August 2013,66 and subsequent British military efforts there and in 
northern Iraq have been confined to Special Forces operations, aerial support 
and “train and equip” capacity building. This shift away from liberal 
peacebuilding and its state- and nation-building corollaries towards “upstream 
capacity building” was signalled by the British Government’s 2011 ‘Building 
Stability Overseas Strategy’ (BSOS) and its military component, the 2013 
‘International Defence Engagement Strategy’ (IDES),67 but has manifested itself 
in proxy-based solutions to securing domestic political preferences overseas.68  
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The process of IMATT withdrawal apparently matched this trend in British 
policy. But unlike subsequent tactically-focused military capacity building, the 
locus of British military engagement moved up the RSLAF’s chain of command 
as IMATT drew-down. As Brigadier Cholerton, who commanded IMATT in 2007, 
later explained: 
‘we were able to influence them [the RSLAF] to become democratically accountable 
because of the great relationship that we had with them…and [so] we were able to 
operate at the strategic level and the operational level with those who were 
influencers of that decision. To be operationally effective you’ve got to work at a 
much lower level which requires much larger numbers. So it’s probably easier to 
work with less numbers at the strategic-operational level to influence the decision 
makers to become democratically accountable, rather than working in these huge 
numbers at the tactical level – training, embedding with them, mentoring, advising. 
It would be ideal to both, but its resource driven and there were other priorities for 
UK at the time.’69 
Lieutenant Colonel Edkins, a British officer serving as ISAT was established, 
similarly characterised IMATT’s eventual focus on top-down engagement with 
the RSLAF as a product of limited British resources, alongside the need to 
harness political support to maintain change: 
‘With IMATT, there was initially an unwritten assumption that the end-state would 
be a normal training mission, a BMATT. Success was not having IMATT, but a 
standard BMATT, which would have meant that we maintained a bottom-up 
approach. 
The idea of focusing top-down was a bit of a no-brainer after Afghanistan and Iraq. 
There was recognition that with fewer resources, you had a choice of sustaining a 
training base or…influence at the strategic level – you could not do both… 
If I have to make a choice between top-down or bottom-up, I would choose top-
down, because without political buy-in, and the resources that go with it, you are not 
addressing long-term problems. Unless you do that, the minute you take away 
support it will all fall over; if the politicians do not see it as important, then it doesn’t 
matter how good the soldiers are.’70 
Therefore, the implicit assumption behind IMATT’s approach as it drew down 
was that to ensure normative change in the RSLAF, IMATT and ISAT must 
work from the strategic and political level down through the RSLAF as an 
institution. Had the objective been simply to improve the RSLAF’s tactical 
capabilities, a wider training mission focusing on tactical mentoring would have 
been more appropriate – but as IMATT’s size and resources diminished, it could 
not simultaneously carry out both. 
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Yet, as this thesis has shown, the implicit assumption that defence 
engagement intended to improve local military effectiveness can be primarily 
conducted through tactical mentoring alone is not supported by the relationship 
between military cultural change and military effectiveness seen in the RSLAF. 
The Sierra Leonean experience suggests that tactical capacity building is an 
unlikely mechanism for external interventionists to produce profound military 
transformation in foreign armed forces, particularly in those developing in a neo-
patrimonial political climate. As British “train and equip” capacity building 
programmes during the Rebel War demonstrate, external interventionists can 
support local military adaptation to a limited degree. But in Sierra Leone, these 
programmes failed to radically improve RSLAF military effectiveness, because, 
lacking strong and coherent institutional components, they were unable to 
influence the organisational culture of the SLAF, which was itself a significant 
impediment to improved combat performance. The cultural norms of RSLAF 
behaviour were only really challenged once IMATT began to use institutional 
reform to re-socialise the RSLAF officer corps through training and education, 
but also through career incentives like promotion contingent on normative 
behaviour. 
This raises questions about the utility of mentoring as a primary means of 
implementing externally-desired change. In his examination of Western 
mentoring in the Afghan state administration, Rosén concluded that as a 
strategy for implementing change, mentoring reflected the core principles of 
neo-liberal governmentality. Informed by New Public Management ideas, Rosén 
described mentoring as ‘an activity that aims at correcting behavioural nuances’ 
by steering ‘free individuals into common action without restraining their 
freedom by laws and regulations’. As such, Rosén found that mentoring, in 
principle, rejected bureaucratic institutional mechanisms ‘by elevating individual 
subjectivity as the key reform area, and decentralising the creation of reform 
plans to its most radical site – the individual.’71 IMATT certainly did engage in 
mentoring as a personal development activity for RSLAF officers. Brigadier 
Cholerton, for example, described how: 
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‘if you want a result you had to do more yourself, if you wanted to try and educate 
and allow them to make mistakes and have failures you sort of backed off…it was 
always a constant sort of balancing act of how much you get engaged, how much 
you pull back, how much you allow failure to happen.’72 
Yet, contrary to Rosén’s description of (largely unsuccessful) mentoring in 
Afghanistan, the highly political and contested nature of reform in the RSLAF 
highlights the importance of institutional processes in shaping mentee’s 
behaviour. Indeed, because normative change directly challenged the vested 
patrimonial interests of many senior RSLAF commanders, implementing change 
in Sierra Leone was sometimes entirely contingent upon highly coercive political 
leverage – including the dismissal of “spoilers” and the marginalisation of 
recalcitrant or ineffective individuals. This experience is at odds with Rosén’s 
vision of mentoring as ‘“soft” governance’. While “friends of IMATT” may well 
have benefitted from a collegiate approach to personal development, “spoilers” 
were either marginalised or coerced into change through the manipulation of 
institutional processes – and it was these institutional processes which 
ultimately proved essential to changing the RSLAF’s organisational culture. 
This thesis has demonstrated that military culture affects the character 
and form of military change, but equally, through institutional processes of 
socialisation, military change can in time reshape military culture. The 
relationship between organisational culture and institutional processes is 
reciprocal, and in consequence, external interventionists may enduringly 
change local military practices to improve both effectiveness and civil-military 
relations, providing they are able to reshape the socialising aspects of the 
military institution. In Sierra Leone, change in the RSLAF was driven externally 
by IMATT using civil-military pressure to push through institutional changes, 
which in turn would be cemented through intra-service rivalry and a structured 
process of generational replacement. Ultimately, IMATT withdrew before their 
new norms were widely accepted in the RSLAF, resulting in only a partial 
improvement in military effectiveness and Sierra Leonean civil-military relations. 
Nonetheless, the reciprocal relationship between institutional change and 
organisational culture seen in IMATT’s reform of the RSLAF demonstrates that 
external interventionists can effectively build other peoples’ armies. 
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